Year in Review 2025: The major headlines and moments from Sophos this year
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Game of clones: Sophos and the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise 2025 Evaluations
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Human-in-the-loop security will define 2026: Predictions from Sophos experts
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A big finish to 2025 in December’s Patch Tuesday
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The Week in Vulnerabilities: 2026 Starts with 100 PoCs and New Exploits

Cyble Vulnerability Intelligence researchers tracked 678 vulnerabilities in the last week, a decline from the high volume of new vulnerabilities observed in the last few weeks of 2025.
Nearly 100 of the disclosed vulnerabilities already have a publicly available Proof-of-Concept (PoC), significantly increasing the likelihood of real-world attacks on those vulnerabilities.
A total of 42 vulnerabilities were rated as critical under the CVSS v3.1 scoring system, while 15 received a critical severity rating based on the newer CVSS v4.0 scoring system.
Below are some of the more significant IT and industrial control system (ICS) vulnerabilities highlighted by Cyble in recent reports to clients.
The Week’s Top IT Vulnerabilities
CVE-2025-60534 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability affecting Blue Access Cobalt v02.000.195, which could allow an attacker to selectively proxy requests to operate functionality on the web application without the need for authentication, potentially allowing full admin access to application and door systems.
CVE-2025-68428 is a critical path traversal and local file inclusion vulnerability in the jsPDF JavaScript library’s Node.js builds. It affects methods like loadFile, addImage, html, and addFont, where unsanitized user input as file paths could enable attackers to read arbitrary server files and embed their contents into generated PDFs.
CVE-2020-36923 is a medium-severity insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in Sony BRAVIA Digital Signage 1.7.8, which could allow attackers to bypass authorization controls and access hidden system resources like ‘/#/content-creation’ by manipulating client-side access restrictions.
CISA added its first two vulnerabilities of 2026 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog: A 16-year-old Microsoft PowerPoint flaw and a new maximum-severity HPE vulnerability. The agency added 245 vulnerabilities to the KEV catalog in 2025.
CVE-2025-37164 is a 10.0-severity Code Injection vulnerability in HPE’s OneView IT infrastructure management software up to version 10.20 that has had a publicly available PoC since last month, while CVE-2009-0556 is a 9.3-rated Code Injection vulnerability present in Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2000 SP3, 2002 SP3, and 2003 SP3, and PowerPoint in Microsoft Office 2004 for Mac that was first known to be exploited in April 2009.
Notable vulnerabilities discussed in open-source communities include CVE-2025-13915, a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in IBM API Connect that could allow remote unauthenticated attackers to circumvent authentication controls and gain unauthorized access to sensitive API management functions. Another was CVE-2025-68668, a 9.9-severity sandbox bypass vulnerability in the n8n workflow automation platform’s Python Code Node that uses Pyodide.
Another vulnerability getting attention is CVE-2025-52691, a maximum-severity unauthenticated arbitrary file upload vulnerability in SmarterMail email servers. The flaw affects SmarterMail versions before Build 9413 and could allow remote attackers to upload malicious files to any server location without requiring credentials, which could lead to remote code execution (RCE), full server compromise, data theft, or ransomware deployment.
Cyble dark web researchers observed a threat actor (TA) on a cybercrime forum advertising a zero-day vulnerability allegedly affecting the latest version of Microsoft Word. The TA described the vulnerability as affecting a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) module that Microsoft Word loads without proper verification due to the absence of absolute path validation, allegedly enabling remote code execution and local privilege escalation exploitation. The TA did not provide technical proof of concept, affected version numbers, or independent verification; therefore, the claim remains unverified.
ICS Vulnerabilities
Three ICS vulnerabilities also merit priority attention by security teams.
CVE-2025-3699 is a Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability affecting multiple versions of Mitsubishi Electric Air Conditioning Systems. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability could have far-reaching consequences beyond simple unauthorized access. By bypassing authentication, an attacker could gain full control over the air conditioning system, enabling them to manipulate environmental conditions within commercial facilities. This could lead to equipment overheating, disruption of medical environments, or production downtime. Additionally, access to sensitive information stored within the system, such as configuration files, user credentials, or operational logs, could provide attackers with valuable intelligence for further compromise.
