Resolutions, shmesolutions (and what’s actually worked for me)

Resolutions, shmesolutions (and what’s actually worked for me)

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

I went to bed at 8:30 p.m. on New Year’s Eve, and I think that’s pretty indicative of how I approach the whole idea of New Year’s resolutions. 

I love to count down to the new year with loved ones as much as the next person, but I have really conflicted feelings about traditional resolutions. On one hand, it’s great to have goals for the future and pick a day to start putting them into action. On the other, why wait until the New Year, and why pick goals that are often wildly unsustainable? It feels like it just promotes an “all or nothing” approach, and starts the year on a disappointing note if you stumble even a little. Life happens, and many resolutions don’t give enough grace. 

Here are some resolutions I failed at this past year: 

  • Lift weights three days/week for a whole year: Close, but no cigar! 
  • Journal at least one sentence every day: Yeah, I failed at this one pretty quickly. I’m not a journal person. 
  • Knit at least three sweaters: I made a shirt, almost finished a vest, and spent a ton of money on yarn.

I have done a lot of things I’m proud about this year, so then… what has worked? An intention that I’ve held throughout the year is turning “shoulds” into setting plans into motion right away. For example, “I should host a one-time book club to discuss my favorite book” becomes “I just posted in my neighborhood Facebook page to find people who are interested and pick a date.” Or “I should finish my certification” becomes “I just set a weekly three-hour calendar block, and I won’t move it unless there’s an emergency.”

That shift in mindset reminds me a lot of what works in cybersecurity. Our industry is full of ambitious, high-level goals: “Eliminate all vulnerabilities,” “achieve zero trust,” or “stop every threat.” These aspirations are important, but the reality is that security happens in small, consistent actions: patching systems as soon as updates are available, educating teams on the latest phishing techniques, reviewing logs regularly, or simply responding quickly to a new alert.

Just like with personal resolutions, there’s often pressure in security to be perfect, to never let anything slip through the cracks. Even the organizations that have amazing budget and headcount will face challenges and setbacks, and no environment is ever perfectly secure. What matters most is how we respond in the moment, learn from what’s happened, and keep moving forward.

So as we head into 2026, whether you’re setting personal goals or planning your organization’s security strategy, consider focusing less on flawless resolutions and more on building habits that adapt to change. Celebrate the small wins, reflect on what you’ve accomplished, and don’t be afraid to pivot when things don’t go as planned. Show up every day and take that next step.

The one big thing 

Earlier today, Cisco Talos disclosed a sophisticated threat actor we track as UAT-7290, who has been active since at least 2022. UAT-7290 is tasked with gaining initial access as well as conducting espionage-focused intrusions against critical infrastructure entities in South Asia. UAT-7290’s arsenal includes a malware family consisting of implants we call RushDrop, DriveSwitch, and SilentRaid. Our findings indicate that UAT-7290 conducts extensive technical reconnaissance of target organizations before carrying out intrusions. 

Why do I care? 

UAT-7290 targets telecom and network infrastructure, which, if compromised, can have cascading impacts on national security, business operations, and customer data. Their advanced tactics, use of publicly available exploits, and ability to establish persistent footholds make detection and remediation difficult. 

So now what? 

Review and apply the latest ClamAV and Snort signatures (see the blog) to detect and block UAT-7290’s malware and activity. Audit your edge devices (especially those exposed to the internet) for signs of compromise, weak credentials, or unpatched vulnerabilities, and prioritize patching and hardening them. Make sure your incident response plans are ready to address potential intrusions involving advanced persistent threats (APTs).

Top security headlines of the week 

U.S. cyber pros plead guilty over BlackCat ransomware activity  
Two US citizens plead guilty to working as ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware affiliates in 2023. Along with an unnamed third conspirator, they were previously employed by security firms Sygnia and DigitalMint. (DarkReading)

European Space Agency (ESA) confirms breach after hacker offers to sell data 
The ESA has confirmed that some of its systems have been breached and is working on securing compromised devices. The hacker offered to sell 200GB of allegedly stolen data from ESA’s systems, including files from private Bitbucket repositories. (SecurityWeek)

Sophisticated ClickFix campaign targeting hospitality sector 
Fake Booking reservation cancellations and fake BSODs trick victims into executing malicious code leading to RAT infections. (SecurityWeek) (The Hacker News)

New n8n vulnerability lets authenticated users execute system commands  
It affects n8n versions from 1.0.0 up to, but not including, 2.0.0, and allows an authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the host running n8n. The issue has been addressed in version 2.0.0. (The Hacker News

Russia-aligned hackers abuse Viber to target Ukrainian military and government 
The attack chain involves the use of Viber to distribute malicious ZIP archives containing multiple Windows shortcut (LNK) files disguised as official Microsoft Word and Excel documents to trick recipients into opening them. (The Hacker News)

Can’t get enough Talos? 

How Cisco Talos powers the solutions protecting your organization 
What happens under the hood of Cisco’s security portfolio? Our reputation and detection services apply Talos’ real-time intelligence to detect and block threats. Here’s how. 

The TTP: Talking through a year of cyber threats, in five questions 
Hazel is joined by Nick Biasini to reflect on what stood out, what surprised them, and what didn’t in 2025. What might defenders want to think about differently heading into 2026? 

Upcoming events where you can find Talos 

  • JSAC (Jan. 21 – 23) Tokyo, Japan 
  • S4x26 (Feb. 23 – 26) Miami, FL

Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week 

SHA256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507  
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f  
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507  
Example Filename: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507.exe  
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201 

SHA256: 90b1456cdbe6bc2779ea0b4736ed9a998a71ae37390331b6ba87e389a49d3d59 
MD5: c2efb2dcacba6d3ccc175b6ce1b7ed0a  
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=90b1456cdbe6bc2779ea0b4736ed9a998a71ae37390331b6ba87e389a49d3d59  
Example Filename: ck8yh2og.dll  
Detection Name: Auto.90B145.282358.in02 

SHA256: 96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974  
MD5: aac3165ece2959f39ff98334618d10d9  
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974  
Example Filename: 96fa6a7714670823c83099ea01d24d6d3ae8fef027f01a4ddac14f123b1c9974.exe  
Detection Name: W32.Injector:Gen.21ie.1201 

SHA256: ecd31e50ff35f41fbacf4b3c39901d5a2c9d4ae64b0c0385d661b1fd8b00481f  
MD5: e41ae00985e350137ddd9c1280f04fc3  
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=ecd31e50ff35f41fbacf4b3c39901d5a2c9d4ae64b0c0385d661b1fd8b00481f  
Example Filename: tg-submit-JDs62cgS.exe  
Detection Name: Auto.ECD31E.252552.in02 

SHA256: 1aa70d7de04ecf0793bdbbffbfd17b434616f8de808ebda008f1f27e80a2171b  
MD5: a8fd606be87a6f175e4cfe0146dc55b2  
Talos Rep: https://talosintelligence.com/talos_file_reputation?s=1aa70d7de04ecf0793bdbbffbfd17b434616f8de808ebda008f1f27e80a2171b  
Example Filename: WCInstaller_NonAdmin.exe  
Detection Name: W32.1AA70D7DE0-95.SBX.TG

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

Initial Access Sales Accelerated Across Australia and New Zealand in 2025

Initial Access Australia and New Zealand Region

The cyber threat environment in Australia and New Zealand experienced a new escalation throughout 2025, driven by a surge in initial access sales, ransomware operations, and high-impact data breaches. According to our Threat Landscape Report Australia and New Zealand 2025, threat activity observed between January and November 2025 reveals a complex and commercialized underground ecosystem, where compromised network access is actively bought, sold, and exploited across multiple sectors. 

