Think Twice Before You Click: INTERPOL Unveils Alarming Cybercrime Trends

Interpol

Overview

In response to the growing threat of cyber and financial crimes targeting individuals and organizations, INTERPOL has launched a new campaign called “Think Twice.” The campaign aims to raise awareness about the dangers of increasingly complex online threats, urging people to pause and think before making decisions online. The campaign highlights five key cyber threats: ransomware attacks, malware attacks, phishing, generative AI scams, and romance baiting.

With these crimes becoming more advanced and widespread, the campaign serves as a timely reminder of the importance of vigilance and careful decision-making in the digital world.

The Rising Threat of Cybercrime

Cybercrime is on the rise, with criminals using more advanced techniques to exploit vulnerable individuals and organizations. According to INTERPOL’s findings, ransomware attacks have increased by 70 percent, and malware attacks have risen by over 30 percent in just the past year.

Fostering a culture of cyber-awareness in the workforce is the first and last line of defense against cybercrime, as employees form the backbone of any cybersecurity strategy.

Phishing attacks have also evolved, becoming increasingly difficult to detect. Cybercriminals are now using sophisticated methods, including generative AI, to manipulate voices, images, and text, creating ultra-realistic human avatars to deceive victims. These scams are gaining traction, with scammers targeting victims worldwide using tactics that were once unimaginable. Another rising threat is romance baiting, where criminals use fake online profiles to form relationships with victims, only to later ask for money.

The “Think Twice” campaign, which will run from December 3 to December 19, 2024, emphasizes the importance of making informed choices online. By raising awareness of these growing threats, INTERPOL hopes to empower individuals and organizations to take proactive steps in safeguarding themselves against cybercrime.

Key Threats Highlighted by the “Think Twice” Campaign

The campaign focuses on five major threats that have been identified as rapidly growing concerns in the online space:

  1. Ransomware Attacks:
    Ransomware continues to be one of the most disruptive forms of cybercrime. It involves criminals encrypting a victim’s data and demanding a ransom to unlock it. The rise of ransomware attacks has been staggering, with a 70 percent increase in the past year alone.
  2. Malware Attacks:
    Malware attacks involve malicious software designed to infiltrate and damage computers or networks. Over 30 percent of malware attacks have increased in the past year, often spreading through emails, links, or infected files.
  3. Phishing:
    Phishing scams involve tricking individuals into revealing sensitive information, such as passwords or financial data, through deceptive emails or messages. Phishing has become more sophisticated, with cybercriminals using AI-generated content to make their scams harder to detect.
  4. Generative AI Scams:
    Generative AI scams involve using AI technology to create fake human avatars, voices, and images to deceive victims. These scams are gaining traction, with cybercriminals using realistic content to manipulate and steal money from victims.
  5. Romance Baiting Scams:
    Romance baiting is a growing form of fraud where criminals create fake online profiles to form emotional connections with victims. After gaining their trust, they ask for money, often claiming to be in a financial emergency or need.

The “Think Twice” Campaign: Empowering Individuals and Organizations

The primary objective of the “Think Twice” campaign is to encourage individuals to pause and think before acting on digital content. INTERPOL urges people to verify the authenticity of messages, links, and requests before taking any action. This two-week awareness campaign will primarily run through social media channels, reaching individuals globally and educating them about the risks associated with cybercrime.

INTERPOL emphasizes the importance of adopting a mindset of caution and awareness when interacting with digital content. The campaign encourages individuals to:

  • Pause and evaluate: Take a moment to verify the authenticity of any unsolicited emails, links, or messages.
  • Check for credibility: Ensure the sources of information are legitimate, especially if you’re asked for personal or financial information.
  • Verify identities: Even if a request seems to come from a familiar contact, always verify their identity through multiple channels.
  • Stay informed: Learn about the latest cybercrime tactics and how to recognize them.
  • Be cautious with online relationships: Especially when money is involved, approach online relationships with skepticism.

Taking Action Against Cybercrime: What Can You Do?

INTERPOL’s campaign is not just about raising awareness; it also provides a practical checklist for reducing the risks of cybercrime. Here are some simple steps that individuals and organizations can take to protect themselves:

  1. Be cautious of unsolicited requests: Always be wary of emails or messages from unfamiliar sources. Avoid clicking on suspicious links or attachments.
  2. Implement a cybersecurity culture: Businesses should foster a culture of cybersecurity awareness among employees, providing training and guidelines on handling potential threats.
  3. Verify identities: If you receive a request for money or sensitive information from a known person, verify their identity before acting.
  4. Use in-person verification: For high-risk situations, like online transactions or relationships, consider verifying details through face-to-face meetings or phone calls.
  5. Stay informed: Cybercrime tactics are constantly evolving, so it’s crucial to stay updated on the latest scams and threats.

Conclusion

As cyber and financial crimes continue to grow in scale, INTERPOL’s “Think Twice” campaign serves as an essential reminder for individuals and organizations to remain vigilant. By pausing to consider their digital actions and verifying the authenticity of online content, people can reduce their exposure to threats like phishing, malware, and romance baiting.

As INTERPOL’s Secretary General Valdecy Urquiza said, cybersecurity is a shared responsibility. Through proactive measures and informed decisions, we can help build a safer digital world for everyone.

Source: https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2024/INTERPOL-campaign-warns-against-cyber-and-financial-crimes

The post Think Twice Before You Click: INTERPOL Unveils Alarming Cybercrime Trends appeared first on Cyble.

Blog – Cyble – ​Read More

Head Mare Group Intensifies Attacks on Russia with PhantomCore RAT

Head Mare

Key takeaways

  • Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) has identified a campaign associated with the infamous group Head Mare aimed at targeting Russians.
  • This campaign involves a ZIP archive containing both a malicious LNK file and an executable. The executable is cleverly disguised as an archive file to deceive users and facilitate its malicious operations.
  • The LNK file contains commands designed to extract and execute the disguised, which has been identified as PhantomCore.
  • PhantomCore is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) utilized by the hacktivist group Head Mare. It has been active since 2023 and is known for consistently targeting Russia.  
  • In previous attacks, GoLang-compiled PhantomCore binaries were used. However, in this campaign, the threat actor (TA) is using C++-compiled PhantomCore binaries instead.
  • TA also integrated the Boost.Beast library into PhantomCore to enable communication with the command-and-control (C&C) server.
  • PhantomCore collects the victim’s information, including the public IP address, to gain detailed insights into the target before deploying the final-stage payload or executing additional commands on the compromised system.
  • PhantomCore RAT is known to deploy ransomware payloads such as LockBit and Babuk, inflicting significant damage on the victim’s systems.

Overview

On 2nd September 2024, Kaspersky released a blog about the Head Mare group, which first emerged in 2023. Head Mare is a hacktivist group targeting organizations in Russia and Belarus with the goal of causing maximum damage rather than financial gain. They use up-to-date tactics, such as exploiting the CVE-2023-38831 vulnerability in WinRAR, to gain initial access and deliver malicious payloads. The group maintains a public presence on X, where they disclose information about their victims.

Their targets span various industries, including government, transportation, energy, manufacturing, and entertainment. Unlike other groups, Head Mare also demands ransom for data decryption.

