June 2025 saw several sophisticated and stealthy cyber attacks that relied heavily on obfuscated scripts, abuse of legitimate services, and multi-stage delivery techniques. Among the key threats observed by ANY.RUN’s analysts were malware campaigns using GitHub for payload hosting, JavaScript employing control-flow flattening to drop Remcos, and obfuscated BAT scripts delivering NetSupport RAT. Let’s see how ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox and Threat Intelligence Lookup can help security teams detect, investigate, and understand these threats.
1. Braodo Stealer Abuses GitHub for Payload Staging and Hosting
A new campaign distributing Braodo stealer leverages public GitHub repository, including raw file content, to host payloads. The primary goal of this stealer is data exfiltration, and at the time of analysis, its detection rate was low. The BAT files used in the campaign include misleading comments to complicate analysis.
ANY.RUN’s Script Tracer simplifies the analysis by logging the multi-stage execution flow step by step, without the need for manual deobfuscation. Let’s take a closer look at this threat’s behavior using ANY.RUN Interactive Sandbox, which provides full visibility into process activity and persistence mechanisms.
The first BAT file executes a CMD command that launches PowerShell in hidden mode to avoid displaying a visible window. It then downloads a second BAT file from github[.]com, disguised as a .PNG file, saves it to the %temp% folder, and executes it.
Pseudo .png file downloaded from GitHub
The second BAT file launches a new PowerShell script file, that removes components from the earlier stages, enforces TLS 1.2, retrieves an additional payload from raw.githubusercontent[.]com, saving it in the Startup folder, and downloads main payload in a ZIP file. This behavior is captured in ANY.RUN’s Script Tracer.
The final payload, Braodo Stealer, is extracted from a ZIP file, stored in the Public directory, and executed using python.exe. After execution, it deletes the initial archive to reduce artifacts. The Python file is obfuscated with pyobfuscate and contains non-encrypted, custom Base64-encoded payload strings appended to the script.
The whole attack chain detailed in the Interactive Sandbox
ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup allows analysts to discover recent Braodo attacks and fresh samples of this stealer dissected by the users of the Interactive Sandbox. Search by the malware’s name and view analyses:
Braodo analyses in the Sandbox found via Threat Intelligence Lookup
The search results contain a selection of Brado samples recently analyzed by the Sandbox users. Each analysis session can be explored in depth for harvesting IOCs and observing the malware’s behavior.
Speed up triage and incident response with instant access to threat data on attacks across 15,000 organizations
Another tricky piece of malicious Java script has been observed using a technique called control-flow flattening obfuscation to secretly deliver Remcos malware. The JS contains multiple self-invoking functions that loop arrays of strings and numbers in a while(!![]) loop until a calculated checksum matches a predefined value. This obfuscation technique forces static analyzers to parse through the array’s content instead of returning the required string directly.
ANY.RUN’s Script Tracer enables easy analysis of heavily obfuscated scripts by logging their execution in real time, with no need for manual deobfuscation.
A Remcos malware sample including the obfuscated JavaScript
The script:
Invokes #PowerShell using ActiveXObject(“http://WScript.Shell”) with parameters;
Creates a http://System.Net.WebClient object;
Specifies the URL to download the binary;
Downloads the binary data and passes it to #MSBuild;
Downloads and executes the Remcos malware module.
The script’s architecture and behavior exposed in ANY.RUN’s sandbox
PowerShell-abusing script attacks are becoming more widespread and sophisticated. It is extremely important for threat hunters to be able to investigate and analyze such attacks, see what malware and malefactors are using them, and how.
A guest article by Clandestine, threat hunter and researcher, has recently been published in our blog highlighting a number of advanced tips for leveraging Threat Intelligence Lookup for malware data gathering and analysis (a guide to main TI Lookup features and their use is included, so we recommend to read and take note).
Clandestine demonstrates how one can find malware samples that use scripting languages to hide malicious code or execute obfuscated commands:
This query identifies scripts that run system commands, the pattern commonly observed in multi-stage attacks where script files act as initial droppers that subsequently execute obfuscated PowerShell commands.
The combination of file extension parameters (you can search for other script types like Visual Basic Script (.vbs) files) with command-line indicators helps security analysts identify and analyze this obfuscation technique.
Learn to Track Emerging Cyber Threats
Check out expert guide to collecting intelligence on emerging threats with TI Lookup
Read full guide
3. Obfuscated BAT file used to deliver NetSupport RAT
Cybercriminals continue to rely on BAT files (batch scripts) to sneak malware into systems and evade detection. ANY.RUN team has studied one such case where an obfuscated BAT file was used to deliver the NetSupport Remote Access Trojan (RAT) – a tool originally designed for remote IT support but now abused by attackers to gain full control over victims’ machines.
Cmd.exe runs an obfuscated BAT file which launches PowerShell scripts.
PowerShell downloads and executes client32.exe — the NetSupport client.
The malware uses a ‘client32’ process to run NetSupport RAT and add it to autorun in registry via reg.exe.
ANY.RUN’s Sandbox Process Graph showing NetSupport penetrating network
Creates an ‘Options’ folder in %APPDATA % if missing.
NetSupport client downloads a task .zip file, extracts, and runs it from %APPDATA%Application.zip.
Options folder created, .zip archive delivered: Script Tracer in the Sandbox
Deletes ZIP files after execution.
As attackers develop new ways to penetrate networks and evade detection, threat hunting becomes more challenging and demands to follow trends to keep ahead of possible disasters.
Threat Intelligence Lookup allows you to search for small, seemingly benign artifacts in the network that can be traces of malicious activities, like a folder creation in the system directory AppDataRoaming by a command line-run script:
A number of NetSupport trojan samples found by their creating a folder on endpoint
With the CommandLine search parameter, you can find malware samples based on any script artifacts found in system logs, for example, registry key changes.
How TI Lookup Benefits SOC
ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup is a critical ally for security teams facing an ever-growing variety of evasive malware. With attackers increasingly relying on multi-stage scripts, living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins), and public infrastructure like GitHub, traditional indicators often go unnoticed.
With Threat Intelligence Lookup your team can:
Speed up threat investigations by letting analysts quickly pivot from indicators and suspicious behaviors to related malware samples and campaigns.
Shorten response times by providing contextual threat insights essential for fast, informed security decisions.
Enhance alert triage by prioritizing detections based on real-world behavior and threat prevalence.
Support proactive threat hunting through flexible search queries that uncover evolving obfuscation and delivery techniques.
Improve detection coverage by uncovering patterns like scripting abuse, LOLBins, and infrastructure used in multi-stage attacks.
The cyber incidents in June 2025 underscore a clear trend: adversaries are refining their methods with obfuscation, open-source abuse, and layered execution chains. To combat these threats effectively, security teams need both visibility and context. Our Interactive Sandbox and TI Lookup empower analysts to deconstruct complex attacks and proactively hunt emerging threats before they become breaches.
About ANY.RUN
ANY.RUN supports over 15,000 organizations across industries such as banking, manufacturing, telecommunications, healthcare, retail, and technology, helping them build stronger and more resilient cybersecurity operations.
With our cloud-based Interactive Sandbox, security teams can safely analyze and understand threats targeting Windows, Linux, and Android environments in less than 40 seconds and without the need for complex on-premise systems. Combined with TI Lookup, YARA Search, and TI Feeds, we equip businesses to speed up investigations, reduce security risks, and improve team’s efficiency.
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00adminhttps://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.pngadmin2025-06-25 12:06:442025-06-25 12:06:44Top 3 Cyber Attacks in June 2025: GitHub Abuse, Control Flow Flattening, and More
Cybercriminals are continuing to explore artificial intelligence (AI) technologies such as large language models (LLMs) to aid in their criminal hacking activities.
Some cybercriminals have resorted to using uncensored LLMs or even custom-built criminal LLMs for illicit purposes.
Advertised features of malicious LLMs indicate that cybercriminals are connecting these systems to various external tools for sending outbound email, scanning sites for vulnerabilities, verifying stolen credit card numbers and more.
Cybercriminals also abuse legitimate AI technology, such as jailbreaking legitimate LLMs, to aid in their operations.
Generative AI and LLMs have taken the world by storm. With the ability to generate convincing text, solve problems, write computer code and more, LLMs are being integrated into almost every facet of society. According to Hugging Face (a platform that hosts models), there are currently over 1.8 million different models to choose from.