The threat landscape report identifies a persistent focus on data-rich industries, with threat actors disproportionately targeting Retail, Banking, Financial Services, and Insurance (BFSI), Professional Services, and Healthcare organizations. These sectors continue to attract attackers due to the volume of sensitive personally identifiable information (PII), financial data, and downstream access opportunities they offer. 

Growth of Initial Access Sales in 2025 

A central finding of the report is the continued growth of the initial access market. Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) documented 92 instances of compromised access sales affecting organizations in Australia and New Zealand during 2025. Retail organizations were the most heavily targeted, accounting for 31 incidents, or approximately 34% of all observed activity. This figure is more than three times higher than that of the next most targeted sector. 

The BFSI sector recorded nine compromised access listings, followed by Professional Services with seven incidents. Combined, these three sectors accounted for more than half of all initial access listings observed in the region during the reporting period. 

This concentration reflects a strategic approach by initial access brokers. Retail and BFSI organizations routinely handle large volumes of customer data and payment information, making them valuable targets for monetization or follow-on ransomware attacks. Professional Services firms, meanwhile, often provide access to client environments, creating opportunities for supply chain exploitation. 

A Fragmented but Active Access Brokerage Market 

Analysis of the compromised access marketplace reveals a highly fragmented ecosystem rather than one dominated by a small number of major actors. The threat actor known as “cosmodrome” emerged as the most prolific seller of compromised access during the period, followed closely by an actor operating under the alias “shopify.” 

Despite their activity, these actors did not control the market. The top seven most active sellers were collectively responsible for only about 26% of the observed access listings. The remaining activity originated from dozens of individual threat actors who posted listings once or twice, suggesting a low barrier to entry and a marketplace populated by both specialized brokers and opportunistic participants. 

This structure indicates that initial access sales have become an accessible revenue stream for a wide range of threat actors, reinforcing the resilience and scalability of the underground economy. 

High-Impact Incidents Highlight Broader Risks 

Several notable incidents documented in the threat landscape report illustrate how initial access is translated into real-world impact. 

In June 2025, the threat group Scattered Spider was suspected of orchestrating a cyberattack against a major Australian airline. Attackers reportedly gained unauthorized access to a customer service portal, resulting in a data breach that exposed records belonging to nearly six million customers. The compromised data included names, email addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, and frequent flyer numbers. 

The airline confirmed that more sensitive information, such as credit card details, financial records, and passport data, was not affected because it was not stored in the breached system. Investigators believe the incident may be part of a broader campaign targeting the aviation sector. 

In March, threat actor “Stari4ok” advertised the sale of unauthorized access to a large Australian retail chain on the Russian-language cybercrime forum Exploit. The actor claimed the access involved a hosting server containing approximately 250 GB of data, including a 30 GB SQL database with a user table of around 71,000 records. Based on the claimed annual revenue of USD 2.6 billion and the described industry, the victim appears to be a major retailer, although this has not been independently confirmed. The access was listed for auction with a starting price of USD 1,500. 

Another listing emerged in May when the threat actor “w_tchdogs” offered unauthorized access to a portal belonging to an Australian telecommunications provider on the English-language forum Darkforums. The actor claimed the access provided entry to domain administration tools and critical network information. The listing price was USD 750. 

Data Breaches and Hacktivist Activity 

Not all incidents were tied directly to access sales. In mid-April, unidentified threat actors gained unauthorized access to the IT systems of a prominent accounting firm operating across Australia and New Zealand. The organization publicly confirmed the breach, stating that some data may have been compromised and that an investigation was ongoing. While business operations continued, the firm warned clients of potential phishing attempts and obtained court injunctions in both countries to prevent the dissemination of affected data. As of the time of reporting, no threat group had claimed responsibility. 

Hacktivist activity also remained visible. In January 2025, the group RipperSec claimed to have accessed an optical-fiber network monitoring device belonging to an Australian cable and media services provider. The device was reportedly no longer supported by its vendor. As proof, the group released images suggesting internal defacement and possible data manipulation. 

Want a deeper insight into these threats? Check out Cyble’s Australia and New Zealand Threat Landscape Report 2025 or schedule a demo to see check out how Cyble can protect your organization against these threats. 

The post Initial Access Sales Accelerated Across Australia and New Zealand in 2025 appeared first on Cyble.

Cyble – ​Read More

UAT-7290 targets high value telecommunications infrastructure in South Asia

  • Cisco Talos is disclosing a sophisticated threat actor we track as UAT-7290, who has been active since at least 2022.
  • UAT-7290 is tasked with gaining initial access as well as conducting espionage focused intrusions against critical infrastructure entities in South Asia.
  • UAT-7290’s arsenal includes a malware family consisting of implants we call RushDrop, DriveSwitch, and SilentRaid.
  • Our findings indicate that UAT-7290 conducts extensive technical reconnaissance of target organizations before carrying out intrusions.

UAT-7290 targets high value telecommunications infrastructure in South Asia

Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-7290 is a sophisticated threat actor falling under the China-nexus of Advanced Persistent Threat actors (APTs). UAT-7290 primarily targets telecommunications providers in South Asia. However, in recent months we have also seen UAT-7290 expand their targeting into Southeastern Europe.

In addition to conducting espionage focused attacks where UAT-7290 burrows deep inside a victim enterprise’s network infrastructure, their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and tooling suggests that this actor also establishes Operational Relay Box (ORBs) nodes. The ORB infrastructure may then be used by other China-nexus actors in their malicious operations, signifying UAT-7290’s dual role as an espionage motivated threat actor as well as an initial access group.

Active since at least 2022, UAT-7290 has an expansive arsenal of tooling, including open-source malware, custom developed malware, and payloads for 1-day vulnerabilities in popular edge networking products. UAT-7290 primarily leverages a Linux based malware suite but may also utilize Windows based bespoke implants such as RedLeaves or Shadowpad commonly linked to China-nexus threat actors.