Threat Actor
Figure 1 – Threat Actor profile

CRIL recently identified a campaign targeting Russians linked to the notorious Head Mare group. While the initial infection vector remains unknown, the group typically reaches users via spam emails. In this campaign, a ZIP archive named “Doc.Zip” was discovered, containing a malicious LNK file, an executable disguised as “Doc.zip” identified as the PhantomCore RAT, and a corrupted PDF.

Upon executing the LNK file, it extracts the “Doc.Zip” archive into the “C:ProgramData” directory and executes the file “Doc.zip” using cmd.exe. Once executed, the malware gathers the victim’s information, such as the public IP address, windows version username, etc., and sends it to a command-and-control (C&C) server controlled by the TA. It then awaits further commands from the C&C server to execute additional malicious activities. The figure below shows the infection chain.

Infection Chain
Figure 2 – Infection chain

Earlier, PhantomCore samples were developed using GoLang. However, in the latest campaign, the threat actor is using C++-compiled PhantomCore binaries. Additionally, the C++ version of PhantomCore incorporates the Boost.Beast library, which facilitates communication between the infected system and the command-and-control (C&C) server through HTTP WebSockets.

Technical Analysis

The ZIP archive “Doc.zip,” downloaded from the file-sharing website hxxps://filetransfer[.]io/data-package/AiveGg6u/download, is suspected to have been delivered to the victim via a spam email. The email likely carried a social engineering theme, designed to appear legitimate, such as an invoice for goods or similar financial documents. This theme was intended to deceive the recipient into interacting with the malicious attachment, ultimately leading to the delivery of the malicious payload.

The zip archive contains multiple files, including two LNK files, a corrupted lure PDF file, and an executable camouflaged as a “.zip” file extension. All the files within the archive are notably in Russian, as detailed in the table below.

Actual file names Translated names
Список товаров и услуг.pdf.lnk List of goods and services.pdf.lnk
Счет-фактура.pdf.lnk Invoice.pdf.lnk
Контактные данные для оплаты.pdf Contact details for payment.pdf
Doc.zip Doc.zip

The LNK file is configured to execute a PowerShell command that locates and extracts the “Doc.zip” archive into the “C:ProgramData” directory. Once extracted, the “Doc.zip” archive, which contains an executable, is launched using the cmd.exe start command. The figure below illustrates the contents of the LNK file.

Trojan, Lure
Figure 3 – Contents of Список товаров и услуг.pdf.lnk

Upon execution, the Doc.zip file sets both the input and output code pages to OEM Russian (Cyrillic) using the SetConsoleCP and SetConsoleOutputCP Win32 APIs. Additionally, it sets the locale language of the victim machine to “ru_RU.UTF-8” to configure the system to use the Russian locale with UTF-8 encoding.

Locale, Russia
Figure 4 – Sets locale to Russia

After configuring the locale settings, the malware attempts to connect to the C&C server at 45.10.247.152 using the User-Agent string “Boost.Beast/353”. It retries the connection until successful, sleeping for 10 seconds between each attempt.

Connect Request
Figure 5 – Connect request

After a successful connection is established, the malware gathers the victim’s information, including the Buildname, Windows version, public IP address, computer name, username, and domain details. The Buildname, which can vary (e.g., ZIP, URL), may indicate the infection vector. This collected data is then sent to the C&C server via the “init” endpoint, as illustrated in the figure below.

Infostealer
Figure 6 – Gathering victim’s information

Extracting victim details
Figure 7 – Sending victim’s details

After sending the initial request containing the victim details and UUID, the malware waits for a response from the TA. However, during our analysis, we were unable to capture the response. Nevertheless, code analysis indicates that the typical response from the TA follows a format similar to the one shown below.

TA Response
Figure 8 – TA’s response

Moreover, the TA can execute commands on the victim’s machine and download additional payloads from the C&C server. This enables them to escalate the compromise, conduct further malicious activities, or expand the attack by deploying specific commands and payloads.  The RAT uses the following endpoints for its C&C communication and to receive commands

  • hxxp:// [C&C IP Address]/connect
  • hxxp:// [C&C IP Address]/init
  • hxxp:// [C&C IP Address]/check
  • hxxp:// [C&C IP Address]/command

The TA uses the following methods to execute commands and deploy additional payloads.

Command Execution through Pipes

The execution process involves creating a pipe and redirecting the WritePipe handle to the standard output (stdout) and standard error (stderr). A new process is then launched using the command “cmd.exe /c” to execute the specified command. After the command is executed, the output is retrieved by reading from the pipe using the “ReadFile” API and the ReadPipe handle. Additionally, a log is generated to monitor and track the success or failure of the pipe creation and command execution.

The following code demonstrates the TAs ability to execute commands through a pipe, read the command output, and parse the commands for execution via the pipe.

PIPE
Figure 9 – PIPE creation

Creating new process

The malware can also create a new process based on the input from the calling function. If successful, it closes the process and thread handles, updates the log with a success message, and sets a flag to notify the calling process. In case of failure, it logs an error message and sets a different flag to indicate the failure.

Process
Figure 10 – New Process Creation

The Head Mare group has been known to deploy ransomware in previous attacks, targeting a variety of systems and environments. This includes the use of widely recognized ransomware strains such as LockBit for Windows machines and Babuk for ESXi (VMware) environments. These ransomware strains are notorious for their ability to encrypt valuable data and demand ransom payments from victims in exchange for decryption keys.

Yara and Sigma rules to detect this campaign are available for download from the linked Github repository.

Conclusion

The Head Mare group’s campaign continues to target Russian organizations using the PhantomCore RAT and evolving tactics, including using C++-compiled binaries and social engineering techniques. The group’s ability to collect victim data and deploy additional payloads, including ransomware, highlights the ongoing threat it poses. Organizations must stay vigilant and strengthen their security measures to defend against such attacks.

Recommendations

  • Avoid opening unexpected or suspicious email attachments, particularly ZIP or LNK files. Train employees to identify phishing attempts and verify file origins before interacting with downloads. Implement email security solutions that detect and block malicious attachments.
  • Ensure all software, including WinRAR and operating systems, is updated with the latest security patches. Vulnerabilities like CVE-2023-38831 can be exploited in outdated software, making patch management critical for prevention.
  • Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to monitor suspicious activities such as unauthorized PowerShell execution. Use intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS) to block connections to known malicious C&C servers like the one observed in this attack.
  • Limit user permissions to execute potentially dangerous commands or files. Use application whitelisting to allow only trusted programs to run and disable unnecessary scripting tools like PowerShell on non-administrative systems.
  • Continuously monitor network traffic for anomalies, such as unusual locale settings or repeated connection attempts to unknown IP addresses. Create an incident response plan to quickly isolate and remediate affected systems in case of compromise.

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques

Tactic Technique Procedure
Initial Access (TA0001) Phishing (T1566) ZIP archives might be sent through phishing email to the target users
Execution (TA0002) Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) Powershell is used to extract the archive file
Execution (TA0002) Windows Command Shell (T1059.003) Cmd.exe is used to execute commands through PIPE, start command
Execution (TA0002) Native API (T1106) SetConsoleCP, SetConsoleOutputCP, and other Win32 APIs to configure locale
Command and Control (TA0011) System Information Discovery (T1082) Collects victim details, including OS version, computer name, username, and domain details
Command and Control (TA0011) Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)   Communicates with the C&C server over HTTP using the “Boost.Beast” library.