LLMs are usually built with key safety features, including alignment and guardrails. Alignment is a training process that LLMs undergo to minimize bias and ensure that the LLM generates outputs that are consistent with human values and ethics. Guardrails are additional real-time safety mechanisms that try to restrain the LLM from engaging in harmful or undesirable actions in response to user input. Many of the most advanced (or “frontier”) LLMs are protected in this manner. For example, asking ChatGPT to produce a phishing email will result in a denial, such as, “Sorry, I can’t assist with that.”
For cybercriminals who wish to utilize LLMs for conducting or improving their attacks, these safety mechanisms can present a significant obstacle. To achieve their goals, cybercriminals are increasingly gravitating towards uncensored LLMs, cybercriminal-designed LLMs and jailbreaking legitimate LLMs.
Uncensored LLMs
Uncensored LLMs are unaligned models that operate without the constraints of guardrails. These systems happily generate sensitive, controversial, or potentially harmful output in response to user prompts. As a result, uncensored LLMs are perfectly suited for cybercriminal usage.
Figure 1. An uncensored LLM, OnionGPT, advertised on the hacking forum Dread.
Uncensored LLMs are quite easy to find. For example, using the cross-platform Omni-Layer Learning Language Acquisition (Ollama) framework, a user can download and run an uncensored LLM on their local machine. Ollama comes with several uncensored models such as Llama 2 Uncensored which is based on Meta’s Llama 2 model. Once it is running, users can submit prompts that would otherwise be rejected by more safety-conscious LLM implementations. The downside is that these models are running on users’ local machines and running larger models, which generally produce better results but requires more system resources.
Another uncensored LLM popular among cybercriminals is a tool called WhiteRabbitNeo. WhiteRabbitNeo bills itself as a “Uncensored AI model for (Dev) SecOps teams” which can support “use cases for offensive and defensive cybersecurity”. This LLM will happily write offensive security tools, phishing emails and more.
Figure 3. Sample output from the WhiteRabbitNeo uncensored LLM
Researchers have also published methods to demonstrate how to strip alignment that is embedded into the training data of existing open-source models. Once removed, a user can uncensor their LLM by using the modified training set to fine tune a base model.
Cybercriminal-designed LLMs
Since most popular LLMs come with significant guardrails, some enterprising cybercriminals have developed their own LLMs without restrictions that they market to other cybercriminals. This includes apps like GhostGPT, WormGPT, DarkGPT, DarkestGPT and FraudGPT.
Figure 4. FraudGPT dark web homepage.
For example, the developer behind FraudGPT, CanadianKingpin12, advertises FraudGPT on the dark web, and also has an account on Telegram. The dark web site for FraudGPT advertises some interesting features:
Write malicious code
Create undetectable malware
Find non-VBV bins
Create phishing pages
Create hacking tools
Find groups, sites, markets
Write scam pages/letters
Find leaks and vulnerabilities
Learn to code/hack
Find cardable sites
Millions of samples of phishing emails
6220+ source code references for malware
Automatic scripts for replicating logs/cookies
In-panel Page hosting included (10 pages/month) with Google Chrome anti-red page
Code obfuscation
Custom data set (upload your sample page in .html)
Bot creation of virtual machines and accounts (1 virtual machine per month on license)
Utilizing GoldCheck CVV checker
OTP Bot with spoofing (*additional package)
Check CVVs with GoldCheck API
Create username:password website configs
Remote OpenBullet configs
Scan websites for vulnerabilities across a massive CVE database (*PRO only)
Generate realistic phishing panels, pages, SMS and e-mails
Send mail from webshells
Talos attempted to obtain access to FraudGPT by reaching out to CanadianKingpin12 on Telegram. After considerable negotiation, we were finally offered a username and password at the FraudGPT dark web site. However, the username and password provided by CanadianKingpin12 did not work. CanadianKingpin12 then asked us to send them cryptocurrency to purchase a software “crack” for the FraudGPT login page. At this point it was clear that CanadianKingpin12 had no working product, and they were scamming potential FraudGPT customers out of their cryptocurrency. This was confirmed by several other victims who had also been scammed by CanadianKingpin12 when they attempted to purchase access to the FraudGPT LLM. Scams such as these are an ever-present risk when dealing with unscrupulous actors, and it continues a long tradition of scams in the cybercrime space.
Similar cybercriminal-designed LLM projects can be found elsewhere on the dark web. A cybercriminal LLM called DarkestGPT, which starts at .0015BTC for a one-month subscription, advertises the following features:
Figure 5. DarkestGPT “Tools and Potential” tab on their dark web site.
LLM jailbreaks
Given the limited viability of uncensored LLMs due to resource constraints and the high level of fraud and scams present among cybercriminal LLM purveyors, many cybercriminals have elected to abuse legitimate LLMs instead. The main hurdle that cybercriminals need to overcome are the training alignment and guardrails that prevent the LLM from responding to prompts with unethical, illegal or harmful content. A form of prompt injection, jailbreak attacks aim to put the LLM into a state where it ignores its alignment training and guardrails protection.
There are many ways to trick an LLM into providing dangerous responses. New jailbreaking methods are constantly being researched and discovered, while LLM developers respond by enhancing the guardrails in a sort of jailbreak arms race. Below are just a few of the available jailbreaking techniques.
Obfuscation/encoding-based jailbreaks
By obfuscating certain words or phrases, these text-based jailbreak attacks seek to bypass any hardcoded restrictions on specific words/topics, or to cause the execution to follow a nonstandard path that might bypass protections put in place by the LLM developers. These obfuscation techniques may include:
Base64/Rot-13 encoding
Different languages
L33t sp34k
Morse code
Emojis
Adding spaces or UTF-8 characters into words/text, among othersetc.
Adversarial suffix jailbreaks
These attacks are somewhat like obfuscation and encoding tricks. Instead of modifying the tokens in the prompt itself, adversarial suffix jailbreaks involve appending random text to the end of a malicious prompt to elicit a harmful response.
Role-playing jailbreaks
This type of attack involves prompting the LLM to adopt the persona of a fictional universe/character that ignores the ethical rules set by the model’s creators and is willing to fulfill any command. This includes jailbreak techniques such as DAN (Do Anything Now), and the Grandma jailbreak which involves asking the chatbot to assume the role of the user’s grandmother.
Meta prompting
Meta prompting involves exploiting the model’s awareness of its own limitations to devise successful workarounds, effectively enlisting the model in the effort to bypass its own safeguards.
Context manipulation jailbreaks
This covers several different jailbreak techniques including:
Crescendo, a technique which progressively increases the harmfulness in prompts until some sort of rejection is received in order to probe for where and how LLM guardrails are implemented.
Context Compliance Attacks, which exploit the fact that many LLMs do not maintain conversation state. Attackers inject fake prior LLM responses into their prompts, such as a brief statement discussing the sensitive topic, or a statement expressing readiness to supply further details as per the user’s preferences.
Math prompt jailbreaks
The math prompt method evaluates how well an AI system can manage malicious inputs when they’re disguised using mathematical frameworks such as set theory, group theory, and abstract algebra. Rephrasing harmful requests as math problems can allow attackers to evade safety features in advanced large language models (LLMs).
Payload splitting
In this scenario, the attacker guides the LLM to merge several prompts in a way that produces harmful output. While texts A and B may seem benign when considered separately, their combination (A+B) can result in malicious content.
Academic framing
This method makes harmful content appear acceptable by framing it as part of a research or educational discussion. It takes advantage of the model’s interpretation of academic intent and freedom, often using scholarly language and formatting to bypass safeguards.
System override
This strategy tries to trick the model into believing it is functioning in a unique mode where usual limitations are lifted. It leverages the model’s perception of system-level functions or maintenance states to circumvent safety mechanisms.
How cybercriminals use LLMs
In December 2024, Anthropic, the developers behind the Claude LLM, published a report detailing how its users were utilizing Claude. Using a system named Clio, they summarized and categorized users’ conversations with their AI model. According to Anthropic, the top three uses for Claude were programming, content creation and research.
Figure 6. Anthropic’s graphic of top use cases on Claude.ai.
Analyzing the feature sets advertised by the criminal-designed LLMs, we can see that cybercriminals are using LLMs for mostly the same tasks as normal LLM users. Programming features of many criminal LLMs include the ability to assist cybercriminals in writing ransomware, remote access trojans, wipers, code obfuscation, shellcode generation and script/tool creation. To facilitate content creation, criminal LLMs will assist in writing phishing emails, landing pages and configuration files. Criminal LLMs also support research activities like verifying stolen credit cards, scanning sites/code for vulnerabilities and even helping cybercriminals come up with “lucrative” criminal ideas for their next big score.
