DarkSword and Coruna are two new tools for invisible attacks on iOS devices. These attacks require no user interaction and are already being actively used by bad actors in the wild. Before these threats emerged, most iPhone users didn’t have to lose sleep over their data security. Protection was really only a major concern for a narrow group — politicians, activists, diplomats, high-level business execs, and others who handle extremely sensitive data — who might be targeted by foreign intelligence agencies. We’ve covered sophisticated spyware used against such a group before — noting how hard to come by those tools were.

However, DarkSword and Coruna — discovered by researchers earlier this year — are total game-changers. This malware is being used for mass infections of everyday users. In this post, we dive into why this shift happened, why these tools are so dangerous, and how you can stay protected.

What we know about DarkSword, and how it can target your iPhone

In mid-March 2026, three separate research teams coordinated the release of their findings on a new spyware strain called DarkSword. This tool is capable of silently hacking devices running iOS 18 without the user ever knowing something is wrong.

First, we should clear up some confusion: iOS 18 isn’t as vintage as it might sound. Even though the latest version is iOS 26, Apple recently overhauled its versioning system, which threw everyone for a loop. They decided to jump ahead eight versions — from 18 straight to 26 — so the OS number matches the current year. Despite the jump, Apple estimates that about a quarter of all active devices still run iOS 18 or older.

With that cleared up, let’s get back to DarkSword. Research shows that this malware infects victims when they visit perfectly legitimate websites that have been injected with malicious code. The spyware installs itself without any user interaction at all: you just have to land on a compromised page. This is what’s known as a zero-click infection technique. Researchers report that several thousand devices have already been hit this way.

To compromise a device, DarkSword uses a six-vulnerability exploit chain to escape the sandbox, escalate privileges, and execute code. Once it’s in, the malware harvests data from the infected device, including:

• Passwords
• Photos
• Chats and data from iMessage, WhatsApp, and Telegram
• Browser history
• Information from Apple’s Calendar, Notes, and Health apps

On top of all that, DarkSword lets attackers scoop up crypto-wallet data, making it essentially dual-purpose malware that functions as both a spy tool and a way to drain your crypto.

The only bit of good news is that the spyware doesn’t survive a reboot. DarkSword is fileless malware, meaning it lives in the device’s RAM, and never actually embeds itself into the file system.

Coruna: how older iOS versions are being targeted

Just two weeks before the DarkSword findings went public, researchers flagged another iOS threat dubbed Coruna. This malware is capable of compromising devices running older software — specifically iOS 13 through 17.2.1. Coruna uses the exact same playbook as DarkSword: victims visit a legitimate site injected with malicious code which then drops the malware onto the device. The whole process is completely invisible and requires zero user interaction.

A deep dive into Coruna’s code revealed it exploits a total of 23 different iOS vulnerabilities, several of which are tucked away in Apple’s WebKit. It’s worth reminding that, generally speaking (outside the EU), all iOS browsers are required to use the WebKit engine. This means these vulnerabilities don’t just affect Safari users — they’re a threat to anyone using a third-party browser on their iPhone as well.

The latest version of Coruna, much like DarkSword, includes modifications designed to drain crypto wallets. It also harvests photos and, in certain instances, email data. From what we can tell, stealing cryptocurrency seems to be the primary motive behind Coruna’s widespread deployment.

Who created Coruna and DarkSword — and how did they end up in the wild?

Code analysis of both tools suggests that Coruna and DarkSword were likely built by different developers. However, in both cases, we’re looking at software originally created by state-affiliated companies, possibly from the U.S. The high quality of the code points to this; these aren’t just Frankenstein kits cobbled together from random parts, but uniformly engineered exploits. Somewhere along the line, these tools leaked into the hands of cybercrime gangs.

Experts at Kaspersky’s GReAT analyzed all of Coruna’s components and confirmed that this exploit kit is actually an updated version of the framework used in Operation Triangulation. That earlier attack targeted Kaspersky employees, a story we covered in detail on this blog.

One theory suggests an employee at the company that developed Coruna sold it to hackers. Since then, the malware has been used to drain crypto wallets belonging to users in China; experts estimate that at least 42 000 devices were infected there alone.