CVE-2025-59287, a vulnerability disclosed by Microsoft in the Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) application, impacts servers running Schneider Electric EcoStruxure Foxboro DCS Advisor. Deserialization of untrusted data in WSUS could allow an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
CVE-2018-4063 is a remote code execution vulnerability in the upload.cgi functionality of Sierra Wireless AirLink ES450 FW 4.9.3 that was added to CISA’s KEV database last month after attacks were detected on OT network perimeter devices.
Conclusion
New vulnerabilities declining closer to long-term trends would be welcome news if it continues, but that still leaves security teams with hundreds of new vulnerabilities a week to contend with, many of which have PoCs or active exploits. In that challenging environment, rapid, well-targeted actions are needed to patch the most critical vulnerabilities and successfully defend IT and critical infrastructure. A risk-based vulnerability management program should be at the heart of those defensive efforts.
Other cybersecurity best practices that can help guard against a wide range of threats include segmentation of critical assets; removing or protecting web-facing assets; Zero-Trust access principles; ransomware-resistant backups; hardened endpoints, infrastructure, and configurations; network, endpoint, and cloud monitoring; and well-rehearsed incident response plans.
Cyble’s comprehensive attack surface management solutions can help by scanning network and cloud assets for exposures and prioritizing fixes, in addition to monitoring for leaked credentials and other early warning signs of major cyberattacks.
The post The Week in Vulnerabilities: 2026 Starts with 100 PoCs and New Exploits appeared first on Cyble.
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Resolutions, shmesolutions (and what’s actually worked for me)

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter.
I went to bed at 8:30 p.m. on New Year’s Eve, and I think that’s pretty indicative of how I approach the whole idea of New Year’s resolutions.
I love to count down to the new year with loved ones as much as the next person, but I have really conflicted feelings about traditional resolutions. On one hand, it’s great to have goals for the future and pick a day to start putting them into action. On the other, why wait until the New Year, and why pick goals that are often wildly unsustainable? It feels like it just promotes an “all or nothing” approach, and starts the year on a disappointing note if you stumble even a little. Life happens, and many resolutions don’t give enough grace.
Here are some resolutions I failed at this past year:
- Lift weights three days/week for a whole year: Close, but no cigar!
- Journal at least one sentence every day: Yeah, I failed at this one pretty quickly. I’m not a journal person.
- Knit at least three sweaters: I made a shirt, almost finished a vest, and spent a ton of money on yarn.
I have done a lot of things I’m proud about this year, so then… what has worked? An intention that I’ve held throughout the year is turning “shoulds” into setting plans into motion right away. For example, “I should host a one-time book club to discuss my favorite book” becomes “I just posted in my neighborhood Facebook page to find people who are interested and pick a date.” Or “I should finish my certification” becomes “I just set a weekly three-hour calendar block, and I won’t move it unless there’s an emergency.”
That shift in mindset reminds me a lot of what works in cybersecurity. Our industry is full of ambitious, high-level goals: “Eliminate all vulnerabilities,” “achieve zero trust,” or “stop every threat.” These aspirations are important, but the reality is that security happens in small, consistent actions: patching systems as soon as updates are available, educating teams on the latest phishing techniques, reviewing logs regularly, or simply responding quickly to a new alert.
Just like with personal resolutions, there’s often pressure in security to be perfect, to never let anything slip through the cracks. Even the organizations that have amazing budget and headcount will face challenges and setbacks, and no environment is ever perfectly secure. What matters most is how we respond in the moment, learn from what’s happened, and keep moving forward.
So as we head into 2026, whether you’re setting personal goals or planning your organization’s security strategy, consider focusing less on flawless resolutions and more on building habits that adapt to change. Celebrate the small wins, reflect on what you’ve accomplished, and don’t be afraid to pivot when things don’t go as planned. Show up every day and take that next step.
The one big thing
Earlier today, Cisco Talos disclosed a sophisticated threat actor we track as UAT-7290, who has been active since at least 2022. UAT-7290 is tasked with gaining initial access as well as conducting espionage-focused intrusions against critical infrastructure entities in South Asia. UAT-7290’s arsenal includes a malware family consisting of implants we call RushDrop, DriveSwitch, and SilentRaid. Our findings indicate that UAT-7290 conducts extensive technical reconnaissance of target organizations before carrying out intrusions.
Why do I care?
