Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure

  • Cisco Talos observed an existing distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) malware known as XorDDoS, continuing to spread globally between November 2023 and February 2025. 
  • A significant finding shows that over 70 percent of attacks using XorDDoS targeted the United States from Nov. 2023 to Feb. 2025. 
  • The language settings of the muti-layer controller, XorDDoS builder and controller binding tool strongly suggest that the operators are Chinese-speaking individuals. 
  • Talos discovered the latest version of the XorDDoS controller, called the “VIP version,” and its corresponding central controller were used to build the DDoS bot network for more sophisticated and widespread attacks. 
  • Talos’ analysis exposes the network connection between central controller, sub-controller and XorDDoS malware in order to highlight the XorDDoS trojan network pattern. This may help victims identify when they are targeted by these trojans.

Linux XorDDoS trojan trend and victimology  

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure

The XorDDoS trojan is a well-known DDoS malware that targets Linux machines, turning them into “zombie bots” that carry out attacks. First identified in 2014, its sub-controller was uncovered in 2015. Based on the simplified Chinese user interface and instructions of the XorDDoS controllers and builder, Talos assess with high confidence that the operators are Chinese-speaking individuals. 

From 2020 to 2023, the XorDDoS trojan has increased significantly in prevalence. This trend is not only due to the widespread global distribution of the XorDDoS trojan but also an uptick in malicious DNS requests linked to its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. In addition to targeting commonly exposed Linux machines, the trojan has expanded its reach to Docker servers, converting infected hosts into bots. It employs a strategy of Secure Shell (SSH) brute-force attacks to gain remote access to target devices. Once it obtains valid SSH credentials, the attacker leverages root privileges to execute a script that downloads and installs XorDDoS on the compromised device. 

Even though numerous security vendors have already provided solutions and detection methods to capture them, Talos continues to observe attempts to deliver XorDDoS malware.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 1. Cisco Secure Firewall’s monthly malware connection detection statistics.

Between November 2023 and February 2025, Talos observed that the XorDDoS trojan continued to have a global impact, with nearly 50 percent of its successfully compromised victims located in the United States. Additionally, we noted that the compromised systems attempted to target and attack several countries, including Spain, the United States, Taiwan, Canada, Japan, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Ukraine, Germany, Thailand, China, India, Israel, Venezuela, Switzerland, Singapore, Finland, Australia, Saudi Arabia, France, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and South Korea.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 2. Percentage of XorDDoS successfully-compromised machines across all regions.

Talos also used our Cisco Secure Network/Cloud Analysis to observe actors using those compromised machines to launch DDoS attack and the attacks are globalized. Notably, we found that the United States accounted for over 70 percent of attempted attacks employing XorDDoS.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 3. Percentage of XorDDoS attempted targets across all regions.

Infection chain  

XorDDoS has long relied on SSH brute-force attacks to spread. It deploys a malicious shell script that attempts numerous root credential combinations across thousands of servers until it successfully accesses a target Linux device. Once inside the machine, XorDDoS implements persistence mechanisms to ensure it launches automatically at system startup, therefore evading detection and termination by security products. To maintain persistence, the malware installs an init script and a cron job script. These scripts are embedded within the malware and perform actions consistent with those outlined in previous reports.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 4. Inint script and cron script embedded in trojan.

The latest version of XorDDoS malware continues to use the same decryption function and the XOR key “BB2FA36AAA9541F0” to decrypt its embedded configuration. Once the URLs or IPs are decrypted, they are added to a remote list. This list is then used to establish communication and retrieve commands from the C2 server. Talos used CyberChef to successfully decrypt one of the examples.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 5. Talos CyberChef decryption.

XorDDoS new sub-controller and central controller 

Although the sub-controller for XorDDoS was exposed in 2015, attacks have persisted over the last decade. The panel from 2015 was for version 1.4, the oldest version, which we believe is no longer in use by threat actors. In 2024, Talos discovered a new “VIP” version of the XorDDoS sub-controller, which can control the “VIP version” of the XorDDoS trojan, the first instance of which we traced back to 2017. With the newest version of the XorDDoS sub-controller and trojan builder, Talos believes that this collection is a product suite developed for sale.

Figure 6 shows translated screenshots of the XorDDoS trojan sub-controller and builder. The builder also contains new feature descriptions, which strengthens Talos’ assessment that this is a product meant to be sold. The VIP version of the XorDDoS trojan builder includes new feature descriptions. When translated, the description in Figure 7 reads, “Stable Anti-Kick, 100% Packet Sending, Fixes for Over Ten Thousand Online Without Lag. Supports Domain Online, IP Online, with New Packet Sending Code and Wall-Penetration Optimization. Can Send 1024 Packets with Resource Utilization Optimization.”

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 6. VIP version sub-controller.
Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 7. Feature description in the VIP version of the XorDDoS trojan builder.

Talos observed a new version of the sub-controller, which we call the “central controller.” Specifically created for the XorDDoS trojan, the central controller enables threat actors to manage multiple XorDDoS controllers simultaneously. This updated central controller enhances cybercriminals’ ability to coordinate and execute attacks more efficiently, indicating an evolution in their tactics and capabilities.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 8. Example view of central controller controlling each sub-controller.

The central controller can generate a controller binder that will inject a DLL file to the XorDDoS controller to bind network connection and command operation to the sub-controller, allowing the central controller to fully remote control the sub-controllers.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 9. Generator Setting

The controller binder will establish a connection with the central controller. When running the controller binder on the host, the actor can enter the controller’s process name, allowing them to inject into the process and take control. This straightforward strategy allows the actor to send the DDoS commands to multiple controllers simultaneously. There are two notable facts Talos observed from this central controller. First, when the actor opens the central controller, there is a feature description in its mission list column that, when translated, includes the following:

  •  “Check the SYN packet length to make it a large packet, otherwise it will be a small packet. 
  • A round-robin attack is a task performed by all online hosts.
  • Select the host and click the test mode, which means a single host sends a packet.
  • Multiple measurement modes cannot be selected, only one at a time!
  • The round-robin attack needs to be stopped manually.
  • Supports 1024 packages but requires a corresponding sub-controller.
  • The sub-controller of version 1.4 and 1.8 on the underground market cannot use the central controller to send 1024 packages.”

Second, the controller’s creator left their Tencent QQ instant message contact number and nickname on the central controller, while also mentioning other sub-controller versions available on the underground market. This further supports Talos’ assessment that these tools are for sale.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 10. Central controller and controller binder.

Advanced XorDDoS traffic analysis 

Talos’ detailed analysis of these new tools suggests cybercriminals’ continued investment in the development and deployment of the XorDDoS trojan, allowing for more sophisticated and widespread attacks. The entire control flow of these operations demonstrates the adaptability and resilience of these threat actors, emphasizing the ongoing challenge in combating this form of cybercrime. Talos completed a traffic analysis in our sandbox environment, first to analyze how the XorDDoS trojan is connected to the sub-controller, and then to understand how the central controller manages the sub-controller.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 11. XorDDoS control flow diagram.