Various hacking forums also shed additional light on criminal uses of LLMs. For example, on the popular hacking forum Dread, users were discussing connecting LLMs to external tools like Nmap, and using the LLM to summarize the Nmap output.
Figure 7. A post on the Dread hacking forum discussing connecting Nmap to LLMs
LLMs are also targets for cyber attackers
Any new technology typically brings along with it changes to the attack surface, and LLMs are no exception. In addition to using LLMs for their own nefarious ends, attackers are also attempting to compromise LLMs and their users.
Backdoored LLMs
A vast majority of the models available at Hugging Face use Python’s pickle module to serialize the models into a file that users can download. Clever attackers can include Python code in the pickle file, which runs as part of the deserialization process. Thus, when a user downloads an AI model and runs it, they may be running code placed into the model by an attacker. Hugging Face uses Picklescan, among other tools, to scan the models uploaded by users in an effort to identify models that misbehave. However, there have been several recent vulnerabilities in Picklescan, and researchers have already identified Hugging Face models containing malware. As always, make sure any file you plan to download and run comes from a trusted source and consider running the file in a sandbox to mitigate any risk of infection.
Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG)
LLMs that utilize Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) make calls to external data sources to augment their training data with up-to-date information. For example, if you ask an LLM what the weather is like a particular day, the LLM will need to reach out to an external data source such as a website to retrieve the correct forecast. If an attacker has access to submit or manipulate content in the RAG database, they may poison the lookup results, perhaps adding additional instructions for the LLM to alter its response to the user’s prompt, even targeting specific users.
Conclusion
As AI technology continues to develop, Cisco Talos expects cybercriminals to continue adopting LLMs to help streamline their processes, write tools/scripts that can be used to compromise users and generate content that can more easily bypass defenses. This new technology doesn’t necessarily arm cybercriminals with completely novel cyber weapons, but it does act as a force multiplier, enhancing and improving familiar attacks.
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00adminhttps://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.pngadmin2025-06-25 10:06:362025-06-25 10:06:36Cybercriminal abuse of large language models
Researchers have uncovered three vulnerabilities in the popular content management system, Sitecore Experience Platform.
CVE-2025-34509 involves a hard-coded password (consisting of just a single letter) that allows an attacker to remotely log in as a service account.
CVE-2025-34510 is a Zip Slip vulnerability enabling an authenticated user to upload and extract a ZIP archive to the website’s root directory.
CVE-2025-34511 also allows users to upload external files to the site, but this time without any restrictions.
By combining the first vulnerability with either of the latter two, an attacker can achieve remote code execution (RCE) on a server running the Sitecore Experience Platform.
There’s currently no evidence of these vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild; however, the detailed analysis published by watchTowr contains enough information for threat actors to weaponize them at any moment.
CVE-2025-34509 — access through a preset account
The Sitecore CMS includes several default accounts, one of which is sitecoreServicesAPI. Naturally, passwords for all accounts are stored in a hashed (and even salted) form. However, this doesn’t make much difference if the password consists of just the single letter “b”. Such a password can be brute-forced in about three seconds.
Notably, Sitecore’s developers advise against modifying default accounts, warning that “editing a default user account can affect other areas of the security model” (whatever that means). Site admins following the official instructions are thus unlikely to change these passwords. As a result, such default accounts are likely present in most websites using this CMS.
That said, the sitecoreServicesAPI user has no assigned rights or roles, so simply authenticating through the standard Sitecore login interface isn’t possible. However, the researchers found a way to bypass the database check required for successful authentication (for details, see the original research). As a result, the attacker obtains a valid session cookie. They still don’t have administrator rights, but this cookie can be used for further attacks.
CVE-2025-34510 — vulnerability in Sitecore’s file uploader
Sitecore has a file upload mechanism which any authenticated user can use. So having a valid session cookie, an attacker can create an HTTP request to upload and automatically extract a ZIP archive. The essence of CVE-2025-34510 is that due to flawed input sanitization, an authenticated attacker can perform a path traversal. You can read more about this type of vulnerability — known as Zip Slip — in our post on ZIP file processing. In essence, the attacker can extract the archive to any location — for example, the website’s root folder. This way, the attacker can upload anything — such as their own web shell.
CVE-2025-34511 — vulnerability in the file uploader of the Sitecore PowerShell Extensions module
CVE-2025-34511 is an alternative way to compromise Sitecore. This vulnerability is present in the Sitecore PowerShell Extensions module, which is required for a number of Sitecore extensions to function — for example, the Sitecore Experience Accelerator, one of the most popular extensions for this CMS.
Essentially, this vulnerability works in much the same way as CVE-2025-34510, only slightly simpler. The Sitecore PowerShell extension also has its own file upload mechanism, which can be exploited by an authenticated user. Through HTTP requests, an attacker can upload any file with any extension to the CMS, and save it to any directory on the website. This means there’s no need to prepare a custom ZIP archive and path, and the result is basically the same: a web shell upload.
How to protect against attacks on the Sitecore Experience Platform
Patches for these three vulnerabilities were released back in May 2025. If your company uses Sitecore, especially in combination with Sitecore PowerShell Extensions, we recommend updating the CMS as soon as possible. According to NIST descriptions, CVE-2025-34509 affects Sitecore Experience Manager and Experience Platform versions 10.1 through 10.1.4 rev. 011974 PRE; all variants of 10.2; 10.3 through 10.3.3 rev. 011967 PRE; and 10.4 through 10.4.1 rev. 011941 PRE. CVE-2025-34510 is present in Experience Manager, Experience Platform, and Experience Commerce versions 9.0 through 9.3 and 10.0 through 10.4. Lastly, CVE-2025-34511 affects all versions of Sitecore PowerShell Extensions up to version 7.0.
The researchers who discovered these flaws claim to be aware of four other, much more interesting vulnerabilities. However, since patches aren’t ready yet, they’ve said they will disclose these vulnerabilities later. As such, we recommend keeping an eye on upcoming updates from the Sitecore developers.
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00adminhttps://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.pngadmin2025-06-24 20:06:392025-06-24 20:06:39Multiple vulnerabilities in Sitecore CMS | Kaspersky official blog
When malware infiltrates a system, it doesn’t always make noise. In fact, some of the most dangerous threats operate quietly embedding themselves deep within the system and ensuring they come back even after a reboot. One of the most common ways they achieve this is by abusing the Windows Registry.
In this article, we’ll walk through how registry abuse works, the signs to watch out for, and how security analysts can catch it using interactive sandboxes, such as ANY.RUN.
What Is Registry Abuse in Malware?
The Windows Registry is an important part of the operating system. It stores configuration settings that determine how Windows behaves, how software runs, and even how users interact with the system. From startup routines to driver settings and user preferences, the registry touches almost every part of the OS.
As it’s central, the registry is also a target for malware authors. By modifying registry keys and values, malware can silently manipulate system behavior to:
Stay persistent by adding itself to autorun keys, it ensures execution every time the system boots.
Hide from users disabling Task Manager, hiding file extensions, or suppressing warnings to avoid detection.
Weaken security turning off Windows Defender or blocking updates to bypass protection.
Control user behavior redirecting browser traffic, setting fake proxies, or hijacking default apps.
The Fastest Way to Spot Registry Abuse inside ANY.RUN Sandbox
Traditional security tools often miss subtle but critical signs of registry abuse, especially when malware hides behind scripts or legitimate-looking processes.
By running suspicious files or links inside ANY.RUN’s interactive sandbox, analysts can observe real-time registry changes as they happen, without waiting for static scans to catch up.
Why It’s So Effective:
Instant visibility into registry modifications, autorun key changes, and process behaviors
Behavior-based detection, not just signatures; perfect for catching new or obfuscated threats
Clear labeling and process tree that highlight when a script or binary tampers with the registry
Interactive control, so you can simulate real user actions that trigger registry abuse (like opening a file or clicking a button)
Real-World Examples of Registry Abuse in Malware
Now, let’s look at how malware abuses the registry in practice and how ANY.RUN makes it easy to detect.
1. Persistence via Autorun Key Modification
This sample shows how the malware (BootstrapperNew.exe) abuses the registry to ensure it launches automatically every time the system boots; a classic persistence mechanism.
BootstrapperNew.exe process with its details demonstrated inside ANY.RUN sandbox
Click on the tactic to get all the details:
Modification of the mentioned registry key
This modification triggers Windows to execute the malicious file at every user login, giving the attacker a reliable foothold on the system.