Indicators of Compromise

Indicator Indicator type Comments
6ac2d57d066ef791b906c3b4c6b5e5c54081d6657af459115eb6abb1a9d1085d SHA-256 coYLaSU4TQum
0f578e437f5c09fb81059f4b5e6ee0b93cfc0cdf8b31a29abc8396b6137d10c3 SHA-256 Список товаров и услуг.pdf.lnk
dd49fd0e614ac3f6f89bae7b7a6aa9cdab3b338d2a8d11a11a774ecc9d287d6f SHA-256 Счет-фактура.pdf.lnk
57848d222cfbf05309d7684123128f9a2bffd173f48aa3217590f79612f4c773 SHA-256 Doc.zip
4b62da75898d1f685b675e7cbaec24472eb7162474d2fd66f3678fb86322ef0a SHA-256 Phantomcore RAT
44b1f97e1bbdd56afeb1efd477aa4e0ecaa79645032e44c7783f997f377d749f SHA-256 Phantomcore RAT
2dccb526de9a17a07e39bdedc54fbd66288277f05fb45c7cba56f88df00e86a7 SHA-256 Phantomcore RAT
1a2d1654d8ff10f200c47015d96d2fcb1d4d40ee027beb55bb46199c11b810cc SHA-256 Phantomcore RAT
8aad7f80f0120d1455320489ff1f807222c02c8703bd46250dd7c3868164ab70 SHA-256 Phantomcore RAT
9df6afb2afbd903289f3b4794be4768214c223a3024a90f954ae6d2bb093bea3 SHA-256 Phantomcore RAT
hxxps://city-tuning[.]ru/collection/srvhost.exe URL Phantomcore RAT Download URL
hxxps://filetransfer[.]io/data-package/AiveGg6u/download URL ZIP file download URL
hxxp://45.10.247[.]152/init URL C&C
hxxp://45.10.247[.]152/check URL C&C
hxxp://45.10.247[.]152/connect URL C&C
hxxp://45.10.247[.]152/command  URL  C&C
hxxp://185.80.91[.]84/command URL C&C
hxxp://185.80.91[.]84/connect URL C&C
hxxp://185.80.91[.]84/check URL C&C
hxxp://185.80.91[.]84/init URL C&C
hxxp://45.87.245[.]53/init URL C&C
hxxp://45.87.245[.]53/check URL C&C
hxxp://45.87.245[.]53/connect URL C&C
hxxp://45.87.245[.]53/command URL C&C

The post Head Mare Group Intensifies Attacks on Russia with PhantomCore RAT appeared first on Cyble.

Blog – Cyble – ​Read More

Security Risks in TP-Link Archer Router Could Lead to Unauthorized Access

TP Link Archer

Overview

The TP-Link Archer C50 V4, a popular dual-band wireless router designed for small office and home office (SOHO) networks, has been found to contain multiple security vulnerabilities that could expose users to a range of cyber threats.

These TP-Link Archer router vulnerabilities, identified under the CVE-2024-54126 and CVE-2024-54127 identifiers, affect all firmware versions prior to Archer C50(EU)_V4_240917. The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) flagged these vulnerabilities and the security of TP-Link Archer routers.

The vulnerabilities identified in the TP-Link Archer C50 V4 wireless router could allow attackers to exploit critical security holes in the device, leading to unauthorized access and potentially damaging consequences. Two specific issues have been highlighted: a flaw in the firmware upgrade process and the exposure of sensitive Wi-Fi credentials.

Details of the TP-Link Archer Router Vulnerabilities

The TP-Link Archer router vulnerabilities have been classified as medium risk. While the immediate impact may not be critical, the potential for exploitation remains a threat to network security. CVE-2024-54126 and CVE-2024-54127 were reported by Khalid Markar, Amey Chavekar, Sushant Mane, and Dr. Faruk Kazi from CoE-CNDS Lab, VJTI, Mumbai.

Vulnerability Details in TP-Link Archer Router

  1. Insufficient Integrity Verification During Firmware Upgrade (CVE-2024-54126)

One of the key vulnerabilities in the TP-Link Archer C50 router arises from an improper signature verification mechanism in the firmware upgrade process. This issue is present in the web interface of the router, which could be exploited by an attacker with administrative privileges. If the attacker is within the Wi-Fi range of the router, they could upload and execute malicious firmware, allowing them to compromise the device completely.

The absence of adequate integrity checks during firmware updates could enable an attacker to introduce backdoors or malicious code into the router. This would allow the attacker to control the device, manipulate network traffic, or even hijack the entire system, posing a serious security risk for users relying on this router for their home or business networks.

  • Exposure of Wi-Fi Credentials in Plaintext (CVE-2024-54127)

The second vulnerability is related to the lack of proper access control on the serial interface of the TP-Link Archer C50 router. An attacker with physical access to the device could exploit this weakness by accessing the Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART) shell. Once inside, the attacker could easily extract Wi-Fi credentials, including the network name (SSID) and password, which would give them unauthorized access to the targeted network.

This vulnerability in TP-Link Archer routers is particularly malicious because obtaining Wi-Fi credentials allows attackers to infiltrate the network, potentially exposing sensitive data, intercepting communications, or launching further attacks on connected devices. The ability to obtain such information without the need for remote access makes this vulnerability especially dangerous in situations where physical access to the device is possible.

Impact of the TP-Link Archer Vulnerability

The presence of these vulnerabilities in the TP-Link Archer C50 V4 router could lead to significant security risks, including:

  • Compromise of the router: Malicious firmware uploads could enable attackers to control the device, potentially disrupting network operations or using it as a platform for launching further attacks.
  • Exposure of sensitive information: The vulnerability related to the exposure of Wi-Fi credentials allows attackers to access the network and all connected devices. This could lead to data breaches, unauthorized surveillance, and even identity theft.
  • Potential system compromise: Once the attacker gains access to the router or the Wi-Fi network, they may leverage this foothold to exploit other vulnerabilities in the network infrastructure, leading to a larger-scale attack.

Given that many home and small office networks rely on TP-Link Archer routers for wireless connectivity, these vulnerabilities have the potential to affect a large number of users. The impact could be particularly severe for businesses or individuals who store sensitive information or rely on secure communications.

Mitigating the Vulnerability in TP-Link Archer Router

To mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities, TP-Link has released a firmware update designed to address the issues. The solution is available for download through the official TP-Link website and should be applied as soon as possible to protect the router from potential attacks. Some of the recommended actions include:

  • Update Firmware: Users of the TP-Link Archer C50 V4 router are advised to upgrade to the latest firmware version, Archer C50(EU)_V4_240917. This update fixes the vulnerabilities by enhancing the integrity checks during the firmware upgrade process and securing access to the serial interface to prevent unauthorized access to Wi-Fi credentials.
  • Firmware Upgrade Instructions: To ensure a smooth upgrade, users should follow the specific instructions provided by TP-Link, which include verifying the hardware version of the router, downloading the correct firmware, and ensuring the router is not powered off during the upgrade process. It is also recommended to use a wired connection during the upgrade to avoid any issues with wireless disconnections.