The connection between the sub-controller and DDoS trojan is the orange line in Figure 11. When the malware is successfully installed in the target system, it will attempt to send encrypted data, including “phone home,” which consists of the CRC Header, uname string release, uname string machine, magic string and hardcoded version string. Talos used CyberChef to provide a decryptor function for this data.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 12. Example of decrypted phone home data.

We noticed that the latest VIP version’s “phone home” CRC header remains unchanged from what Unit 42 previously detailed in a blog post. Since the blog post has already covered the encryption of the XorDDoS trojan’s phone home data, we will focus here on the behavior of the controller’s responses and any modifications in the CRC header.

Once the XorDDoS trojan successfully establishes a connection, the CRC header changes to “5343f096000000000200000000000000000000000000000000000000”, as shown in Figure 13. This functions similarly to basic client-server authentication for establishing a connection. When the controller issues a command to the XorDDoS trojan, it uses the same CRC header to attach the encrypted command, sending it to the trojan. This process, illustrated in Figure 14, helps the XorDDoS trojan verify that the commands are authorized and safe to execute.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 13. The CRC header changes after successfully establishing a connection.
Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 14. Network flow of sub-controller sending the command to XorDDoS trojan.

Next, Talos explored the connection between the central controller and the sub-controller, represented by the purple line in Figure 11. The central controller can create a controller binder to inject the sub-controller, thereby gaining full access to it. Once the controller binder successfully takes control of the sub-controller, it sends the sub-controller’s machine information back to the central controller as a “phone home” beacon. This phone home data uses plaintext to send information, which includes the message number, packet size, IP address, hostname and connection port.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 15. Network flow of the phone home connection.

Talos used the central controller to establish a connection with the sub-controller to monitor network traffic. During this process, we observed that the MSG number in the packets increases with each command sent to either the client controller or back to the central controller. As shown in Figure 16, Talos used the central controller to issue commands to start a SYN DDoS attack, stop the attack, and target specific IPs or domains. For every command sent, the MSG number increments. Similarly, each received packet also sees an increase in its MSG number. However, it’s important to note that the MSG numbers for sent packets and received packets are not directly related to each other.

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure
Figure 16. Network flow of central controller sending the command to sub-controller.

Coverage

Unmasking the new XorDDoS controller and infrastructure

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense VirtualAdaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.

Umbrella, Cisco’s secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them. Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. Snort SIDs for this threat are 64669, 64668 and 64667.

ClamAV detections are also available for this threat: Unix.Dropper.Xorddos::in07.talos

Indicators of Compromise

IOCs for this threat can be found in our GitHub repository here.

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

How Indicators of Compromise, Attack, and Behavior Help Spot and Stop Cyber Threats

In cybersecurity, the three main types of indicators are a critical concept for threat detection and response. These main types are indicators of compromise, behavior, and attack (IOCs, IOBs, IOAs). Let’s elaborate on their essence, difference, and use.  

Distinction in a Nutshell 

  IOCs IOBs  IOAs 
Definition  Artifacts or observables that suggest a system has already been compromised  Patterns or activities that indicate an attack is in progress or imminent  Describes the adversary’s TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures), often abstracted from specific tools or campaigns 
Nature  Reactive  Proactive  Strategic 
Type  Technical evidence left behind  Behavioral analysis  High-level behavioral models 
Purpose  Help identify intrusions and data breaches  Detect and block attacks before they succeed  Understand and profile attackers across campaigns or tools 
Use  Used in threat detection tools like SIEM, IDS/IPS, antivirus, and EDR. Help correlate logs and trace how an attack occurred. Often shared via threat intelligence feeds.  Applied in real-time detection by EDR/XDR platforms. Used in behavioral analytics and heuristics. Focus on what the attacker is trying to do, not just the tools used.  Used in threat modeling, proactive defense, and red teaming. Integrated into MITRE ATT&CK mapping, behavior-based threat hunting. Help anticipate novel attack chains and identify APTs. 

Indicators of Compromise 

IOCs are pieces of evidence that suggest that a system, network, or device has been compromised by a cyberattack or malicious activity. They are typically reactive, meaning they are identified after an attack has occurred. 

The main purpose of IOCs is to help detect and confirm security incidents with known threats or malware. They serve as forensic evidence in incident investigations and are necessary for adequate incident response and mitigation. 

More often than not IOCs are specific — tied to a particular malware or campaign.  

IOCs can be classified into:  

background
  • File-based: malicious file hashes (e.g., MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256), known malware signatures. 
  • Network-based: suspicious IP addresses, domains, URLs, or unusual traffic patterns (e.g., connections to a known command-and-control server). 
  • System-based: registry key changes, unauthorized user accounts, or suspicious processes running. 

Being reactive by their nature, IOCs are of immense help in threat prevention. When used smartly, they can be weaponized to block, disrupt, or preempt similar attacks in the future. 

This function is provided by threat intelligence: SOC teams collect indicators associated with known malware and incidents (malicious IPs, domains, file hashes, or URLs) and blacklist them in their security systems to prevent future communication or execution associated with those IOCs. 

For example, a phishing domain seen in a past attack is added to the block list, preventing any user from accessing it if reused. Potential IOCs can be checked with the help of services like ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup.  It searches for information from malware samples added and analyzed in the Interactive Sandbox

destinationIP:”147.185.221.26″ 

The IP is flagged as malicious, linked to known malware, and should be blocked 

Another way of using IOCs for proactive protection is setting up decoys (honeypots or honeytokens) to monitor access to known indicators or infrastructure that mimics IOC traits. 

Finally, IOCs reveal which vulnerabilities are being exploited, so teams can prioritize patching or tighten firewall rules accordingly. 

Enrich alerts and expand threat context with TI Lookup
Get 50 trial requests to collect your first intel 



Try now for your SOC


IOCs have their limitations, though. They may not help to detect brand new or advanced threats. It’s important to keep in mind that attackers can easily change IOCs (e.g., domains, hashes), so IOC-based prevention is only as effective as its freshness and context. Context also helps to reduce false positives in detection.  

Context can also be provided by TI Lookup: it supports over 40 search parameters and wildcards which allows to combine indicators and parameters in complex search queries:

(syncObjectName:”PackageManager” or syncObjectName:”DocumentUpdater”) and syncObjectOperation:”Create” 

Combining several IOCs in one search request helps to enrich the indicators with context 

Mutexes often generate false positive alerts in monitoring systems. Malware samples can contain the same objects as legitimate programs, and a lot of mutex names are generic. 

Switching to the Analyses tab in the search results, we see, that the combination of mutexes with such innocent general names as PackageManager and DocumentUpdater occurs in malware campaigns of MuddyWater APT group from Iran, which is exactly as dangerous as an APT group from Iran is supposed to be.  

On the other hand, this combination of mutexes was last spotted in malware samples about four months ago which allows us to consider this signal obsolete.  

Security teams share IOCs via threat intelligence feeds: continuously updated data streams with indicators from fresh malware samples integrated with monitoring and detection systems. ANY.RUN provides Threat Intelligence Feeds in STIX and MISP formats. 

