Foul play: Fake FIFA websites target soccer fans looking for World Cup tickets, merchandise
Watch out for bogus World Cup websites that mimic official ticket and merchandise flows to steal money and personal data
WeLiveSecurity – Read More
Watch out for bogus World Cup websites that mimic official ticket and merchandise flows to steal money and personal data
WeLiveSecurity – Read More
Imagine handing your smartphone over for repair. A couple of days later, you pick it up — and great, it’s working again! But you won’t even realize that your device has been injected with malicious code, allowing attackers to access your smartphone even when it’s locked.
This is the beginning of the story shared by Kaspersky ICS CERT researchers, Alexander Kozlov and Sergey Anufrienko, at the Black Hat Asia 2026 conference. They managed to uncover a vulnerability that flips conventional assumptions about smartphone and IoT security on their head. Its core lies at the very heart of Qualcomm chips.
To grasp the severity of this discovery, we first need to look at how a modern device powered by a Qualcomm chip boots up. Think of it as a fortress with multiple layers of security. Each subsequent layer verifies the pass issued by the previous one. The bedrock foundation — the most trusted layer of them all — is the BootROM, a read-only memory baked directly into the silicon that can’t be modified once it comes off the fab.
The BootROM is the very first thing to run when a device powers on. It verifies the signature of the next bootloader, which in turn verifies the next, building a chain of trust all the way up to the operating system. If an attacker can compromise this chain at the BootROM level, it’s game over: the malicious code will execute before the main operating system even has a chance to load.
This is exactly what attackers can do by exploiting the CVE-2026-25262 vulnerability discovered by Kaspersky ICS CERT researchers.
The research began with a protocol called Sahara. This is a component of Emergency Download Mode (EDL). Manufacturers and service centers use it to revive bricked devices: the phone is connected to a computer via USB, and a special utility program signed by the manufacturer (in this case, Qualcomm) is uploaded to it.
Sahara is implemented directly within the ARM PBL (Primary Boot Loader) — the BootROM itself. This means the protocol runs before any operating system boots, before any user access privileges are checked, and before any security controls are activated. The device simply waits for a USB connection, ready to accept data.
The communication scheme looks simple: the device sends a handshake (HELLO) to the computer, the computer selects the mode, a cycle begins to upload the utility program in chunks, and finally, the device executes the uploaded code. And it was within the verification logic of these very file chunks that the vulnerability was identified.
In technical terms, the bug introduced by the developers is classified as CWE-123: Write-What-Where Condition. This is about as bad as it gets when it comes to flaws in low-level programming. An attacker can write arbitrary data to an arbitrary address in the device memory.
Without diving too deep into the technical weeds, suffice it to say that by exploiting the discovered vulnerability, attackers can gain access to any data on the device, including user-entered passwords, files, contacts, geolocation data, as well as the hardware sensors like the camera and microphone. In certain scenarios, complete control over the device is possible. Just a few minutes of physical access to the device via a cable connection, and the gadget has been compromised. This creates a risk if you hand your smartphone over to a repair shop, pass it to someone else to set up and install apps on, or just leave it unattended.
The CVE-2026-25262 vulnerability affects the following Qualcomm chip series: MDM9x07, MDM9x45, MDM9x65, MSM8909, MSM8916, MSM8952, and SDX50 — every single version released to date, until the vulnerability is patched by the manufacturer.
These are no obsolete museum pieces. The MDM9207, which we used for the bulk of our research, is integrated into modem modules for the internet of things (IoT), industrial equipment, smart home devices, healthcare monitoring systems, logistics trackers, and banking terminals. The MSM8916 powers many budget smartphones, while the SDX50 is used in automotive control units.
The catch is that the attacker needs physical access to the device to pull this off. In the real world, this translates to:
With just a few minutes of physical access to the device an attacker can plant a backdoor so deep inside that standard research tools won’t even detect it in most cases.
Qualcomm was notified of the discovery in March 2025 and confirmed the vulnerability in its chips. To identify it, the vendor reserved CVE-2026-25262, and on April 20, 2026, Kaspersky ICS CERT published technical information on the vulnerability and recommendations for users.
Qualcomm included this vulnerability in its May security bulletin. While fixing already-made devices is fundamentally impossible, the company promised to make all future chips without this vulnerability.
If you currently own a device with an affected chip, use our recommendations below to help mitigate the risk of infection.
If you notice that your gadget with a vulnerable Qualcomm chip starts acting up — overheating when idle, reporting unexpected spikes in network traffic, or exhibiting strange app behavior — you may have fallen victim to this vulnerability. You can wipe the malicious code and reset your device to its baseline state simply by completely cutting its power. This means either pulling the battery or letting it drain all the way to zero until the gadget shuts down entirely. In this case, the malicious code will most likely not persist on the device — during our research, we were unable to confirm that it could achieve persistence in non-volatile memory.