Conclusion

The discovery of vulnerabilities in the TP-Link Archer router highlights the critical need for users to stay updated with the latest firmware releases and security patches. The vulnerabilities in the TP-Link Archer C50 V4, including the insufficient integrity verification during firmware upgrades and the exposure of Wi-Fi credentials, present an ongoing security risks that could lead to unauthorized access and system compromise.

By upgrading to the latest firmware version, users can mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities and protect their networks from potential exploitation. TP-Link Archer router users should take immediate action to secure their devices and ensure their networks remain safe from attackers seeking to exploit these flaws.

References

The post Security Risks in TP-Link Archer Router Could Lead to Unauthorized Access appeared first on Cyble.

Blog – Cyble – ​Read More

Manufacturing Companies Targeted with New Lumma and Amadey Campaign

The manufacturing industry has long been a target of cybercriminals. While data encryption has been a prevalent tactic in recent years, threat actors are now increasingly focusing on stealing sensitive information and gaining control over critical infrastructure.  

One of the latest campaigns on record involves the use of Lumma and Amadey malware. 

Campaign Uses Fake LogicalDOC URLs  

This campaign heavily leverages Living Off the Land (LOLBAS) techniques to deliver malware as part of its operations. 

Threat actors distribute phishing emails with URLs leading targets to download LNK files disguised as PDFs. These files are accessed via a domain name masquerading as one belonging to LogicalDOC, a service for managing documentation widely utilized in the manufacturing industry.  

Attack Involves Scripts to Aid Infection  

The malicious LNK file, once activated, initiates PowerShell via an ssh.exe command. Following a chain of scripts, a CPL file is downloaded from berb[.]fitnessclub-filmfanatics[.]com as a ZIP archive.  

The malware utilizes both PowerShell and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) commands to collect detailed information about the victim’s system. This includes:  

  • Data such as language settings 
  • Antivirus software 
  • Operating system versions 
  • Hardware specifications 

This reconnaissance allows attackers to tailor subsequent attacks and enhances their credibility when sending follow-up malicious emails within the targeted organization. 

DLL Sideloading Ensures Evasion  

Attackers run malicious code in memory without leaving traces and abuse standard Windows tools to blend in with regular system activities. The downloaded ZIP file contains several malicious files used to carry out DLL sideloading.  

Key Objective

The primary purpose of this attack is to:

  • Steal important information with Lumma Stealer
  • Maintain control over the infected systems with Amadey Bot

Aattackers gain the ability to continuously monitor and manipulate their targets, which poses a significant threat to manufacturing businesses.

Why Businesses Need to Pay Attention 

For manufacturing companies, the consequences of such attacks can be severe and include:  

  • Theft of intellectual property 
  • Disruption of operations 
  • Financial losses and compliance violations 

Understanding and preparing for these threats is crucial for protecting valuable assets, maintaining operational integrity, and ensuring the safety of employees and customers. 

Analysis of the Attack with ANY.RUN Sandbox

To proactively identify malicious files belonging to this and other malware attacks, analyze them in the safe environment of ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox that offers: 

  • Real-time Insights: In-depth view of malicious activities as they occur. 
  • Interactivity: Test threat responses in a live system. 
  • Comprehensive Reporting: Detailed reports on IOCs, malware families, and more. 
Analysis of a malicious LNK file inside ANY.RUN’s Sandbox

By uploading a malicious LNK file to the sandbox and executing it we can observe how the entire chain of infection plays out. 

View analysis session 

ANY.RUN detects activities related to malicious and suspicious process

First, the .lnk file initiates SSH, which starts PowerShell. 

Mshta is utilized to download a payload from remote server

PowerShell then launches Mshta with the AES-encrypted first-stage payload that it decrypts and executes. 

Attack uses Emmenhtal loader to faciliate infection

PowerShell executes an AES-encrypted command to decrypt and run Emmenhtal

Suricata IDS is used in ANY.RUN to identify Amadey-related traffic

Emmental leads to system infections with Lumma and Amadey as a result. 

Strengthen your company’s security
with ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox 



Get free trial


Collect Threat Intelligence on Lumma and Amadey Attacks 

With TI Lookup, ANY.RUN’s searchable database of the latest threat intelligence, you can find more info on malware and phishing campaigns. TI Lookup provides: 

  • Fresh Data: Latest samples from a global network of security professionals. 
  • Actionable Indicators: IOCs from traffic, memory dumps, and manual collection. 
  • Contextual Information: Links to full sandbox analysis sessions with detailed data. 

Use the following query, consisting of the name of the threat and the path to one of the malicious files used in the attack, for your search: 

TI Lookup lets you collect threat data and view relevant sandbox sessions

The service provides a list of files matching the query along with sandbox sessions featuring analysis of samples belonging to the same campaign that you can explore in detail. 

Collect information on the latest cyber attacks
with TI Lookup 



Get free trial


About ANY.RUN  

ANY.RUN helps more than 500,000 cybersecurity professionals worldwide. Our interactive sandbox simplifies malware analysis of threats that target both Windows and Linux systems. Our threat intelligence products, TI LookupYARA Search and Feeds, help you find IOCs or files to learn more about the threats and respond to incidents faster.  

The post Manufacturing Companies Targeted with New Lumma and Amadey Campaign appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog – ​Read More

MC LR Router and GoCast unpatched vulnerabilities

MC LR Router and GoCast unpatched vulnerabilities

Cisco Talos’ Vulnerability Research team recently discovered two vulnerabilities in MC Technologies LR Router and three vulnerabilities in the GoCast service. 

These vulnerabilities have not been patched at time of this posting. 

For Snort coverage that can detect the exploitation of these vulnerabilities, download the latest rule sets from Snort.org, and our latest Vulnerability Advisories are always posted on Talos Intelligence’s website.  

MC Technologies OS command injection vulnerabilities 

Discovered by Matt Wiseman of Cisco Talos. 

The MC-LR Router from MC Technologies supports IPsec and OpenVPN implementations, firewall capabilities, remote management via HTTP and SNMP, and configurable alerting via SMS and email, with two-port and four-port variants, includes models that support transparent serial-to-TCP translations and 1-in/1-out digital I/O. 

Talos recently published two advisories detailing OS command injection vulnerabilities discovered in the MC-LR Router from MC Technologies. TALOS-2024-1953 covers three vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-28025 through CVE-2024-28027), which are reachable through the I/O configuration functionality of the web interface. TALOS-2024-1954 covers one vulnerability (CVE-2024-21786) in the importation of uploaded configuration files. All vulnerabilities may be triggered with an authenticated HTTP request. 

GoCast authentication and OS command injection vulnerabilities 

Discovered by Edwin Molenaar and Matt Street of Cisco Meraki. 

The GoCast tool provides BGP routing for advertisements from a host; it is commonly used for anycast-based load balancing for infrastructure service instances available in geographically diverse regions.  

The GoCast HTTP API allows the registration and deregistration of apps without requiring authentication, shown in TALOS-2024-1962 (CVE-2024-21855). The lack of authentication can be used to exploit TALOS-2024-1960 (CVE-2024-28892) and TALOS-2024-1961 (CVE-2024-29224), leading to OS command injection and arbitrary command execution. 