As for DarkSword, cybercriminals have already used it to compromise users in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Malaysia. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the attackers who first deployed DarkSword left the full source code on infected websites, meaning it could easily be picked up by other criminal groups.

The code also includes detailed comments in English explaining exactly what each component does, which supports the theory of its Western origins. These step-by-step instructions make it easy for other hackers to adapt the tool for their own purposes.

How to protect yourself from Coruna and DarkSword

Serious malware that allows for the mass infection of iPhones while requiring zero interaction from the user has now landed in the hands of an essentially unlimited pool of cybercriminals. To pick up Coruna or DarkSword, you simply have to visit the wrong site at the wrong time. So this is one of those cases where every user needs to take iOS security seriously — not just those in high-risk groups.

The best thing you can do to protect yourself from Coruna and DarkSword is to update your devices to the latest version of iOS or iPadOS 26, as soon as you can. If you can’t update to the newest software — for instance, if your device is older and doesn’t support iOS 26 — you should still install the latest version available to you. Specifically, look for versions 15.8.7, 16.7.15, or 18.7.7. In a rare move, Apple patched a wide range of older operating systems.

To protect your Apple devices from similar malware that will likely pop up in the future, we recommend the following:

• Install updates promptly on all your Apple devices. The company regularly releases OS versions that patch known vulnerabilities — don’t skip them.
• Enable Background Security Improvements. This feature allows your device to receive critical security fixes separately from full iOS updates, reducing the window for hackers to exploit vulnerabilities. To enable it, go to Settings → Privacy & Security → Background Security Improvements and turn on the Automatically Install
• Consider using Lockdown Mode. This is a heightened security setting that limits some device features but simultaneously blocks or significantly complicates attacks. To enable this, go to Settings → Privacy & Security → Lockdown Mode → Turn On Lockdown Mode.
• Reboot your device once a day (or more). This stops fileless malware in its tracks, since these threats aren’t embedded in the system and disappear after a restart.
• Use encrypted storage for sensitive data. Keep things like crypto wallet keys, photos of IDs, and confidential info in a secure vault. Kaspersky Password Manager is a great fit for this; it manages your passwords, two-factor authentication tokens, and passkeys across all your devices while also keeping your notes, photos, and docs synced and encrypted.

The idea that Apple devices are bulletproof is a myth. They’re vulnerable to zero-click attacks, Trojans, and ClickFix infection techniques — and we’ve even seen malicious apps slip into the App Store more than once. Read more here:

• Predator vs. iPhone: the art of invisible surveillance
• AirBorne: Attacks on Apple devices through vulnerabilities in AirPlay
• Are your Bluetooth headphones spying on you?
• SparkCat trojan stealer infiltrates App Store and Google Play, steals data from photos
• Banshee: A stealer targeting macOS users

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

Cisco Talos’ Vulnerability Discovery & Research team recently disclosed one Foxit Reader vulnerability, and six LibRaw file reader vulnerabilities.

The vulnerabilities mentioned in this blog post have been patched by their respective vendors, all in adherence to Cisco’s third-party vulnerability disclosure policy.    

For Snort coverage that can detect the exploitation of these vulnerabilities, download the latest rule sets from Snort.org, and our latest Vulnerability Advisories are always posted on Talos Intelligence’s website.

Foxit use-after-free vulnerability

Discovered by KPC of Cisco Talos.

Foxit Reader allows users to view, edit, and sign PDF documents, among other features. Foxit aims to be one of the most feature-rich PDF readers on the market, and contains many similar functions to that of Adobe Acrobat Reader.

TALOS-2026-2365 (CVE-2026-3779) is a use-after-free vulnerability in the way Foxit Reader handles an Array object. A specially crafted JavaScript code inside a malicious PDF document can trigger this vulnerability, which can lead to memory corruption and result in arbitrary code execution. An attacker needs to trick the user into opening the malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.

LibRaw heap-based buffer overflow and integer overflow vulnerabilities

Discovered by Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos.

LibRaw is a library and user interface for processing RAW file types and metadata created by digital cameras. Talos analysts found 6 vulnerabilities in LibRaw.