Want to learn more about severe vulnerabilities in Android phones? Check out these posts:
Kaspersky official blog – Read More

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter.
“It takes very little to govern good people. Very little. And bad people can’t be governed at all. Or if they could, I never heard of it.” ― Cormac McCarthy, No Country for Old Men
Most of my career has been built on dichotomy: striving to be a supportive teammate while also pushing every boundary in front of me. I’ve often been told to “never do X, only do Y,” but I’ve invariably chosen to do X anyway (even when fraught with peril) to get to the deeper answer. For years, I was told that I should perform in certain ways — instead of in ways that made sense for my brain and way of learning.
I wasn’t governable, but I wasn’t bad. Just … challenging. While Sheriff Ed Tom Bell’s view of good vs. bad is compelling, maybe our careers should be defined as “acquiescent” vs. “challenging.” It’s less of an existential crisis that way.
Over the past few years, I’ve been enjoying the mentoring aspect of my career. One of the things that I love to share with people is that being ungovernable is very challenging early in career; it’snot a favorite of middle management, but it can take you to places that you really want to be (i.e., Talos). The road is going to be longer and much bumpier than your governable cohort, but this is the long con.
The path to Talos was long and arduous, but I’ve learned to make my career choices through the lens of the axiom, “If you’re the smartest person in the room, you’re in the wrong room.” It’s been the only guidepost I’ve needed. I don’t know that it applies to everyone, because everyone is unique, but it absolutely helps me decide what I want to learn, what I want to dive into, who I want to surround myself with.
The secret lies in the last comment — it’s the people. If you continue to search for the smartest people in the room, you’ll find it and when you do, you’ll find that you aren’t ungovernable — rather, you’re understood. Be ungovernable (but kind) in the short term, find new ways to solve problems, think around solutions in new ways, program in different languages, and be the person in the meeting that says, “I think we should do Y instead, and here’s why.”
I suspect that this is the same approach many of you already take in your daily roles when identifying threats vs. benign activity, choosing your pivots in hunting, or deciding the priorities in device replacement. It’s a natural direction for the intellectually curious, so be kind, but ungovernable.
“The future of intelligence must be about search, while the future of ignorance must be about the inability to evaluate information.” ― Patricia Lockwood, No One Is Talking About This
Cisco Talos has recently discovered a commodity BadIIS malware variant fueling a thriving malware-as-a-service (MaaS) ecosystem for Chinese-speaking cybercrime groups. Identifiable by its embedded “demo.pdb” strings, this toolset boasts a multi-year development cycle complete with builder tools and persistence mechanisms. Threat actors are leveraging this robust framework to easily execute malicious search engine optimization (SEO) fraud, hijack server content, and redirect traffic to illicit sites.
This is a highly active, commercially driven malware ecosystem. The author constantly pushes rapid updates to introduce new features and actively evade specific security vendors, making it a persistent headache for defenders. Because this BadIISvariant is sold as a commodity tool, it lowers the barrier to entry for cybercriminals, leading to widespread attacks that silently hijack server traffic without triggering obvious alarms.
Defenders should actively monitor IIS environments for unauthorized traffic redirection, unexpected reverse proxying, or sudden spikes in “503 Service Unavailable” errors. Threat hunting efforts should also target the distinct “demo.pdb” strings and associated Chinese-language folder paths within IIS binaries. Ensure your endpoint detection solutions are updated to catch these reactive evasion tactics, and read the full blog for complete coverage and indicators of compromise (IOCs).
CISA exposes secrets, credentials in “private” repo
A researcher discovered a public GitHub repository belonging to CISA that contained 844MB of sensitive data, including plain-text passwords, authentication tokens, and other secrets. (Dark Reading)
NYC Health + Hospitals says hackers stole medical data and fingerprints, affecting at least 1.8 million people
The breach is particularly sensitive because hackers stole biometric information, including fingerprints and palm prints, which affected individuals have for life and cannot replace. (TechCrunch)
Bug bounty businesses bombarded with AI slop
Companies that pay hackers to find flaws in their software are being inundated with low-quality (often false) reports generated by AI, forcing some to suspend the programs altogether. (Ars Technica)
Four OpenClaw flaws enable data theft, privilege escalation, and persistence
The vulnerabilities, collectively dubbed Claw Chain, can permit an attacker to establish a foothold, expose sensitive data, and plant backdoors. (The Hacker News)
New NGINX vulnerability allows remote attackers to trigger malicious code
A new vulnerability in NGINX JavaScript (njs) allows unauthenticated remote attackers to trigger a heap‑based buffer overflow that can lead to denial‑of‑service and, in some conditions, remote code execution in the NGINX worker process. (Cyber Security News)
TP-Link, Photoshop, OpenVPN, Norton VPN vulnerabilities
Talos’ Vulnerability Discovery & Research team recently disclosed eight vulnerabilities in TP-Link, and one each in Adobe Photoshop, OpenVPN, and Gen Digital’s Norton VPN. The vulnerabilities have been patched by their respective vendors.
