Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

Anyone who spoke with me in the last several weeks has had to deal with me loudly waiting in anticipation for the long-awaited “Project Hail Mary” movie adaptation. I read (and cried over) the book by Andy Weir, who’s also the author of “The Martian,” about a year ago and, shortly after, found out it was being made into a movie. 

(I know what you’re thinking: Two movie-themed editions in two weeks? It’s every cinephile’s dream!) 

Anyway, the story centers around a biologist and science teacher named Ryland Grace (Ryan Gosling), who wakes up from a coma on a spaceship lightyears away from Earth, his two crewmembers long dead. Our planet’s sun is slowly dimming, its energy being consumed by alien microbes called “astrophage” that are infecting all the stars in our stellar neighborhood — except one. Grace’s task is to figure out why this star is unaffected and send the solution back to Earth. It’s a one-way trip, and he’ll eventually die in space alone… or so he thinks. 

The movie met 99.9% of my expectations, which is rare for an adaptation. The humor was spot-on, the soundtrack was gorgeous, and the puppetry — yes, the puppetry (mild spoilers for Rocky, Grace’s new alien friend) — was out-of-this-world. 

While it is a story about space, it’s first and foremost about communication, trust, and collaboration — things we’re no strangers to at Talos, especially when creating the Year in Review report (which is available now). The entire processof creating this report, from raw data to final design, is only a little bit less monumental than stopping alien microbes from plunging the earth into an ice age. 

The process begins with Talos’ Strategic Analysis team, who leverage the vast amount of Cisco’s telemetry, Talos research, and data from Talos Incident Response cases to analyze trends over the past year. This analysis is synthesized into a comprehensive report, which undergoes rigorous review and proofing at multiple levels. While the report is being drafted, the Strategic Comms team develops a detailed schedule of content and collateral to promote it both internally and externally, meeting weekly to track our progress. Once the text is finalized, it moves to our design team, who transform the data into a visually stunning, accessible format. Even after the report launches, the work continues: We produce videos, answer your questions on Reddit (today only!), record podcasts, create social media graphics, and collaborate across Cisco to ensure our findings reach the right people. 

We do this for the good of the community. Our report isn’t gated, and it never will be; you can read it right in your browser without filling out fake names and emails in annoying forms. Talos’ job is to keep as many people as safe as possible, and that means free access to critical information. Here’s a taste of our findings: 

• React2Shell was the No. 1 most targeted CVE in 2025 despite only being discovered in December. ToolShell was No. 3 despite being released in June. 
• About 25% of the vulnerabilities on our top 100 list affect widely used frameworks and libraries, highlighting the risk of supply chain-style attacks. 
• Nearly a third of MFA spray attacks targeted identity and access management (IAM) applications. 
• Attackers continued to rely heavily on phishing for initial access, observed in 40% of Talos IR cases. 35% of cases involved internal phishing. 
• Qilin was the most seen ransomware variant in 2025, with over 40 victims each month except January. 

We also offer insights on AI and state-sponsored threats, so be sure to view the full report. 

In “Project Hail Mary,” Grace and his alien friend, Rocky, realize that they can’t save their respective worlds alone. The Talos Year in Review is the result of a massive, cross-functional mission. It takes collaboration between all of Talos’ teams to turn complex, often daunting telemetry into actionable intelligence for the community. 

When we share knowledge, communicate clearly, and work together, the results are, to quote Rocky, “Amaze! Amaze! Amaze!” 

Stay tuned over the coming days and weeks as we break each section down into the most important 2025 Year in Review findings you need to know.

The one big thing 

One of the main themes from the 2025 Year in Review’s vulnerability data is that attackers are targeting identity by compromising the infrastructure that sits around it, including physical hardware devices, software, and management platforms. Network components act as de facto identity gateways, allowing adversaries to impersonate users, bypass MFA, and traverse networks undetected. Attackers overwhelmingly prefer high-access targets that require minimal exploitation steps and yield maximum operational payoff. 

Why do I care? 

Identity-centric network components act as control points for the entire environment, meaning their compromise can invalidate MFA, bypass segmentation, and grant immediate access to high-value resources. Network management platforms give adversaries direct access to privileged administrative functions, device credentials, and automation pipelines that touch hundreds of downstream systems. Compromising a single ADC or management platform can expose dozens of downstream systems, making these devices powerful force multipliers. 