ANY.RUN also flags this behavior with the MITRE ATT&CK sub-technique T1547.001 (Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder), clearly highlighting the persistence mechanism used. The visual process tree further confirms the execution flow, registry operation, and background network activity.
With static detection tools, this behavior might go unnoticed. But in ANY.RUN’s sandbox, the threat is immediately identified, tagged, and visually traceable in real time, from registry edit to scheduled task creation.
2. FormBook Stealer Using Registry for Stealth
In this example, the malware identified as FormBook manipulates the Windows Registry to aid in stealth and persistence.
Right after execution, FormBook writes a new registry entry under:
Key: HKEY_CURRENT_USERSOFTWARESoftina
Name: MMM-Vkusnaa
Value: 19.06.2025
Formbook detected with modified registry key
Custom registry values like this aren’t random. They’re typically placed in obscure subkeys (SOFTWARESoftina in this case) to avoid detection and logging by standard monitoring tools, but in ANY.RUN’s sandbox, it’s instantly visible and tied to MITRE technique T1112: Modify Registry.
Some malware doesn’t act immediately. Instead, it quietly profiles the environment to decide how (or whether) to execute. That’s exactly what we see in this sample, where the malware queries the registry to gather detailed system information.
Malware reading CPU info exposed inside ANY.RUN sandbox
This query fetches CPU information, such as model name and vendor. While this might seem benign, it plays a crucial role in anti-analysis and evasion tactics.
Why malware reads CPU info:
Environment validation: Malware may use CPU data to check if it’s running on a real machine or a virtual one (e.g., commonly used by sandboxes or researchers).
Tailored payloads: Some threats adapt their behavior based on system specs, avoiding execution if they detect low-end CPUs or virtual environments.
Fingerprinting the target: CPU info is often collected alongside other system data to create a unique victim profile.
But this is just the beginning. According to the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1012: Query Registry, this sample retrieves a wide range of values:
MITRE ATT&CK technique T1012: Query Registry with a wide range of values
Proxy configuration: Determines whether the system uses a proxy and may hijack it
Machine GUID: A unique identifier, useful for tracking infected hosts
Installed software (50 reads): Likely for reconnaissance or to check for security tools
Internet Explorer security settings: May suggest preparation for exploit delivery via browser
System language & locale: Used to avoid infecting machines in certain countries
Computer name & Windows product ID: Adds more detail to the fingerprint
Software policy settings: Used to detect restrictions or protections enabled by admins
This shows how malware can treat the registry as a rich source of system intelligence. Each value queried helps build a clearer picture of the host environment, guiding the next malicious action.
4. Suspicious Registry Modification via REG.EXE
This sample involves a process (_virlock.exe) that uses reg.exe, a legitimate Windows utility, to modify the registry. This kind of activity isn’t inherently malicious, but in the context of malware execution, it often signals stealthy post-infection behavior.
Shortly after execution, the malware launches a command: reg add HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerAdvanced /v HideFileExt /t REG_DWORD /d 1
This command modifies the registry to hide file extensions for known file types, a well-documented trick used by malware to disguise malicious executables (e.g., invoice.pdf.exe appears as invoice.pdf).
This case is a good reminder that not all registry abuse is about persistence. Some changes are purely meant to deceive the user, reduce visibility, or mask malicious actions.
With ANY.RUN’s behavioral analysis, this tactic becomes immediately visible, showing which registry key was changed, how, when, and by what process, including full command-line context.
5. Script-Based Registry Modification
In this sample, we see a Windows Script Host process (wscript.exe) modifying the registry, not through a typical executable, but via script-based interaction. This kind of behavior is harder to detect, especially if you’re relying on traditional static analysis.
Thanks to ANY.RUN’s Script Tracer, we can observe the exact call and parameters used:
Key: HKCUSoftwareOJXVOPIitLTnYNgdonnsegment2
Value: (Hex-encoded string payload)
Process: wscript.exe
Operation: RegWrite via WshShell3
ANY.RUN’s Script Tracer observing calls and parameters
This script creates a new key and writes what appears to be an obfuscated or encoded payload into the registry; a technique commonly used to:
Store secondary payloads or shellcode
Evade file-based detection mechanisms
Delay execution until a later stage (fileless persistence)
The registry key name (OJXVOPIitLTnYNg) is randomly generated and meaningless, a common trait of obfuscated malware activity.
We can see how the script writes a long block of hexadecimal content, which may later be decoded and executed, without ever dropping a traditional file on disk.
Long block of hexadecimal content displayed inside ANY.RUN sandbox
These modifications fall under MITRE ATT&CK technique T1112: Modify Registry, and ANY.RUN labels this behavior as Dangerous (13 instances).
The technique “Modify Registry” with all its details inside ANY.RUN sandbox
Without behavioral analysis, this kind of registry manipulation would be nearly invisible, but with Script Tracer, security analysts can follow every step the script takes, down to the exact method calls and values.
Spotting Registry Abuse is Easy with ANY.RUN
Registry modifications are a common and powerful tactic used by malware to stay hidden, persist through reboots, and weaken your defenses. But with the right tools, these threats become much easier to spot, investigate, and respond to.
ANY.RUN’s interactive sandbox doesn’t just show you what malware is doing, it visually breaks down every behavior, from registry edits to process injection and data exfiltration, in real time.
Faster threat detection Catch malicious registry changes and system tampering before damage is done; no need to wait for traditional tools to catch up.
Improved incident response With clear visual evidence and behavior chains, your team can respond to threats with greater accuracy and speed.
Reduced investigation time Analysts can immediately see what’s been changed, what triggered the behavior, and which malware family is involved.
Stronger defenses across the board By identifying how threats abuse the registry, you can harden your endpoints, update rules, and block similar attacks in the future.
Better collaboration and reporting Export detailed analysis reports, share IOCs with teams, and make smarter security decisions faster.
See how ANY.RUN’s interactive sandbox reveals the behavior behind modern threats in real time, and with full context.
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00adminhttps://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.pngadmin2025-06-24 13:06:362025-06-24 13:06:36How to Spot Registry Abuse by Malware: Examples in ANY.RUN Sandbox
Your snapshots are, quite literally, the keys to your private life. Your gallery holds your future plans, financial secrets, cat pictures, and sometimes even things you’d never share with anyone. But how often do you truly think about protecting those images? We hope that ever since you heard about the SparkCat cross-platform stealer, you’ve been pondering it more often than usual.
Now we’ve discovered that Trojan’s little sibling, which we’ve affectionately named SparkKitty. But don’t let the cute name fool you — behind it lies a spy that, like its older brother, aims to steal photos from its victims’ smartphones. What makes this threat unique, and why should both Android and iPhone users prick up their ears?
How SparkKitty makes its way onto devices
The stealer spreads in two ways: (i) in the wild — that is, across the untamed parts of the internet; and (ii) through official app stores like the App Store and Google Play. Let’s break this down.
Official app stores
In Apple’s App Store, the malware was lurking inside the 币coin app — designed for tracking cryptocurrency rates and trading signals. We’re not sure exactly how this suspicious spy activity ended up in the app. It’s possible there was a supply-chain compromise, and the developers themselves weren’t aware of SparkKitty until we notified them. But there’s also a second possibility: the developers deliberately embedded the stealer into the app. Regardless, this is the second time we’ve seen a Trojan sneak into the App Store, and we’ve alerted Apple about it. SparkCat was the first instance.
Infected application in the App Store
It’s a different story with Google Play: malicious apps pop up on a regular basis, and we frequently cover these threats on Kaspersky Daily. This time, we detected malicious activity in a messaging app that includes crypto-exchange features. This is a popular app that’s been installed more than 10 000 times, and was still available in the store at the time of the study. We’ve contacted Google to warn them about the threat.
Suspicious links in the wild
That said, the attackers have been much more creative this time in spreading the malware out in the wild. Once, during a routine review of suspicious links (we click them so you don’t have to!) our experts uncovered several similar pages distributing a TikTok mod for Android. One of the main things this mod did was call additional code. “That looks suspicious”, we thought. And we were right. The code contained links displayed as buttons within the app, all directing users to an online store called TikToki Mall, which sold a variety of items. Unfortunately, we couldn’t determine if the store was legitimate or just a big trap — but one interesting fact stood out: TikToki Mall accepts cryptocurrency payments, and you need an invitation code to sign up and pay for any item. We didn’t find any further suspicious activity at this stage, and no traces of SparkKitty or other malware.