Webinar: AI found the problem. Now what?
Experts from Talos and Cisco Security will examine how AI is changing the game for both defenders and well-resourced adversaries, and why the most persistent risks often remain rooted in unpatched legacy systems.
Breaking things to keep them safe with Philippe Laulheret
From his memorable experiment using a green onion to bypass a biometric fingerprint reader to his experience on the frontlines of cybersecurity, Philippe shares the journey that led him to vulnerability research.
SHA256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507
Example Filename: VID001.exe
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201**
SHA256: d87e8d9d43758ce67a8052cb2334b99cc24f9b0437ee44815f360be0b22d835a
MD5: 362498c3e71eeaa066a67e4a3f981d1c
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=d87e8d9d43758ce67a8052cb2334b99cc24f9b0437ee44815f360be0b22d835a
Example Filename: TunMirror.exe
Detection Name: PUA.Win.Tool.Tunmirror::1201
SHA256: 9896a6fcb9bb5ac1ec5297b4a65be3f647589adf7c37b45f3f7466decd6a4a7f
MD5: 38de5b216c33833af710e88f7f64fc98
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=9896a6fcb9bb5ac1ec5297b4a65be3f647589adf7c37b45f3f7466decd6a4a7f
Example Filename: SECOH-QAD.exe
Detection Name: Win.Tool.Procpatcher::1201
SHA256: acd55c44b8b0d66d66defed85ca18082c092f048d3621da827fce593305c11fd
MD5: 0f03f72a92aef6d63eb74e73f8ac201d
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=acd55c44b8b0d66d66defed85ca18082c092f048d3621da827fce593305c11fd
Example Filename: KMSSS.exe
Detection Name: PUA.Win.Tool.Hackkms::1201
SHA256: 96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974
MD5: aac3165ece2959f39ff98334618d10d9
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974
Example Filename: d4aa3e7010220ad1b458fac17039c274_63_Exe.exe
Detection Name: W32.Injector:Gen.21ie.1201
Cisco Talos Blog – Read More
ESET researchers describe new tools and techniques that the Webworm APT group recently added to its arsenal
WeLiveSecurity – Read More
We’ve written time and again about how QR codes are used in phishing schemes. Our secure email gateway solution even includes technology to read these codes — not just from emails, but also from attachments — and check the embedded links. Yet, attackers haven’t given up on trying to send QR codes to their victims. Lately, we’ve increasingly seen them use ASCII art for this purpose — images composed of characters. This seems particularly ironic considering that phishers once tried to evade link scanning by hiding links in images, and now they’re trying to dodge image scanning by going back to text. But with a few twists.
It’s hard to believe today, but there was a time when computers couldn’t display graphics. Consequently, the very first computer images were constructed from text characters. Following the adoption of the standard in 1963, characters from the ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange) set were used for this type of artwork to ensure that images looked the same across different computers. Over time, other text symbols (for example, from the extended Unicode set) began to be used to create images, but the name “ASCII graphics” remained the term used to describe this art form as a whole. There were serious artists working in this medium, the earliest websites were designed with ASCII art, and even the first computer pornography was rendered with text characters.
As image display technology evolved, ASCII art began to fall out of fashion. It saw a major resurgence in the 2000s during the heyday of email spam. Back then, spammers primarily used it because it allowed them to disguise blatant spam keywords that could trigger mail filters, while also placing less load on mail servers than images. Additionally, since many users paid for volume of internet traffic at the time, they often disabled image loading in their email clients. Naturally, at that time, we augmented our email security solutions with technology specifically designed to block ASCII art.
Now, ASCII art has been rediscovered — this time by those looking to bypass technology that recognizes QR codes within images.
Here’s a recent example. The pretext itself is pretty run-of-the-mill: someone has supposedly sent to victim a confidential document via DocuSign, but to open it the recipient needs to scan the QR code in the email to visit a website and enter corporate login credentials.
A QR code rendered with unicode characters. We’ve blurred out a portion of the code to prevent the malicious link from being scanned.