Our findings suggest that the threat actor conducts extensive reconnaissance of target organizations before carrying out intrusions. UAT-7290 leverages one-day exploits and target-specific SSH brute force to compromise public facing edge devices to gain initial access and escalate privileges on compromised systems. The actor appears to rely on publicly available proof-of-concept exploit code as opposed to developing their own.

UAT-7290 shares overlapping TTPs with known China-nexus adversaries, including the exploitation of high-profile vulnerabilities in networking devices, use of open-source web shells for persistence, leveraging UDP listeners, and using compromised infrastructure to facilitate operations.

Specifically, we have observed technical indicators that overlap with RedLeaves, a malware family attributed to APT10 (a.k.a. MenuPass, POTASSIUM and Purple Typhoon), as well as infrastructure associated with ShadowPad, a malware family used by a variety of China-nexus adversaries.

Additionally, UAT-7290 shares a significant amount of overlap in victimology, infrastructure, and tooling with a group publicly reported by Recorded Future as Red Foxtrot. In a 2021 report, Recorded Future linked Red Foxtrot to Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Unit 69010.

UAT-7290’s malware arsenal for edge devices

Talos currently tracks the Linux-based malware families associated with UAT-7290 in this intrusion as:

  • RushDrop – The dropper that kickstarts the infection chain. RushDrop is also known as ChronosRAT.
  • DriveSwitch – A peripheral malware used to execute the main implant on the infected system.
  • SilentRaid – The main implant in the intrusion meant to establish persistent access to compromised endpoints. It communicates with its command-and-control server (C2) and carries out tasks defined in the malware. SilentRaid is also known as MystRodX.

Another malware implanted on compromised devices by UAT-7290 is Bulbature. Bulbature, first disclosed by Sekoia in late 2024, is an implant that is used to convert compromised devices into ORBs.

RushDrop and DriveSwitch

RushDrop is a malware dropper that consists of three binaries encoded and embedded within it. RushDrop first makes rudimentary checks to ensure it is running on a legitimate system instead of a sandbox.

UAT-7290 targets high value telecommunications infrastructure in South Asia
Figure 1. RushDrop deleting itself if VM checks fail.

Then it either checks for the existence of, or creates a folder called “.pkgdb” in the current working directory of the dropper. RushDrop then decodes and drops three binaries to the “.pkgdb” folder:

  • “daytime” – A malware family that simply executes a file called “chargen” from the current working directory. This executor is being tracked as DriveSwitch.
  • “chargen” – The central implant of the infection chain, tracked as SilentRaid. SilentRaid communicates with its C2 server, usually in the form of a domain and can carry out action as instructed by the C2.
  • “busybox” – Busybox is a legitimate Linux utility that can be used to execute arbitrary commands on the system. 
UAT-7290 targets high value telecommunications infrastructure in South Asia
Figure 2. RushDrop setting up files on disk.

 DriveSwitch simply executes the SilentRaid malware on the system.

UAT-7290 targets high value telecommunications infrastructure in South Asia
Figure 3. DriveSwitch executing SilentRaid.

SilentRaid: The multifunctional malware

SilentRaid is a malware written in C++ and consists of multiple functionalities, written in the form of “plugins” embedded in the malware. On execution, it does certain rudimentary anti-VM and analysis checks to ensure it isn’t running in a sandbox. Then the malware simply initializes its “plugins” and contacts the C2 server for instructions to carry out malicious tasks on the infected endpoint. The plugins are built in functionalities, but modular enough to enable the threat actor to stitch together a combination of them during compilation.

Plugin: my_socks_mgr

This plugin handles communication to C2 server. It obtains the C2 IP by resolving a domain using “8[.]8[.]8[.]8” and passes commands received from the C2 to the appropriate plugin.

Plugin:my_rsh

This plugin opens a remote shell by executing “sh” either via either “busybox” or “/bin/sh”. This remote shell is then used to run arbitrary commands on the infected system.

UAT-7290 targets high value telecommunications infrastructure in South Asia

Plugin:port_fwd_mgr

This plugin sets up port forwarding between ports specified — a local port and a port on a remote server. It can also set up port forwarding across multiple ports.

Plugin:my_file_mgr

This is the file manager of the backdoor. It allows the SilentRaid to:

  • Read contents of “/etc/passwd”
  • Execute a specified file on the system
  • Archive directories specified by the C2 using “tar -cvf” – executed via busybox
  • Check if a file is accessible
  • Remove a file or directory using the “rm” command – via busybox
  • Read/write a specified file

SilentRaid can also parse thru x509 certificates and collect attribute information such as:

  • id-at-dnQualifier | Distinguished Name qualifier
  • id-at-pseudonym | Pseudonym
  • id-domainComponent | Domain component
  • id-at-uniqueIdentifier | Unique Identifier

Bulbature

The Bulbature malware discovered consisted of the same string encoding scheme as the other UAT-7290’s malware illustrated earlier. Usually UPX compressed, Bulbature can bind to and listen to either a random port of its choosing or one specified via command line via the “-d <port_number>” switch.

Bulbature obtains the local network interface’s name by executing the command:

cat /proc/net/route | awk '{print $1,$2}' | awk '/00000000/ {print $1}'

It also obtains basic system information and the current user using the command:

echo $(whoami) $(uname -nrm)

The malware typically records its C2 address in a config file in the /tmp directory. The file will have the same name as the malware binary with the “.cfg” extension appended to it. The C2 address may be an encoded string.

Bulbature can obtain additional or new C2 addresses from the current C2 and can switch over communications with them instead. The malware can open up a reverse shell with its C2 to execute arbitrary commands on the infected system.

A recent variant of Bulbature contained an embedded self-signed certificate that it used for communicating with the C2. This certificate matches the one from the sample disclosed by Sekoia as well:

509 Certificate:
Version: 3
Serial Number: 81bab2934ee32534
Signature Algorithm:
    Algorithm ObjectId: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 sha256RSA
    Algorithm Parameters:
    05 00
Issuer:
    O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
    S=Some-State
    C=AU
  Name Hash(sha1): d398f76c7ba0bbf79b1cac0620cdf4b42e505195
  Name Hash(md5): 4a963519b4950845a8d76668d4d7dd29
 
NotBefore: 8/8/2019 3:33 AM
NotAfter: 12/24/2046 3:33 AM
 
Subject:
    O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd
    S=Some-State
    C=AU
  Name Hash(sha1): d398f76c7ba0bbf79b1cac0620cdf4b42e505195
  Name Hash(md5): 4a963519b4950845a8d76668d4d7dd29
 
Cert Hash(sha256): 918fb8af4998393f5195bafaead7c9ba28d8f9fb0853d5c2d75f10e35be8015a

Censys data shows that this certificate, with the exact Serial number, is present on at least 141 hosts, all either located in China or Hong Kong. On Virus Total, many of the IPs identified hosting this certificate are associated with other malware typically associated with China-nexus of threat actors such as SuperShell, GobRAT, Cobalt Strike, etc.