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

Cyble’s Weekly Vulnerability Report: Critical Flaws in Major Software Including Progress Software, QNAP, and 7-Zip

Weekly Vulnerability

Overview

The Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs (CRIL) has released its Weekly Vulnerability Insights Report, highlighting a series of critical vulnerabilities reported between November 27, 2024, and December 3, 2024.

This week’s findings focus on various vulnerabilities that pose risks to organizations, ranging from open-source applications to widely used enterprise software. The analysis includes vulnerabilities that have been actively exploited or are likely to be exploited in the near future, with some already accompanied by proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code.

One of the most noteworthy vulnerabilities identified in this week’s report is CVE-2024-11680, which impacts ProjectSend, an open-source file-sharing application. This vulnerability is categorized as a critical vulnerability in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added CVE-2024-11680 along with two other vulnerabilities to its catalog.

Throughout this week, CRIL has extensively analyzed vulnerabilities in products from major vendors like Progress Software, Veeam, Microsoft, and QNAP, as well as open-source software like 7-Zip.

CISA’s KEV Catalog: Active Exploitation and Critical Vulnerabilities

As part of its efforts to inform the public about vulnerabilities that are actively exploited, CISA has added three vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog between November 27 and December 3, 2024.

Among these is CVE-2024-11680, a critical flaw in ProjectSend that involves improper authentication, allowing attackers to bypass security and potentially gain unauthorized access. This vulnerability has been assigned a CVSSv3 score of 9.8, making it a high-priority issue for organizations using the software.

Additionally, CVE-2024-11667, a path traversal vulnerability in Zyxel firewalls, also made it to the KEV catalog. Although not as critical as CVE-2024-11680, this vulnerability is still high-risk, affecting multiple models of Zyxel Firewalls with a CVSSv3 score of 7.5. This issue could allow attackers to access sensitive files on vulnerable systems.

Furthermore, CVE-2023-45727, an XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability in North Grid’s Proself software, was included as well. Exploitation of this vulnerability can allow attackers to launch XXE attacks remotely, exposing systems to potential data breaches.

Major Vulnerabilities Identified

Several other vulnerabilities have been identified as critical threats in this week’s report. Among them:

  1. CVE-2024-8785 – A Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in WhatsUp Gold, a network monitoring software by Progress Software Corporation. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote attackers to exploit the NmAPI.exe service to manipulate the Windows registry, potentially resulting in system compromise. With the availability of PoC exploit code, the risk of this vulnerability being weaponized is particularly high.
  2. CVE-2024-42448 and CVE-2024-42449 – Both vulnerabilities affect the Veeam Service Provider Console (VSPC), a cloud-based platform used for managing and monitoring data protection services. These vulnerabilities could allow for Remote Code Execution (RCE) and the exposure of sensitive information like NTLM hashes. Veeam has released patches, but organizations are urged to patch their systems immediately to prevent exploitation.
  3. CVE-2024-11477 – An RCE vulnerability in the popular file archiver 7-Zip. This flaw arises from Zstandard Decompression in versions prior to 24.07 and could be exploited in email-based phishing campaigns that use malicious compressed files as delivery mechanisms. Given the high use of 7-Zip in both personal and organizational settings, this vulnerability is a major concern.
  4. CVE-2024-49019 – A high-severity elevation of privilege vulnerability in Microsoft’s Active Directory Certificate Services. This flaw allows attackers to gain elevated permissions by exploiting misconfigurations in certificate templates. CVE-2024-49019 affects millions of Windows-based systems, and with exploit codes already circulating, it poses a significant risk.
  5. CVE-2024-38077 – A critical vulnerability affecting the Windows Remote Desktop Licensing Service, which allows Remote Code Execution (RCE). This vulnerability is particularly dangerous as it impacts multiple versions of Windows, making it a prime target for attackers.

Online Threats on Underground Forums

One of the more concerning findings in the Weekly Vulnerability Report is the presence of active discussions and exploit sharing on underground forums and Telegram channels. These forums are often frequented by cybercriminals who share PoC exploit codes for various vulnerabilities. This week, researchers from CRIL tracked several discussions related to the following vulnerabilities:

  • CVE-2024-44285 – A use-after-free vulnerability found in Apple’s operating systems, including iOS, iPadOS, and watchOS. Exploiting this flaw could lead to unexpected termination of the system or even kernel memory corruption.
  • CVE-2024-11320 – An arbitrary code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting Pandora FMS. This vulnerability can be exploited via the LDAP authentication mechanism, potentially giving attackers full access to vulnerable systems.
  • CVE-2024-44308 – A critical vulnerability in JavaScriptCore, part of the WebKit engine used by Apple’s Safari browser. This flaw could lead to RCE when users visit malicious websites.
  • CVE-2024-0012 – An authentication bypass vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks’ PAN-OS, affecting several versions of the software. This flaw allows attackers to bypass authentication and gain administrative privileges, providing them with full control over affected devices.

Recommendations and Mitigations

Following these vulnerabilities, CRIL offers several key recommendations to help organizations mitigate potential security risks:

  1. Organizations should ensure they are applying the latest patches released by vendors to address vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-11680 and others identified in this report. Patching critical vulnerabilities immediately can prevent attacks from exploiting these weaknesses.
  2. A comprehensive patch management process is essential. This includes testing, deployment, and verification of patches to ensure that systems remain secure.
  3. Critical systems should be isolated from less secure areas of the network to reduce exposure to potential attacks. Using firewalls and access control measures can help limit the impact of a breach.
  4. Organizations should implement monitoring systems such as SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) to detect suspicious activities across their networks.
  5. Regular training on security best practices, particularly for dealing with phishing emails and malicious attachments, can help reduce the risk of exploitation through social engineering.

Conclusion

The Weekly Vulnerability Report from Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs provides essential insights into the vulnerabilities impacting critical systems and software. With high-risk vulnerabilities such as CVE-2024-11680, CVE-2024-8785, and CVE-2024-49019 in play, it is crucial for organizations to stay proactive in applying patches, monitoring for potential attacks, and reinforcing their overall security posture.

With PoC exploit code already circulating for many of these vulnerabilities, the window of opportunity for attackers to exploit these flaws is rapidly closing, making immediate action imperative. By following the best practices and recommendations provided in this report, organizations can better protect themselves.

The post Cyble’s Weekly Vulnerability Report: Critical Flaws in Major Software Including Progress Software, QNAP, and 7-Zip appeared first on Cyble.

Blog – Cyble – ​Read More

Comprehensive overview of network detection & response capabilities and uses | Kaspersky official blog

Why do even large companies that have invested heavily in their cyberdefense still fall victim to cyberattacks? Most often, it’s a matter of an outdated approach to security. Security teams may deploy dozens of tools, but lack visibility within their own networks, which nowadays include not only usual physical segments, but cloud environments as well. Hackers often exploit stolen credentials, operate through compromised contractors, and try to use malware as rarely as possible — preferring to exploit legitimate software and dual-purpose applications. That’s why security tools that are usually used to protect company’s endpoints may not be effective enough against well-disguised cyberattacks.