So now what? 

Organizations should consider the impact on identity when prioritizing the patching of network devices. ADCs must be protected as identity control points, not merely performance appliances. Defenders should focus on these high-leverage vulnerability classes that enable identity compromise, policy manipulation, and infrastructure-wide escalation. Read the full Year in Review for more information.

Top security headlines of the week 

U.S. Department of Energy publishes five-year energy security plan 
The three goals are to develop ‘world-class’ security technologies, to harden the US energy infrastructure, and establish emergency preparedness for response and recovery from incidents. (SecurityWeek) 

Someone has publicly leaked an exploit kit that can hack millions of iPhones 
Researchers are warning that this will allow any hacker to easily use the tools to target iPhone users running older versions of Apple’s operating systems who have not yet updated to its latest iOS 26 software. (TechCrunch) 

Checkmarx KICS code scanner targeted in widening supply chain hit 
Specifically, the cybercriminals infiltrated KICS GitHub Action, which organizations use to run KICS scans within their CI/CD pipelines, and poisoned multiple versions of the software. (Dark Reading) 

Attackers hide infostealer in copyright infringement notices 
Aimed at organizations in critical sectors, including healthcare, government, hospitality, and education, it attempts to install PureLog Stealer, a low-cost infostealer easy for threat actors to use. (Dark Reading) 

Oracle releases emergency patch for critical identity manager vulnerability 
CVE-2026-21992 can be used without authentication for remote code execution and it may have been exploited in the wild. (SecurityWeek) 

Can’t get enough Talos? 

Today only: Ask us anything 
Talos and Splunk researchers are standing by on Reddit to answer your questions about the Year in Review, Top 50 Cybersecurity Threats report, or just about anything else you want to know. It’s halfway over, so post your questions now! 

Year in Review highlights 
In 2025, attackers moved fast, but they also played the long game. This short video highlights the biggest trends from the 2025 Talos Year in Review and what they reveal about where the threat landscape is headed. 

Gravy, glutes, and the Talos Year in Review 
Hazel, Bill, Joe, and Dave discuss the 2025 Year in Review, supported as always by the Turkey Lurkey Man. We also discuss the cyber activity tied to the situation in the Middle East. 

Cybersecurity’s double-header 
With the recent release of the Year in Review and Splunk’s Top 50 Cybersecurity Threats report, Amy, Bill, and Lou break down the most critical trends that shaped the security landscape last year. 

Upcoming events where you can find Talos 

• Botconf 2026 (April 15 – 17) Reims, France 

Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week 

SHA256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507 
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f 
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507 
Example Filename: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507.exe 
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201 

SHA256: 96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974 
MD5: aac3165ece2959f39ff98334618d10d9 
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974 
Example Filename: d4aa3e7010220ad1b458fac17039c274_63_Exe.exe 
Detection Name: W32.Injector:Gen.21ie.1201 

SHA256: 90b1456cdbe6bc2779ea0b4736ed9a998a71ae37390331b6ba87e389a49d3d59 
MD5: c2efb2dcacba6d3ccc175b6ce1b7ed0a 
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=90b1456cdbe6bc2779ea0b4736ed9a998a71ae37390331b6ba87e389a49d3d59 
Example Filename: APQ9305.dll 
Detection Name: Auto.90B145.282358.in02 

SHA256: 5e6060df7e8114cb7b412260870efd1dc05979454bd907d8750c669ae6fcbcfe 
MD5: a2cf85d22a54e26794cbc7be16840bb1 
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=5e6060df7e8114cb7b412260870efd1dc05979454bd907d8750c669ae6fcbcfe 
Example Filename: a2cf85d22a54e26794cbc7be16840bb1.exe 
Detection Name: W32.5E6060DF7E-100.SBX.TG 

SHA256: a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91 
MD5: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376 
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91 
Example Filename: d4aa3e7010220ad1b458fac17039c274_62_Exe.exe 
Detection Name: Win.Dropper.Miner::95.sbx.tg 