Coverage

The following ClamAV signatures detect and block this threat:

  • Unix.Dropper.Agent
  • Unix.Malware.Agent
  • Unix.Packed.Agent

The following Snort Rule (SIDs) detects and blocks this threat: 65124

IOCs

723c1e59accbb781856a8407f1e64f36038e324d3f0bdb606d35c359ade08200

59568d0e2da98bad46f0e3165bcf8adadbf724d617ccebcfdaeafbb097b81596

961ac6942c41c959be471bd7eea6e708f3222a8a607b51d59063d5c58c54a38d

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

How Cisco Talos powers the solutions protecting your organization

How Cisco Talos powers the solutions protecting your organization

Cisco Talos is Cisco’s threat intelligence and security research organization that powers Cisco’s product portfolio with that intelligence. While we are well known for the security research in our blog, vulnerability discoveries, and our open-source software, you may not be aware of exactly how our know-how protects Cisco customers.

Talos’ core mission is to understand the broad threat landscape and distill the massive amount of telemetry we ingest into actionable intelligence. This intelligence is put to use in detecting and defending against threats with speed and accuracy, providing incident response and empowering our customers, constituents, and communities with context-rich actionable cyber intelligence. Under the hood of Cisco’s security portfolio, you will find our reputation and detection services applying our real time intelligence to detect and block threats.

Defending networks

Possibly our best-known service is the Cisco Talos Network Intrusion Prevention system, widely known as SNORT®. Snort performs deep packet inspection on network traffic, using advanced signature-based detection to identify known threats. In addition, its machine learning-powered component, SnortML, helps detect and block attempts to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities, providing robust protection against both familiar and emerging network attacks.

Securing the web

The core of securing our customers across our product portfolio is Cisco Talos Web Filtering Service. This service considers the reputation and categorization of domains, IP addresses, and indicators surrounding the URL. The service can proactively block web traffic to sites that have a poor reputation or that serve content in contravention of a customer’s web use policy.

The Cisco Talos DNS Security service augments our web filtering by defending specific attacks at the DNS layer. It detects domains used by threat actors for command and control (C2), data exfiltration, and phishing attacks. Behind the scenes, our machine learning algorithms constantly analyze patterns in the DNS traffic to identify new malicious domains to add to our own intelligence.

Protecting your inbox

Cisco Talos Email Filtering analyzes a wide range of indicators within email to determine if it is malicious, spam, or a genuine email. This includes assessing the sender’s domain and IP reputation and behavior, examining URLs and the content they reference, and evaluating the body of the email, header, and any attachments. By combining these factors, our email filtering can identify benign messages, spam, phish, as well as other unwanted messages.

Cisco Talos Email Threat Prevention goes one step further than DMARC, the standard for properly handling emails with inaccurate sender data, by analyzing anomalies in email traffic patterns with AI, to identify when brands are being impersonated. This technology can detect when an email is likely to be a phish or a business email compromise attempt.

Detecting malware

Talos provides two complementary technologies to detect malware: Cisco Talos Antivirus and Cisco Talos Malware Protection. The former provides signature and pattern detection of malware within files to identify known malware, similar to our ClamAV open-source product. The latter goes further, checking the dispositions of unknown files and looking for suspicious behavior on the machine. This layered approach allows us to quickly spot and contain threats while our researchers scour telemetry for any indications that a bad actor has gained access to a device.

We also provide Orbital queries and scripts, a platform by which administrators can collect information from networked devices and use their own queries (or those provided by us) to hunt for devices that are insecure, out of policy, or potentially affected by a security incident.

Summary

You can find Talos’ intelligence integrated into a wide variety of Cisco products:

How Cisco Talos powers the solutions protecting your organization

Our published research and threat intelligence reports represent just a small part of the work we do at Talos. The many hours our researchers, analysts, and engineers spend researching the threat environment and developing systems to detect and block attacks bear fruit in the components that we deploy as part of the Cisco Security portfolio. Our intelligence and know-how protect Cisco Security customers from threats, brand new or decades old.

Note: You can benefit from the experience of our analysts directly through a Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) retainer. While Talos IR can provide relevant threat information and expert emergency incident response, you can also use our proactive services to help prepare your systems, support and train your team, or actively hunt for bad guys on your network.

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

Singapore Cyber Agency Warns of Critical IBM API Connect Vulnerability (CVE-2025-13915) 

CVE-2025-13915

Overview 

The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore has issued an alert regarding a critical vulnerability affecting IBM API Connect, following the release of official security updates by IBM on 2 January 2026. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2025-13915, carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8, placing it among the most severe vulnerabilities currently disclosed for enterprise automation software. 

According to IBM’s security bulletin, the issue stems from an authentication bypass weakness that could allow a remote attacker to gain unauthorized access to affected systems without valid credentials. The vulnerability impacts multiple versions of IBM API Connect, a widely used platform for managing application programming interfaces across enterprise environments. 

Details of CVE-2025-13915 and Technical Impact 

IBM confirmed that CVE-2025-13915 was identified through internal testing and classified under CWE-305: Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness. The flaw allows authentication mechanisms to be bypassed, despite the underlying authentication algorithm itself being sound. The weakness arises from an implementation flaw that can be exploited independently. 

The official CVSS vector for the vulnerability is: 

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 

This indicates that the vulnerability is remotely exploitable, requires no user interaction, and can lead to a complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. IBM stated that successful exploitation could enable attackers to access the application remotely and operate with unauthorized privileges. 

Data from Cyble Vision further classifies the issue as “very critical,” confirming that IBM API Connect up to versions 10.0.8.5 and 10.0.11.0 is affected.  

Affected IBM API Connect Versions 

IBM confirmed that the following versions are vulnerable to CVE-2025-13915: 

  • IBM API Connect V10.0.8.0 through V10.0.8.5 

  • IBM API Connect V10.0.11.0 

No evidence has been disclosed indicating active exploitation in the wild, and the vulnerability is not currently listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. 

CVE-2025-13915 Not Added to CISA KEV (Source: CISA) 

Cyble Vision data also indicates that the vulnerability has not been discussed in underground forums, suggesting no known public exploit circulation at this time.  

No discussion of the CVE-2025-13915 vulnerability in underground forums (Source: Cyble) 

The EPSS score for CVE-2025-13915 stands at 0.37, indicating a moderate probability of exploitation compared to other high-severity vulnerabilities. 

Remediation and Mitigation Guidance 

IBM has released interim fixes (iFixes) to address the vulnerability and strongly recommends that affected organizations apply updates immediately. For IBM API Connect V10.0.8, fixes are available for each sub-version from 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.5. A separate interim fix has also been released for IBM API Connect V10.0.11.0. 