TALOS-2026-2330 (CVE-2026-20911), TALOS-2026-2331 (CVE-2026-21413), TALOS-2026-2358 (CVE-2026-20889), and TALOS-2026-2359 (CVE-2026-24660) are heap-based buffer overflow vulnerabilities in LibRaw, and TALOS-2026-2363 (CVE-2026-24450) and TALOS-2026-2364 (CVE-2026-20884) are integer overflow vulnerabilities. Specially crafted malicious files can lead to heap buffer overflow in all cases. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger these vulnerabilities.

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In this episode of Humans of Talos, Amy sits down with Wendy Bishop, Head of Creative, to explore the vital role of design in the world of cybersecurity. From her early beginnings in web design and journalism to leading the creative vision for Talos, Wendy shares the unique challenges and rewards of bridging the gap between artistic expression and highly technical research.

Whether you’re a creative professional looking to break into the cybersecurity industry or simply curious about the people behind our security intelligence, this conversation offers a fascinating look at the artistic side of Talos’ mission to keep the digital world safe.

Amy Ciminnisi: Wendy, welcome! We haven’t had anyone from creative here yet. Can you talk to me a little bit about what drew you into creative work and how your career evolved into what it is now at Talos?

Wendy Bishop: I never in my entire life thought I would do anything besides something creative. It’s the only thing I’ve ever known. I have so many memories in my childhood of just being locked in my moody teenage bedroom. In high school, I started doing web design courses, and I think that’s when I really started being interested in a graphic design path. I learned Photoshop and basic HTML/CSS stuff as a side hobby. I moderated a message board for my favorite pop-punk band in high school. When it came time to go to college, there was nothing I wanted to do otherwise besides design. I found myself at Ohio University— that’s where I’m from, Ohio — in the School of Visual Communication.

I went off to a job working in newspapers. I actually never thought I would, but it was the job I found after college, and I designed news pages. It sounds funny now; it was already dying then, probably not the best long career path. But I think my background in journalism and communication-driven design is really what made me a great fit for the kind of design work we do here at Talos. We work with complicated materials, and a lot of the creative work we do is comms-driven. Our blog in some ways functions as a news outlet, so visual storytelling is a lot of my job. But of course, we have a lot of regular, branding-based design work now that comes out of my team.

AC: We just had a really big report come out that has occupied our minds for months, especially over here in design. Can you talk a little bit about the 2025 Year in Review and share what that process is like?

WB: When it starts to take shape, I look over that draft with the team and we talk about each graphic. I say, “That one might be better if we did this,” or “This is missing that piece for when it goes into production.” I really start to wrap my mind around the various assets and how we would go about taking what is essentially an Excel graphic or something created in PowerPoint and making it into a much more polished and designed presentation.

We get a sneak peek, and then one day it lands on your desk, Amy. From there, my designers and I put it together. It’s a lot about putting that puzzle together, thinking about what makes sense on each page, making sure the content flow is clean and linear, and the adjacencies of the graphics are in the right place. I come to you and say, “Amy, I need a headline,” or “Does this make sense?” We come up with a look and feel and theme for the whole report every year that’s greater than just the layout of the document. That gets extended to all the other companion pieces — our videos, social graphics, and any continuing campaign pieces.

Want to see more? Watch the full interview, and don’t forget to subscribe to our YouTube channel for future episodes of Humans of Talos.

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

• Cisco Talos discovered an ongoing malicious campaign, operating since at least December 2025, affecting a broader workforce in the Czech Republic with a previously undocumented botnet we call “PowMix.” 
• PowMix employs randomized command-and-control (C2) beaconing intervals, rather than persistent connection to the C2 server, to evade the network signature detections. 
• PowMix embeds the encrypted heartbeat data along with unique identifiers of the victim machine into the C2 URL paths, mimicking legitimate REST API URLs. 
• PowMix has the capability to remotely update the new C2 domain to the botnet configuration file dynamically. 
• Talos observed a few tactical similarities of the current campaign with the ZipLine campaign, including the payload delivery mechanism and the misuse of the legitimate cloud platform Heroku for C2 operations.

Victimology  

Talos observed that an attacker targeted Czech organizations across various levels, based on the contents of the lure documents used by the attacker in the current campaign.