Boost threat detection with ANY.RUN’s TI Feeds
Get continuous stream of malicious IOCs from the latest attacks on 15,000+ companies 



Try demo sample


Indicators of Behavior 

IOBs focus on patterns or behaviors that suggest malicious activity, rather than specific artifacts or static signatures. They describe how an attacker operates, often describing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). In other words, these indicators focus on what an attacker does rather than specific tools or files. 

This enables them to be used for detecting zero-day attacks, unknown or evolving threats that may not have specific IOCs which makes IOBs useful in proactive threat hunting and monitoring. Suspicious behavior can signal an attack in progress, before significant damage occurs.  

IOBs may refer to:  

background
  • User Behavior: An account logs in from an unusual location or at an odd time. 
  • System Behavior: A process attempts to access sensitive files repeatedly or executes unauthorized scripts. 
  • Network Behavior: Encrypted traffic spikes to unknown external servers, resembling data exfiltration. 

Thus, typical examples of IOBs are:  

  • Use of living-off-the-land binaries (e.g., rundll32, certutil); 
  • Obfuscation techniques; 
  • Credential dumping after privilege escalation; 
  • Repeated use of valid accounts for persistence.

IOBs also come with a few shortcomings. It requires advanced analytics, such as behavioral analysis or machine learning, to identify anomalies. Sophisticated monitoring tools (e.g., SIEM, UEBA) should be employed to work with this family of indicators. They can be resource-intensive to analyze and validate. And they may produce false positives if legitimate behaviors mimic malicious ones. 

ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox allows analysts to observe how malware or suspicious files behave in a controlled environment and detect anomalous behaviors that may indicate a potential threat. For example, in this analysis session we see remote code execution via mshta.exe triggered by a command entered manually by a user and mentioning a (misspelled) CAPTCHA:

Abuse of legitimate Windows component observed in a malware analysis session 

What does this activity indicate? In their latest campaign, Storm-1865 distributed phishing emails impersonating Booking.com. The emails contained links leading to fake CAPTCHA pages designed to build trust and lure users into interaction. The threat actor leveraged the ClickFix technique, instructing victims to paste a malicious command into the Windows command prompt. 


Enrich your threat knowledge with TI Lookup

Enrich your threat knowledge with TI Lookup

Learn about TI Lookup and its capabilities to see how it can contribute to your company’s security



The campaign has been observed delivering several commodity malware families, including XWorm, Lumma Stealer, VenomRAT, AsyncRAT, DanaBot, and NetSupport RAT. With the following TI lookup query, we can search through recent public sandbox analyses and find samples with the same malicious activity for further research: 

commandLine:”mshta92.255.57.155/Capcha 

Malware with a typical behavioral pattern found via TI Lookup 

Indicators of Attack 

IOAs are proactive indicators that focus on the intent and actions of an adversary during an attack, emphasizing the “how” and “why” of malicious activity. They aim to detect attacks in real time, and to catch it in its early stages (e.g., during reconnaissance, exploitation, or lateral movement). This allows cybersecurity teams to prevent attacks by interrupting the kill chain. 

Examples of IOAs:  

background
  • Reconnaissance: Unusual port scanning or enumeration of network resources. 
  • Exploitation: Attempts to exploit a known vulnerability (e.g., SQL injection or buffer overflow). 
  • Persistence: Installation of backdoors or scheduled tasks to maintain access. 
  • Lateral Movement: Abnormal internal network traffic, such as attempts to access multiple systems with stolen credentials. 
  • C2 Communication: Process beaconing to rare external IP at intervals. 
  • Credential Theft: LSASS memory access by a non-standard process. 
  • Data Exfiltration: Sensitive files zipped and sent via Dropbox or OneDrive. 

What typical indicators of attack might look like:  

  • Word document spawns PowerShell; 
  • Process injection detected; 
  • A user logs in from two geographies within minutes; 
  • Suspicious lateral movement. 

Since IOAs are specific signs of an active or imminent attack, often tied to known TTPs or malicious artifacts, it is possible to research these indicators with the aid of ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup through the Interactive MITRE ATT&CK Matrix.

The Matrix lets you map TTPs to actual samples of malware and phishing threats and view their entire execution chain inside the Interactive Sandbox, as well as collect additional indicators.

Conclusion  

The most valuable aspect of indicators in institutional cybersecurity is of course their potential to help prevent threats and incidents, stop attacks from succeeding, and thus avoiding financial loss, operational disruption, and reputation damage. Regularly collecting and using IOCs, IOAs, and IOBs, including with the services like ANY.RUN’s TI Lookup and TI Feeds, can help your SOC team fight off threats and keep your infrastructure safe.

About ANY.RUN

ANY.RUN helps more than 500,000 cybersecurity professionals and 15,000 organizations worldwide. The Interactive Sandbox simplifies malware analysis of threats that target both Windows and Linux systems. The threat intelligence products, TI Lookup, YARA Search, and Feeds, help you find IOCs or files to learn more about the threats and respond to incidents faster.

Integrate ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence suite in your organization →

The post How Indicators of Compromise, Attack, and Behavior Help Spot and Stop Cyber Threats appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog – ​Read More

Eclipse and STMicroelectronics vulnerabilities

Eclipse and STMicroelectronics vulnerabilities

Cisco Talos’ Vulnerability Discovery & Research team recently disclosed three vulnerabilities found in Eclipse ThreadX and four vulnerabilities in STMicroelectronics.   

The vulnerabilities mentioned in this blog post have been patched by their respective vendors, all in adherence to Cisco’s third-party vulnerability disclosure policy.     

For Snort coverage that can detect the exploitation of these vulnerabilities, download the latest rule sets from Snort.org, and our latest Vulnerability Advisories are always posted on Talos Intelligence’s website.      

Eclipse vulnerabilities 

Discovered by Kelly Patterson of Cisco Talos.    

Eclipse ThreadX is an embedded development suite including an operating system that provides performance for resource-constrained devices. 

TALOS-2024-2098 (CVE-2025-0726, CVE-2025-2260) A denial of service vulnerability exists in the NetX HTTP server functionality of Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo git commit 6c8e9d1. A specially crafted network packet can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send a malicious packet to trigger this vulnerability. 

Two integer underflow vulnerabilities exist in the HTTP server PUT request functionality of Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo git commit 6c8e9d1, TALOS-2024-2104 (CVE-2025-0727, CVE-2025-2259) and TALOS-2024-2105 (CVE-2025-0728, CVE-2025-2258). Specially crafted network request packets can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send malicious packets to trigger these vulnerabilities. 

STMicroelectronics vulnerabilities 

Discovered by Kelly Patterson of Cisco Talos.    

STMicroelectronics is a European multinational semiconductor contract manufacturing and design company. 

TALOS-2024-2096 (CVE-2024-45064) is a buffer overflow vulnerability in the FileX Internal RAM interface functionality of STMicroelectronics X-CUBE-AZRTOS-WL 2.0.0. A specially crafted set of network packets can lead to code execution. An attacker can send a sequence of requests to trigger this vulnerability. 