IBM’s advisory explicitly states: 
“IBM strongly recommends addressing the vulnerability now by upgrading.” 

For environments where immediate patching is not possible, IBM advises administrators to disable self-service sign-up on the Developer Portal, if enabled. This mitigation can help reduce exposure by limiting potential abuse paths until updates can be applied. 

Cyble Vision reinforces this recommendation, noting that upgrading removes the vulnerability entirely, and that temporary mitigations should only be considered short-term risk reduction measures. 

Broader Security Context 

The disclosure of CVE-2025-13915 reinforces the persistent risk posed by authentication bypass vulnerabilities in enterprise platforms such as IBM API Connect. Classified under CWE-305 and CWE-287, the flaw demonstrates how implementation weaknesses can negate otherwise robust authentication controls. Despite the absence of confirmed exploitation, the vulnerability, remote attack surface, and critical CVSS score of 9.8 make immediate remediation necessary. 

The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore’s alert reflects heightened regional scrutiny of high-impact vulnerabilities affecting widely deployed enterprise software. IBM’s advisory, first published on 17 December 2025 and reinforced in January 2026, provides clear guidance on patching and mitigation. Organizations running affected versions of IBM API Connect should assess exposure without delay and apply the recommended fixes to reduce risk. 

Threat intelligence data from Cyble Vision further confirms the vulnerability’s severity, its impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and the effectiveness of upgrading as the primary remediation. Continuous monitoring and contextual intelligence remain critical for identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities with enterprise-wide consequences like CVE-2025-13915. 

Security teams tracking high-risk vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-13915 need real-time visibility, context, and prioritization. Cyble delivers AI-powered threat intelligence to help organizations assess exploitability, monitor new risks, and respond faster. 

Learn how Cyble helps security teams stay protected from such vulnerabilities— schedule a demo

References: 

The post Singapore Cyber Agency Warns of Critical IBM API Connect Vulnerability (CVE-2025-13915)  appeared first on Cyble.

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CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Surged 20% in 2025 

CISA KEV

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added 245 vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog in 2025, as the database grew to 1,484 software and hardware flaws at high risk of cyberattacks. 

The agency removed at least one vulnerability from the catalog in 2025 – CVE-2025-6264, a Velociraptor Incorrect Default Permissions vulnerability that CISA determined had insufficient evidence of exploitation – but the database has generally grown steadily since its launch in November 2021. 

After an initial surge of added vulnerabilities after the database first launched, growth stabilized in 2023 and 2024, with 187 vulnerabilities added in 2023 and 185 in 2024

Growth accelerated in 2025, however, as CISA added 245 vulnerabilities to the KEV catalog, an increase of more than 30% above the trend seen in 2023 and 2024. With new vulnerabilities surging in recent weeks, the elevated exploitation trend may well continue into 2026. 

Overall, CISA KEV vulnerabilities grew from 1,239 vulnerabilities at the end of 2024 to 1,484 at the end of 2025, an increase of just under 20%. 

We’ll look at some of the trends and vulnerabilities from 2025 – including 24 vulnerabilities known to be exploited by ransomware groups – along with the vendors and projects that had the most CVEs added to the list this year. 

Older Vulnerabilities Added to CISA KEV Also Grew 

The addition of older vulnerabilities to the CISA KEV catalog also grew in 2025. In 2023 and 2024, 60 to 70 older vulnerabilities were added to the KEV catalog each year. In 2025, the number of vulnerabilities from 2024 and earlier added to the catalog grew to 94, a 34% increase from a year earlier. 

The oldest vulnerability added to the KEV catalog in 2025 was CVE-2007-0671, a Microsoft Office Excel Remote Code Execution vulnerability. 

The oldest vulnerability in the catalog remains one from 2002 – CVE-2002-0367, a privilege escalation vulnerability in the Windows NT and Windows 2000 smss.exe debugging subsystem that has been known to be used in ransomware attacks.  

Vulnerabilities Used in Ransomware Attacks 

CISA marked 24 of the vulnerabilities added in 2025 as known to be exploited by ransomware groups. They include some well-known flaws such as CVE-2025-5777 (dubbed “CitrixBleed 2”) and Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerabilities exploited by the CL0P ransomware group. 

The full list of vulnerabilities newly exploited by ransomware groups in 2025 is included below, and should be prioritized by security teams if they’re not yet patched. 

Vulnerabilities Exploited by Ransomware Groups 
CVE-2025-5777  Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway Out-of-Bounds Read 
CVE-2025-31161  CrushFTP Authentication Bypass 
CVE-2019-6693  Fortinet FortiOS Use of Hard-Coded Credentials 
CVE-2025-24472  Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy Authentication Bypass 
CVE-2024-55591  Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy Authentication Bypass 
CVE-2025-10035  Fortra GoAnywhere MFT Deserialization of Untrusted Data 
CVE-2025-22457  Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and ZTA Gateways Stack-Based Buffer Overflow 
CVE-2025-0282  Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and ZTA Gateways Stack-Based Buffer Overflow 
CVE-2025-55182  Meta React Server Components Remote Code Execution 
CVE-2025-49704  Microsoft SharePoint Code Injection 
CVE-2025-49706  Microsoft SharePoint Improper Authentication 
CVE-2025-53770  Microsoft SharePoint Deserialization of Untrusted Data 
CVE-2025-29824  Microsoft Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) Driver Use-After-Free 
CVE-2025-26633  Microsoft Windows Management Console (MMC) Improper Neutralization 
CVE-2018-8639  Microsoft Windows Win32k Improper Resource Shutdown or Release 
CVE-2024-55550  Mitel MiCollab Path Traversal 
CVE-2024-41713  Mitel MiCollab Path Traversal 
CVE-2025-61884  Oracle E-Business Suite Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) 
CVE-2025-61882  Oracle E-Business Suite Unspecified 
CVE-2023-48365  Qlik Sense HTTP Tunneling 
CVE-2025-31324  SAP NetWeaver Unrestricted File Upload 
CVE-2024-57727  SimpleHelp Path Traversal 
CVE-2024-53704  SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN Improper Authentication 
CVE-2025-23006  SonicWall SMA1000 Appliances Deserialization 

Projects and Vendors with the Highest Number of Exploited Vulnerabilities 

Microsoft once again led all vendors and projects in CISA KEV additions, with 39 vulnerabilities added to the database in 2025, up from 36 in 2024. 

Several vendors and projects had fewer vulnerabilities added in 2025 than they did in 2024, suggesting improved security controls. Among the vendors and projects that saw a decline in KEV vulnerabilities in 2025 were Adobe, Android, Apache, Ivanti, Palo Alto Networks, and VMware. 

11 vendors and projects had five or more KEV vulnerabilities added this year, included below. 

