How to Collect Threat Intelligence Using Search Parameters in TI Lookup

ANY.RUN‘s Threat Intelligence Lookup is a valuable resource for security professionals searching for information on the latest cyber threats. 

One of the key features of Threat Intelligence Lookup is its extensive search capabilities. The service offers over 40 different search parameters that can be combined to form specific queries. These parameters allow you to filter and refine your search results based on various criteria, such as IOCs, behavioral indicators, and other relevant information. 

Let’s explore each search parameter and provide examples of how they can be used in your investigations.

About Threat Intelligence Lookup

Threat Intelligence Lookup is a centralized platform for threat data exploration, collection, and analysis.

At the core of Threat Intelligence Lookup lies a global network of over 400,000 security experts. These individuals actively contribute by submitting suspicious samples to the ANY.RUN sandbox for advanced analysis on a daily basis. 

The submission process generates a wealth of valuable threat data, including indicators of compromise (IOCs), which are then extracted and integrated into Threat Intelligence Lookup.

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Thanks to its integration with ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox, users can access real-time search results, each one linked to a corresponding sandbox session, enabling in-depth analysis of the identified threats.

Search Parameters in TI Lookup

Search parameters in TI Lookup are divided into separate groups: tasks, registry, environment, detection, module, connection, process, network threats, file, synchronization, and URL.

Task

Task parameters refer to the characteristics of tasks (sandbox sessions). 

threatName

The name of a particular threat: malware family, threat type, etc., as identified by the sandbox.

Examples: “Phishing”, “xworm”, “ransomware”, “tycoon”.

submissionCountry

The country from which the threat sample was submitted.

Examples: “es”, “us”, “de”.

Results for a query that includes a threat name (Remcos) and country (Brazil) 

Here is an example of a query for samples of the Remcos malware submitted by users in Brazil. The service provides a list of sandbox sessions that correspond to the request.

Try it:

threatLevel

A verdict on the threat level of the sample.

Examples: “malicious”, “suspicious”.

taskType

The type of the sample submitted to the sandbox.

Examples: “URL”, “file”.

You can adjust the timeframe of your search to 180, 90, 60, 30, 7, 3, or 1 days

In this screenshot, you can see a query for malicious URLs uploaded to the sandbox over the past 24 hours. TI Lookup displays a list of the latest one hundred sessions.

Try it:

Registry

Registry parameters refer to specific attributes related to registry modifications detected within sandbox sessions. These parameters provide insights into how a threat interacts with the Windows registry.

registryKey

The specific key within the registry hive where the modification occurred. Please note: when entering registry keys, use a double backslash () to escape the single backslash.  

Examples: “Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce”, “Windows NT\CurrentVersionWindows”.

registryName

The name of the Windows Registry key field.

Examples: “browseinplace”, “docobject”, “isshortcut”.

registryValue

The value of the Windows Registry key.

Examples: “internet exploreriexplore.exe”.

The service provides events, synchronization, and network threats associated with the query

Using the query above, we can identify threats that aim to execute malicious code through scheduled tasks.

Try it:

Environment

These parameters are used to provide context about the environment where a threat was detected or executed.

os

The specific version of Windows used in the environment.

Examples: “11”, “10”, “7”.

osSoftwareSet

The software package of applications installed on the OS.

Examples: “clean”, “office”, “complete”.

osBitVersion

The bitness of the operating system, 32-bit or 64-bit.

Examples: “32”, “64”.

The service provides Lumma analysis sessions that you can explore

We can use these parameters to, for instance, discover Windows 11 x64 sandbox sessions containing analysis of the Lumma stealer launched in the service over the past 14 days.

Try it:

Detection

These parameters are utilized to describe the detection signatures and MITRE TTPs relating to the execution of threats in the sandbox.

ruleName

The name of the detection rule.

Examples: “Executable content was dropped or overwritten”, “Phishing has been detected”.

ruleThreatLevel

The threat level assigned to a particular event.

Examples: “malicious”, “suspicious”, “info”.

MITRE

Techniques used by the malware according to the MITRE ATT&CK classification.

Examples: “T1071”, “T1114.001”.

The service provides events, mutexes, files, network threats, and sessions

Let’s consider a query combining the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1053.005, which describes a common persistence mechanism, with a detection rule for threats that steal browser credentials. 