Admittedly, the code looks weird. This is primarily because it’s drawn piece-by-piece in pseudo-graphic elements, and even the gaps between the lines can be seen. In reality, there’s no actual image in the e-mail message code; the QR code looks something like this behind the scenes:
As a result, link scanners can’t see the link, and image analysis tools can’t find the URL hidden inside the QR code, so the attackers assume the phishing email is going to reach the victim just fine. Spoiler alert: no, we haven’t forgotten how to block ASCII art.
In theory, there are situations where using a QR code makes sense. It’s a fairly convenient way to share contacts, a link to a mobile app, a map location, or a configuration. In other words, it works well whenever information needs to be delivered specifically to the recipient’s mobile device.
However, someone using a QR code to make you enter corporate credentials on a mobile device is an instant red flag. And when that QR code is generated with ASCII art, it’s clearly a phishing attempt or an effort to lure you to a malicious URL. This trick can only have one purpose — an attempt to bypass security controls.
To prevent phishing emails — whether containing ASCII art or not — from ever reaching employee inboxes, we recommend using a secure email gateway with advanced anti-phishing capabilities. As an additional layer of defense, install security solutions on all endpoints used to access the internet.
Additionally, we recommend regular security awareness training to educate employees on modern phishing tactics. Specifically, to explain that ASCII art in modern emails can be a telltale sign of an attempted phishing attack.
Kaspersky official blog – Read More
Netflix, Apple TV+, Disney+, Hulu, Amazon Prime, YouTube Premium… The average law-abiding family today pays for five to 10 subscriptions just to watch their shows of choice, with the monthly bill easily crossing the hundred-dollar mark. It’s no surprise, then, that social media and online marketplaces are seeing a surge in demand for the “magic boxes” that popped up at the end of 2025: Android-powered TV boxes that promise to unlock thousands of channels and every streaming service subscription-free for a one-time purchase.
Ads for these devices are flooding TikTok and Instagram: smiling influencers unbox the SuperBoxes, plug them into a TV, and browse endlessly through channels. It looks like the ultimate life hack against subscription fatigue, right? In reality, it’s one of the easiest ways to invite a botnet into your home network.
A promotional video on TikTok explaining how great it is when the cheese is free you can just go ahead and cancel all your subscriptions
Stories about malicious TV boxes have surfaced before, but right now, their marketing has reached a truly alarming scale.
At the end of 2025, analysts examined several models of the popular SuperBox device available from major retail stores and online marketplaces. The findings were deeply concerning: immediately upon powering up, the devices began pinging the servers of the Chinese messaging app Tencent QQ, as well as the Grass proxy service — effectively renting out the owner’s internet bandwidth to third parties.
Inside the firmware, researchers discovered applications completely uncharacteristic of a media player: a network scanner, a traffic analyzer, and tools for DNS hijacking. Consequently, the device not only streams pirated content but also scans the local network for other targets (including industrial SCADA interfaces), and stands ready to participate in DDoS attacks. The SuperBoxes were also found to contain folders with the telltale name “secondstage”, a textbook indication of multi-stage malware.
More recently, in April 2026, the Darknet Diaries podcast featured an interview with a security researcher known by the alias D3ada55, who shared plenty of intriguing details about these boxes — including the fact that they were still openly sold on major platforms like Amazon, Walmart, and Best Buy.
The SuperBox case is far from the only instance where Android devices have been turned into botnet nodes — or sold infected right out of the box. Here’s a look at the most recent cases:
All of these stories share the same origin: the Triada Trojan, first documented by our researchers back in 2016 and dubbed at the time “one of the most advanced mobile Trojans”. Over the past decade it has evolved from a standard piece of malware into a modular backdoor baked directly into firmware during manufacturing.
Manufacturers of cheap TV boxes cut corners on absolutely everything: Google Play Protect certification, firmware audits, and security updates. Many of these devices run on the Android Open Source Project without any security guarantees whatsoever. Somewhere along the supply chain — whether at the factory, through a middleman, or at a distributor — a backdoor gets injected into the firmware image. Our experts suspect that the manufacturer itself might not even be aware of the compromise.
The sheer scale of the infection turns millions of identical boxes into the perfect foundation for a botnet: every compromised device represents a unique IP address that can be rented out to anyone. Botnet operators like Kimwolf monetize this not only through distributed DDoS attacks but also by reselling the bandwidth of infected smart TVs and streaming boxes.
An infected TV box sits right in your living room, connected to your home Wi-Fi. That means it can see smartphones running banking apps, network-attached storage (NAS) units holding family archives, IP cameras, smart locks, work laptops, and any other the devices connected to your Wi-Fi network.