In a recent survey, 44% of CISOs reported missing a data breach, with 84% attributing the issue to an inability to analyze traffic, particularly encrypted traffic. This is where network detection and response (NDR) systems come into play. They offer comprehensive traffic analysis, including internal traffic — significantly enhancing security capabilities. In the Kaspersky product range, NDR functionality is implemented as part of its Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack Platform (KATA).

Outdated security tools aren’t enough

If there was one word to describe the priorities of today’s attackers, it would be “stealth”. Whether it’s espionage-focused APTs, ransomware groups, or any other attacks targeting a specific organization, adversaries go to great lengths to avoid detection, and complicate post-incident analysis. Our incident response report illustrates this vividly. Attackers exploit legitimate employee or contractor credentials, leverage admin tools already in use within the system (a tactic known as “living off the land”), and exploit vulnerabilities to perform actions from privileged user accounts, processes, or devices. Moreover, edge devices, such as proxy servers and firewalls, are increasingly being used as attack footholds.

How do cybersecurity teams respond to this? If a company’s threat detection approach was designed several years ago, its defenders might simply lack the tools to detect such activity in a timely manner:

  • In their traditional form, they only protect the organization’s perimeter, and don’t assist in detecting suspicious network activity inside it (such as attackers taking over additional computers).
  • Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS). The capabilities of classic IDS’s for detecting activity over encrypted channels are very limited, and their typical location between network segments impedes detection of lateral movement.
  • Antivirus and endpoint protection systems. These tools are difficult to use for detecting activity conducted entirely with legitimate tools in manual mode. Moreover, organizations always have routers, IoT devices, or network peripherals where it’s not possible to deploy such protection systems.

What is network detection and response?

NDR systems provide detailed monitoring of an organization’s traffic and apply various rules and algorithms to detect anomalous activity. They also include tools for rapid incident response.

The key difference to firewalls is the monitoring of all types of traffic flowing in various directions. Thus, not only communications between a network and the internet (north-south) are being analyzed, but data exchange between hosts within a corporate network (east-west) as well. Communications between systems in external networks and corporate cloud resources, as well as between cloud resources themselves, are not left unattended either. This makes NDR effective in various infrastructures: on-premises, cloud, and hybrid.

The key difference to classic IDS/IPS is the use of behavioral analysis mechanisms alongside signature analysis.

Besides connections analysis, an NDR solution keeps traffic in its “raw” form, and provides a whole range of technologies for analysis of such “snapshots” of data exchange; NDR can analyze many parameters of traffic (including metadata), going beyond simple “address-host-protocol” dependencies. For example, using JAx fingerprints, NDR can identify the nature even of encrypted SSL/TLS connections, and detect malicious traffic without needing to decrypt it.

Benefits of NDR for IT and security teams

Early threat detection. Even the initial steps of attackers — whether it’s brute-forcing passwords or exploiting vulnerabilities in publicly accessible applications — leave traces that NDR tools can detect. NDR, having “presence” not only on the edges of a network, but at its endpoints as well, is also well-suited to detecting lateral movement within the network, manipulation with authentication tokens, tunneling, reverse shells, and other common attack techniques, including network interactions.

Accelerated incident investigation. NDR tools allow for both broad and deep analysis of suspicious activity. Network interaction diagrams show where attackers moved and where their activity originated from, while access to raw traffic allows for the reconstruction of the attacker’s actions and the creation of detection rules for future searches.

A systematic approach to the big picture of an attack. NDR works with the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the attack — systematized according to such a popular framework as MITRE ATT&CK. Solutions of this class usually allow a security team to easily classify the detected indicators and, as a result, better understand the big picture of the attack, figure out the stage it’s at, and how the attack can be stopped as effectively as possible.

Detection of internal threats, misconfigurations, and shadow IT. The “behavioral” approach to traffic allows NDR to address preventive tasks as well. Various security policy violations, such as using unauthorized applications on personal devices, connecting additional devices to the company infrastructure, sharing passwords, accessing information not required for work tasks, using outdated software versions, and running server software without properly configured encryption and authentication, can be identified early and stopped.

Supply chain threat detection. Monitoring the traffic of legitimate applications may reveal undeclared functionality, such as unauthorized telemetry transmission to the manufacturer or attempts to deliver trojanized updates.

Automated response. The “R” in NDR stands for response actions such as isolating hosts with suspicious activity, tightening network zone interaction policies, and blocking high-risk protocols or malicious external hosts. Depending on the circumstances, the response can be either manual or automatic, triggered by the “if-then” presets.

NDR, EDR, XDR, and NTA

IT management and executives often ask tricky questions about how various *DR solutions differ from each other and why they’re all needed at the same time.

NTA (network traffic analysis) systems are the foundation from which NDR evolved. They were designed to collect and analyze all the traffic of a company (hence the name). However, practical implementation revealed the broader potential of this technology — that is, it could be used for rapid incident response. Response capabilities, including automation, are NDR’s primary distinction.

EDR (Endpoint Detection & Response) systems analyze cyberthreats on specific devices within the network (endpoints). While NDR provides a deep analysis of devices’ interactions and communication within the organization, EDR offers an equally detailed picture of the activity on individual devices. These systems complement each other, and only together do they provide a complete view of what’s happening in the organization and the tools needed for detection and response.

XDR (eXtended Detection & Response) systems take a holistic approach to threat detection and response by aggregating and correlating data from various sources, including endpoints, physical and cloud infrastructures, network devices, and more. This enables defenders to see a comprehensive overview of network activity, combine events from different sources into single alerts, apply advanced analytics to them, and simplify response actions. Different vendors put different spins on XDR: some offer XDR as a product that includes both EDR and NDR functionalities, while for others it may only support integration with these external tools.

Kaspersky’s approach: integrating NDR into the security ecosystem

Implementing NDR implies that an organization has already achieved a high level of cybersecurity maturity, with established monitoring and response practices, as well as tools for information exchange between systems, ensuring correlation and enrichment of data from various sources. This is why in Kaspersky’s product range and the NDR module enhances the capabilities of the Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack Platform (KATA). The basic version of KATA includes mechanisms such as SSL/TLS connection fingerprint analysis, north-south traffic attack detection, selective traffic capture for suspicious connections, and basic response functions.

The KATA NDR Enhanced version includes all the NDR capabilities described above, including deep analysis and full storage of traffic, intra-network connection monitoring, and automated advanced response functions.

The top-tier version, KATA Ultra, combines expert EDR capabilities with full NDR functions, offering a comprehensive, single-vendor XDR solution.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

QNAP NAS Vulnerabilities Exposed: What You Need to Know to Stay Secure

QNAP

Overview

QNAP NAS systems, a trusted choice for personal and enterprise data storage, have recently been flagged for multiple critical vulnerabilities.

Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in QNAP’s operating systems, leaving users exposed to a variety of potential threats, including remote code execution, denial of service (DoS), data manipulation, sensitive information disclosure, and security restriction bypass. If exploited, these vulnerabilities could compromise not just the integrity of the systems but also the valuable data they house.

With businesses and individuals relying heavily on QNAP NAS for secure storage, these vulnerabilities highlight the growing need for strong security measures and proactive updates. This blog dives deep into the technical aspects of the vulnerabilities, their impact, and how users can protect their systems.