Try it:

Module

Module parameters refer to specific modules or components within a threat. This can be a DLL, library, or other executable that is loaded by the main executable.

moduleImagePath

The full path to the module’s image file, the location on the disk where the module’s executable is stored.

Examples: “SysWOW64\cryptbase.dll”, “SysWOW64\msasn1.dll”.

The service yields events, files, and other results in response to the query

Above you can see an example of a query that looks for all instances of sandbox sessions where KernelBase.dll was called.

Try it:

Connection

The Connection parameters describe network-related aspects of a threat.

domainName

The domain name that was recorded during the threat execution in a sandbox.

Examples: “tventyvd20sb[.]top”, “5.tcp.ngrok[.]io”.

destinationIP

The IP address of the network connection that was established or attempted.

Examples: “147[.]185[.]221[.]22”, “162[.]125[.]66[.]15”.

destinationPort

The network port through which the connection was established.

Examples: “49760”, “49780”.

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destinationIpAsn

Detected ASN.

Examples: “akamai-as”, “akamai international b.v.”.

destinationIPgeo

Two-letter country or region code of the detected IP geolocation.

Examples: “ae”, “de”.

ja3, ja3s, jarm

Types of TLS fingerprints that can indicate certain threats.

Examples: “1af33e1657631357c73119488045302c” (JA3S), “a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1” (JA3).

You can explore network threats tab to see triggered Suricata IDS rules

In the picture above, we can see a query that searches for threats that made connections to IP addresses located in the Czech Republic (CZ), belonging to Cogent Communications.

Try it:

Process

The following parameters relate to processes registered during active sandbox sessions.

imagePath

Full path to process image.

Examples: “System32\conhost.exe”, “Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe”.

commandLine

The full command line that initiated the process.

Examples: “PDQConnectAgent\pdq-connect-agent.exe –service”, “system32\cmd.exe /c”.

The events tab shows the exact processes corresponding to the query

Using these parameters, we can find Strela stealer samples that use net.exe to mount a C2 server containing a ‘davwwwroot’ folder.

Try it:

Network Threats

These parameters describe network-based threats detected by the Suricata intrusion detection system (IDS).

suricataMessage

The description of the threat according to Suricata.

Examples: “ET INFO 404/Snake/Matiex Keylogger Style External IP Check”, “STEALER [ANY.RUN] Stealc HTTP POST Request”.

Search using Suricata message reveals malconf IPs of Redline

 We can use a Suricata message to discover more samples, as well as IOCs, including those extracted directly from malware’s configs, relating to a particular threat.

Try it:

suricataClass

The category assigned to the threat by Suricata based on its characteristics.

Examples: “misc activity”, “a network trojan was detected”.

suricataID

The unique identifier of the Suricata rule.

Examples: “2044767”, “8001997”.

suricataThreatLevel

The verdict on the threat according to Suricata based on its potential impact.

Examples: “malicious”, “suspicious”, “info”

The service returns Suricata IDS rules detecting njRAT

By combining this parameter with threaName, we can collect Surica rules relating to a specific malware.

Try it:

File

These parameters describe file-related aspects of a threat.

filePath

The full path to the file on the system.

Examples: “invoice”, “order”

A query searching for sessions where a readme.txt file was dropped on the desktop, a common ransomware sign

We can use this parameter along with threatLevel to find specific files in sandbox sessions with malicious content.

Try it: filePath:”Users\admin\Desktop\README.TXT” AND threatLevel:”malicious”

fileExtension

The extension that indicates the file type.

Examples: “exe”, “dll”.

sha256, sha1, md5

Hash values relating to a file.

Examples: “1412faf1bfd96e91340cedcea80ee09d”, “ce554fe53b2620c56f6abb264a588616”

In response to a hash query, the service returns events, network threats, files, and other data

We can use the hash of a malicious file to discover the specific malware family it relates to.

Try it:

Synchronization

These parameters describe synchronization-related activities within a threat, such as mutexes.

syncObjectName

The name or identifier of the synchronization object used.

Examples: “rmc”, “m0yv”.

syncObjectType

The type of synchronization object used.

Examples: “event”, “mutex”.

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syncObjectOperation

The operation performed on the synchronization object.

Examples: “create”, “open”.