With this kind of beachhead inside your home network, an attacker can intercept unencrypted traffic, spoof DNS requests, scan ports, and hunt for vulnerabilities on neighboring devices. On top of that, they can use your IP address for fraudulent activity. As a result, in the best-case scenario, your IP will end up blacklisted, and legitimate services will start blocking you for suspicious activity; in the worst-case scenario, law enforcement could come knocking on your door.
You should be on alert if a device:
Want to know how else to protect your smart home devices? Read more in our related posts:
Kaspersky official blog – Read More
A complete decoupling from US technology is neither realistic nor necessary, but the changing environment does require nations and companies to reassess their relationships and dependencies
WeLiveSecurity – Read More

Cisco Talos’ Vulnerability Discovery & Research team recently disclosed eight vulnerabilities in TP-Link, and one each in Adobe Photoshop, OpenVPN, and Gen Digital’s Norton VPN.
The vulnerabilities mentioned in this blog post have been patched by their respective vendors, in adherence to Cisco’s third-party vulnerability disclosure policy, except the Norton VPN vulnerability, which was discovered in-use before a patch was available.
For Snort coverage that can detect the exploitation of these vulnerabilities, download the latest rule sets from Snort.org, and our latest Vulnerability Advisories are always posted on Talos Intelligence’s website.
Discovered by Lilith >_> of Cisco Talos.
The TP-Link Archer AX53 is a dual band gigabit Wi-Fi router. Talos has disclosed eight vulnerabilities, as follows:
TALOS-2025-2302 (CVE-2026-30814) is a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the tmpServer opcode 0x436 functionality of Tp-Link AX53 v1.0 1.3.1 Build 20241120 rel.54901(5553). A specially crafted set of network packets can lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker can send packets to trigger this vulnerability.
TALOS-2025-2303 (CVE-2026-30815) is an OS command injection vulnerability in the OpenVPN configuration restore script_security functionality of Tp-Link Archer AX53 v1.0 1.3.1 Build 20241120 rel.54901(5553). A specially crafted configuration value can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can upload a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.
TALOS-2025-2304 (CVE-2026-30816) is an external config control vulnerability in the OpenVPN configuration restore crt.sed functionality of Tp-Link Archer AX53 v1.0 1.3.1 Build 20241120 rel.54901(5553). A specially crafted configuration value can lead to arbitrary file reading. An attacker can upload a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.
TALOS-2025-2305 (CVE-2026-30817) is an external config control vulnerability in the OpenVPN configuration restore route_up functionality of Tp-Link Archer AX53 v1.0 1.3.1 Build 20241120 rel.54901(5553). A specially crafted configuration value can lead to arbitrary file reading. An attacker can upload a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.
TALOS-2025-2306 (CVE-2026-30818) is an OS command injection vulnerability exists in the dnsmasq configuration restore dhcpscript functionality of Tp-Link Archer AX53 v1.0 1.3.1 Build 20241120 rel.54901(5553). A specially crafted configuration value can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can upload a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.
TALOS-2025-2307, TALOS-2025-2308, and TALOS-2025-2309 are OS command injection vulnerabilities in the OpenVPN configuration restore client_disconnect, client_connect, and route_up functionalities of Tp-Link Archer AX53 v1.0 1.3.1 Build 20241120 rel.54901(5553). A specially crafted configuration value can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can upload a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.
Discovered by KPC of Cisco Talos.
Adobe Photoshop is a popular digital photo manipulation and illustration program with a wide array of features for personal and business use cases.
TALOS-2025-2274 (CVE-2026-34632) is a privilege escalation vulnerability in the installation process of Adobe Photoshop via the Microsoft Store. The vulnerable version of the installer is Photoshop_Set-Up.exe 2.11.0.30. A low-privilege user can replace files during the installation process, which may result in elevation of privileges.
Discovered by Emma Reuter of Cisco ASIG.
OpenVPN is an open source SSL VPN with remote access, site-to-site VPNs, WiFi security, enterprise load balancing, failover, and granular access control features available.
TALOS-2026-2381 (CVE-2026-35058) is a reachable assertion vulnerability in the TLS Crypt v2 Client Key Extraction functionality of OpenVPN 2.6.x and 2.8_git. A specially crafted network packet can lead to a denial of service. An attacker can send a sequence of malicious packets to trigger this vulnerability.
Discovered by KPC of Cisco Talos.
Gen Digital’s Norton VPN client is a proprietary tool for private proxy network information exchange.
TALOS-2025-2276 (CVE-2025-58074) is a privilege escalation vulnerability in the installation process of Norton VPN via the Microsoft Store. A low-privilege user can replace files during the installation process, which may result in deletion of arbitrary files, possibly leading to elevation of privileges.