Impact of the Vulnerabilities

The reported vulnerabilities pose significant threats to the security and stability of QNAP NAS systems. Here’s a breakdown of the potential impacts:

Impact Description
Remote Code Execution Allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the system remotely.
Denial of Service (DoS) Overloads the system, making it inaccessible to legitimate users.
Information Disclosure Exposes sensitive information stored in the NAS to unauthorized users.
Data Manipulation Enables attackers to alter, delete, or corrupt critical data.
Security Restriction Bypass Allows attackers to circumvent security controls, leading to unauthorized access.

Systems and Technologies Affected

The vulnerabilities affect specific versions of QNAP’s operating systems, including QTS and QuTS hero. Below is the list of impacted systems:

Operating System Affected Versions
QTS 5.1.x, 5.2.x
QuTS hero h5.1.x, h5.2.x

Details of the Vulnerabilities

These vulnerabilities, identified by their Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers, target various system components. A closer look at each vulnerability:

CVE ID Vulnerability Type Description
CVE-2024-48859 Improper Authentication Could allow remote attackers to compromise the system’s security.
CVE-2024-48865 Improper Certificate Validation Enables attackers with local network access to compromise security.
CVE-2024-48866 Improper URL Encoding Handling Causes the system to enter an unexpected state.
CVE-2024-48867, 48868 CRLF Injection Permits attackers to modify application data.
CVE-2024-50393 Command Injection Allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the system.
CVE-2024-50402, 50403 Externally-Controlled Format String Enables attackers with administrator privileges to access secret data or modify system memory.

These vulnerabilities highlight a range of attack vectors, from improper input validation to poorly managed authentication mechanisms.

Mitigation and Fixes

QNAP has released patches addressing these vulnerabilities in updated versions of its operating systems. Users are strongly encouraged to update to the fixed versions as shown below:

Affected Product Fixed Version Release Date
QTS 5.1.x QTS 5.1.9.2954 build 20241120 and later November 20, 2024
QTS 5.2.x QTS 5.2.2.2950 build 20241114 and later November 14, 2024
QuTS hero h5.1.x QuTS hero h5.1.9.2954 build 20241120 and later November 20, 2024
QuTS hero h5.2.x QuTS hero h5.2.2.2952 build 20241116 and later November 16, 2024

How to Update

To ensure your QNAP NAS system is secure, follow these steps to update your firmware:

  1. Login: Access QTS or QuTS hero as an administrator.
  2. Navigate to Firmware Update:
    • Go to Control Panel > System > Firmware Update.

  3. Check for Updates:
    • Under the Live Update tab, click Check for Update.
    • The system will automatically download and install the latest update.

  4. Manual Update (Optional):
    • Visit the QNAP Download Center.
    • Download the latest firmware and install it manually.

Why These Vulnerabilities Matter

QNAP NAS devices are widely used in personal and enterprise environments. Sensitive data such as backups, financial records, and confidential information are often stored on these systems, and a breach can lead to catastrophic consequences, including financial losses and reputational damage.

Key Lessons for Users

  1. Regular Updates: Always ensure your NAS firmware is up-to-date to protect against the latest threats.
  2. Vulnerability Awareness: Familiarize yourself with vulnerabilities affecting your devices to act proactively.
  3. Network Security: To complement device security, implement additional network-level defenses, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems.

Best Practices for Securing QNAP NAS

  • Enable 2-Factor Authentication: Adds an extra layer of security by requiring a secondary verification method.
  • Limit External Access: Restrict remote access to the NAS device to only trusted IP addresses.
  • Regular Backups: Ensure all critical data is backed up in a secure and separate location.
  • Monitor for Anomalies: Use QNAP’s built-in monitoring tools to detect unusual activities.
  • Use Strong Passwords: Replace default credentials with complex and unique passwords to prevent unauthorized access.

Conclusion

The discovery of these vulnerabilities points out the importance of maintaining strong cybersecurity practices for critical systems like QNAP NAS. With the provided fixes and recommendations, users can safeguard their systems against potential exploitation.

Stay vigilant, update promptly, and prioritize security to ensure the integrity of your data and systems.

Source:

https://www.hkcert.org/security-bulletin/qnap-nas-multiple-vulnerabilities_20241209

https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-24-49

The post QNAP NAS Vulnerabilities Exposed: What You Need to Know to Stay Secure appeared first on Cyble.

Blog – Cyble – ​Read More

A Technical Look at the New ‘Termite’ Ransomware that Hit Blue Yonder

Termite ransomware Blue Yonder

The ransomware attack that hit supply chain management platform Blue Yonder and its customers last month was the work of a new ransomware group called “Termite.”

Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) researchers have examined a Termite ransomware binary and determined that Termite is essentially a rebranding of the notorious Babuk ransomware. The Termite leak site claims seven victims so far (geographic distribution below).

We’ll cover the technical details of the new Termite ransomware strain, which was first identified by PCrisk, along with MITRE ATT&CK techniques, indicators of compromise (IoCs) and recommendations.

Technical Details of Termite Ransomware

Upon execution, the ransomware invokes the SetProcessShutdownParameters(0, 0) API to ensure that its process is one of the last to be terminated during system shutdown. This tactic is used to maximize the time available for the ransomware to complete its encryption process.

The ransomware then attempts to terminate services on the victim’s machine to prevent interruptions during the encryption process. It uses the OpenSCManagerA() API to establish a connection with the Service Control Manager, granting access to the service control manager database (image below).

Enumerating services

After gaining access, the ransomware enumerates the services on the victim’s machine to retrieve their names. It specifically looks for services such as veeam, vmms, memtas and others, and terminating them if they are found to be actively running.

The ransomware enumerates running processes using the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(), Process32FirstW(), and Process32NextW() APIs. It checks process names such as sql.exe, oracle.exe, firefox.exe and others and terminates them if they are actively running.

Process termination

After that, the ransomware launches the vssadmin.exe process to delete all Shadow Copies, as shown in the below figure. This action is performed to prevent system recovery after the files have been encrypted.

Deleting shadow copies

The ransomware also uses the SHEmptyRecycleBinA() API to delete all items from the Recycle Bin, ensuring that no deleted files can be restored after encryption. After execution, Termite Ransomware attempts to retrieve system information using the GetSystemInfo() API, which collects details like the number of processors, as shown in the below figure.

Retrieving system information

The ransomware then creates a separate thread for each detected CPU, generates ransom notes named “How To Restore Your Files.txt”, and encrypts files on the victim’s machine.

It avoids encrypting certain system folders such as AppData, Boot, Windows, Windows.old etc. Additionally, it specifically excludes system files such as autorun.inf, boot.ini, bootfont.bin etc., as well as file extensions like .exe, .dll, and .termite from the encryption process to ensure that essential system functions remain intact.

Similar to Babuk ransomware, Termite appends the signature “choung dong looks like hot dog” at the end of the encrypted file.

Encryption marker

The figure below shows the ransom note dropped by the ransomware, titled ” How To Restore Your Files.txt,” which instructs victims to visit the onion site for additional information.

Ransom note

After dropping the ransom notes, the malware encrypts the files on the victim’s machine and appends the “.termite” extension, as shown in the figure below.

Encrypted files

The Termite ransomware can also spread through network shares and paths of the infected machine, as shown below.