Vendor/project  CISA KEV additions in 2025 
Microsoft  39 
Apple 
Cisco 
Fortinet 
Google Chromium 
Ivanti 
Linux Kernel 
Citrix 
D-Link 
Oracle 
SonicWall 

Most Common Software Weaknesses Exploited in 2025 

Eight software and hardware weaknesses (common weakness enumerations, or CWEs) were particularly prominent among the 2025 KEV additions. The list is similar to last year, although CWE-787, CWE-79, and CWE-94 are new to the list this year. 

  • CWE-78 – Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (‘OS Command Injection’) – was again the most common weakness among vulnerabilities added to the KEV database, accounting for 18 of the 245 vulnerabilities added in 2025. 

  • CWE-502 – Deserialization of Untrusted Data – again came in second, occurring in 14 of the vulnerabilities. 

  • CWE-22 – Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, or ‘Path Traversal’ – moved up to third place with 13 appearances. 

  • CWE-416 – Use After Free – slipped a spot to fourth and was behind 11 of the vulnerabilities. 

  • CWE-787 – Out-of-bounds Write – was a factor in 10 of the vulnerabilities. 

  • CWE-79 – Cross-site Scripting – appeared 7 times. 

  • CWE-94 (Code Injection) and CWE-287 (Improper Authentication) occurred 6 times each. 

Conclusion 

CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog remains a valuable tool for helping IT security teams prioritize patching and vulnerability management efforts. 

The CISA KEV catalog can also alert organizations to third-party risks – although by the time a vulnerability gets added to the database, it’s become an urgent problem requiring immediate attention. Third-party risk management (TPRM) solutions could provide earlier warnings about partner risk through audits and other tools. 

Finally, software and application development teams should monitor CISA KEV additions to gain awareness of common software weaknesses that threat actors routinely target. 

Take control of your vulnerability risk today — book a personalized demo to see how CISA KEV impacts your organization. 

The post CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Surged 20% in 2025  appeared first on Cyble.

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The Week in Vulnerabilities: The Year Ends with an Alarming New Trend 

weekly-vulnerabilities-surge-trend-2026

Cyble Vulnerability Intelligence researchers tracked 1,782 vulnerabilities in the last week, the third straight week that new vulnerabilities have been growing at twice their long-term rate. 

Over 282 of the disclosed vulnerabilities already have a publicly available Proof-of-Concept (PoC), significantly increasing the likelihood of real-world attacks on those vulnerabilities. 

A total of 207 vulnerabilities were rated as critical under the CVSS v3.1 scoring system, while 51 received a critical severity rating based on the newer CVSS v4.0 scoring system. 

Here are some of the top IT and ICS vulnerabilities flagged by Cyble threat intelligence researchers in recent reports to clients. 

The Week’s Top IT Vulnerabilities 

CVE-2025-66516 is a maximum severity XML External Entity (XXE) injection vulnerability in Apache Tika’s core, PDF and parsers modules. Attackers could embed malicious XFA files in PDFs to trigger XXE, potentially allowing for the disclosure of sensitive files, SSRF, or DoS without authentication. 

CVE-2025-15047 is a critical stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Tenda WH450 router firmware version V1.0.0.18. Attackers could potentially initiate it remotely over the network with low complexity, and a public exploit exists, increasing the risk of widespread abuse. 

Among the vulnerabilities added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog were: 

  • CVE-2025-14733, an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS that could enable remote unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code. 

  • CVE-2025-40602, a local privilege escalation vulnerability due to insufficient authorization in the Appliance Management Console (AMC) of SonicWall SMA 1000 appliances. 

  • CVE-2025-20393, a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Cisco AsyncOS Software affecting Cisco Secure Email Gateway and Cisco Secure Email and Web Manager appliances. The flaw has reportedly been actively exploited since late November by a China-linked APT group, which has deployed backdoors such as AquaShell, tunneling tools, and log cleaners to achieve persistence and remote access. 

  • CVE-2025-14847, a high-severity MongoDB vulnerability that’s been dubbed “MongoBleed” and reported to be under active exploitation. The Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency vulnerability could potentially allow uninitialized heap memory to be read by an unauthenticated client, potentially exposing data, credentials and session tokens. 

Vulnerabilities Under Discussion on the Dark Web 

Cyble dark web researchers observed a number of threat actors sharing exploits and discussing weaponizing vulnerabilities on underground and cybercrime forums. Among the vulnerabilities under discussion were: 

CVE-2025-56157, a critical default credentials vulnerability affecting Dify versions through 1.5.1, where PostgreSQL credentials are stored in plaintext within the docker-compose.yaml file. Attackers who access deployment files or source code repositories could extract these default credentials, potentially gaining unauthorized access to databases. Successful exploitation could enable remote code execution, privilege escalation, and complete data compromise. 

CVE-2025-37164, a critical code injection vulnerability in HPE OneView. The unauthenticated remote code execution flaw affects HPE OneView versions 10.20 and prior due to improper control of code generation. The vulnerability exists in the /rest/id-pools/executeCommand REST API endpoint, which is accessible without authentication, potentially allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary code and gain centralized control over the enterprise infrastructure. 

CVE-2025-14558, a critical severity remote code execution vulnerability in FreeBSD’s rtsol(8) and rtsold(8) programs that is still awaiting NVD and CVE publication. The flaw occurs because these programs fail to validate domain search list options in IPv6 router advertisement messages, potentially allowing shell commands to be executed due to improper input validation in resolvconf(8). Attackers on the same network segment could potentially exploit this vulnerability for remote code execution; however, the attack does not cross network boundaries, as router advertisement messages are not routable. 

CVE-2025-38352, a high-severity race condition vulnerability in the Linux kernel. This Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition in the posix-cpu-timers subsystem could allow local attackers to escalate privileges. The flaw occurs when concurrent timer deletion and task reaping operations create a race condition that fails to detect timer firing states. 

ICS Vulnerabilities 

Cyble threat researchers also flagged two industrial control system (ICS) vulnerabilities as meriting high-priority attention by security teams. They include: 

CVE-2025-30023, a critical Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Axis Communications Camera Station Pro, Camera Station, and Device Manager. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, conduct a man-in-the-middle-style attack, or bypass authentication. 

Schneider Electric EcoStruxure Foxboro DCS Advisor is affected by CVE-2025-59827, a Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Server Update Service (WSUS). Successful exploitation could allow for remote code execution, potentially resulting in unauthorized parties acquiring system-level privileges. 

Conclusion 

The persistently high number of new vulnerabilities observed in recent weeks is a worrisome new trend as we head into 2026. More than ever, security teams must respond with rapid, well-targeted actions to patch the most critical vulnerabilities and successfully defend IT and critical infrastructure. A risk-based vulnerability management program should be at the heart of those defensive efforts. 