SHA256: 38d053135ddceaef0abb8296f3b0bf6114b25e10e6fa1bb8050aeecec4ba8f55 
MD5: 41444d7018601b599beac0c60ed1bf83 
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=38d053135ddceaef0abb8296f3b0bf6114b25e10e6fa1bb8050aeecec4ba8f55 
Example Filename: 38d053135ddceaef0abb8296f3b0bf6114b25e10e6fa1bb8050aeecec4ba8f55.js 
Detection Name: W32.38D053135D-95.SBX.TG 

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

Spammers are constantly seeking new ways to reach the widest audience possible while dodging email filters — all to ensure their “tempting” offers land in your inbox rather than the spam folder. To pull this off, bad actors are increasingly pivoting to legitimate platforms, dreaming up sophisticated ways to weaponize them for their own gain.

We’ve previously covered scam attacks using Google Forms, where fraudulent emails were sent directly from Google’s mail servers. In those cases, links were shielded by the reputable forms.gle domain, allowing them to breeze past spam filters. Now, a similar tactic has been implemented using Yandex Surveys. Here’s a look at how this new scam works, and how you can stay safe.

Everything looks fine at first glance…

Online survey tools are fairly common these days. Marketing professionals use them to gather feedback, HR departments use them for employee engagement, and researchers use them to study target audiences. But how are scammers getting in on the action?

They create a survey, embed links to fraudulent websites within the body, and blast out emails containing the survey link to their mailing lists. Standard anti-spam filters see URLs like yandex.com/poll/… as legitimate. Recipients often have the same reaction, reasonably assuming, “It’s a link to a well-known service — what could go wrong?”

Our experts have tracked a massive spike in these emails. In January, Kaspersky Premium blocked just over 2200 of these messages; by February, that number soared to over 32 000. We’re looking at aggressive scaling here — nearly a 15-fold increase in just one month.

Here’s a survey page containing a scam message and link. The visible portion features a well-known crypto exchange logo and an active link to the attackers’ site. At the bottom, you’ll notice a couple of dots — more on these later

Spammers distribute these survey links through their own channels, often hijacking website feedback forms that lack sender verification. The fact that the message originates from a legitimate network provides yet another green flag for anti-spam filters to let these emails slide right through.

A crypto scam email in English sent through a feedback form on a Greek website

The most popular themes for this type of spam currently involve crypto scams — promising users a windfall in digital currency — and links to sketchy dating sites.

How scammers exploit Yandex Surveys

To build a survey that doesn’t actually look like one, attackers take advantage of the platform’s extended survey mode.

Yandex Surveys allows users to swap out a simple question for a text block, which can include descriptions, images, or videos. This is exactly where scammers embed their pitch and the link to their phishing site. They use the built-in “Upload media” feature to add official-looking logos and other embellishments that sell the illusion.

To make sure the victim doesn’t see the “Next” button or the standard disclaimer — which warns that surveys are created by third parties and that Yandex isn’t responsible for the content — the scammers pad the space below the scam block with invisible characters. For instance, they might add dozens of lines of transparent emojis; you can’t see them, but they still take up screen real estate. Further down, past the point where most people would stop scrolling, they simply drop in punctuation marks, one per line.

To understand how these surveys are built, we used a test survey to retrace the scammers’ steps. Transparent emojis are used to create dead space under the scam block, followed by punctuation marks further down where few users are likely to scroll

The result? The user sees nothing but the fraudulent offer and the link, while everything else is pushed off-screen. It’s the same technique we’ve seen used with Google Forms.

Beyond the benefit of using legitimate URLs, another perk for the scammers is that this method doesn’t cost them a dime. They aren’t paying the service for promotion, or using the built-in targeting tools; they simply blast the link to their own database. In this scenario, the service is essentially being used as good-reputation web page hosting.

To top it off, the scammers can jump into the “Statistics” section of the survey to track click-through rates in real-time and then export the data into a spreadsheet. This is basically a turnkey analytics suite.

Once a victim clicks the link in the survey and lands on the attackers’ website, they are greeted by a professional-looking site running a classic “prize giveaway” scheme.