UAT-7290 targets telecom and network infrastructure, which, if compromised, can have cascading impacts on national security, business operations, and customer data. Their advanced tactics, use of publicly available exploits, and ability to establish persistent footholds make detection and remediation difficult.
So now what?
Review and apply the latest ClamAV and Snort signatures (see the blog) to detect and block UAT-7290’s malware and activity. Audit your edge devices (especially those exposed to the internet) for signs of compromise, weak credentials, or unpatched vulnerabilities, and prioritize patching and hardening them. Make sure your incident response plans are ready to address potential intrusions involving advanced persistent threats (APTs).
Top security headlines of the week
U.S. cyber pros plead guilty over BlackCat ransomware activity
Two US citizens plead guilty to working as ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware affiliates in 2023. Along with an unnamed third conspirator, they were previously employed by security firms Sygnia and DigitalMint. (DarkReading)
European Space Agency (ESA) confirms breach after hacker offers to sell data
The ESA has confirmed that some of its systems have been breached and is working on securing compromised devices. The hacker offered to sell 200GB of allegedly stolen data from ESA’s systems, including files from private Bitbucket repositories. (SecurityWeek)
Sophisticated ClickFix campaign targeting hospitality sector
Fake Booking reservation cancellations and fake BSODs trick victims into executing malicious code leading to RAT infections. (SecurityWeek) (The Hacker News)
New n8n vulnerability lets authenticated users execute system commands
It affects n8n versions from 1.0.0 up to, but not including, 2.0.0, and allows an authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the host running n8n. The issue has been addressed in version 2.0.0. (The Hacker News)
Russia-aligned hackers abuse Viber to target Ukrainian military and government
The attack chain involves the use of Viber to distribute malicious ZIP archives containing multiple Windows shortcut (LNK) files disguised as official Microsoft Word and Excel documents to trick recipients into opening them. (The Hacker News)
Can’t get enough Talos?
How Cisco Talos powers the solutions protecting your organization
What happens under the hood of Cisco’s security portfolio? Our reputation and detection services apply Talos’ real-time intelligence to detect and block threats. Here’s how.
The TTP: Talking through a year of cyber threats, in five questions
Hazel is joined by Nick Biasini to reflect on what stood out, what surprised them, and what didn’t in 2025. What might defenders want to think about differently heading into 2026?
Upcoming events where you can find Talos
Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week
SHA256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507
Example Filename: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507.exe
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201
SHA256: 90b1456cdbe6bc2779ea0b4736ed9a998a71ae37390331b6ba87e389a49d3d59
MD5: c2efb2dcacba6d3ccc175b6ce1b7ed0a
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=90b1456cdbe6bc2779ea0b4736ed9a998a71ae37390331b6ba87e389a49d3d59
Example Filename: ck8yh2og.dll
Detection Name: Auto.90B145.282358.in02
SHA256: 96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974
MD5: aac3165ece2959f39ff98334618d10d9
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974
Example Filename: 96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974.exe
Detection Name: W32.Injector:Gen.21ie.1201
SHA256: ecd31e50ff35f41fbacf4b3c39901d5a2c9d4ae64b0c0385d661b1fd8b00481f
MD5: e41ae00985e350137ddd9c1280f04fc3
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=ecd31e50ff35f41fbacf4b3c39901d5a2c9d4ae64b0c0385d661b1fd8b00481f
Example Filename: tg-submit-JDs62cgS.exe
Detection Name: Auto.ECD31E.252552.in02
SHA256: 1aa70d7de04ecf0793bdbbffbfd17b434616f8de808ebda008f1f27e80a2171b
MD5: a8fd606be87a6f175e4cfe0146dc55b2
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=1aa70d7de04ecf0793bdbbffbfd17b434616f8de808ebda008f1f27e80a2171b
Example Filename: WCInstaller_NonAdmin.exe
Detection Name: W32.1AA70D7DE0-95.SBX.TG
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Initial Access Sales Accelerated Across Australia and New Zealand in 2025

The cyber threat environment in Australia and New Zealand experienced a new escalation throughout 2025, driven by a surge in initial access sales, ransomware operations, and high-impact data breaches. According to our Threat Landscape Report Australia and New Zealand 2025, threat activity observed between January and November 2025 reveals a complex and commercialized underground ecosystem, where compromised network access is actively bought, sold, and exploited across multiple sectors.