So we decided to take a different approach and see what happened when we tapped these same suspicious links from an iPhone. This led us to a page that vaguely resembled the App Store, which immediately prompted us to download the “TikTok app”.
iOS doesn’t allow users to download and run applications from third-party sources. However, Apple provides so-called provisioning profiles to every member of the Apple Developer Program. These allow installing custom applications not available in the App Store on user devices, such as beta versions or apps developed for internal corporate use. Attackers exploit these profiles to distribute apps that contain malware.
The installation process differed slightly from the usual procedure. Typically, in the App Store, you only need to tap Install once, but in this case, installing the fake TikTok required additional steps: downloading and installing a developer provisioning profile.
Installing an app from an unknown source on an iPhone
Naturally, this version of TikTok didn’t have any funny videos; it was just another store, similar to the Android version. While seemingly harmless, the iOS version requested access to the user’s gallery every time it launched — and that was the catch. This led us to discover a malicious module that sent images from the infected phone’s gallery, along with device information, to the attackers. We also found its traces in other Android applications. For the technical details of the story, check out our full report on Securelist.
Who’s at risk?
Our data shows that this campaign primarily targets users in Southeast Asia and China. That doesn’t mean, however, that other countries are beyond the reach of SparkKitty’s claws. The malware has been spreading since at least early 2024, and over the past year and a half attackers have likely considered upscaling their operation to other countries and continents. There’s nothing stopping them. What’s more, it’s not just the TikTok mod you should worry about; we’ve also found malicious activity inside various gambling and adult games, and even crypto-related apps.
If you think these attackers are just interested in admiring your vacation photos, think again. SparkKitty uploads each and every one of your snapshots to its command-and-control server. Those images could easily include screenshots of sensitive information like crypto wallet seed phrases, allowing these bad actors to steal your cryptocurrency.
How to protect yourself from SparkKitty
This Trojan spreads in many ways, and protecting yourself from every single one is a tough challenge. While the golden rule of “download apps from official sources only” still applies, we’ve found traces of this stealer in both Google Play and the App Store — places where apps are supposedly vetted and 100% safe. So what can you do about that?
We recommend focusing on securing your smartphone’s gallery. Naturally, the most foolproof method would be to never take photos or screenshots of sensitive information, but that’s virtually impossible nowadays. There’s a solution: store valuable photos in a secure vault. With Kaspersky Password Manager, you can only view and send protected, important photos after entering the main password, which only you know. Note that the protected content is not confined to just one device. The password manager can sync information between smartphones and computers. This includes bank-card data, two-factor authentication tokens, and anything else you choose to store in Kaspersky Password Manager – including your photos.
It’s also crucial to check your smartphone right now for any of the infected apps we’ve discovered; the extended list is available on Securelist. For Android, Kaspersky for Android can help with this — it’ll find and remove malware for you. On iPhone, due to the closed architecture of iOS, our security solution can’t scan for and delete previously installed infected apps, but it will prevent any attempts to send data to the attackers’ servers and warn you about them.
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00adminhttps://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.pngadmin2025-06-23 08:06:402025-06-23 08:06:40SparkKitty: a new stealer in the App Store and Google Play | Kaspersky official blog
You’ve probably already seen the headlines “The biggest leak in human history”. The whole world is in uproar after Cybernews journalists found the logins and passwords to 16 billion accounts in the public domain — two for each inhabitant of the planet! What is this leak, and what do you need to do right now?
What’s the leak, and are my credentials there?
The original study says that the Cybernews team has been working on the topic since the beginning of the year, and in six months they’ve managed to collect 30 unsecured datasets that add up to 16 billion exposed login credentials. The largest chunk of data — 3.5 billion records — is related to the world’s Portuguese-speaking population; another 455 million records are related to Russia, and 60 million are “most likely” related to Telegram.
The database is built on the following principle: URL, followed by login and password. That’s it, nothing else. At the same time, it’s said that the data of users of all the giant services was leaked: Apple, Google, Facebook, Telegram, GitHub, etc. Surprisingly, it was passwords and not hashes that ended up in the hands of the journalists. In our study How hackers can crack your password in an hour, we detailed exactly how companies store passwords (spoiler: almost always in closed form using hashing algorithms).
The story pays special attention to the freshness of the data: journalists claim that the 16 billion doesn’t include the biggest leaks, which we wrote about on the Kaspersky Daily blog. The important question remains behind the scenes: “Where did the 16 billion freshly leaked passwords come from, and why has no one seen them except Cybernews?”. Unfortunately, the journalists haven’t provided any evidence of existence of this database. Therefore, neither Kaspersky’s experts nor anyone else has managed to analyze it. Therefore, we cannot say whether yours – or anyone else’s – data is in there.
According to Cybernews, the accessing the entire database was possible through the use of stealers. This seems reasonable, since this is a threat that’s gaining momentum. According to our data, the number of detected password-theft attacks worldwide increased by 21% from 2023 to 2024. Attackers are targeting both private and corporate users.
What you need to do right now
First, let’s set skepticism aside. Yes, we don’t reliably know what exactly this leak is, or whose data is in it. But that doesn’t mean you should do nothing.
The first and best recommendation is to change your passwords. There are many options for creating a new password that’s difficult for hackers to crack but easy to remember. We covered this in detail in our post Creating an unforgettable password – have a read and choose any method you prefer.
Think of a favorite line from a song or a memorable quote from a movie, and then replace, say, every second or third letter with special characters that aren’t in sequential order on the keyboard.
For example, if you’re a fan of the Harry Potter saga, you may try to use the Wingardium Leviosa charm for a good cause. Let’s try transforming this levitation charm according to the rule above while peppering it generously with special characters: Wi4ga/di0mL&vi@sa
Easy, right?
Store your passwords securely. The best solution is to use a special password manager. It will generate, securely store, and automatically fill in complex, hack-proof passwords on all your devices for you. You’ll only need to create and remember one main password, which will become a secure key to all other passwords, bank details, photos, and everything else that can be stored in Kaspersky Password Manager.
Set up two-factor authentication. Almost all popular services support 2FA in one form or another, and the presence of a second factor makes it much more difficult, if not impossible, to hack your account. Kaspersky Password Manager makes it easy to store and sync 2FA tokens, as well as generate one-time codes on either your smartphone or computer.
Remove saved passwords from browsers. Browsers are most often the culprit behind data breaches. Doubt it? Read our arguments in the article How to store passwords securely – there you’ll clearly see how hackers can swipe all the saved passwords from your browser in just a few seconds.
Protect your messenger accounts. For Telegram and WhatsApp we have a list of specific steps to take right now, before your account is hijacked.
Use passkeys wherever possible. This is the modern passwordless method of logging into accounts, which is already supported by Google, iCloud, Microsoft, Meta and others. Haven’t heard of this technology yet? Read the detailed description on our blog and follow the updates in our Telegram channel – next week we’ll tell you everything you wanted to know about passkeys: what kind of technology it is, how secure it is, who supports it, what are its advantages and disadvantages. And most importantly – we’ll give detailed step-by-step instructions on how to switch from insecure passwords to secure passkeys. And yes, you can also store, manage and sync passkeys using Kaspersky Password Manager.
What else do you need to know about passwords to avoid being hacked:
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00adminhttps://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.pngadmin2025-06-20 12:06:482025-06-20 12:06:48The world’s biggest data breach: what should folks do? | Kaspersky official blog
Researchers have published technical details and a proof of concept (PoC) for vulnerability CVE-2025-6019 in the libblockdev library, which allows an attacker to gain root privileges in most Linux distributions. Exploitation of this vulnerability has not been observed in the wild as yet, but since the PoC is freely available, attackers could start exploiting it at any time.
Under what conditions can CVE-2025-6019 be exploited?
The libblockdev library is used for low-level operations with block devices (e.g., hard disks) in Linux. The CVE-2025-6019 vulnerability is exploited by accessing the udisks2 daemon (used to manage storage devices) — provided that the attackers manage to obtain the privileges of the active user present on the computer (allow_active).
Almost all modern popular Linux builds include udisks, and enthusiasts have already tested the exploitability of the CVE-2025-6019 vulnerability on Ubuntu, Debian, Fedora and openSUSE. In theory, only the user physically using the computer can have allow_active privileges. However, in reality, an attacker may have the means to obtain allow_active remotely.
For example, the researchers who discovered CVE-2025-6019 initially demonstrated it in the exploitation chain, where allow_active privileges are obtained through another vulnerability — CVE-2025-6018 — which is contained in the configuration of pluggable authentication modules (PAMs). CVE-2025-6018 is present in at least openSUSE Leap 15 and SUSE Linux Enterprise 15, but may be relevant for other distributions as well.