Spreading through network shares and paths

If the command-line argument is “shares,” the ransomware uses the NetShareEnum() API to locate network shares and retrieve information about each shared resource on the server. It then checks for the $ADMIN share and begins encrypting the files. If the command-line argument is “paths,” the ransomware calls the GetDriveTypeW() API to identify network drives connected to the infected machine, and once located, it starts encrypting the files. If neither “-paths” nor “-shares” are provided, and the mutex named “DoYouWantToHaveSexWithCuongDong” is not found on the infected machine, the ransomware recursively traverses all local drives and encrypts the files.

Conclusion

Termite ransomware represents a new and growing threat in the cyber landscape, leveraging advanced tactics such as double extortion to maximize its impact on victims. By targeting businesses and demanding substantial ransoms, it not only disrupts operations but also exposes organizations to significant financial, legal, and reputational risks. The emergence of Termite underscores the critical need for robust cybersecurity measures, proactive threat intelligence, and incident response strategies to counter the evolving tactics of ransomware groups.

Recommendations

We have listed some essential cybersecurity best practices that create the first line of control against attackers. We recommend that our readers follow the best practices below:

Safety Measures to Prevent Ransomware Attacks

  • Do not open untrusted links and email attachments without first verifying their authenticity.
  • Conduct regular backup practices and keep those backups offline or in a separate network.
  • Turn on the automatic software update feature on your computer, mobile, and other connected devices wherever possible and pragmatic.
  • Use a reputable antivirus and Internet security software package on your connected devices, including PC, laptop, and mobile. 

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques

Tactic Technique Procedure
Execution  T1204.002 (User Execution)  User executes the ransomware file
Defense Evasion  T1070.004 (Indicator Removal: File Deletion)  Ransomware deletes itself after execution
Discovery  T1083 (File and Directory Discovery)  Ransomware enumerates folders for file encryption and file deletion. 
Discovery  T1135 (Network Share Discovery)  Targets Network Shares and Paths
Impact  T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact)  Ransomware encrypts the data for extortion. 
Impact  T1490 (Inhibit System Recovery) Disable automatic Windows recovery 

IOC

Indicators Indicator Type Description
f0ec54b9dc2e64c214e92b521933cee172283ff5c942cf84fae4ec5b03abab55 SHA-256 Termite Ransomware

The post A Technical Look at the New ‘Termite’ Ransomware that Hit Blue Yonder appeared first on Cyble.

Blog – Cyble – ​Read More

Kaspersky SIEM improvements in Q4 2024 | Kaspersky official blog

In attacks on infrastructure of various companies, cybercriminals are increasingly resorting to manipulating modules that interact with the Local Security Authority (LSA) process. This enables them to steal user credentials, establish persistence in the system, elevate privileges, or extend the attack to other systems within the target company. Therefore, for the latest quarterly update of our SIEM system, the Kaspersky Unified Monitoring and Analysis Platform, we’ve added rules designed to detect such attempts. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK classification, the new rules can detect techniques T1547.002, T1547.005 and T1556.002.

What are techniques T1547.002, T1547.005 and T1556.002?

Both variants of technique T1547 mentioned above involve using the LSA process to load malicious modules. Sub-technique 002 describes adding malicious dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) with Windows authentication packages, while sub-technique 005 involves DLLs with security support provider (SSP) packages. Loading these modules allows attackers to access the LSA process memory, which can contain critical data such as user credentials.

Technique T1556.002 describes a scenario where an attacker registers a malicious password filter DLL in the system. These filters are essentially mechanisms for enforcing password policies. When a legitimate user changes a password or sets a new one, the LSA process compares it against all registered filters, and is forced to handle the passwords in plain text form, i.e., unencrypted. If an attacker manages to introduce a malicious password filter into the system, they can collect passwords with every request.

All three techniques involve placing malicious libraries in the C:Windowssystem32 directory and registering them in the system registry under the following keys of the SYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlLSA branch: Authentication Packages for T1547.002, Security Packages for T1547.005, and Notification Packages for T1556.002.

How our SIEM counters techniques T1547.002, T1547.005 and T1556.002

To counter these techniques, the Kaspersky Unified Monitoring and Analysis Platform will be updated with rules R154_02–R154_10, which detect, among other things, the following events:

  • Loading of suspicious authentication packages, password filter packages, and security support provider modules using events 4610, 4614 and 4622, respectively.
  • Commands executed in cmd.exe and powershell.exe and aimed at modifying the LSA registry branch and the Authentication Packages, Notification Packages and Security Packages keys.
  • Changes (detected through registry modification event 4657) of the LSA registry branch that could enable a malicious file.

Other improvements in the Kaspersky Unified Monitoring and Analysis Platform update

In this update, we’re also introducing rule R999_99, which detects changes in Active Directory accounts’ critical attributes, such as scriptPath and msTSInitialProgram, which enable various actions to be performed upon login.

These attributes set some scripts to execute every time a user logs into the system. This makes them an attractive target for attackers aiming to establish persistence in the network. Tampering with these attributes may indicate unauthorized attempts to gain a foothold in the system or escalate privileges — technique T1037.003 under the MITRE ATT&CK classification.

The strategy for detecting these manipulations is to monitor Windows event logs — particularly event 5136. This event records any changes made to objects in Active Directory, including attribute modifications.

After the latest update, our SIEM platform will provide over 700 rules. Thus, by the end of 2024, our solution will cover 400 MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Of course, we’re not aiming to create rules to detect every technique described in the matrix. A significant portion of them cannot be fully addressed due to their nature — for example, ones involving actions performed outside the protected perimeter or the techniques not fully covered by SIEM solutions by definition. However, in the fourth quarter of this year, we’ve focused on further expanding the coverage of MITRE ATT&CK techniques while enhancing the detection logic for already covered techniques.

New and improved normalizers

In the latest update, we’ve also added normalizers to our SIEM system that support the following event sources:

  • [OOTB] McAfee Endpoint DLP syslog
  • [OOTB] LastLine Enterprise syslog cef
  • [OOTB] MongoDb syslog
  • [OOTB] GajShield Firewall syslog
  • [OOTB] Eltex ESR syslog
  • [OOTB] Linux auditd syslog for KUMA 3.2
  • [OOTB] Barracuda Cloud Email Security Gateway syslog
  • [OOTB] Yandex Cloud
  • [OOTB] InfoWatch Person Monitor SQL
  • [OOTB] Kaspersky Industrial CyberSecurity for Networks 4.2 syslog

In addition, our experts have improved the following normalizers:

  • [OOTB] Microsoft Products via KES WIN
  • [OOTB] Microsoft Products for KUMA 3
  • [OOTB] KSC from SQL
  • [OOTB] Ideco UTM syslog
  • [OOTB] KEDR telemetry
  • [OOTB] Vipnet TIAS syslog
  • [OOTB] PostgreSQL pgAudit syslog
  • [OOTB] KSC PostgreSQL
  • [OOTB] Linux auditd syslog for KUMA 3.2

The full list of supported event sources in Kaspersky Unified Monitoring and Analysis Platform 3.4 can be found in the Online Help, where you can also find information on correlation rules. In our blog you can also read about the updates for our SIEM platform for the first, second and third quarters of 2024.

To learn more about our SIEM system, the Kaspersky Unified Monitoring and Analysis Platform, please visit the official product page.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More