Other cybersecurity best practices that can help guard against a wide range of threats include segmentation of critical assets; removing or protecting web-facing assets; Zero-Trust access principles; ransomware-resistant backups; hardened endpoints, infrastructure, and configurations; network, endpoint, and cloud monitoring; and well-rehearsed incident response plans. 

Cyble’s comprehensive attack surface management solutions can help by scanning network and cloud assets for exposures and prioritizing fixes, in addition to monitoring for leaked credentials and other early warning signs of major cyberattacks

The post The Week in Vulnerabilities: The Year Ends with an Alarming New Trend  appeared first on Cyble.

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The Week in Vulnerabilities: The Year Ends with an Alarming New Trend 

weekly-vulnerabilities-surge-trend-2026

Cyble Vulnerability Intelligence researchers tracked 1,782 vulnerabilities in the last week, the third straight week that new vulnerabilities have been growing at twice their long-term rate. 

Over 282 of the disclosed vulnerabilities already have a publicly available Proof-of-Concept (PoC), significantly increasing the likelihood of real-world attacks on those vulnerabilities. 

A total of 207 vulnerabilities were rated as critical under the CVSS v3.1 scoring system, while 51 received a critical severity rating based on the newer CVSS v4.0 scoring system. 

Here are some of the top IT and ICS vulnerabilities flagged by Cyble threat intelligence researchers in recent reports to clients. 

The Week’s Top IT Vulnerabilities 

CVE-2025-66516 is a maximum severity XML External Entity (XXE) injection vulnerability in Apache Tika’s core, PDF and parsers modules. Attackers could embed malicious XFA files in PDFs to trigger XXE, potentially allowing for the disclosure of sensitive files, SSRF, or DoS without authentication. 

CVE-2025-15047 is a critical stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Tenda WH450 router firmware version V1.0.0.18. Attackers could potentially initiate it remotely over the network with low complexity, and a public exploit exists, increasing the risk of widespread abuse. 

Among the vulnerabilities added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog were: 

  • CVE-2025-14733, an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in WatchGuard Fireware OS that could enable remote unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code. 

  • CVE-2025-40602, a local privilege escalation vulnerability due to insufficient authorization in the Appliance Management Console (AMC) of SonicWall SMA 1000 appliances. 

  • CVE-2025-20393, a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Cisco AsyncOS Software affecting Cisco Secure Email Gateway and Cisco Secure Email and Web Manager appliances. The flaw has reportedly been actively exploited since late November by a China-linked APT group, which has deployed backdoors such as AquaShell, tunneling tools, and log cleaners to achieve persistence and remote access. 

  • CVE-2025-14847, a high-severity MongoDB vulnerability that’s been dubbed “MongoBleed” and reported to be under active exploitation. The Improper Handling of Length Parameter Inconsistency vulnerability could potentially allow uninitialized heap memory to be read by an unauthenticated client, potentially exposing data, credentials and session tokens. 

Vulnerabilities Under Discussion on the Dark Web 

Cyble dark web researchers observed a number of threat actors sharing exploits and discussing weaponizing vulnerabilities on underground and cybercrime forums. Among the vulnerabilities under discussion were: 

CVE-2025-56157, a critical default credentials vulnerability affecting Dify versions through 1.5.1, where PostgreSQL credentials are stored in plaintext within the docker-compose.yaml file. Attackers who access deployment files or source code repositories could extract these default credentials, potentially gaining unauthorized access to databases. Successful exploitation could enable remote code execution, privilege escalation, and complete data compromise. 

CVE-2025-37164, a critical code injection vulnerability in HPE OneView. The unauthenticated remote code execution flaw affects HPE OneView versions 10.20 and prior due to improper control of code generation. The vulnerability exists in the /rest/id-pools/executeCommand REST API endpoint, which is accessible without authentication, potentially allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary code and gain centralized control over the enterprise infrastructure. 

CVE-2025-14558, a critical severity remote code execution vulnerability in FreeBSD’s rtsol(8) and rtsold(8) programs that is still awaiting NVD and CVE publication. The flaw occurs because these programs fail to validate domain search list options in IPv6 router advertisement messages, potentially allowing shell commands to be executed due to improper input validation in resolvconf(8). Attackers on the same network segment could potentially exploit this vulnerability for remote code execution; however, the attack does not cross network boundaries, as router advertisement messages are not routable. 

CVE-2025-38352, a high-severity race condition vulnerability in the Linux kernel. This Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition in the posix-cpu-timers subsystem could allow local attackers to escalate privileges. The flaw occurs when concurrent timer deletion and task reaping operations create a race condition that fails to detect timer firing states. 

ICS Vulnerabilities 

Cyble threat researchers also flagged two industrial control system (ICS) vulnerabilities as meriting high-priority attention by security teams. They include: 

CVE-2025-30023, a critical Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Axis Communications Camera Station Pro, Camera Station, and Device Manager. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, conduct a man-in-the-middle-style attack, or bypass authentication. 

Schneider Electric EcoStruxure Foxboro DCS Advisor is affected by CVE-2025-59827, a Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Server Update Service (WSUS). Successful exploitation could allow for remote code execution, potentially resulting in unauthorized parties acquiring system-level privileges. 

Conclusion 

The persistently high number of new vulnerabilities observed in recent weeks is a worrisome new trend as we head into 2026. More than ever, security teams must respond with rapid, well-targeted actions to patch the most critical vulnerabilities and successfully defend IT and critical infrastructure. A risk-based vulnerability management program should be at the heart of those defensive efforts. 

Other cybersecurity best practices that can help guard against a wide range of threats include segmentation of critical assets; removing or protecting web-facing assets; Zero-Trust access principles; ransomware-resistant backups; hardened endpoints, infrastructure, and configurations; network, endpoint, and cloud monitoring; and well-rehearsed incident response plans. 

Cyble’s comprehensive attack surface management solutions can help by scanning network and cloud assets for exposures and prioritizing fixes, in addition to monitoring for leaked credentials and other early warning signs of major cyberattacks

The post The Week in Vulnerabilities: The Year Ends with an Alarming New Trend  appeared first on Cyble.

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Integrating a Malware Sandbox into SOAR Workflows: Steps, Benefits, and Impact 

SOAR platforms are excellent at moving work forward. They trigger playbooks, route incidents, and enforce consistent response steps. What they don’t do well on their own is confirm what’s actually SOAR helps teams move faster, but speed isn’t the real problem. 

The real issue is figuring out what an alert actually means. A sandbox solves that by safely running the file or link and showing what it really does. With clear evidence in hand, playbooks make better decisions, triage moves quicker, and fewer incidents turn into long investigations. 

Let’s walk through how teams use a sandbox inside SOAR, and what that means for faster decisions and lower risk. 