How to avoid taking the bait:

• Don’t blindly trust “reputable domain names”. Seeing yandex.com or forms.gle in the address bar is no longer a guarantee that the content is safe. Anyone can create a survey at those addresses.
• Stay alert if you receive an unexpected email. Be especially wary if it promises a payout, a prize, or asks you to “confirm” something urgently. These are scammers’ tricks of choice.
• Always scroll to the bottom of the page. If the content abruptly cuts off and you’re left with a wall of empty space, that should set off alarm bells. Check the footer — you’ll often find service disclaimers or other clues that prove you’re looking at a fraudulent survey.
• Don’t click links in suspicious surveys. If you do happen to click through, never enter any personal or financial information on the resulting site.
• Use a trusted security tool. Kaspersky Premium detects these fraudulent sites and blocks access before you have a chance to hand over your data or risk infecting your device through a zero-click vulnerability.

Finally, it’s worth noting that scammers didn’t actually hack Yandex Surveys; instead, they took a creative — albeit malicious — approach to repurposing the tool for their own ends. Since Yandex Surveys is scheduled to shut down on April 6, 2026, this specific scheme will soon hit a dead end. Still, scammers are constantly hunting for the next loophole to exploit. Your best defense remains a healthy dose of skepticism toward any unexpected email — even if the links point to a domain you know and trust.

Other tricks spammers use:

• Beware of Google Forms bearing crypto gifts
• Phishing and spam: the wildest campaigns of 2025
• Spam 101: what is spam, and how to defeat it
• How phishers and scammers use AI
• Fifty shades of sextortion

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

ANY.RUN has been recognized at Global InfoSec Awards 2026 by Cyber Defense Magazine (CDM), the industry’s leading electronic information security magazine.

We’re especially proud and grateful that our impact for the industry has been acknowledged in two categories at once: 

• Innovative Malware Analysis for Sandbox 

• Market Leader Threat Intelligence  

This dual recognition reflects the approach to cybersecurity we prioritize: supporting the full SOC workflow by combining advanced malware and phishing analysis with integrated threat intelligence. 

What Made This Possible 

As highlighted by the award founders at CDM, ANY.RUN matched the values they looked for in participants:  

We believe that ANY.RUN’s repeated presence high in industry rankings reflects its ability to address operational challenges across the investigation cycle. Our solutions support enterprise security teams as they successfully: 

• Unify SOC Workflow: ANY.RUN offers a single ecosystem that streamlines monitoring, triage, and incident response without tool switching. 

• Accelerate Decision-Making: Interactive malware analysis combined with contextual threat intelligence delivers immediate insights, no external double-checking needed. 

• Scale Operations for SOCs and MSSPs: Standardized workflows and integrated intelligence empower teams of any size. 

Community Trust in Numbers 

ANY.RUN is used broadly by organizations with high security requirements, including the world’s largest enterprises: 

• We support 15,000+ SOCs and 600,000+ analysts in accelerating investigations, reducing risk, and improving operational outcomes across industries. 

• 74% of Fortune 100 companies rely on ANY.RUN for malware analysis and threat investigation workflows.   

We’re deeply thankful for customers, partners, and community for their continued trust. We appreciate every contribution and piece of feedback and process them to maintain high standards we set for our solutions. 

More on Global InfoSec Awards 2026  

Global InfoSec Awards 2026 is organized by Cyber Defense Magazine, a premier source of cyber security news and information for InfoSec professions in business and government. 

With a mission is to share cutting-edge knowledge, real-world stories and awards on the best ideas, products, and services in the information technology industry, they deliver monthly magazines, as well as special editions for the RSAC Conferences.    

The award’s judges are CISSP, FMDHS, CEH, certified security professionals who voted based on their independent review of the company submitted materials on the website of each submission including but not limited to data sheets, white papers, product literature and other market variables. 

About ANY.RUN 

ANY.RUN provides interactive malware analysis and actionable threat intelligence that enable security teams worldwide to investigate threats faster, understand attacker behavior more clearly, and respond with greater confidence. 

We prioritize: 

• Maintaining SOC 2 Type II certification and commitment to protect customer data. 

• Constantly improving Interactive Sandbox, Threat Intelligence Lookup, and Threat Intelligence Feeds for support across monitoring, triage, and response SOC processes. 