TALOS-2024-2097 (CVE-2024-50384-CVE-2024-50385) is a denial-of-service vulnerability in the NetX Component HTTP server functionality. A specially crafted network packet can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send a malicious packet to trigger this vulnerability. 

Two integer underflow vulnerabilities exist in the HTTP server PUT request functionality. For TALOS-2024-2102 (CVE-2024-50594-CVE-2024-50595), a specially crafted series of network requests can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send a sequence of malicious packets to trigger this vulnerability. For TALOS-2024-2103 (CVE-2024-50596-CVE-2024-50597), a specially crafted network packet can lead to denial of service. An attacker can send a malicious packet to trigger this vulnerability. 

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

CISO priorities in 2025 | Kaspersky official blog

In late March, the popular CISO MindMap, a cheat sheet on infosec team priorities, was updated. However, the economic landscape began shifting just days after its release. Now that the likelihood of economic instability, recession, falling oil prices, and rising microchip costs has increased, many companies and their CISOs face a pressing issue: cost optimization. In light of these developments, we decided to examine the CISO MindMap from a different angle, and highlight new or crucial infosec projects that can contribute to budget savings without creating excessive organizational risks.

Optimization of tools

MindMap authors advice CISOs to “consolidate and rationalize infosec tools”. In an IDC study from 2024, something like half of all large organizations surveyed used more than 40 infosec tools, and a quarter – more than 60. This abundance typically leads to decreased productivity, employee fatigue from unsynchronized and uncoordinated alerts, and excessive expenditure.

The solution lies in either consolidating the tech stack under a single-vendor approach (one vendor for the security platform and all its components), or selecting the best tool in each category. The latter approach requires (i) strict compliance with open communication standards, and (ii) API integration capabilities. It’s better suited for technologically mature teams capable of allocating internal resources (primarily time) to properly and efficiently set up integrations according to the infosec department’s procedures.

For effective stack consolidation, there are specialized planning tools that can assess all infosec systems that have been implemented, identify gaps in coverage, and pinpoint areas of significant functional overlap. This analysis also reveals inefficiently used tools that can be safely eliminated. For some niche and infrequent tasks, open-source tools can bring about budget savings. However, for large systems like SIEM that see regular use, open-source solutions may not be cheaper than proprietary ones due to the extensive efforts required for implementation, fine-tuning and support.

Consolidation often goes hand-in-hand with automation, which is only achievable with a well-synchronized toolset. In the same above-mentioned IDC study, it was found that companies that consolidated their tools and adopted modern XDR and SOAR solutions achieved average cost savings of 16% and analyst time savings of 20%. Simultaneously, they saw an improvement in organizational security with Mean Time to Respond (MTTR) decreasing by 21% and incident resolution time by 19.5%.

Automation

While automation projects initially involve additional expenses, their implementation in infosec processes pays off in the long run by saving analyst time and mitigating the talent shortage. Automation is not necessarily based on neural networks and language models, but these trendy technologies are already making practical contributions in several infosec areas. Tangible results are primarily achievable through the following measures:

  • Selective incident response automation
  • Alert prioritization in the monitoring center
  • Application of infosec policies to accounts and resources
  • Verification of compliance of internal policies with regulatory ones and enforcement of these policies
  • Risk assessment and prioritization of infosec controls
  • Automated third-party risk management (TPRM)

Generative AI

Despite the economic challenges, many companies continue to prioritize the implementation of AI-powered tools, viewing these as essential for future competitiveness and economic efficiency. Some organizations have even issued management directives such as “Before you hire a new employee, prove that AI cannot do their job.”

From the infosec perspective, the widespread adoption of AI-powered technology has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the vast and poorly understood array of AI tools creates a significant additional workload on infosec teams. On the other, it provides an opportunity to launch and fund various infosec initiatives within the broader corporate AI implementation program. To effectively manage AI-related risks, a company needs to do the following:

  • Establish standards and regulations for the use of AI-powered solutions, while keeping in mind the rapidly evolving regulatory landscape in this area
  • Create a controlled list of approved AI tools for different departments and processes
  • Regularly review recommendations and verify that all AI-driven processes comply with infosec policies
  • Include AI tools in the asset inventory for vulnerability management and infosec assessments
  •  Develop specialized training programs for both AI users and infosec personnel

Using open-source AI solutions instead of proprietary cloud systems can reduce operational costs and enhance data protection – especially when the solutions are deployed within the organization’s network or in a private cloud. However, the availability of suitable, high-quality open-source models depends on the specific use case.

Meaningful infosec metrics

This area doesn’t require substantial financial investment but it significantly simplifies the process of justifying infosec budgets to the board of directors. The composition of key metrics varies across industries and companies, but the following groups are worth considering:

  • Risk level and achieved risk reduction expressed in financial terms
  • Organizational readiness for attacks (MTTR, MTTD) and its trends
  • Progress in ongoing infosec projects, including automation and tool consolidation
  • Effectiveness of infosec measures and its trends: average time to remediate critical and other vulnerabilities, percentage of users successfully passing cybersecurity testing, and so on

Identity management

While implementing comprehensive IAM solutions can be expensive, companies can find a balance that provides significant risk reduction at a reasonable cost.

Many companies still lack basic infosec controls like multi-factor authentication. Even limited implementation of these controls significantly reduces the risk of compromise through credential theft. In addition to cost-effective solutions that utilize TOTP-based authenticator apps, 2025 has seen passkey-based solutions mature and become quite user-friendly on the major platforms (Microsoft, Google, Apple). This phishing-resistant, highly affordable authentication method is worth deploying at least for employees who have access to critical data and systems, and ideally, for everyone. Ultimately, the transition to passkeys can also improve efficiency for all employees, as password-free access saves time and reduces support costs for password-related issues.

Another aspect of IAM is centralized management of machine identities, API tokens, and other secrets. Due to a significant increase in attacks on cloud environments, investments in this area are likely unavoidable. However, many companies can strategically plan the implementation of appropriate tools by deploying open-source solutions in their infrastructure, utilizing secret managers included in their cloud provider subscriptions, and so on.

SOC cost management

Security operations centers (SOCs) represent a major expense in any infosec budget, with significant costs associated with analyst effort, data storage, and processing. Effective separation into “hot” and “cold” log storage can significantly reduce data storage costs. For large companies, it’s worth considering hierarchical or geographically distributed processing infrastructure. In some cases, such as with our SIEM – the Kaspersky Unified Monitoring and Analysis Platform – SIEM hardware savings can reach 50%.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

Malware Trends Report, Q1 2025: Get Your Copy

What’s Inside the Report

Get your free copy of the report to save time on research

ANY.RUN’s Malware Trends Report provides a comprehensive analysis of the current cyber threat landscape. The report includes insights from malware and phishing samples analyzed by 15,000 companies and 500,000 analysts inside the Interactive Sandbox in Q1, 2025.

It enables organizations to save hours on research by offering actionable intelligence to enhance security resilience. Key threats covered in the report:

Previous Reports

ANY.RUN publishes quarterly malware trends reports along with the final annual report. Below are links to reports from 2024:

To see reports for 2023, please click here

Learn all about the most recent malware trends to keep track of growing threats and stay alert to protect your organization. 