Cisco Talos Blog – Read More
While many companies are intentionally rolling out AI to boost quality and efficiency, unsanctioned AI tools are cropping up in corporate environments even faster. Software vendors are baking AI right into products companies already use (think Microsoft Copilot and Google Gemini), while employees are taking matters into their own hands and installing tools on the sly. As a result, businesses are staring down a poorly managed data leak channel: staff paste information from corporate systems into AI chatbots, sending data not just to the SaaS vendor, but straight to the developers behind the underlying AI model. Both the risks and the mitigation strategies vary depending on the type of AI system in play. We break down this broad topic, focusing heavily on tools for spotting and blocking AI at two distinct levels.
Depending on the type of AI in question, managing and blocking its use requires a different playbook. It’s essential to break down AI into four distinct categories:
Every company, depending on its industry, appetite for innovation, and risk tolerance, needs to draw its own line in the sand between recommended, approved case-by-case, and completely banned use cases for specific AI products. Regulated sectors like healthcare play by one set of rules, while retail businesses operate under an entirely different playbook. Either way, after analyzing exactly which AI tools have already slipped into the organization, corporate policies need to be fine-tuned. That’s why the first order of business is employing existing infosec and logging tools to scan corporate infrastructure.
Depending on the chosen strategy, the uncovered AI systems can be:
Spotting AI requires a multi-layered approach, as different detection methods complement each other and work best against specific types of AI.
| Technology | What it can detect |
| DNS | Any AI tool with an identifiable domain |
| Web Gateway or NGFW | Any AI tool with a recognizable request-and-response fingerprint (API endpoint paths, domains, and other indicators). Web filters can inspect traffic content, and many gateways/NGFWs now feature a dedicated category for detecting and blocking generative AI |
| EPP/EDR | Locally deployed LLMs (running via Ollama, LM Studio, and similar shells), native desktop apps for ChatGPT or Claude, agentic browsers, and open-source AI agents. An indirect but strong red flag is the presence of Node.js, Python, Git, Docker, or other containerization tools on machines belonging to non-technical staff |
| Application control | Similar to EPP/EDR, this allows to immediately block unwanted applications right out of the gate |
| Browser control | AI-focused browser extensions and visits to AI-themed websites. This is a lifesaver if the corporate web gateway can’t inspect encrypted traffic |
| SaaS Security Posture Management (SSPM) / Identity Governance | OAuth permissions requested by AI apps and services, as well as any third-party integrations plugging into core productivity hubs (Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, and others) |
Naturally, almost all of these tools allow to do more than just spot AI — they let to block it entirely, or at the very least, sound the alarm for the team in charge.
Popular office AI solutions — especially meeting assistants, email and calendar automation agents, and the like — gain access to corporate data by requesting OAuth permissions directly from communication, document workflow, or video conferencing platforms. If a user has the green light to grant these permissions to third-party apps, the resulting data leaks completely bypass the organization’s perimeter. Tools like EDR and NGFW won’t see a thing when a tool like Read.ai grabs recordings of every single meeting in, say, Microsoft Teams.
The most drastic — and often best — move is to block standard users from granting OAuth consent in the first place. Here’s how to handle the technical heavy lifting (Global Administrator, Application Administrator, or equivalent rights are needed):
In the Microsoft Entra admin center, head over to <em>Identity > Applications > Enterprise apps > Consent and permissions > User consent settings</em>. There <em>User consent for applications</em> can be disabled (check out Microsoft’s full guide).
In the Google Admin console, navigate to <em>Security > Access and data control > API controls</em>. Under <em>Manage App Access</em>, the trust level for all apps can be set: <em>Trusted</em>, <em>Limited</em>, <em>Specific Google data</em>, or <em>Blocked</em>. However, the real kicker here is the <em>Unconfigured app settings</em> subsection, which dictates what happens when a user tries to connect an unknown app. To seal this loophole, select <em>Don’t allow users to access any third-party apps</em>.
A separate subsection, <em>Manage Google Services</em>, permits fine-tuning exactly how third-party apps interact with Google Workspace and Google Cloud services. This allows to cut off access for each individual Google product (see Google’s official guide).
In <em>Setup</em>, use the <em>Quick Find</em> box to search for connected apps, then select <em>Manage Connected Apps</em> from the results. While settings are configured for each external app individually, all users can approve access by default. There isn’t a blanket block switch here; instead, Salesforce allows to opt for <em>Admin approved users are pre-authorized</em> (see the full Salesforce guide on this).