• Helping SOC and MSSP teams accelerate analysis, gain deeper context during investigations, and identify emerging threats earlier. 

The post ANY.RUN Recognized for Innovations and Market Leadership at Global InfoSec Awards 2026   appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog – ​Read More

Millions of automated software development pipelines rely on security tools, such as Trivy and Checkmarx AST, integrated into the build process. It is precisely these trusted solutions recently became the entry point for one of the largest and most dangerous supply chain attacks in modern history. In this post we discuss how to audit automated workflows and secure corporate cloud infrastructure.

Timeline of the attack and known consequences

On March 19, a successful targeted supply chain attack was carried out via Trivy, an open-source vulnerability scanning tool widely used in CI/CD pipelines. The attackers, a group known as TeamPCP, managed to inject malware into official GitHub Actions workflows and Docker images associated with Trivy. As a result, every automated pipeline scan made triggered malware that stole SSH keys, cloud access tokens, cryptocurrency wallets, and other valuable data from compromised systems. Given the critical nature of the incident, it was assigned the identifier CVE-2026-33634 with a near-maximum CVSS4B score of 9.4.

Later that same day, the Trivy team detected the attack and removed malicious artifacts from the distribution channels, halting this phase of the attack. However, the attackers had already gained access to the environments of many Trivy users.

On March 23, a similar incident was discovered in another application security tool: a GitHub Action for Checkmarx KICS, as well as Checkmarx AST.  Three hours later, the malicious code was removed from there as well. TeamPCP also managed to compromise OpenVSX extensions supported by Checkmarx: cx-dev-assist 1.7.0 and ast-results. Reports on when this part of the incident was resolved vary.

On March 24, a popular project using Trivy’s code scanning — the LiteLLM AI gateway, a universal library for access to various LLM providers — was attacked. Versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8, uploaded to PyPI repository, were compromised. These versions were publicly available for about 5 hours.

But the fact that the attack lasted only a few hours is no reason to dismiss it. Given the popularity of the affected projects, the malicious code could have been executed thousands of times, including within the infrastructures of very large companies.

This allowed attackers to deploy persistent backdoors in Kubernetes clusters, as well as launch the self-replicating CanisterWorm worm across the JavaScript npm ecosystem.

The attackers’ code has destructive capabilities that wipe out a Kubernetes cluster and all its nodes if it detects Farsi as the primary language or the Tehran time zone on the compromised system. In other regions, the malware simply steals data using CanisterWorm.

According to experts, more than 20,000 repositories are considered potentially vulnerable. The attackers claim to have stolen hundreds of gigabytes of data and more than 500,000 accounts.

How Trivy Was Attacked

To compromise Trivy, the attackers used credentials stolen in a previous incident. The previous Trivy compromise, which occurred in late February, was likely not fully contained, and the attackers — the TeamPCP group — returned with a new attack.  Trivy’s developers, Aqua Security, speculate that because credentials were being phased out gradually following the previous incident, the attackers were able to generate new access tokens for themselves before compromised old ones had been revoked.

As a result, TeamPCP was able to compromise GitHub Actions used in CI/CD pipelines. Using credentials with tag-writing privileges, the attackers forcibly overrode 76 out of 77 version tags in aquasecurity/trivy-action and all 7 tags in aquasecurity/setup-trivy, redirecting existing trusted versions to malicious commits. This resembles tactics observed in the Shai-Hulud 2.0 campaign.  As a result, workflows throughout the pipeline began executing the attackers’ code, while the release metadata showed no visible changes.

At the same time, the attackers published an infected Trivy binary (v0.69.4) to official distribution channels, including GitHub Releases and container registries.

LiteLLM Compromise

The compromise of the popular language model access tool LiteLLM could itself trigger a major wave of attacks across the chain of projects that use it. The attack took place on March 24, 2026, when TeamPCP directly published malicious versions of the library (1.82.7 and 1.82.8) on PyPI. Between 10:39 UTC and 16:00 UTC, these compromised packages contained a malware that stole credentials. It was embedded in the proxy_server.py file, and version 1.82.8 also contained a malicious litellm_init file. The stolen data was exfiltrated to the server models.litellm[.]cloud.