The threat landscape report identifies a persistent focus on data-rich industries, with threat actors disproportionately targeting Retail, Banking, Financial Services, and Insurance (BFSI), Professional Services, and Healthcare organizations. These sectors continue to attract attackers due to the volume of sensitive personally identifiable information (PII), financial data, and downstream access opportunities they offer.
Growth of Initial Access Sales in 2025
A central finding of the report is the continued growth of the initial access market. Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) documented 92 instances of compromised access sales affecting organizations in Australia and New Zealand during 2025. Retail organizations were the most heavily targeted, accounting for 31 incidents, or approximately 34% of all observed activity. This figure is more than three times higher than that of the next most targeted sector.
The BFSI sector recorded nine compromised access listings, followed by Professional Services with seven incidents. Combined, these three sectors accounted for more than half of all initial access listings observed in the region during the reporting period.
This concentration reflects a strategic approach by initial access brokers. Retail and BFSI organizations routinely handle large volumes of customer data and payment information, making them valuable targets for monetization or follow-on ransomware attacks. Professional Services firms, meanwhile, often provide access to client environments, creating opportunities for supply chain exploitation.
A Fragmented but Active Access Brokerage Market
Analysis of the compromised access marketplace reveals a highly fragmented ecosystem rather than one dominated by a small number of major actors. The threat actor known as “cosmodrome” emerged as the most prolific seller of compromised access during the period, followed closely by an actor operating under the alias “shopify.”
Despite their activity, these actors did not control the market. The top seven most active sellers were collectively responsible for only about 26% of the observed access listings. The remaining activity originated from dozens of individual threat actors who posted listings once or twice, suggesting a low barrier to entry and a marketplace populated by both specialized brokers and opportunistic participants.
This structure indicates that initial access sales have become an accessible revenue stream for a wide range of threat actors, reinforcing the resilience and scalability of the underground economy.
High-Impact Incidents Highlight Broader Risks
Several notable incidents documented in the threat landscape report illustrate how initial access is translated into real-world impact.
In June 2025, the threat group Scattered Spider was suspected of orchestrating a cyberattack against a major Australian airline. Attackers reportedly gained unauthorized access to a customer service portal, resulting in a data breach that exposed records belonging to nearly six million customers. The compromised data included names, email addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, and frequent flyer numbers.
The airline confirmed that more sensitive information, such as credit card details, financial records, and passport data, was not affected because it was not stored in the breached system. Investigators believe the incident may be part of a broader campaign targeting the aviation sector.
In March, threat actor “Stari4ok” advertised the sale of unauthorized access to a large Australian retail chain on the Russian-language cybercrime forum Exploit. The actor claimed the access involved a hosting server containing approximately 250 GB of data, including a 30 GB SQL database with a user table of around 71,000 records. Based on the claimed annual revenue of USD 2.6 billion and the described industry, the victim appears to be a major retailer, although this has not been independently confirmed. The access was listed for auction with a starting price of USD 1,500.
Another listing emerged in May when the threat actor “w_tchdogs” offered unauthorized access to a portal belonging to an Australian telecommunications provider on the English-language forum Darkforums. The actor claimed the access provided entry to domain administration tools and critical network information. The listing price was USD 750.
Data Breaches and Hacktivist Activity
Not all incidents were tied directly to access sales. In mid-April, unidentified threat actors gained unauthorized access to the IT systems of a prominent accounting firm operating across Australia and New Zealand. The organization publicly confirmed the breach, stating that some data may have been compromised and that an investigation was ongoing. While business operations continued, the firm warned clients of potential phishing attempts and obtained court injunctions in both countries to prevent the dissemination of affected data. As of the time of reporting, no threat group had claimed responsibility.
Hacktivist activity also remained visible. In January 2025, the group RipperSec claimed to have accessed an optical-fiber network monitoring device belonging to an Australian cable and media services provider. The device was reportedly no longer supported by its vendor. As proof, the group released images suggesting internal defacement and possible data manipulation.
Want a deeper insight into these threats? Check out Cyble’s Australia and New Zealand Threat Landscape Report 2025 or schedule a demo to see check out how Cyble can protect your organization against these threats.
The post Initial Access Sales Accelerated Across Australia and New Zealand in 2025 appeared first on Cyble.