From the <em>Admin</em> settings menu, head to <em>Apps and workflows -> App Management Settings</em>. Tweak the <em>Require approved apps</em> setting by selecting <em>Only allow pre-approved apps</em>. Once that’s locked in, double-check that no rogue AI tools have slipped onto the approved list.
Kaspersky official blog – Read More
Have you ever tried to tally up how much you spend on subscriptions each month? Music, movies, gaming, language courses, delivery services, heated seats, and even the ability to chat with the Grok bot directly from your car — there’s a subscription for just about everything now. There’s even a subscription service specifically designed to… track your other subscriptions.
The number of subscriptions varies significantly depending on where you live, but statistically, 78% of adults worldwide have at least one paid subscription, with the average user juggling 5.6 active services. Furthermore, a large portion of these are family plans used by groups of close relatives… and sometimes other people: 37% of users share their subscriptions outside their immediate family.
Because subscription accounts, especially family plans, often contain sensitive personal data, they’ve become a prime target for cybercriminals. Today we look at how to manage your subscriptions securely, avoid having your accounts compromised, and keep from falling for scammers’ latest tricks.
Why would anyone want to hack your subscription? Even if the service only offers entertainment, your account almost certainly contains sensitive information: your name, address, email, phone number, the names of other members, and other personally identifiable information. This data is then sold on the dark web and used for further attacks.
Attackers compromise subscription accounts either through social engineering and phishing, or by taking advantage of many users’ reliance on weak or leaked passwords. As we recently highlighted in our research, nearly half of all passwords worldwide can be cracked in less than a minute. Scammers then either resell existing subscriptions or slots in a family group at a discount, or they sign the victim up for new services, hoping the extra charges go unnoticed.
Finally, some middlemen don’t bother with hacking at all; they simply buy bulk subscriptions for a large number of devices, where the per-unit cost is typically much lower. They then resell individual slots in these plans on online marketplaces. As a result, a single “family” account can end up filled with people who are complete strangers to one another.
Many subscription owners think nothing of sharing access with family and friends. What could possibly go wrong?
The worst-case scenario from a security standpoint is when a single account is purchased and the owner shares the login and password with other users. This usually happens when people try to save money on a family plan by buying an individual subscription and sharing it. Some services even allow for different profiles, but they are all tied to a single account, meaning the credentials are shared. This is how streaming platforms like Hulu and Disney+ operate.
Sharing one account among multiple people significantly increases the risk of your credentials falling into the wrong hands. There’s no way to guarantee that everyone else is storing those details securely or that their devices aren’t infected with malware. Even without malware, it’s incredibly easy to accidentally hand over a password to attackers simply by signing in to the subscription service over unprotected public Wi-Fi.
It’s entirely possible that the password you kindly shared with some friends has already surfaced in some corner of the dark web, and you may soon lose access to your account. Furthermore, if you reuse the same password across different sites and apps, your other accounts are now in the crosshairs as well.
The second scenario is when each group member has an individual account. Many services now allow you to add extra users to a subscription at no additional cost, and most owners are happy to give away these free slots. Even then, you shouldn’t let your guard down: a breach of just one of these accounts can still leak sensitive information, such as family members’ names, addresses, billing info, and other subscription-related data.
To keep your and your loved ones’ personal data private and your accounts under your control, follow these simple rules.
To do this, learn — and teach your friends and family — how to use password managers, two-factor authentication, or passkeys.
If you and your loved ones rely on memory to store passwords, there’s a high probability that you’re reusing the same one across multiple services. This is a major blunder: data breaches happen all the time, and a single compromised password gives attackers access to your other accounts.
The simplest solution is to use a password manager that generates and remembers complex, unique passwords for every site and service on your behalf. All you have to do is remember the single main password for its encrypted vault. Additionally, Kaspersky Password Manager doesn’t just store and create passwords; it can also check if they’ve appeared in leaked databases, and sync your credentials across all your devices.
Additionally, a password manager provides a robust defense against phishing: unlike a human, who can easily be misled by a sign-in form that looks almost identical to the real thing and is hosted on a look-alike domain, a password manager won’t fall for the trick. It’ll only offer to autofill your saved login and password on the specific site or service for which they were originally stored.
Avoid using browsers to store your passwords: unfortunately, attackers have long figured out how to extract browser-saved passwords in a matter of seconds.
Two-factor authentication (2FA) is an extra layer of verification the system requests after you enter your password — such as an SMS code or a one-time code from an authenticator app. Whenever technically possible, be sure to enable 2FA on every account linked to a subscription. This applies to the subscription services themselves, as well as any third-party accounts you use to sign in, such as Google, Apple, or Facebook.