About ANY.RUN

ANY.RUN’s services are used by SOC teams and companies across different industries, including finance, manufacturing, healthcare, and technology.

The Interactive Sandbox helps businesses ensure fast and accurate analysis of threats targeting Windows, Linux, & Android systems. It provides capabilities for hands-on and in-depth investigations of complex malware and phishing scenarios.

Threat Intelligence Lookup enables organizations to enrich their knowledge on active cyber attacks, while TI Feeds allow businesses to expand threat coverage and detection.

Integrate ANY.RUN to level up your cyber resilience →

The post Malware Trends Report, Q1 2025: Get Your Copy appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog – ​Read More

Malware Signatures: How Cybersecurity Teams Use Them to Catch Threats 

Every piece of malware leaves traces behind. Sometimes it’s a string buried deep in the code. Other times it’s a mutex, a registry key, or a network pattern. The key is knowing what to look for. 

That’s exactly what malware signatures are for. They describe these recurring elements, unique strings, behaviors, or structural patterns, that can be used to reliably identify known threats. 

Security teams use these signatures to detect and flag malicious activity; sometimes before the malware even has a chance to do damage. 

In this article, we’ll break down what malware signatures are, the different types you’ll encounter, and how tools like YARA and Suricata help turn small clues into confident decisions. 

What Is a Malware Signature? 

A malware signature is a unique indicator tied to a specific piece of malicious software. It could be a text string, a file hash, a mutex, or even a sequence of behaviors. Security tools use these signatures to recognize and flag known threats, kind of like matching fingerprints at a crime scene. 

The goal is simple: spot malware based on something that consistently shows up across samples from the same family or campaign. Once identified, these signatures become part of detection rules used by antivirus engines, sandboxes, and intrusion detection systems. 

How Are Malware Signatures Created? 

Malware signatures are usually crafted by security researchers and automated detection systems after analyzing how a threat behaves or what it contains. 

When a new malware sample is discovered, analysts break it down, looking at code, memory behavior, registry changes, network traffic, and other markers. If they notice something unique or consistently present across samples, like a specific mutex name, string, or packet structure, that becomes a potential signature. 

Depending on the tool or platform, these signatures might take different forms; 

  • Static signatures are based on strings, byte sequences, or file hashes. 
  • Behavioral signatures are based on what the malware does, like creating certain processes or modifying the registry. 
  • Custom rules, like YARA or Suricata, allow analysts to define more complex patterns based on real-world observations. 

Main Types of Malware Signatures 

Not all malware looks or behaves the same, and the same goes for how we detect it. Over time, security teams have developed different types of signatures to match different kinds of threats.  

Here are the most common ones: 

Static Signatures 

These are the most traditional and widely used. Static signatures match fixed elements inside a file, like strings, byte sequences, or hashes, without needing to run the malware. 

Key traits: 

  • Match based on file content (strings, hex patterns, hashes) 
  • Fast and efficient for known threats 
  • Can be bypassed through obfuscation or slight code changes 
  • Commonly used in antivirus software  

Heuristic Signatures

Heuristic signatures look beyond exact matches. They evaluate the structure or logic of a file to identify suspicious patterns that may indicate malware, even if the sample is new or modified. 

Key traits: 

  • Detect threats based on suspicious code structures 
  • Useful for catching variants or zero-day malware 
  • May generate false positives if too broad 
  • Often found in email filters, AVs, and static analyzers 

Behavioral Signatures 

Rather than scanning a file, these signatures monitor what it does when executed. If it behaves like malware, e.g., injecting code or modifying the registry, it gets flagged. 

Key traits: 

  • Trigger on real-time actions and behaviors 
  • Great for catching fileless or evasive malware 
  • Requires sandboxing or endpoint monitoring 
  • Common in EDRs, sandboxes, and dynamic analysis tools 


Learn to analyze malware in a sandbox

Learn to analyze cyber threats

See a detailed guide to using ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox for malware and phishing analysis



How Detection Tools Use Signatures: YARA and Suricata 

Once malware signatures are defined, they need to be used effectively, and that’s where tools like YARA and Suricata come in. Each serves a unique purpose: one focuses on files and memory, the other on network traffic. Together, they cover a wide range of threats and detection angles. 

YARA Signatures: Matching Patterns in Files and Processes 

YARA is a rule-based detection tool that helps analysts identify malware by describing textual or binary patterns. It’s especially powerful for hunting threats across memory dumps, unpacked payloads, or large malware datasets. 

YARA helps security teams quickly identify threats by matching known patterns in files, processes, or memory. It automates what would otherwise be a slow, manual process, making detection faster, more accurate, and more scalable. 

Its real strength lies in customization. Teams can write tailored rules to catch specific malware strains or adapt to new threats as they emerge. When combined with ANY.RUN’s interactive sandbox, YARA also reveals how they behave, giving organizations the insight they need to act fast and prevent damage. 

Key benefits of YARA in a security workflow: 

  • Speeds up detection and reduces manual effort 
  • Detects both known and emerging malware families 
  • Cuts down false positives with precise rules 
  • Boosts efficiency across security teams 
  • Helps contain threats early and minimize risk 

Real-World Example: Matching the Mutex Pattern 

YARA rule example pulled from ANY.RUN sandbox analysis 

Let’s look at an example of YARA rule used in ANY.RUN’s sandbox: 

$s6 = “Local\SM0:%d:%d:%hs” wide 

This string is part of a rule designed to detect mutexes created by certain malware families.

To see this signature in action, check out this ANY.RUN analysis session

Checking mutex signature inside ANY.RUN sandbox 

Navigate to the MediaCenter.exe process → More InfoSynchronization tab. 

There, you’ll find the mutex: LocalSM0:5320:168:WilStaging_02 

YARA-based mutex signature detected inside ANY.RUN sandbox

This mutex exactly matches the YARA signature pattern. The use of placeholders like %d and %hs allows the rule to flexibly detect variations of this format across different samples. 

  • %d matches any sequence of digits (0–9) 
  • %hs matches a short string or hexadecimal value, typically 2 bytes 

This is a great example of how YARA rules aren’t just powerful, they’re also adaptable to the real-world quirks of evolving malware behavior. 

Submit suspicious files and URLs to ANY.RUN
for proactive analysis of threats targeting your company 



Sign up with business email


Suricata Signatures: Detecting Malicious Behavior in Network Traffic 

While YARA focuses on identifying malware based on what it is, Suricata helps detect malware based on what it does across the network. It’s an advanced intrusion detection system (IDS) that monitors real-time traffic and flags suspicious behavior using both signature- and anomaly-based techniques. 

ANY.RUN integrates Suricata to enhance threat visibility at the network level, allowing analysts to catch threats as they try to communicate with command-and-control servers, exfiltrate data, or spread laterally. Suricata signatures give security teams immediate context; what’s happening, where, and why it matters. 