How to stay safe?
The teams responsible for the development of most popular Linux builds immediately started working on fixes for vulnerabilities. Patches for Uubuntu are ready. Users of other distributions are advised to keep an eye out for updates, and promptly install them as they’re released.
If the patch is not yet available for your Linux distribution, or you cannot install it for some reason, the Qualys experts who found the vulnerability recommend changing the setting allow_active of the polkit rule org.freedesktop.udisks2.modify-device from yes to auth_admin.
In addition, we recommend forgetting the myth that Linux doesn’t need additional security. It, like any other operating system, can be a target for a cyberattack, so it also needs protection .
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00adminhttps://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.pngadmin2025-06-19 17:06:492025-06-19 17:06:49CVE-2025-6019: time to upgrade Linux | Kaspersky official blog
Threat analysis is a complex task that demands full attention, especially during active incidents, when every second counts. ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox is designed to ease that pressure with an intuitive interface and fast threat detection.
Our new feature, Detonation Actions, takes this further by highlighting detonation steps during analysis. When a specific action is needed to trigger the sample, like launching a file or clicking a link, it appears as a suggestion, so you know exactly what to do.
Detonation Actions work in both manual mode and with Automated Interactivity. Whether you’re investigating manually or running automated sessions, this guided mode reduces the time it takes to respond to threats and helps you catch the full scope of malicious behavior with minimal effort.
What Are Detonation Actions?
You can find the Actions tab next to the Processes tab
Detonation Actions are built-in hints in ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox that guide users step-by-step through the threat analysis process. They are available in every sandbox session, for all users, and help make both manual and automated investigations clearer and more efficient.
Free Plan: You can see the suggested actions and follow them manually during your session.
Paid Plans: Track and manage each action performed by Automated Interactivity, including via API, for a fully automated, hands-free analysis with full transparency and control.
Speed up threat analysis in your SOC with ANY.RUN boost detection rate and extract IOCs for effective response
Before launching your analysis, you’ll now see a new “Auto” button during the VM setup phase. Clicking this button starts your session with Automated Interactivity enabled, which in turn activates the guided mode, powered by Detonation Actions.
Use the new “Auto” button for faster activation of Automated Interactivity
For your convenience, you can also enable the same feature manually by toggling “Automated Interactivity (ML)” in the “Additional settings” section above.
Automated Interactivity (ML) toggle enabled instead of using the “Auto” button
Once the session begins, you’ll notice Detonation Actions appear on the right side of the screen, next to the process tree. These hints show you exactly what steps have been or should be taken to trigger malicious behavior.
This gives you a clear picture of what was done, what triggered the threat, and how it unfolded, helping you detect malicious activity faster and respond more confidently.
In the manual mode, you can manually approve actions (by clicking the “Approve” button) or reject them (by clicking the “X” icon) for each suggested step.
You can trigger actions by clicking the Approve button
Automated Interactivity handles the actions for you; no manual approval needed.
Thanks to Detonation Actions, you get a guided analysis flow that improves detection and drastically cuts down your time to respond.
How Detonation Actions Help Analysts
Automated Interactivity
Boosts detection rate by ensuring no critical actions are missed during analysis thanks to predefined, expert-crafted hints.
Visualizes critical detonation steps, showing which actions were performed or recommended during the analysis.
Frees up analyst time by automating routine tasks, so they can focus on more complex investigations while maintaining high detection quality.
Manual Analysis
Helps uncover hidden threats by suggesting actions tailored to detonate specific malware types.
Simplifies investigations with interactive hints like “Running this executable” or “Following this link.”
Some of the Actions include launching a file from a Registry key and Task Scheduler
Streamlines analysis of specific samples, for instance, by opening URLs in QR codes directly inside the analysis sessions.
Improves accessibility by making manual analysis more intuitive for SOC analysts at any skill level.
Speeds up decision-making through a clearer workflow and real-time actionable guidance.
See It in Action: Detonation Actions + Automated Interactivity in a Real Sample
Let’s walk through how Detonation Actions work in a real scenario using an .exe file and Automated Interactivity.
To start, we upload the .exe file and simply click the “Auto” button during the VM setup phase. This launches the sandbox session immediately with Automated Interactivity and Detonation Actions.
As the session begins, we can see Detonation Actions popping up quickly in the right corner of the screen. These actions, such as “Launching a file from Task Scheduler” or “Extracting a file from an archive”, are automatically executed, moving the analysis forward without any manual intervention.
Detonation Actions approved automatically
At the same time, the Processes section started populating with detailed insights, showing each spawned process along with associated tactics, techniques, and indicators.
Tree of processes displayed along with Detonation Actions
This combination, automated execution + guided visibility, gives analysts a powerful advantage: a complete behavioral picture of the malware, without delays or missed steps. It’s fast, structured, and built for clarity.
How SOCs and Businesses Benefit from It
The introduction of Detonation Actions brings clear, measurable value to security teams and businesses by improving both the speed and quality of threat analysis.
Simplifies and accelerates threat analysis Makes threat analysis easier and faster for SOC teams at any level, saving time, reducing manual effort, and boosting overall productivity.
Improves data handover between SOC Tiers Enhances the quality of data transfer from Tier 1 to Tier 2 analysts through detailed, action-based reports, ensuring critical insights are passed along clearly and efficiently.
Enables faster incident response Streamlines triage by automating key steps in the response process, reducing time to detect and respond to threats, and minimizing potential impact.
Boosts employee training and onboarding Helps junior analysts learn faster thanks to clear, guided hints, shortening the learning curve and allowing them to contribute to investigations sooner.
Supports smarter decision-making Empowers team members with more context and clearer behavioral evidence, helping them make faster, more confident decisions during investigations.
Integrates easily into automation workflows Works seamlessly with automated triage and incident response setups, maintaining high detection rates while reducing manual overhead.
Ready to Try It Yourself?
Detonation Actions are built to make your job easier, whether you’re triaging a live threat or onboarding a new team member. You get expert guidance, faster detection, and a clearer view of what malware is really doing.
Start your next investigation with ANY.RUN’s guided mode and see how much smoother analysis can be.
ANY.RUN helps more than 500,000 cybersecurity professionals worldwide. Our Interactive Sandbox simplifies malware analysis of threats that target both Windows and Linux systems. Our threat intelligence products, Threat Intelligence Lookup and Feeds, help you find IOCs or files to learn more about the threats and respond to incidents faster.
Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter.
June 9 was Whit Monday — a bank holiday here in Germany — so I decided to take the whole week off. It turned out to be the perfect opportunity to try out a brand new car. Little did I know, I was about to get a crash course in modern vehicle technology (and a few unexpected life lessons).
There’s an EU regulation that requires new cars to come equipped with “Advanced Vehicle Systems,” which include features like driver drowsiness and attention warnings, lane-keeping systems and intelligent speed assistance. I hadn’t swapped cars in over a decade, so I was blissfully unaware of just how intrusive these systems could be.
While I generally appreciate technology that makes our life safer, these features gave me a tough time. The car seemed to beep at me constantly, so much so that the beeping itself became a distraction. Instead of focusing on the road, I found myself trying to decipher what each alert meant. After a few kilometers, I had to pull over and consult the manual just to figure out how to disable these “helpful” assistants.
Problem solved? Not quite. Every time I turned off and restarted the car, the systems re-enabled themselves. Disabling the lane-keeping assistant was just a button press, but turning off the “intelligent” speed assistant required a convoluted sequence: six menu clicks, a long press then a short click. I had to dig out the manual every time.
You might think I’m just cutting corners, or that I should pay better attention to speed limits. But here’s the thing: Technology fails, and these systems are no exception. Sometimes the cameras miss speed signs, or worse, pick up the wrong ones. I’ve read about people putting stickers on their windshields to block the camera, only to discover the system then falls back to GPS data, which can be outdated or just plain wrong. On one occasion, it thought a car was on a 50 km/h road when the person was actually on the Autobahn directly next and parallel to the road, which famously has no speed limit.
Some drivers try to muffle the alerts by gluing the speaker, but in modern cars, the system also lowers the radio volume to make sure you hear the alarm. Pulling the fuse would disable the emergency brake, too — not something I’m willing to risk, regardless of how insurance would feel about it.
I ended up learning two important lessons that week. The first was technical: I dove into the world of Controller Area Network (CAN) bus wiring, protocols, network gateways and tools like SavvyCAN to understand how these systems work… and maybe how to disable a few, purely for educational purposes.