The service provides a long list of objects found in sessions containing analysis of the Xworm malware

By combining operation and type parameters with threatName, we can search for specific mutexes or events created during the execution of a particular malware

Try it:

URL

These parameters describe network traffic related to HTTP requests and responses.

url

The URL called by the process.

Examples: “http://192[.]168[.]37[.]128:8880[/]zv8u”, “http://tventyvd20sb[.]top/v1/upload[.]php”.

httpRequestContentType

The content type of the HTTP request sent to the server.

Examples: “application/octet-stream”.

httpResponseContentType

The content type of the HTTP response received from the server.

Examples: “text/html”.

httpRequestFileType

The file type of the file being uploaded in the HTTP request.

Examples: “binary”.

httpResponseFileType

The file type of the file being downloaded in the HTTP response.

Examples: “binary”.

Results for binary file requests in HijackLoader sandbox sessions

It is possible to use the parameter with threatName again to find binary files that were requested during the analysis in the sandbox.

Try it:

Conclusion

ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup offers a comprehensive set of search parameters that enable security professionals to effectively analyze and investigate threats. Using these search options, you can identify and enrich your information on emerging threats.

Try Threat Intelligence Lookup for free →

About ANY.RUN  

ANY.RUN helps more than 400,000 cybersecurity professionals worldwide. Our interactive sandbox simplifies malware analysis of threats that target both Windows and Linux systems. Our threat intelligence products, TI Lookup, Yara Search and Feeds, help you find IOCs or files to learn more about the threats and respond to incidents faster.

The post How to Collect Threat Intelligence Using Search Parameters in TI Lookup appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

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SambaSpy, a new RAT | Kaspersky official blog

Today, let’s talk about rats. Not the long-tailed rodents, but the digital kind – Remote Access Trojans, or RATs. These are Trojans that attackers use to gain remote access to a device. Typically, these RATs can install and uninstall programs, control the clipboard and log keystrokes.

In May 2024, a new breed of RAT, SambaSpy, wandered into our rat trap. To learn how this malware infects its victims’ devices and what it does once it’s inside, read on.

What SambaSpy is

SambaSpy is a feature-rich RAT Trojan obfuscated using Zelix KlassMaster, making it much more difficult to detect and analyze. However, our team was up to the challenge and discovered that this new RAT is capable of:

Managing the file system and processes
Downloading and uploading files
Controlling the webcam
Taking screenshots
Stealing passwords
Loading additional plug-ins
Remotely controlling the desktop
Logging keystrokes
Managing the clipboard

Impressed? It seems SambaSpy can do it all – the perfect tool for a 21st century James Bond villain. But even this extensive list isn’t exhaustive: read more about this RAT’s capabilities in the full version of our study.

The malicious campaign we uncovered was exclusively targeting victims in Italy. You may be surprised, but this is actually good news (for everyone except Italians). Threat actors usually try to cast a wide net to maximize their profits, but these attackers are focused on just one country. So why is that a good thing? It’s likely that the attackers are testing the waters with Italian users before expanding their operation to other countries – and we’re already one step ahead, since we’re familiar with SambaSpy and how to counter it. All that our users worldwide need to do is make sure they have a reliable security solution, and read on knowing that we’ve got this.

How attackers spread SambaSpy

In short, just like many other RATs, via email. The attackers used two primary infection chains, both involving phishing emails disguised as communications from a real estate agency. The key element in the email is a CTA to check an invoice by clicking a hyperlink.

At first glance, the email appears legitimate – except that it’s sent from a German email address, but written in Italian

Clicking the link redirects users to a malicious website that checks the system language and the browser used. If the potential victim’s OS is set to Italian and they open the link in Edge, Firefox or Chrome, they receive a malicious PDF file that infects their device with either a dropper or a downloader. The difference between the two is minimal: the dropper installs the Trojan immediately, while the downloader first downloads the necessary components from the attackers’ servers.

Before starting, both the loader and the dropper check that the system isn’t running in a virtual machine and, most importantly, that the OS language is set to Italian. If both conditions are met, the device is infected.

Users who don’t meet these criteria are redirected to the website of FattureInCloud, an Italian cloud-based solution for storing and managing digital invoices. This clever disguise allows the attackers to target only a specific audience – everyone else is redirected to a legitimate website.