Click on the Threats tab inside ANY.RUN sandbox to view all threats detected by Suricata rules   

Key benefits of Suricata in a security workflow: 

  • Detects malicious traffic and C2 communication in real time 
  • Complements file-based detection with network-layer visibility 
  • Helps attribute threats to specific malware families 
  • Speeds up incident response with actionable alerts 
  • Empowers teams with visibility into protocol activity across multiple layers 
Suricata Rule Example from ANY.RUN Sandbox Analysis

In ANY.RUN, Suricata rules are applied automatically during sandbox analysis. Let’s take a look at a real-world detection involving Gh0st Remote Access Trojan (RAT). 

View analysis session with Gh0st RAT 

Suricata rule triggered by Gh0st RAT inside ANY.RUN 

After execution, the sample initiates suspicious encrypted traffic. Suricata instantly detects it and flags the connection as Gh0st RAT activity.

Gh0st RAT detected by Suricata 

How it works: 

  • Suricata inspects packets across protocols (HTTP, TCP, UDP, etc.) 
  • It matches patterns defined in the ET (Emerging Threats) rule sets 
  • Once a match is found, it provides detailed metadata: source/destination IPs, ports, signature ID, and threat name 
Clicking on a threat from the list reveals its details 

By switching to the Suricata rule tab, you’ll be able to inspect it more thoroughly.  

Suricata signature displayed inside the ANY.RUN sandbox 

Making the Most of Malware Signatures in ANY.RUN 

Malware signatures can do a lot on their own but when they’re used in the right environment, they become even more useful. 

Inside ANY.RUN’s sandbox, YARA and Suricata work together to give you the full picture. You can see what a file is doing locally, spot mutexes, registry changes, and other signs of malicious behavior, then switch to the network layer to catch things like encrypted C2 traffic or data exfiltration. Both angles are covered, without having to jump between tools. 

Instead of switching between tools, analysts get everything in one place; interactive, real-time, and backed by constantly updated signature sets. This gives less time digging and more time acting. 

If your goal is to reduce investigation time, improve detection accuracy, and truly understand how malware behaves, ANY.RUN puts those capabilities right at your fingertips. 

About ANY.RUN

ANY.RUN is used by over 500,000 cybersecurity professionals and 15,000+ companies across finance, manufacturing, healthcare, and other industries. Its Interactive Sandbox offers fast threat analysis for Windows, Linux, and Android, aiding malware and phishing investigations. Threat Intelligence Lookup and TI Feeds enhance cyber attack knowledge and detection.

Strengthen your company’s cyber resilience with ANY.RUN →

The post Malware Signatures: How Cybersecurity Teams Use Them to Catch Threats  appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog – ​Read More

Year in Review: The biggest trends in ransomware

Year in Review: The biggest trends in ransomware

This week, our Year in Review spotlight is on ransomware—where low-profile tactics led to high-impact consequences.

Ransomware operators often prioritized stealth over complexity for initial access. They also focused on slipping past defenses with minimal noise—uninstalling security tools, creating new firewall rules for remote access, and using common, freely available tools.

The ransomware-as-a-service landscape also paints an interesting picture. A new player quickly rose through the ranks, becoming the second most prolific operator by targeting large payouts.

Something that hasn’t really changed over the years is the sectors that ransomware actors target most heavily – favouring industries that typically have lower security budgets, irregular monitoring, but highly sensitive data.

We’ve pulled together the most significant insights in a quick, 2-page PDF:

If you only have 55 seconds? Watch this video:

For the full analysis, download Talos’ 2024 Year in Review.

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

12 tips on how to use WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Viber, WeChat, and other messaging apps safely | Kaspersky official blog

How do you keep your chats private and protect your messaging account from being stolen or hacked? Here are 12 simple rules with brief explanations of why each one is important.

Enable two-factor authentication

Why this is important. It keeps your account from being hacked or hijacked through SIM swapping or some other technique. Turning on this setting requires entering your secret password in addition to the SMS verification code when signing in to the messaging app with your account on a new device.

What to do. Open the security and privacy settings of your messaging app, enter a secret password, and memorize it. You’ll only need to enter it when linking a new device to your account. To make things easier, you can generate and store it in a secure password manager, or test the strength of your password using our free Kaspersky Password Checker.

Don’t share one-time passwords

Why this is important. If scammers want to steal your account, they’ll try to trick you into giving them the verification code after you receive it in your messaging app.

What to do. Don’t forward or dictate one-time passwords for signing in to chat apps to anyone. Your friends, support agents, companies, or banks will never need these codes. If someone is asking for a code, it’s a scammer.

Never scan QR codes outside of the messaging app

Why this is important. Some account hijacking schemes masquerade as invitations to join a group or chat. You scan a QR code in an ad, but instead of joining a neighborhood or class chat, you allow a scammer to link their device to your account.

What to do. If someone is asking you to scan a QR code, find the scanner in the messaging app — typically in the Settings. Don’t use your camera or some other QR-code scanning app. Carefully read the prompts displayed by the messaging app: it’ll tell you whether you’re joining a group or channel, or linking a new device to your account.

Carefully check new contact requests

Why this is important. Scammers typically imitate people you know: “Hi! Me again. I’ve a new phone number”. They may even know who your boss is. Many scams that result in major financial losses start with requests from “friends” or “colleagues”. Another type of attack is a “misdialed call” scam. “Is this Hannah? It’s not? Oh, sorry! I misdialed. Anyway, how are things?”

What to do. If you see a new chat, but there’s no history, stay alert! If this is supposedly an acquaintance, ask them about something only they would know. If your boss is texting you, it’s best to confirm it with them directly through a different channel, such as their office phone, work email, or in person, before proceeding. If you get a message from someone claiming it was sent in error, ignore any enticing offers, especially if accompanied by links or files.

Use the block feature

Why this is important. It’s the best way to get rid of stalkers, scammers, and clinging exes.

What to do. Don’t ignore spammers or scammers from the previous tip. Every chat app has a “Block user” button — don’t hesitate to press it! This will prevent the scammer from writing you again — or, after several reports, anyone else. This button is also a great way to minimize reminders of those unpleasant people from your past.

Think before you open a link — even if it’s from a friend

Why this is important. Your friends are vulnerable too. Scammers can compromise their accounts, then use them to send manipulative messages — pleas for help or provocations — to everyone in their contact list, aiming to extort money or hijack further accounts.

What to do. Steer clear of suspicious website links, unfamiliar file attachments, pleas for cash, requests to vote in dubious contests, messages like, “Is that really you in that photo?”, and unexpected, too-good-to-be-true offers like free premium subscriptions. To ensure you don’t stumble into these traps, delete such messages on sight. If they appear to be from someone you know, reach out using another channel, and alert them to the suspicious activity occurring under their name. If you act quickly, you might be able to help your friends recover their accounts, as 24 hours is often all there is to do so.

Restrict access to your smartphone and messaging app

Why this is important. If your phone gets stolen, or you give it to a friend, coworker, or relative, access control will keep anyone from snooping on your chats.