The second lesson hit me later, and it was more personal. In my job, I often preach about deploying multi-factor authentication (MFA) everywhere. My focus has always been on keeping out the bad guys, not on the user experience. I never understood why anyone would use apps to automatically accept authentication pushes — it seemed crazy to me. But after a a few days with the car, I finally saw things from the user’s perspective. Security tools can’t just be effective; they also have to be easy to use. Reducing friction, like using single sign-on or minimizing unnecessary clicks, matters just as much. Users also need to understand why these barriers are in place.
Tomorrow is another holiday. Maybe I’ll spend it exploring Kali Linux 2025.2 and the latest CARsenal tools (formerly CAN Arsenal). Who knows? I might just tap a wire or two — for educational purposes only, of course.
The one big thing
Cisco Talos has discovered that the North Korean-aligned threat actor Famous Chollima has been actively targeting cryptocurrency and blockchain professionals (primarily in India) through sophisticated phishing campaigns. Previously known for using the GolangGhost trojan, they’ve now introduced a Python-based variant called PylangGhost, which retains the same capabilities. Recent campaigns have targeted Windows users with the Python version, while MacOS users are still being hit with the Golang-based variant.
Why do I care?
Even if you’re not in the cryptocurrency or blockchain space, this campaign highlights how threat actors are constantly evolving their tools. It’s a reminder that no matter how niche or localized an attack might seem, the techniques could easily be adapted to broader campaigns. Plus, if attackers succeed in these targeted efforts, stolen credentials could ripple across networks and platforms globally.
So now what?
Take this as your cue to double-check your defenses. Ensure your organization’s security tools can detect Python and Golang-based malware, and educate your teams on recognizing phishing attempts, especially fake job offers. Stay proactive by monitoring emerging threats like PylangGhost, because even if you’re not the target today, tomorrow isn’t a guarantee.
Top security headlines of the week
AI Scraping Bots Are Breaking Open Libraries, Archives, and Museums AI bots that scrape the internet for training data are hammering the servers of libraries, archives, museums and galleries, and are in some cases knocking their collections offline. (404 Media)
Paraguay Suffered Data Breach: 7.4 Million Citizen Records Leaked on Dark Web Hackers leaked the personal data of 7.4 million people in Paraguay on the dark web. A cybercriminal group called “Cyber PMC” demanded $7.4 million, blaming government corruption and poor security. (Security Affairs)
Trend Micro fixes critical vulnerabilities in multiple products Trend Micro has released security updates to address multiple critical-severity remote code execution and authentication bypass vulnerabilities. (Bleeping Computer)
Can’t get enough Talos?
When legitimate tools go rogue From LOLBins to open-source utilities like DonPAPI, threat actors are leveraging legitimate tools to evade detection and carry out attacks. Read the blog here.
Microsoft Patch Tuesday for June 2025 Microsoft released its monthly security update last week, which includes 66 vulnerabilities affecting a range of products, including 10 that Microsoft marked as “critical.” Read the blog here.
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00adminhttps://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.pngadmin2025-06-18 18:06:372025-06-18 18:06:37A week with a “smart” car
Editor’s note: The current article is authored by Clandestine, threat researcher and threat hunter. You can find Clandestine on X.
Threat actors today are continuously developing sophisticated techniques to evade traditional detection methods. ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup offers advanced capabilities for threat data gathering and analysis. As a specialized search engine, it allows security analysts to query various indicators of compromise (IOCs), behaviors (IOBs), and attacks (IOAs), providing valuable insights into real-world malware activity observed in sandboxed environments.
We shall review several advanced threat hunting techniques using ANY.RUN’s TI Lookup to provide cybersecurity researchers and threat intelligence analysts of SOC and MSSP teams with effective strategies to identify and analyze various types of threats.
Threat Intelligence Lookup Key Capabilities
Threat Intelligence Lookup provides analysts with access to a vast malware database topped up by over 500,000 users of the Interactive Sandbox, including 15,000 corporate SOC teams. A single search request can deliver hundreds of relevant analysis sessions, malware samples, or indicators for further research and refining the results with more specific queries.
Besides the ability to instantly get a verdict and context on a potential indicator of compromise, TI Lookup offers a number of functions that enable effective threat hunting and analysis:
IOC Lookups: Detailed searches of various indicators of compromise, including IP addresses, file hashes, URLs, and domain names.
Behavioral Lookups: Beyond traditional IOCs, the service enables searches based on behavioral indicators, such as registry modifications, process activities, network communications, and mutex creations. It is particularly effective for identifying unknown or emerging threats that may not have established IOCs.
MITRE Techniques Detection: The incorporation of the MITRE ATT&CK framework allows analysts to search for specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by threat actors. This capability facilitates a more structured and comprehensive approach to threat hunting.
File/Event Correlation: The ability to correlate files and events helps analysts identify relationships between different components of an attack and understand the broader context of malicious activities.
YARA-based Threat Hunting: This capability allows for highly specific searches based on file characteristics and patterns.
Wildcards and Logical Operators: The search supports various wildcards and logical operators for the construction of complex and precise queries.
The sophisticated query syntax of Threat Intelligence Lookup supports over 40 parameters, allowing for highly specific and contextualized searches. The basic structure of a query typically includes a parameter, a colon, and a value, often enclosed in quotation marks (e.g., submissionCountry:”us” ).
Logical operators play a crucial role in constructing effective queries:
The AND operator requires both conditions to be true.
The OR operator requires at least one condition to be.
The NOT operator excludes results that match a specific condition.
Parentheses can be used to group conditions and establish precedence.
Wildcards and special characters enhance the flexibility of queries:
The asterisk (*) represents any number of characters.
The question mark (?) represents a single character.
The caret (^) matches the beginning of a string.
The dollar sign ($) matches the end of a string.
The search parameter set covers various aspects of threat analysis, including file properties (e.g., fileExtension, filePath), process activities (e.g., commandLine, imagePath), network communications (e.g., destinationIp, URL), registry operations (e.g., registryKey, registryValue), and threat classifications (e.g., threatName, threatLevel).
Key Tasks Solved by Threat Intelligence Lookup
Threat Intelligence Lookup is used by security teams worldwide to detect, prioritize, and contain threats faster. With TI Lookup, your SOC can:
Speed Up Incident Response: Flexible queries across 40+ IOCs, IOAs, and IOBs with 2-second response times and exclusive indicators enable SOC teams to quickly investigate and mitigate incidents, slashing Mean Time to Respond (MTTR) and minimizing damage.
Enhance Alert Triage with Contextual Insights: An extensive database of indicators on the latest attacks provides analysts with quick insights into any artifact, letting them enrich alerts, pin them to threats, and prioritize critical incidents.
Accelerate Threat Detection and Containment: Query Updates subscriptions and proactive searches using network artifacts help uncover hidden threats, allowing SOC teams to detect, escalate, and mitigate attacks early, preventing spread and protecting business operations.
Uncover critical threat context for faster triage and response with ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup
Now let’s see how this architecture works on a number of hands-on use cases of peculiar threat hunting tasks.
1. Country-based Threat Detection
Geographic analysis of threats provides valuable insights into the origin and distribution of malicious activities. ANY.RUN’s TI Lookup enables country-based threat detection through the submissionCountry parameter, which can be combined with other parameters to create highly specific queries. Many organizations that employ TI Lookup in their SOC, utilize this feature.
Geographic threat analysis typically involves identifying submissions from specific countries and filtering them based on threat levels, threat names, or behavioral indicators. This approach helps security analysts understand regional threat landscapes, identify country-specific attack campaigns, and establish geopolitical context for observed threats.
Several example queries demonstrate the application of country-based threat detection.
The query below targets phishing attacks originating from Brazil. By combining the submissionCountry parameter with the threatName parameter, it focuses on a specific type of threat within a geographic context.
Samples of phishing added to the Sandbox by users from Brazil
This approach helps identify regional trends in phishing campaigns, which may target local institutions or use language-specific social engineering techniques.
The next identifies malicious submissions from India that involve PowerShell commands. It combines geographic filtering with a behavioral indicator and threat classification, providing a more comprehensive view of specific attack methodologies within a regional context.
Malicious samples from Indian users containing PowerShell commands
This approach is particularly valuable for identifying sophisticated attacks that leverage legitimate system tools like PowerShell.
Country-based threat detection can be further enhanced by analyzing temporal patterns, comparing threat distributions across different regions, and correlating geographic data with other threat indicators. This multidimensional approach provides a more comprehensive understanding of the global threat landscape and helps security teams prioritize their defensive efforts based on regional risk profiles.