Who’s behind SambaSpy?

We’ve yet to determine which group is behind this sophisticated distribution of SambaSpy. However, circumstantial evidence has shown us that the attackers speak Brazilian Portuguese. We also know that they’re already expanding their operations to Spain and Brazil – as evidenced by malicious domains used by the same group in other detected campaigns. By the way, these campaigns no longer include the language check.

How to protect yourself from SambaSpy

The key takeaway from this story is the method of infection, which suggests that anyone, anywhere, speaking any language could be the target of the next campaign. For the attackers, it doesn’t really matter who they hit, nor are the particulars of the phishing bait important. Today, it might be an invoice from a real estate agency; tomorrow, a tax notification; and the day after that, airline tickets or travel vouchers.

Here are a few tips and recommendations to help you stay safe from SambaSpy:

Install Kaspersky Premium before your device shows any signs of infection. Our solution reliably detects and neutralizes both SambaSpy and other malware.
Always be wary of phishing emails. Before you click on a link in your inbox, take a moment to ask yourself: “Could this be a scam?”

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CISA Adds Progress WhatsUp Gold and MSHTML Vulnerabilities to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog

Key Takeaways


CISA has added vulnerabilities affecting the Microsoft Windows MSHTML Platform (CVE-2024-43461) and Progress WhatsUp Gold network monitoring solution (CVE-2024-6670) to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

Proofs of Concept and observed exploits of these vulnerabilities mean that users should update affected products as soon as possible.

Progress WhatsUp Gold was observed under exploit within hours after a Proof of Concept emerged, suggesting an urgent need to patch this 9.8-severity vulnerability.

Cyble researchers have detected 381 internet-exposed Progress WhatsUp Gold instances; patching these instances is critical.

Microsoft has patched two high-severity vulnerabilities chained together in Windows MSHTML platform spoofing attacks.

Overview

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added vulnerabilities affecting the Microsoft Windows MSHTML Platform and Progress WhatsUp Gold network monitoring solution to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (KEV) after proofs of concept (PoCs) emerged, and security researchers observed active exploits of the vulnerabilities.

We’ll examine the vulnerabilities, the following steps for affected products, and the best practices that all organizations should follow.

CVE-2024-6670: Progress WhatsUp Gold

CVE-2024-6670 is a critical 9.8 severity SQL Injection vulnerability affecting versions of Progress WhatsUp Gold released before 2024.0.0.

The vulnerability in affected versions of the network monitoring software allows an unauthenticated attacker to retrieve the user’s encrypted password if the application is configured with only a single user.

Exploits began within hours after a Proof of Concept for the vulnerability was made available publicly on GitHub, even though a patch had been available for the vulnerability since mid-August, suggesting that some users were slow to update affected versions.

Trend Micro researchers detected remote code execution (RCE) attacks against WhatsUp Gold that exploited the Active Monitor PowerShell Script, leveraging CVE-2024-6670 and CVE-2024-6671, a companion vulnerability also rated 9.8.

Both vulnerabilities are patched starting with version 2024.0.0.

The Cyble ODIN scanner detected 381 internet-exposed Progress WhatsUp Gold instances, as shown in the figure below. Progress WhatsUp Gold is urged to upgrade as soon as possible and check for indicators of compromise in their environments.

CVE-2024-43461: Microsoft Windows MSHTML

CVE-2024-43461 is a high-severity (CVSS: 8.8) vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows MSHTML Internet Explorer browser engine platform containing a UI misrepresentation flaw that allows attackers to spoof web pages. This vulnerability was exploited in conjunction with CVE-2024-38112.

Microsoft has announced the retirement of Internet Explorer 11 and deprecated Microsoft Edge Legacy. However, MSHTML, EdgeHTML, and related scripting platforms remain supported. MSHTML is used in Internet Explorer mode in Microsoft Edge and other applications via WebBrowser control. WebView and some UWP apps utilize EdgeHTML. Updates for vulnerabilities in MSHTML and scripting platforms are included in IE Cumulative Updates, but EdgeHTML and Chakra updates are not.

CVE-2024-43461 was exploited in conjunction with CVE-2024-38112 before July 2024. A fix for CVE-2024-38112, released in July 2024, disrupted this attack chain. To ensure complete protection, customers should install both the July 2024 and September 2024 security updates.