What to do. Enable screen lock: fingerprint, Face ID, or a long PIN. Also, enable App Lock in the phone settings or messaging app itself. Your fingerprint or PIN will be required to open the app every time. Even if you give someone an unlocked phone, they won’t be able to use the chat app.

Turn off message previews

Why this is important. A locked phone screen may display highly sensitive data: from private messages to verification codes from the bank.

What to do. Disable message previews on the lock screen. You can do that in the “Notifications” section of the phone settings.

Use disappearing and one-time-view messages

Why this is important. If you’re sharing things like Wi-Fi passwords, booking details, or your home address, which are only needed for a moment, don’t leave them in your chat history to haunt you later. What if one of you gets hacked?

What to do. When sharing sensitive data, apply either an auto-delete timer for messages or the “view once” setting, depending on the situation. If neither is an appropriate option, set a reminder to revisit the chat and delete the message for both users after an hour, day, or week.

Added bonus. This looks cool and helps keep the chat uncluttered.

Don’t send nudes!

Why this is important. Even if it’s just a one-time view message, the picture might be shown to people around or screenshotted and then used against you.

What to do. Avoid sharing anything that could upset, embarrass, jeopardize, or open you up to blackmail if published. This is true for any private information, not just nudes. If your nudes have already been leaked online, there might still be a chance to get them removed.

Be careful with group chats

Why this is important. You probably trust your friends. But how well do you know the people your friends add to groups?

What not to do. Don’t share your phone numbers, addresses, or other sensitive (your own as well as others’) personal information in large chats.

Limit your profile visibility

Why this is important. Neither scammers nor strangers need to see your profile photo or know when you were last seen online.

What to do. Open the Privacy section in the chat app settings and choose who can see your “Last Seen”, “Profile Photo”, “Status”, and so on. By default, this data is visible to everyone. Adjust the settings to your preference, choosing either “My Contacts” or “Nobody”.

Read other stories to find out how to adjust security and privacy settings in specific messaging apps, and what to do if you’ve been targeted by scammers or had your account compromised:

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

Threat actors thrive in chaos

Threat actors thrive in chaos

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

If there’s one thing that threat actors love, it’s chaos. Headlines in the news that provoke an emotional response make excellent phishing lures because the intense feelings invoked by a provocative subject line cause our critical thinking faculties to be bypassed. Without cautious reflection, we’re likely to engage with bait, fall for the lure and “click the link” rather than pausing to ask ourselves what the headline’s writer is trying to achieve. 

Economic disruption also works in the bad guys’ favor. In budgetary crises, investments in cyber defenses may be postponed or the hiring of sorely needed additional team members delayed. Alternatively, an end-of-life device that is still functional despite obsolescence and many unpatched vulnerabilities may get an additional year of operation before replacement. 

In such a climate, security teams are often asked to do more with less. However, security can be improved simply by getting the basics right and addressing gaps that don’t require investment. Patching might be time-consuming, but it doesn’t require extra budget. Prioritize removing the most exploited vulnerabilities as listed in our 2024 Year in Review report. Next, review your MFA implementation, ensuring that it is deployed everywhere throughout the organization and that it can’t be bypassed. 

When times are tough, focus on getting the basics right and fixing what can be fixed without needing costly investment. Each vulnerability fixed, each weakness remediated helps move the security posture forwards and makes your organization a tougher target for the bad guys who in turn are more likely to seek easier quarry.

The one big thing 

We are continuing our discussion of Talos’ 2024 Year in Review report, looking at each section in detail. This week, let’s examine the evolution of email lures and the nature of the most frequently targeted vulnerabilities.

Why do I care? 

In a world of limited resources, effective defense requires identifying areas that are more likely to be targeted by threat actors and prioritizing shoring up these areas. Not all vulnerabilities or systems are exploited equally, and remediating the most frequently exploited vulnerabilities maximizes security effectiveness. 

So now what? 

Educate users on the types of social engineering that threat actors are currently using in email lures. Social engineering is not static but constantly changing to try and outwit unwary targets. 

Exploitation of the Shellshock series of vulnerabilities should not be continuing for over 10 years since disclosure. Aggressively identify systems within your IT estate that are vulnerable to this attack and urgently patch them.

Top security headlines of the week 

Hackers strike Australia’s largest pension funds. A series of coordinated attacks has reportedly led to criminals compromising in excess of 20,000 pension accounts and stealing funds. (Reuters

Ireland Plans 300-Strong Military Cyber Command. The Irish armed forces are creating a Joint Cyber Defence Command to support defensive and offensive cyber operations. (Irish Times

Baltimore City Falls Victim to Vendor Fraud. Two payments totaling $1.5 million were reportedly paid to a fraudulent bank account that had been swapped for a contractor’s genuine account. (CBS News

CISA Warns of Vulnerabilities in ICS Software. The US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Agency released advisories relating to five series vulnerabilities in Industrial Control Systems software. (CISA)

Can’t get enough Talos?

  • Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams. Talos has observed a widespread and ongoing smishing campaign since October 2024 that targets toll road users in the U.S. Read the blog here.
  • Beers with Talos: 2024 Year in Review. Joe, Hazel, Bill and Dave break down 2024 Year in Review and discuss how and why cybercriminals are learning on attacks based in stealth and simplicity. Listen here.
  • The TTP Ep 10 (Part 1). Peeling back the layers of the threats that dominated 2024. Watch now.
  • The TTP Ep 10 (Part 2). Ransomware groups, and why we’re seeing more identity attacks. Watch now.

Upcoming events where you can find Talos 

Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week 

SHA 256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507   
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f   
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507/details 
Typical Filename: VID001.exe   
Detection Name: Simple_Custom_Detection

SHA 256: a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91  
MD5: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376  
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91/details 
Typical Filename: IMG001.exe 
Detection Name: Simple_Custom_Detection  

SHA 256: 47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca    
MD5: 71fea034b422e4a17ebb06022532fdde    
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca/details 
Typical Filename: VID001.exe   
Detection Name: Coinminer:MBT.26mw.in14.Talos   

SHA 256: 7bf7550ae929d6fea87140ab70e6444250581c87a990e74c1cd7f0df5661575b 
MD5: f5e908f1fac5f98ec63e3ec355ef6279 
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7bf7550ae929d6fea87140ab70e6444250581c87a990e74c1cd7f0df5661575b/details 
Typical Filename: IMG001.exe 
Detection Name: Win.Dropper.Coinminer::tpd 

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams

  • Cisco Talos has observed a widespread and ongoing financial theft SMS phishing (smishing) campaign since October 2024 that targets toll road users in the United States of America.  
  • We observed that the campaign targets people across several states in the U.S. according to the domain names used in the smishing messages. 
  • Talos assesses with moderate confidence that the toll road smishing attacks are being carried out by multiple financially motivated threat actors using the smishing kit developed by “Wang Duo Yu”, according to the intelligence obtained by Talos. 