Why a Sandbox Changes SOAR Outcomes 

SOAR platforms are excellent at moving work forward. They trigger playbooks, route incidents, and enforce consistent response steps. What they don’t do well on their own is confirm what’s actually happening

Execution of a suspicious file in ANY.RUN’s safe sandbox environment

That gap matters. When alerts arrive with limited context, automation can only go so far. Teams hesitate, escalations increase, and playbooks stall while someone manually checks files, links, or indicators across multiple tools. 

A sandbox changes this dynamic by adding behavior-based proof directly into the workflow. Instead of relying on assumptions or partial signals, SOAR receives concrete answers: what executed, what connected out, what dropped, and how risky it really is. 

With that clarity: 

  • Triage decisions happen faster 
  • Playbooks trigger with more confidence 
  • Fewer cases get escalated “just in case” 

In practice, SOAR stops being a traffic controller and starts acting like a decision engine; one that’s backed by real evidence, not guesses. 

What a Sandbox Does Inside SOAR Workflows 

ANY.RUN’s sandbox auto-detonates and detects malware inside an archive attached to an email

When integrated into SOAR, ANY.RUN’s sandbox covers a few critical steps that static tools alone can’t reliably handle: 

  • Validates alerts with real behavior: Suspicious files and links are executed in a safe environment to confirm whether they’re actually malicious. This replaces guesswork with evidence early in the workflow. 
  • Uncovers multi-stage and evasive attacks: Many threats reveal their intent only after redirects, downloads, or user interaction. A sandbox follows the full execution chain so SOAR can act on what truly happens, not what appears safe at first glance. 
  • Returns decision-ready context to playbooks: SOAR receives clear verdicts, risk scores, and indicators tied to observed behavior, giving playbooks the confidence to move forward without manual checks. 
  • Reduces unnecessary escalations: With reliable evidence available upfront, fewer cases are passed up the chain “just in case,” keeping response focused and queues under control. 
  • Enables safer automation: Once behavior is confirmed, SOAR can trigger containment, enrichment, and documentation steps with much lower risk of false positives. 

Together, these capabilities allow SOAR workflows to run with more confidence and consistency, even during alert spikes, and without increasing operational overhead. 

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Where Sandbox-Driven SOAR Fits in Real Security Stacks 

In enterprise environments, SOAR operates across SIEM, endpoint, and threat intelligence platforms. A sandbox fits into this layer as the system that validates behavior and feeds trusted context back into automation. 

That’s why Interactive Sandbox integrations and connectors are designed to work directly inside widely used SOAR and security platforms, including: 

Within these environments, sandbox execution is triggered automatically from incidents or alerts. Files, URLs, and artifacts are analyzed in a safe environment, and the results, verdicts, risk scores, indicators, and behavioral context, are returned directly into the SOAR case. 

ANY.RUN’s app for IBM SOAR

This means teams don’t have to switch tools to understand what’s happening. Automation continues with confidence, response actions are triggered earlier, and threat intelligence is enriched as part of the same workflow. 

Sandbox-driven SOAR is embedded into the platforms large organizations rely on today, making it easier to scale response without adding operational complexity. 

Connect ANY.RUN with your existing security stack
Add behavior-based insight directly to SOAR workflows



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From Faster Triage to Lower Risk: The Business Impact of Sandbox-Driven SOAR 

When ANY.RUN’s sandbox is embedded into SOAR workflows, the impact goes beyond faster investigations. It changes how incidents are prioritized, handled, and closed with measurable effects at both the SOC and business level. 

  • Real-time threat visibility: Observe full attack chains as they unfold, with 90% of malicious activity exposed within the first 60 seconds, significantly accelerating mean time to detect (MTTD). 
  • Higher detection rates for evasive threats: Sandbox execution uncovers low-detection attacks, including multi-stage malware and interaction-dependent phishing, resulting in up to 58% more threats identified and fewer missed incidents. 
  • Lower MTTR across common incidents: With behavior confirmation available early, response steps trigger sooner and manual verification is removed from first-line playbooks, consistently shortening response cycles. 
  • Operational efficiency at scale: Automated sandbox execution reduces manual analysis time, cutting Tier 1 workload by up to 20% and allowing less experienced team members to handle more complex cases with confidence. 
  • Stronger performance during alert spikes: Evidence-driven automation keeps workflows stable during phishing waves or malware campaigns, helping teams avoid backlog growth and burnout. 
  • Clear business-level impact: Faster containment reduces the risk of lateral movement, data loss, and downtime, while automation lowers the cost per incident by minimizing repeated manual effort. 

Turning Sandbox-Driven SOAR into a Scalable Security Strategy 

SOAR works best when automation is backed by proof. By adding a sandbox into the workflow, teams replace uncertainty with clear behavior, shorten response cycles, and keep decisions consistent even under pressure. 

With ready-made integrations across common SOAR and security platforms, sandbox-driven workflows fit naturally into existing stacks. The result is faster response, lower operational load, and reduced business risk, without expanding teams or tools. 

See how sandbox-driven SOAR fits into your environment. Explore ANY.RUN’s Enterprise integrations and unified security workflows. 

About ANY.RUN 

ANY.RUN helps security teams make faster, clearer decisions when it matters most. The platform is trusted by over 500,000 security professionals and 15,000+ organizations across industries where response speed and accuracy are critical. 

ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox allows teams to safely execute suspicious files and links, observe real behavior in real time, and confirm threats before they escalate. Combined with Threat Intelligence Lookup and Threat Intelligence Feeds, it adds the context needed to prioritize alerts, reduce uncertainty, and stop advanced attacks earlier in the response cycle. 

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1. Why integrate SOAR with a malware sandbox?

SOAR moves tickets fast but can’t tell you what’s really happening. Malware sandbox gives you the proof: what ran, what connected out, what files dropped. Your playbooks turn into decision engines instead of waiting on manual checks.

2. How does a malware sandbox fit into SOAR?

Connectors trigger malware sandbox on alerts. You send files or URLs. Results come back fast. Verdicts, risk scores, IOCs, TTPs. Playbooks use that to triage, contain, or close without humans jumping in.

3. What threats does a malware sandbox catch?

Multi-stage phishing and evasive malware. Malware sandbox follows redirects and downloads to show the full chain. Static scans miss this stuff.

4. Does a malware sandbox cut escalations?

Yes. Tier 1 gets clear evidence upfront. They close 70% more cases without passing them up. No more “just in case” handoffs.

5. How quick are malware sandbox results?

For ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox, 90% of malicious behavior shows up in 60 seconds. Your playbooks act right away.

6. Which SOAR platforms work with a malware sandbox?

FortiSOAR, Cortex XSOAR, Splunk SOAR, Microsoft Sentinel, IBM QRadar SOAR, Google SecOps, and more.

7. How do you start with a malware sandbox?

Grab a 2-week trial. Pick your connector. Test it on real alerts. See the difference yourself.

The post Integrating a Malware Sandbox into SOAR Workflows: Steps, Benefits, and Impact  appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

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