Affected Windows products include:


Windows Server 2012

Windows Server 2012 R2

Windows Server 2008 R2

Windows Server 2008

Windows Server 2016

Windows 10

Windows Server 2022

Windows 11

Conclusion

The recent addition of these vulnerabilities to the CISA KEV database underscores their active exploitation. These vulnerabilities can lead to severe security breaches, including unauthorized access to sensitive information and effective spoofing of web pages. Owners of affected products are urged to update their systems with the latest patch released by the official vendor.

Cyble Recommendations

Cyble urges the following best practices:


Ensure that you install the latest security updates for all affected systems and regularly check for and apply updates to stay protected against known vulnerabilities.

Implement robust monitoring to detect any unusual activity that could indicate the exploitation of these vulnerabilities. This includes monitoring network traffic, system logs, and user behavior.

Review and strengthen your security configurations, including access controls and permissions. Ensure that applications are not unnecessarily exposed to the internet and that strong authentication mechanisms are in place.

Perform regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing to identify and address potential security weaknesses before they can be exploited.

Develop a comprehensive patch management strategy that includes inventory management, patch assessment, testing, deployment, and verification.

Implement proper network segmentation to avoid exposure of critical assets over the internet.

Maintain an up-to-date inventory of all internal and external assets, including hardware, software, and network components.

The post CISA Adds Progress WhatsUp Gold and MSHTML Vulnerabilities to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog appeared first on Cyble.

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CERT India reports vulnerabilities in multiple QNAP products

Earlier today, CERT India (CERT-In) released an advisory announcing multiple vulnerabilities in various QNAP products. QNAP is best known for the Network-Attached Storage (NAS) systems used by firms with their enterprise environments. This batch of vulnerabilities primarily affects the QTS and QuTS Hero operating systems – both key parts of QNAP’s offerings.

The high-severity advisory describes the critical flaws that could potentially allow attacks to elevate privileges on a compromised device, execute code remotely, and even access sensitive data without authorization. The advisory goes on to detail the specific QNAP products affected, the range and type of vulnerabilities, and the steps affected users can take to secure themselves.

Affected QNAP Products

The vulnerabilities impact the following versions of QNAP’s QTS and QuTS hero systems:


QTS 5.1.0.2823 and prior versions.

QTS hero h5.1.0.2823 and prior.

QTS 4.5.4.2790 and prior.

QTS hero h4.5.4.2790 and prior.

QuTS h5.2.0.2782 and prior.

The affected versions of QNAP are used across multiple enterprise environments, necessitating swift and decisive action from system administrators to follow CERT-In’s guidance and apply the latest patches to ensure system security.

Vulnerability Overview

These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely to carry out a plethora of malicious activities. Given the number and size of the affected users, it is imperative that these be patched immediately, or they could lead to the following consequences:


Exposure of Sensitive Information: Attackers might be able to remotely extract confidential data stored on affected NAS devices.

Bypassing Authorization Checks: These flaws potentially allow attackers to successfully bypass the authentication processes put in place by users.

Escalation of Privileges: Unauthorized users will be able to escalate their privileges within the system to further expand the scope of their nefarious activities.

Execution of Arbitrary Code: These vulnerabilities can potentially enable arbitrary code execution, causing significant damage since it would make it possible to inject malicious commands, potentially affecting the entire environment/system.

Detailed Description of Vulnerabilities

The cause for these vulnerabilities arises from several known issues that are detailed in CERT-In’s advisory. A brief summary has been provided below:


Boundary Errors: Flaws in boundary handling can allow attackers to manipulate the memory space.

Improper Input Validation: Inadequate validation of input allows attackers to introduce harmful data into the system.

OS Command Injection Vulnerability: This flaw allows malicious users to inject harmful commands into the operating system.

Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts: Attackers can bypass rate-limiting measures or brute force their way into systems.

Heap-based Buffer Overflow: Memory corruption through buffer overflow can crash systems or open them up to exploitation. 

The aforementioned security weaknesses can allow hackers to corrupt memory, insert commands from a remote location, or employ brute force to infiltrate QNAP systems, greatly heightening the potential threat to data and operational stability.