Impersonating the legitimate EDEKA brand and authentic regulatory frameworks such as the Czech Data Protection Act, the attacker deploys decoy documents with compliance-themed lures, potentially aimed at compromising victims from human resources (HR), legal, and recruitment agencies. In the lure documents, the attacker also used compensation data, as well as the legitimate legislative references, to enhance the authenticity of these decoy documents and to entice the job aspirants across diverse sectors like IT, finance, and logistics. 

TTPs overlaps with the ZipLine campaign  

Talos observed a few tactical similarities employed in the current campaign with that of the ZipLine campaign, reported by researchers from Check Point in August 2025.

In the current campaign, the PowMix botnet payload is delivered via an LNK triggered PowerShell loader that extracts it from a ZIP archive data blob, bypasses AMSI, and executes the decrypted script directly in memory. This campaign shares tactical overlaps with the older ZipLine campaign (which deployed the MixShell malware), including identical ZIP-based payload concealment, Windows-scheduled task persistence, CRC32-based BOT ID generation, and the abuse of “herokuapp.com” for command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. Although there are overlaps in the tactics, the attacker’s final payload was unobserved, and the intent remains unknown in this campaign.

Attack summary  

The attack begins when a victim runs the Windows shortcut file contained within the received malicious ZIP file, potentially through a phishing email. This shortcut file triggers the execution of an embedded PowerShell loader script, which initially creates a copy of the ZIP file along with its contents in the victim’s “ProgramData” folder. Subsequently, it loads the malicious ZIP file, extracts, and executes the embedded PowMix botnet payload directly in the victim’s machine memory and starts to communicate with the botnet C2. 

PowerShell loader executes PowMix in memory  

The first stage PowerShell script functions as a loader, and its execution routine is designed to bypass security controls and deliver a secondary payload. It begins by defining several obfuscated variables, including file name of the malicious ZIP file that was likely received via a phishing email. Then, the script dynamically constructs paths to the folders such as “ProgramData” and the user’s “Downloads” folder to locate this ZIP file. Once the ZIP file is found, it extracts the contents to the “ProgramData”folder, effectively staging the environment for the next phase of the attack.

To evade detection, the script employs an AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass technique. It uses a reflection technique to browse the loaded assemblies in the current process, specifically searching for the AmsiUtils class. Once located, it identifies the amsiInitFailed field and manually sets its value to true. This action deceives the Windows security subsystem into thinking that AMSI has not initialized, which disables real-time scanning of subsequent commands, enabling the script to run malicious code in memory without being detected by Windows Defender or other endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions. 

The script parses the malicious ZIP file to locate a specific marker that is hardcoded, such as zAswKoK. This marker is treated as a delimiter, enabling the extraction of a hidden, encoded command that is embedded within the ZIP file data blob.  

Throughout this process, the script performs a series of string replacements, which include the removal of # symbols and the mapping of placeholders, such as {cdm}, to their corresponding specific file paths, reconstructing a functional secondary PowerShell script payload. Then it executes the secondary payload script in the victim machine memory using the Invoke-Expression (IEX) PowerShell command.  

PowMix botnet 

Talos discovered that the secondary payload PowerShell script, which we call “PowMix,” is a previously unreported botnet designed for remote access, reconnaissance, and remote code execution. 

The main execution of the script begins with an environment check to ensure it is running within a specific loader context at the placeholder {cdm}, which is the path of the Windows shortcut in the ProgramData folder, before immediately attempting to conceal its presence. It invokes a function that utilizes the Win32ShowWindowAsync function of “user32.dll” to hide the current PowerShell console window.  

Then it decrypts the C2 domain and a configuration file using a custom XOR-based routine with a hardcoded key. It retrieves the machine’s product ID by querying the HKLM: SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersion registry key for the Windows ProductID. PowMix processes the victim machine’s ProductID and the decrypted configuration data through a CRC32-style checksum function to generate a unique Bot ID and a corresponding Windows schedule task name, which it subsequently uses to establish persistence. 