Toll road smishing attacks 

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams

Since the middle of Oct. 2024, Talos has seen ongoing smishing attacks impersonating U.S toll road automatic payment services (such as E-ZPass) with the intent of financial theft. The actors have so far sent SMS messages to individuals in about eight states in the U.S., including Washington, Florida, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Texas, Ohio, Illinois and Kansas. Talos identified these states via spoofed domains containing the states’ two-letter abbreviations that we observed in the SMS messages. 

The actors send an SMS notification for an outstanding bill claiming that the potential victim owes a small amount of money, under $5 USD. They warn of potential late fees, prompting victims to visit a spoofed domain for the payment.  

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams
Sample phishing SMS messages. 

When the victim visits the domain, they are prompted to solve a fake image-based CAPTCHA, after which it redirects the victims to a fake webpage with the legitimate toll service’s logo. This webpage prompts the victims to enter their name and ZIP code to view their fake bill. The fake bill displays the victim’s name with a message showing that they owe approximately $4 and warning of a $35 late payment fee. 

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams

After the victim views their fake bill, they click the “Proceed Now” button which redirects them to another fake webpage. This site prompts the victim to enter their name, address, phone number and credit card information, which the threat actor eventually steals. Due to the limited visibility of the threat actor phishing infrastructure, Talos is unsure if there are any further payloads delivered to the victims’ devices. 

In April 2024, FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) warned about a similar toll road smishing campaign where the threat actor used the same brand impersonation technique but with a slight difference in the SMS message language, monetary values and formatting. 

Targeting toll road users in multiple states indicates the likelihood of the threat actor leveraging user information publicly leaked from large databases. For example, the threat actor behind the 2024 National Public Data leak released billions of records publicly which were then shared on private Telegram channels for further abuse. However, Talos currently does not have any evidence to suggest that the toll road smishing campaign is fueled by the National Public Data leaks.  

Phishing infrastructure 

Talos observed that the actors have used several typosquatted domains in the SMS phishing messages to convince the potential victims to visit them. These typosquatted phishing domains were created during Oct. and Nov. 2024 and were observed resolving to one of the following IP addresses: 45[.]152[.]115[.]161 and 82[.]147[.]88[.]22.  

As of March 2025, Talos is still seeing new domains registered by the threat actors for the toll road scams, implying that the campaign is ongoing. During our research period, these newly registered domains resolved to the IP address 43[.]156[.]47[.]209. 

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams

Smishing kits likely used in the U.S. toll road scams 

Talos assesses with moderate confidence that multiple threat actors are operating the toll road smishing campaign by leveraging a smishing kit developed by the actor known as “Wang Duo Yu”, according to the intelligence obtained by Talos. 

We have observed similar smishing kits being used by the organized cybercrime group known as the “Smishing Triad.” This group has conducted large-scale smishing attacks targeting mail services in multiple countries, including the United States Postal Service (USPS), as well as the financial and commercial sectors previously reported by Resecurity

Talos discovered references to specific phishing kits that are targeting toll systems in the DY Tongbu Telegram channel on “老王同步源码开发教学” translated to “Lao Wang Synchronized Source Code Development Tutorial.”  

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams
Public Lao Wang Synchronized Source Code Development Tutorial Telegram channel.

The Telegram channel shared details about a phishing module that allegedly spoofs the Massachusetts MassDOT’s EZDriveMA toll system, as well as a phishing module that targets customers of the North Texas Toll Authority. At the time of publication, the Telegram channel had more than 4,400 subscribers. 

Further investigation has revealed that the developer, 王多余 (translated to Wang Duo Yu), has developed a similar smishing kit and operates the Lao Wang Synchronized Source Code Development Tutorial Telegram channel from two separate accounts. The pictures shown below display screenshots of the two telegram accounts related to Wang Duo Yu. 

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams
Two telegram accounts related to Wang Duo Yu. 

Additionally, we noticed that the developer has created a YouTube channel where they upload tutorial videos. These videos cover topics such as “How to Build a PMTA Mail Server,” “Setting Up an Automatic EPUSD Payment and Vending System,” “Creating a Pagoda Panel Website (宝塔面板),” “Building the Simplest and Safest Node Using Native Tools,” and “Using the X-UI Panel to Set Up a VMess+WS+TLS+Web or VLess+WS+TLS+Web Node.”  Each video guides users on building basic web services or mail servers. 

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams
Wang Duo Yu’s YouTube channel. 

There are also some private video links that cannot be found elsewhere. Talos found one such video on a Chinese forum. To access the post with the video link, users need special permissions in that forum. 

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams
Wang Duo Yu’s YouTube channel with private video. 

We also observed Wang Duo Yu promoting their smishing kits business and tutorials on other Telegram channels, also offering personal lessons that include full-stack development, mail server setup and Telegram bot development. The threat actor offers a two-hour lesson each day and provides one-on-one instruction via remote desktop, charging ¥5888 (converting to approx. US $806 at time of publication) per class. 

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams
Wang Duo Yu marketing the kits in telegram channels. 

One of the Telegram channels shown in the above picture is called, “向前论坛,” translating to ” Xiangqian Forum,” of which Wang Duo Yu is a moderator. Wang Duo Yu posted articles in this forum to increase subscribers, promoted their own teaching courses, and provided links and discount codes for purchasing VPS and domains. 

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams
Wang Duo Yu selling the VPS and cloud services through his website. 

We also found an additional website selling the VPS and cloud services, confirmed to be owned by Wang Duo Yu.  The “wangduoyu[.]vip” website was active from 2022 to 2023. 

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams
Wang Duo Yu’s shop website. 
Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams
Wang Duo Yu’s shop DNS resolved IPs and active periods of time. 

We observed that Wang Duo Yu offers the toll smishing kit source code for sale and provides services to assist in setting up the whole system. In a forum post, they stated that anyone interested can reach out to their personal Telegram account “@wangduofish”. The post also includes hidden content only visible to users with VIP access. 

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams
Wang Duo Yu’s post includes hidden content only visible with VIP access. 

Wang Duo Yu has crafted and designed specific smishing kits and has been selling access to these kits on their Telegram channels. The kits are available with different infrastructure options, priced at US $50 each for a full-feature development, $30 each for proxy development (when the customer has a personal domain and server), $20 each for version updates, and $20 for all other miscellaneous support. The threat actor also offers updated releases for multiple source code versions. The offers on the Telegram channel revealed that the smishing kits and source code primarily target large public-facing entities with a large end-userbase, such as toll road operators, banks and postal services. 

Coverage

Unraveling the U.S. toll road smishing scams

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. 

Cisco Secure Network/Cloud Analytics (Stealthwatch/Stealthwatch Cloud) analyzes network traffic automatically and alerts users of potentially unwanted activity on every connected device. 

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products. 

Cisco Secure Access is a modern cloud-delivered Security Service Edge (SSE) built on Zero Trust principles.  Secure Access provides seamless transparent and secure access to the internet, cloud services or private application no matter where your users work. Please contact your Cisco account representative or authorized partner if you are interested in a free trial of Cisco Secure Access. 

Umbrella, Cisco’s secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.  

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.  Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network. 

Indicators of Compromise  

IOCs for this threat can be found in our GitHub repository here

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More