CVEs tracked in the advisory

For easier tracking and reporting, CERT-In’s advisory has also listed the relevant Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) associated with the aforementioned flaws:


CVE-2023-34974

CVE-2023-34979

CVE-2023-39298

CVE-2024-21906

CVE-2024-32763

CVE-2024-32771

CVE-2024-38641

Every CVE is linked to a particular weakness that attackers could potentially exploit in different ways, such as injecting commands or gaining higher-level privileges. System administrators should review the specifics of these CVEs to acquire a more thorough idea of how these vulnerabilities might affect their system(s).

Potential Impact

If successfully exploited, these vulnerabilities can result in severe consequences, such as:


Data Breaches: Exposure to sensitive information could lead to significant reputational damage, especially for businesses that handle sensitive client data.

Service Downtime: Arbitrary code execution could lead to system crashes, disrupting business operations.

Unauthorized Access: Privilege escalation may allow attackers to gain admin rights, giving them complete control over the NAS systems.

Financial and Legal Ramifications: Depending on the type of information compromised, organizations could face financial losses, legal challenges, and regulatory penalties.

Next steps to secure systems and mitigate the impact of these vulnerabilities

To help mitigate the risk, QNAP rapidly patched several affected systems along with detailed instructions, the links for which can be found below. We highly recommend that system administrators download and install these patches as soon as possible prior to these vulnerabilities being exploited to compromise their organization’s systems.


QNAP Security Advisory QSA-24-28

QNAP Security Advisory QSA-24-32

QNAP Security Advisory QSA-24-33

Conclusion

Despite QNAP’s timely response in identifying and patching affected systems, such severe vulnerabilities with potentially devastating consequences highlight the need for cybersecurity personnel in organizations to take a proactive stance on system and platform security. If immediate corrective action is not taken, malicious actors may gain unauthorized access to critical systems, confidential data may be breached, and even the system may be compromised.

Employees are the first line of defense against cyber threats. Thus, fostering a culture of cyber-awareness and educating the workforce is a time-tested method to increase cyber-resilience by creating a habit of timely patch management, conducting frequent system audits, and implementing security best practices.

The post CERT India reports vulnerabilities in multiple QNAP products appeared first on Cyble.

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Kaspersky AI Technology Research Center | Kaspersky official blog

For nearly two decades, Kaspersky has been at the forefront of integrating artificial intelligence (AI), particularly machine learning (ML), into its products and services. Our deep expertise and experience in applying these technologies to cybersecurity, coupled with our unique datasets, efficient methods, and advanced model-training infrastructure form the bedrock of our approach to solving complex ML challenges. Our Kaspersky AI Technology Research Center brings together data scientists, ML engineers, threat experts, and infrastructure specialists to tackle the most challenging tasks at the intersection of AI/ML and cybersecurity. This includes not only the development of applied technologies but also research into the security of AI algorithms, including the use of promising approaches such as neuromorphic ML, AI risk awareness, and much more.

Our technologies and products

At Kaspersky we’ve developed a wide range of AI/ML-powered threat detection technologies, primarily for identifying malware. These include a deep neural network algorithm for detecting malicious executable files based on static features, decision-tree ML technology for automated creation of detection rules that work on user devices, and neural networks for detecting malicious behavior of programs during execution. We also utilize a system for identifying malicious online resources based on anonymous telemetry received from solutions installed on customer devices and other sources. You can read more about them in our white paper Machine Learning for Malware Detection. Other models – such as the ML model for detecting fake websites and DeepQuarantine for quarantining suspected spam emails – protect users from phishing and spam threats. KSN’s cloud infrastructure makes our AI developments available almost instantly to both home and enterprise users.

Guided by the promise of generative AI, particularly large language models (LLM), we’ve built an infrastructure to explore its capabilities and rapidly prototype new solutions. This infrastructure, which deploys LLM tools akin to ChatGPT, is not only accessible to employees across all departments for everyday tasks but also serves as a basis for new solutions. For example, our Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Portal will soon have a new LLM-based OSINT capability that will quickly deliver threat report summaries for specific IoCs.