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UAT-7290 targets high value telecommunications infrastructure in South Asia
- Cisco Talos is disclosing a sophisticated threat actor we track as UAT-7290, who has been active since at least 2022.
- UAT-7290 is tasked with gaining initial access as well as conducting espionage focused intrusions against critical infrastructure entities in South Asia.
- UAT-7290’s arsenal includes a malware family consisting of implants we call RushDrop, DriveSwitch, and SilentRaid.
- Our findings indicate that UAT-7290 conducts extensive technical reconnaissance of target organizations before carrying out intrusions.

Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-7290 is a sophisticated threat actor falling under the China-nexus of Advanced Persistent Threat actors (APTs). UAT-7290 primarily targets telecommunications providers in South Asia. However, in recent months we have also seen UAT-7290 expand their targeting into Southeastern Europe.
In addition to conducting espionage focused attacks where UAT-7290 burrows deep inside a victim enterprise’s network infrastructure, their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and tooling suggests that this actor also establishes Operational Relay Box (ORBs) nodes. The ORB infrastructure may then be used by other China-nexus actors in their malicious operations, signifying UAT-7290’s dual role as an espionage motivated threat actor as well as an initial access group.
Active since at least 2022, UAT-7290 has an expansive arsenal of tooling, including open-source malware, custom developed malware, and payloads for 1-day vulnerabilities in popular edge networking products. UAT-7290 primarily leverages a Linux based malware suite but may also utilize Windows based bespoke implants such as RedLeaves or Shadowpad commonly linked to China-nexus threat actors.
Our findings suggest that the threat actor conducts extensive reconnaissance of target organizations before carrying out intrusions. UAT-7290 leverages one-day exploits and target-specific SSH brute force to compromise public facing edge devices to gain initial access and escalate privileges on compromised systems. The actor appears to rely on publicly available proof-of-concept exploit code as opposed to developing their own.
UAT-7290 shares overlapping TTPs with known China-nexus adversaries, including the exploitation of high-profile vulnerabilities in networking devices, use of open-source web shells for persistence, leveraging UDP listeners, and using compromised infrastructure to facilitate operations.
Specifically, we have observed technical indicators that overlap with RedLeaves, a malware family attributed to APT10 (a.k.a. MenuPass, POTASSIUM and Purple Typhoon), as well as infrastructure associated with ShadowPad, a malware family used by a variety of China-nexus adversaries.
Additionally, UAT-7290 shares a significant amount of overlap in victimology, infrastructure, and tooling with a group publicly reported by Recorded Future as Red Foxtrot. In a 2021 report, Recorded Future linked Red Foxtrot to Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Unit 69010.
UAT-7290’s malware arsenal for edge devices
Talos currently tracks the Linux-based malware families associated with UAT-7290 in this intrusion as:
- RushDrop – The dropper that kickstarts the infection chain. RushDrop is also known as ChronosRAT.
- DriveSwitch – A peripheral malware used to execute the main implant on the infected system.
- SilentRaid – The main implant in the intrusion meant to establish persistent access to compromised endpoints. It communicates with its command-and-control server (C2) and carries out tasks defined in the malware. SilentRaid is also known as MystRodX.
Another malware implanted on compromised devices by UAT-7290 is Bulbature. Bulbature, first disclosed by Sekoia in late 2024, is an implant that is used to convert compromised devices into ORBs.
RushDrop and DriveSwitch
RushDrop is a malware dropper that consists of three binaries encoded and embedded within it. RushDrop first makes rudimentary checks to ensure it is running on a legitimate system instead of a sandbox.

Then it either checks for the existence of, or creates a folder called “.pkgdb” in the current working directory of the dropper. RushDrop then decodes and drops three binaries to the “.pkgdb” folder:
- “daytime” – A malware family that simply executes a file called “chargen” from the current working directory. This executor is being tracked as DriveSwitch.
- “chargen” – The central implant of the infection chain, tracked as SilentRaid. SilentRaid communicates with its C2 server, usually in the form of a domain and can carry out action as instructed by the C2.
- “busybox” – Busybox is a legitimate Linux utility that can be used to execute arbitrary commands on the system.

DriveSwitch simply executes the SilentRaid malware on the system.