Customers using LiteLLM Cloud or the official LiteLLM Proxy Docker image were not affected due to strict version locking, whereas developers and downstream projects that installed unpinned versions via pip during the specified time window were compromised.

Within 3 hours, the malicious packages were removed from PyPI repository, and the LiteLLM team suspended new releases, rotated credentials, and engaged an external incident response process. Teams that use LiteLLM in their projects are advised to immediately check for the litellm_init.pth compromise indicator and routinely rotate all potentially compromised secrets.

Features of the TeamPCP Cloud Stealer malware

Attackers added new logic to GitHub Actions and the Trivy executable while preserving the original functionality. Vulnerability scan results via Trivy appeared normal, but at the same time, valuable data was being searched for and extracted. Malicious code was:

• performing reconnaissance (collected network data and environment variables);
• searching for tokens and credentials to access AWS and GCP cloud environments;
• scanning memory (/proc/*/mem) to extract secrets stored in the memory of Runner.Worker and Runner.Listener processes;
• extracting Kubernetes secrets (/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount);
• collecting data for connecting to database servers (MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Redis, Vault);
• collecting any other API keys and secrets from environment files and CI/CD configuration files (.env, .json, .yml);
• searching for webhooks for Slack and Discord channels;
• searching for data related to crypto wallets (variables related to the Solana blockchain, as well as rpcuser and rpcpassword data).

The collected data was encrypted and uploaded to a server with a name similar to the name of the Trivy’s developers (scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org). As a backup mechanism, the attackers provided a way for uploading data to a repository named docs-tpcp.

The attack on CheckMarx and LiteLLM used a similar tactic with other typosquatting domains: models.litellm[.]cloud and checkmarx[.]zone.

Response and Defense Strategies for CVE-2026-33634

Existing signature-based checks and dependency scanning in public registries are no longer sufficient, as the malicious code was injected directly into trusted, signed actions and evaded detection until behavioral monitoring was applied. CI/CD pipelines have become the “new perimeter” of security.

Immediate Actions.  Ensure that all workflows use secure versions (Trivy binary 0.69.3, trivy-action 0.35.0, setup-trivy 0.2.6).

CI/CD pipeline administrators and security teams should immediately review their dependances to Checkmarx (kics-github-action, ast-github-action) and Trivy (setup-trivy and trivy-action) solutions. If workflows referenced a version tag rather than a specific SHA hash, carefully review your workflow execution logs for the duration of the active supply chain attack.

You should also check your network logs for traffic to the domains scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org, checkmarx[.]zone, and models.litellm[.]cloud. The presence of such traffic indicates that sensitive data has been successfully exfiltrated.

If a repository named docs-tpcp has appeared on organization’s GitHub, this may also indicate a successful data breach.

In any case, a proactive threat hunting should be conducted, assuming that the systems have been successfully compromised and that the attackers have rapidly advanced within the affected systems.

It is recommended to restore the affected environments from verified backups.

Dependency pinning and secret management. Ensure that exact dependency versions are pinned using cryptographic hashes in all pipelines and Dockerfiles. We advise transition from long-lived tokens to short-lived credentials by using a secrets manager tool and implementing OIDC integrations where they are supported. Minimize the injection of secrets into the runtime environment — do so only when it is absolutely necessary. Ensure that secrets are not stored on disk or in temporary files, and are not reused across different processes.

Other security measures. Allow only GitHub Actions from a list approved by the organization; block new and unverified processes. Configure GITHUB_TOKEN and other access keys in accordance with the principle of least privilege. Do not grant write permissions unless absolutely necessary.

To enhance the security of GitHub Actions, there are several open-source tools available:

• zizmor — a tool for static analysis and detection of configuration errors in GitHub Actions;
• gato and Gato-X — two versions of a tool that helps identify structurally vulnerable pipelines;
• allstar — a GitHub application developed by OpenSSF to configure and enforce security policies in GitHub organizations and repositories.

If you want to learn more about supply chain attacks, we invite you to look at our analytical report Supply chain reaction: securing the global digital ecosystem in an age of interdependence. It’s based on insights from technical experts and reveals how often organizations face supply chain and trusted relationship risks, where protection gaps remain, and what strategies to employ to improve resilience against this kind of threats.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More