To enhance the security of our customers’ infrastructures, we’re actively developing AI technologies tailored to our flagship corporate products and services. For several years now, the AI Analyst in Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response has been helping to reduce the workload of SOC teams by automatically filtering out false positives. Last year alone, this technology closed over 100,000 alerts without human intervention. This allows SOC experts to respond to real threats faster and devote more time to investigating complex cases and proactively hunting for threats. Another of our solutions – AI-based host risk scoring in Kaspersky SIEM (Kaspersky Unified Monitoring and Analysis platform) and Kaspersky XDR – uses ML algorithms to search for suspicious host behavior without the need to transfer data outside a company.

Another key area of Kaspersky’s development is the use of AI/ML in industrial environments. This includes Kaspersky MLAD (Machine Learning for Anomaly Detection) – a predictive analytics software solution that automatically recognizes early (hidden) signs of impending equipment failure, process disruption, human error or cyberattack in telemetry signals. By continuously training the neural network, MLAD analyzes the stream of “atomic” events from the object, structures them into patterns and identifies abnormal behavior. Another of our projects is Kaspersky Neuromorphic Platform (KNP) – a research project and software platform for AI solutions based on spiking neural networks and AltAI, the energy-efficient neuromorphic processor developed by Russian-based Motive Neuromorphic Technologies (Motive NT) in collaboration with Kaspersky.

The widespread adoption of AI technologies requires security control, which is why we’ve also established an AI security team. It offers a range of services aimed at ensuring reliable protection of AI systems and thwarting potential threats to data, business processes and AI infrastructure.

Our people

In the past, ML-based tasks were performed by departments directly involved in detecting specific threats. However, with the growing number of tasks and the increasing importance of ML technologies, we decided to hive off our expertise in AI-based systems to a separate Expertise Center: Kaspersky AI Technology Research. This resulted in the creation of three main teams that drive the use of AI at Kaspersky:

The Detection Methods Analysis Group develops ML algorithms for malware detection in collaboration with the Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) and the Threat Research Center. Their AI systems for both static and behavior-based malware detection directly contribute to the security of our users.
Technology Research, under the Future Technologies Department, specializes in: researching promising AI technologies; developing Kaspersky MLAD and KNP; developing the next-generation AltAI neuromorphic processor in collaboration with Motive NT; and providing AIST services for AI security.
The MLTech team is responsible for developing the corporate ML infrastructure for training ML models, creating content threat detection models (phishing and spam), and implementing AI technologies, including LLM-based, into our advanced corporate services and solutions, such as MDR, Kaspersky SIEM (Unified Monitoring and Analysis platform), and Kaspersky XDR.

This doesn’t mean that our AI expertise is limited to the above teams. The field of AI is currently so complex and multifaceted that it’s impossible to concentrate all the know-how in a few research groups. Other teams also make significant contributions to the Expertise Center’s work, and apply ML in many tasks: machine vision technologies in the Antidrone team; research into AI coding assistants in the CoreTech and KasperskyOS departments; APT search in GReAT; and AI legislation study in the Government Relations team.

Our research and patents

The uniqueness of our AI technologies is underscored by the dozens of patents we’ve obtained worldwide. First and foremost, these are patents for detection technologies, such as malware detection based on program behavior logs, detection of malicious servers in telemetry, fake websites, and spam with the aid of ML. But the Kaspersky portfolio covers a much wider range of tasks: technologies for improving datasets for ML, anomaly detection, and even searching for suspicious contacts of kids in parental control systems. And, of course, we are actively patenting our AI technologies for industrial systems and unique neural network approaches to processing event streams.

In addition, Kaspersky actively shares its AI expertise with the community. Some studies, such as those on monotonic ML algorithms or the application of neural networks for spam detection, are published as academic papers at leading ML conferences. Others are published on specialized portals and at information security conferences. For example, we publish research on the security of our own AI algorithms, in particular attacks on spam detection and malware detection algorithms. We study the application of neural networks for time series analysis and explore the use of neuromorphic networks in industry-relevant tasks. Our Kaspersky Neuromorphic Platform (KNP) is open-source software that will be available for use and development by the entire ML community.

The topic of secure AI development and application is of fundamental importance to us, as we need to be able to trust our algorithms and be confident in their reliability. Other topics we cover include our participation in cybersecurity challenges that simulate attacks on ML systems and the use of advanced technologies such as LLMs to detect threats in system logs and phishing links. We also talk about threats to generative AI, including from a privacy standpoint, attacks on various LLM-based systems, the use of AI by attackers, and the application of our technologies in SOCs. Sometimes we open the door and reveal our inner workings, talking about the process of training our models and even the intricacies of assessing their quality.