Some of the hardcoded XOR key strings found in this campaign are: 

• HpSWSb  
• qDQyxQE  
• bKUxmhyAe 
• HymzqLse 
• KsEYwmgSF 
• ujCPOEPU 

Instead of using obvious task names, PowMix names the scheduled task by concatenating the Bot ID and Configuration file hash, resulting in names that appear as random hexadecimal strings (such as “289c2e236761”). The task configuration specifies a daily trigger set to execute at 11:00 a.m., and the execution action is configured to launch the benign Windows Explorer binary with the malicious Windows Shortcut file path as an argument. Windows Explorer’s file association handling then automatically launches the malicious shortcut file to execute the PowerShell loader script.  

Before attempting to establish persistence, PowMix performs several validation checks to ensure that another instance of the botnet is not running in the infected machine. It examines the process tree using Common Information Model (CIM) queries to identify its parent processes. If the PowMix is not running under either “svchost.exe” or “powershell.exe”, and if certain environmental variables are not set, it attempts to restart itself in the privileged context. 

The mutex implementation in the botnet prevents multiple instances from running at the same time. It creates a mutex with the name “Global[BotID]”.  The “Global” prefix makes the mutex visible across all user sessions, stopping separate instances from running in different user sessions. 

PowMix avoids persistent connections to the C2 server. Instead, it implements a jitter via Get-Random PowerShell command to vary the beaconing intervals initially between 0 and 261 seconds, and subsequently between 1,075 and 1,450 seconds. This technique attempts to prevent detection of C2 traffic through predictable network signatures. 

Each request from PowMix  to C2 is created by concatenating the base C2 domain with the Bot ID, configuration file hash, an encrypted heartbeat, a hexadecimal Unix timestamp, and a random hexadecimal suffix. The standard heartbeat string “[]0” is encrypted using a custom XOR routine using the Bot ID as the key and is then converted to a hex string. The inclusion of a random length hexadecimal suffix further ensures that every URL is unique. 

The attacker mimics the REST API calls URLs by embedding these data directly into the URL path, instead of using a URL query string or a POST request for communicating with the C2 server. 

PowMix establishes a Chrome User-Agent and configures the Accept-Language (en-US) and Accept-Encoding (gzip, deflate, br) headers. It utilizes the GetSystemWebProxy API along with DefaultCredentials to dynamically adopt the host machine’s network proxy settings and automatically authenticates using the logged-in user’s active session tokens, thereby disguising the C2 traffic as legitimate web browser traffic within the victim’s environment. 

The PowMix command processing logic is executed upon receiving the response from the C2 with a period delimiter. It extracts the second segment and decrypts it using the unique Bot ID as the XOR key. The resulting decrypted response is then evaluated through a conditional parser that distinguishes between the command operations hardcoded in the botnet and arbitrary code execution, allowing the attacker to remotely control the victim machine.  

The remote management commands that the botnet receives from the C2 are identified by a leading hash symbol (#). We found that the PowMix botnet facilitates the commands described below: 

• #KILL – The KILL command initiates a self-deletion routine, utilizing the Unregister-ScheduledTask PowerShell command with the parameter Confirm: $false to silently remove persistence, followed by Remove-Item -Recurse–Force command to wipe the malware’s directory in the victim machine.  
• #HOST – The HOST command enables the C2 infrastructure migration by remotely updating a new C2 URL to a configuration file. By receiving the HOST command, PowMix will encrypt the new domain that it receives using the hardcoded XOR key and save it to a local configuration file via Set-Content PowerShell command. During the next initialization of the botnet through the task scheduler execution, it prioritizes the local configuration file data with the encrypted new C2 domain over hardcoded defaults, providing a robust mechanism for evading domain blacklisting. 
• For non #-prefixed responses from the C2, the command processing routine of PowMix transitions into an arbitrary execution mode. It bypasses static detection of the Invoke-Expression (IEX) PowerShell command by dynamically reconstructing the command string from the $VerbosePreference variable and executes the decrypted payload while redirecting the output to Out-Null, ensuring erasing the execution traces.  

Coverage

The following ClamAV signature detects and blocks this threat: 

• Lnk.Trojan.PowMix-10059735-0 
• Txt.Trojan.PowMix-10059742-0 
• Txt.Trojan.PowMix-10059778-0 
• Win.Trojan.PowMix-10059728-0 

The following Snort Rules (SIDs) detect and block this threat: 

• Snort2 and Snort3: 66118 

Indicators of compromise (IOCs) 

The IOCs for this threat are also available at our GitHub repository here. 

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More