2. MITRE Technique-Focused Queries
TI Lookup incorporates this framework through the MITRE parameter, enabling highly specific searches based on known attack techniques.
Command and Script Execution (T1059)
Command and script execution involves the use of command-line interfaces or scripting languages to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. This technique is commonly used by threat actors for various purposes, including initial access, execution, and persistence. The following query targets this technique:
Endpoint events with script and application calls linked to malware samples
Here we identify submissions that exhibit command and script execution behavior, as defined by the MITRE technique T1059, and involve either PowerShell commands or the Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe). The combination of the MITRE parameter with specific command-line or image path indicators provides insights into how threat actors leverage legitimate system tools for malicious purposes.
TI Lookup returns hundreds of relevant results, including numerous sandbox sessions
This example also gives us a representation of TI Lookup’s search volume and comprehensiveness: it can deliver hundreds and thousands of relevant malware samples, indicators, artifacts, and other types of data. An analyst can limit and refine the search employing the parameters and setting, for instance, changing the search period (circled on the screenshot) from the minimum of one day to the maximum of 180 days.
Registry-Based Persistence (T1547)
Registry-based persistence involves modifying the Windows Registry to ensure that malware runs automatically when the system starts or when specific conditions are met. This technique is commonly used by threat actors to maintain access to compromised systems. The following query targets this technique:
Search results for malware changing Windows registry
This query identifies submissions that exhibit registry-based persistence behavior, as defined by the MITRE technique T1547, and specifically target the Run key in the Windows Registry. This key is commonly used for persistence, as any executable listed here will run automatically when a user logs in.
Advanced MITRE Correlation
Advanced threat hunting often involves correlating multiple MITRE techniques to identify sophisticated attack patterns. The following query illustrates this approach:
Malware strains and types combining several attack techniques
This query identifies submissions that exhibit three distinct MITRE techniques: process injection (T1055), registry-based persistence (T1547), and system information discovery (T1082).
The correlation of these techniques suggests a sophisticated attack that injects code into legitimate processes, establishes persistence through registry modifications, and attempts to collect information about the system.
MITRE technique-focused queries can be further enhanced by incorporating additional parameters related to file properties, network communications, or threat classifications. This multidimensional approach provides a more comprehensive understanding of how specific techniques are implemented in real-world attacks and helps security teams develop more effective detection and mitigation strategies.
3. Obfuscated File Behavior Detection
Obfuscation is a common technique used by malware authors to hide malicious code and evade analysis. ANY.RUN TI Lookup enables the detection of various obfuscation techniques through specialized queries that focus on file behaviors and characteristics.
Executables in Non-Standard Directories
Malware often places executable files in non-standard directories to avoid detection and blend in with legitimate system files. The following query targets this behavior:
Samples with executable files in directories except for the queried
This query identifies executable files (.exe) that are not located in the standard Windows or Program Files directories. The combination of the fileExtension parameter with negative conditions for standard file paths helps security analysts identify potentially suspicious executables that may be attempting to hide in unusual locations.
Script-Based Obfuscation
Script-based obfuscation involves the use of scripting languages to hide malicious code or execute obfuscated commands. The following query targets this behavior:
This query identifies JavaScript (.js) files that execute PowerShell commands (you can also search for other script types, like Visual Basic Script (.vbs) files). This pattern is commonly observed in multi-stage attacks where script files are used as initial droppers that subsequently execute obfuscated PowerShell commands. The combination of file extension parameters with command-line indicators helps security analysts identify and analyze this obfuscation technique.
4. Persistence and Mutex Creation
Persistence mechanisms and mutex creation are common techniques used by malware to maintain access to compromised systems and ensure that only one instance of the malware is running at a time.
Mutexes can be explored with the aid of Object parameters:
This query identifies submissions that contain a mutex (a synchronization object often used by malware to ensure single-instance execution) with the name “rmc”. TI Lookup provides numerous analysis results, demonstrating that this mutex belongs to the Remcos trojan.
This approach helps security analysts identify sophisticated malware based on artifacts found in system logs. Further analysis of persistence and mutex creation can involve examining the specific values written to registry keys, analyzing the naming conventions of mutexes, and correlating these indicators with other malicious behaviors.
5. Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection
Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are techniques used by malware to dynamically generate domain names for command and control (C2) communication. This approach helps malware evade detection and blocking by constantly changing the domains used for communication. ANY.RUN TI Lookup enables the detection of DGA-based malware through specialized queries that focus on domain characteristics and communication patterns.
Random TLD with Active Communication
DGA-generated domains often use uncommon or cheaper top-level domains (TLDs) to reduce costs and avoid detection. The following query targets this behavior:
Domains utilizing cheap-TLD domains found across analyses of malicious samples
This query identifies malicious submissions that communicate with domains using the .top or .xyz TLDs over HTTP (port 80) or HTTPS (port 443). These TLDs are relatively inexpensive and are commonly used in DGA implementations. The combination of domain name patterns, communication ports, and threat classification helps security analysts identify potential DGA-based malware.
Domain Name Patterns
This query identifies submissions that communicate with domains deployed on Cloudflare Workers. This is a common way for attackers to host phishing pages:
Malware of known families that abuses legitimate CDN services
This query identifies submissions associated with RedLine or Lumma malware families that communicate with any domain resolved to Cloudflare’s infrastructure. These malware families are known to use DGAs, and the correlation with Cloudflare ASN (Autonomous System Number) may indicate attempts to hide behind legitimate CDN services. This approach helps security analysts identify specific malware families that employ DGAs for C2 communication.
DGA detection can be further enhanced by analyzing temporal patterns of domain generation, examining the linguistic characteristics of generated domains, and correlating domain communications with other malicious behaviors.
6. Malware Family Behavior Queries
Different malware families exhibit distinct behavioral patterns that can be used for identification and analysis. ANY.RUN TI Lookup enables the detection of specific malware families through queries that target their characteristic behaviors.
Formbook
Formbook is a data-stealing malware that captures screenshots, logs keystrokes, and steals data from web browsers.
Sandbox analyses of fresh Formbook samples found via TI Lookup
This query identifies submissions explicitly classified as Formbook or exhibiting behaviors characteristic of this malware family, including process injection (MITRE T1055) combined with Run registry modifications and executable files, or communication with PHP endpoints using specific content types. These indicators collectively provide strong evidence of Formbook activity.
AsyncRAT
AsyncRAT is a remote access trojan that provides attackers with full control over infected systems.
This query identifies submissions explicitly classified as AsyncRAT or exhibiting behaviors characteristic of this malware family, including the use of mshta.exe or PowerShell.
Malware family behavior queries can be further enhanced by incorporating additional indicators specific to each family, analyzing temporal evolution of behaviors, and correlating family-specific indicators with broader threat intelligence. This comprehensive approach provides deeper insights into malware family behaviors and helps security teams develop more effective detection and mitigation strategies.
7. Thematic Search Query Updates
TI Lookup lets you subscribe to receive updates on your custom search queries. For example, you can focus on specific malware families, enabling more efficient and targeted threat hunting.
Credential Stealers
Credential stealing is a common objective for various malware families. The following query targets three popular credential stealers Redline, Lumma, and Formbook that access the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry key, which stores user account information.
You can subscribe to query updates via the bell icon on the right
By subscribing to this query, we’ll receive updates each time new search results become available in TI Lookup. This thematic approach helps security analysts focus specifically on threats targeting credentials, regardless of the specific malware family involved.
Conclusion
We have reviewed a number of advanced threat hunting techniques using ANY.RUN TI Lookup.
Through detailed exploration of various query methodologies, including country-based threat detection, MITRE technique-focused queries, obfuscated file behavior detection, persistence mechanisms, domain generation algorithm detection, and malware family behavior analysis, the research demonstrates the power and flexibility of query-based threat intelligence in modern security operations.
The correlation of different indicators through logical operators and grouping enhances detection precision and reduces false positives, allowing security analysts to focus their efforts on the most relevant threats.
By focusing on specific threat categories and leveraging advanced query techniques, security teams can develop more efficient and effective threat detection strategies.
About ANY.RUN
ANY.RUN helps more than 500,000 cybersecurity professionals worldwide. Our Interactive Sandbox simplifies malware analysis of threats that target both Windows and Linux systems. Our threat intelligence products, Threat Intelligence Lookup and Feeds, help you find IOCs or files to learn more about the threats and respond to incidents faster.