We recommend storing your two-factor authentication tokens and generating the one-time codes — which refresh every 30 seconds — inside Kaspersky Password Manager. This significantly lowers the chances of someone hijacking your account. Even if an attacker somehow discovers or guesses your password, they won’t be able to get the code without physical access to your device.
Finally, you can ditch passwords (almost) entirely by switching to passkeys. We’ve previously covered what this password alternative looks like and the specifics of using it. Currently, this is the most breach-resistant authentication system out there. Its main drawback has been the difficulty of syncing passkeys across different ecosystems, like Windows and iOS, but the updated version of Kaspersky Password Manager can now save and sync passkeys across Windows, macOS, iOS, and Android devices, making that issue a thing of the past.
Even a complex password and 2FA aren’t reasons to let your guard down. An attacker can infect your device with an infostealer: malware designed to swipe things like session cookies from your browser, app configuration files, and other sensitive data. Session cookies allow you to stay signed in without re-entering your credentials every time; however, if scammers get their hands on them, they can sign in to the service as you — even without knowing your username or password. This makes a proactive approach essential, especially if you use Chrome, Edge, Opera, or other Chromium-based browsers on Windows. We recommend installing Kaspersky Premium on all your devices; it includes Kaspersky Password Manager in addition to comprehensive protection against cyberthreats.
Otherwise, you might be asking for trouble. For example, if you share a Steam subscription with a friend who cheats, both of your accounts could end up banned. Furthermore, never try to let someone else into your personal account or individual subscription. Sharing your password with others is usually a violation of the terms of service, and can result in your account being blocked.
To do this, periodically check active devices and sessions in your subscription settings. If you see an unrecognized device in the authorized list, terminate that session — or all of them — and change your account password immediately. Signing back in on a few devices is much easier than trying to recover a hijacked account.
And remember: don’t let your own habits compromise your security. If you’re visiting friends, on vacation, or on a business trip and use a local computer or smart TV — or if you sign in to your account from a public computer — don’t forget to sign out when you’re done. Otherwise, the next person to use that device might find themselves with free subscriptions or, even worse, access to your email or cloud photo stream.
Watch out for phishing emails and messages spoofing legitimate services. If you receive a notification about a “need to update your billing details”, or a claim that a “new user has been added” to your family plan, don’t rush to click any links or open attachments. Links can lead to a phishing page, and attachments may hide malware. Scammers often use email addresses and domains that look nearly identical to the real ones — for instance, by swapping l (lowercase L) for I (uppercase i), or using a familiar name in a different domain zone.
Unfortunately, phishing pages are often indistinguishable from the originals now that AI is being used for high-quality design and layout. Since spotting every red flag yourself is increasingly difficult, it’s best to delegate anti-phishing protection to Kaspersky Premium. It will alert you to suspicious sites, saving your money and keeping your peace of mind.
Lastly, some scammers lure users in with freebies like fake gift subscriptions for Telegram Premium. The victim is asked to visit a phishing page mimicking the Telegram login screen and sign in to their account to claim the gift. The result isn’t hard to guess: instead of a premium subscription — a hijacked account. Recently, scammers have even learned to use mini-apps to steal credentials directly inside Telegram under various pretexts — ranging from gift giveaways to claims that you must move to a new chat because the old one was blocked.
You can often find subscription offers on marketplaces and retail platforms at prices significantly lower than what the official provider charges. More likely than not, that tempting price hides a hacked account or a family group that you could be kicked out of at any moment, because the family admin is either the seller or a random user. Furthermore, sharing a family plan with strangers from around the world is a violation of terms for many services.
Now that we’ve covered subscription security, what about those extra subscriptions that quietly eat away at your balance every month? Research shows that users typically underestimate how many active subscriptions they have and how much they spend on them; they also frequently forget to cancel auto-renewals for subscriptions they no longer use, or auto-charges after the trial period ends.
If you suspect you’re in that boat, start your investigation with your own bank statements. Recurring charges for the same amount can be a subscription you’ve forgotten about. Check who received the payment; if the name doesn’t ring a bell, do an online search on the company. It’s also worth searching your email box for the merchant name or the payment amount; this can help you track down subscription notifications and figure out what exactly you’re paying for. And don’t forget to check your spam folder, as that’s where subscription alerts often end up.
Now, let’s look at how to check and cancel active subscriptions purchased through the App Store and Google Play.
If you’re the family group manager, you’ll be able to see the purchase history for other family members.
Note: to manage your iCloud subscription, you’ll need to go to the specific iCloud section located just below Subscriptions. In the Family Sharing section, if you’re the one who set it up, you can view the subscription and purchase history for all family members.
Read more on subscriptions:
Kaspersky official blog – Read More