SilentRaid: The multifunctional malware
SilentRaid is a malware written in C++ and consists of multiple functionalities, written in the form of “plugins” embedded in the malware. On execution, it does certain rudimentary anti-VM and analysis checks to ensure it isn’t running in a sandbox. Then the malware simply initializes its “plugins” and contacts the C2 server for instructions to carry out malicious tasks on the infected endpoint. The plugins are built in functionalities, but modular enough to enable the threat actor to stitch together a combination of them during compilation.
Plugin: my_socks_mgr
This plugin handles communication to C2 server. It obtains the C2 IP by resolving a domain using “8[.]8[.]8[.]8” and passes commands received from the C2 to the appropriate plugin.
Plugin:my_rsh
This plugin opens a remote shell by executing “sh” either via either “busybox” or “/bin/sh”. This remote shell is then used to run arbitrary commands on the infected system.

Plugin:port_fwd_mgr
This plugin sets up port forwarding between ports specified — a local port and a port on a remote server. It can also set up port forwarding across multiple ports.
Plugin:my_file_mgr
This is the file manager of the backdoor. It allows the SilentRaid to:
- Read contents of “/etc/passwd”
- Execute a specified file on the system
- Archive directories specified by the C2 using “tar -cvf” – executed via busybox
- Check if a file is accessible
- Remove a file or directory using the “rm” command – via busybox
- Read/write a specified file
SilentRaid can also parse thru x509 certificates and collect attribute information such as:
- id-at-dnQualifier | Distinguished Name qualifier
- id-at-pseudonym | Pseudonym
- id-domainComponent | Domain component
- id-at-uniqueIdentifier | Unique Identifier
Bulbature
The Bulbature malware discovered consisted of the same string encoding scheme as the other UAT-7290’s malware illustrated earlier. Usually UPX compressed, Bulbature can bind to and listen to either a random port of its choosing or one specified via command line via the “-d <port_number>” switch.
Bulbature obtains the local network interface’s name by executing the command:
cat /proc/net/route | awk '{print $1,$2}' | awk '/00000000/ {print $1}'
It also obtains basic system information and the current user using the command:
echo $(whoami) $(uname -nrm)
The malware typically records its C2 address in a config file in the /tmp directory. The file will have the same name as the malware binary with the “.cfg” extension appended to it. The C2 address may be an encoded string.
Bulbature can obtain additional or new C2 addresses from the current C2 and can switch over communications with them instead. The malware can open up a reverse shell with its C2 to execute arbitrary commands on the infected system.
A recent variant of Bulbature contained an embedded self-signed certificate that it used for communicating with the C2. This certificate matches the one from the sample disclosed by Sekoia as well:
509 Certificate: Version: 3 Serial Number: 81bab2934ee32534 Signature Algorithm: Algorithm ObjectId: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 sha256RSA Algorithm Parameters: 05 00 Issuer: O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd S=Some-State C=AU Name Hash(sha1): d398f76c7ba0bbf79b1cac0620cdf4b42e505195 Name Hash(md5): 4a963519b4950845a8d76668d4d7dd29 NotBefore: 8/8/2019 3:33 AM NotAfter: 12/24/2046 3:33 AM Subject: O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd S=Some-State C=AU Name Hash(sha1): d398f76c7ba0bbf79b1cac0620cdf4b42e505195 Name Hash(md5): 4a963519b4950845a8d76668d4d7dd29 Cert Hash(sha256): 918fb8af4998393f5195bafaead7c9ba28d8f9fb0853d5c2d75f10e35be8015a
Censys data shows that this certificate, with the exact Serial number, is present on at least 141 hosts, all either located in China or Hong Kong. On Virus Total, many of the IPs identified hosting this certificate are associated with other malware typically associated with China-nexus of threat actors such as SuperShell, GobRAT, Cobalt Strike, etc.
Coverage
The following ClamAV signatures detect and block this threat:
- Unix.Dropper.Agent
- Unix.Malware.Agent
- Unix.Packed.Agent
The following Snort Rule (SIDs) detects and blocks this threat: 65124
IOCs
723c1e59accbb781856a8407f1e64f36038e324d3f0bdb606d35c359ade08200
59568d0e2da98bad46f0e3165bcf8adadbf724d617ccebcfdaeafbb097b81596
961ac6942c41c959be471bd7eea6e708f3222a8a607b51d59063d5c58c54a38d
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