 

Raising awareness

Finally, the most important function of the Kaspersky AI Technology Research Center is to raise awareness among our customers and the general public about the pros and cons of AI technologies and the threats they pose. Our experts at the Expertise Center demonstrate the dangers of deepfake videos. We talk about the finer points of AI usage (for example, how ChatGPT affects the process of hiring developers) and share our experiences through webinars and roundtable discussions.

The FT Technology Research team organizes conferences on neuromorphic technologies with a separate track devoted to AI security issues, including systems based on the neuromorphic approach. Together with our partner, the Institute for System Programming of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISP RAS), we’re researching various attack vectors on neural networks in the areas of Computer Vision, LLM, and Time Series, and ways to protect them. As part of Kaspersky’s industrial partnership with ISP RAS, the team is testing samples of trusted ML frameworks.

We’re also involved in the development of educational courses, including a module on the use of AI in cybersecurity at Bauman Moscow State Technical University. Another example is our module on the safe use of AI in Kaspersky ASAP, our solution for raising employee awareness of cyberthreats. Finally, we’re contributing to the creation of a set of international standards for the use of AI. In 2023, we presented the first principles for the ethical use of AI systems in cybersecurity at the Internet Governance Forum.

 

To sum up, the main tasks of the Kaspersky AI Technology Research Center are the development of AI technologies, their safe application in cybersecurity, threat monitoring for improper or malicious AI usage, and forecasting trends. All these tasks serve a single purpose: to ensure the highest level of security for our customers.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

CISA Adds Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance Vulnerability to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (CVE-2024-8190)

Overview 

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has recently included a security flaw in Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance (CSA) in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. This newly cataloged vulnerability, identified as CVE-2024-8190, involves an OS command injection that poses a serious risk to affected systems.  

The vulnerability in question affects the Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance (CSA) version 4.6, specifically in all versions before Patch 519. It allows remote authenticated attackers with administrative privileges to execute arbitrary commands. This OS command injection flaw poses a risk as it can potentially lead to full system compromise. 

The vulnerability was assigned a CVSS score of 7.2, indicating a high severity level. Users of Ivanti CSA 4.6 must be aware of this issue and take appropriate action to mitigate the risk. 

Moreover, Cyble’s investigation revealed over 1,200 Ivanti CSA instances exposed on the internet, with a large number located in the United States. Systems using dual-homed configurations, with ETH-0 designated as an internal network, are less vulnerable to exploitation. 

Ivanti’s Response and Fixes 

Ivanti has recently released a critical patch to address this vulnerability. CVE-2024-8190 affects the Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance (CSA) version 4.6, specifically in all versions before Patch 519, allowing remote authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands. To mitigate this risk, Ivanti strongly recommends upgrading to CSA version 5.0, which includes the latest security improvements and ongoing support. 

For users who still need to transition to CSA 5.0, upgrading to CSA 4.6 Patch 519 is advised as an interim measure. However, CSA 4.6 has reached its end-of-life and will not receive future updates, making the upgrade to CSA 5.0 essential for continued security and support. 
 

Conclusion 

The addition of CVE-2024-8190 to CISA’s KEV catalog highlights the urgent need for organizations using Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance to address this vulnerability. With a known history of targeted cyber attacks on Ivanti products, organizations must apply the necessary patches and strengthen their security measures to prevent potential exploitation.  

Recommendations and Mitigations 


Move to this version for essential security updates and ongoing support. 

If an immediate upgrade to CSA 5.0 is not possible, update CSA 4.6 to Patch 519 as a temporary measure. 

Review and tighten administrative access controls to reduce the risk of exploitation. 

Increase surveillance for unusual or unauthorized activities and potential exploitation attempts. 

Develop a comprehensive patch management strategy, including regular updates and verification processes. 

Ensure critical systems are properly segmented and not directly exposed to the internet. 

The post CISA Adds Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance Vulnerability to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (CVE-2024-8190) appeared first on Cyble.

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Top Cyber Threats of the Week: Brute Force Attacks, CVE Attempts and Malware Infections

Overview 

The Cyble Global Sensor Intelligence Network, or CGSI, has been actively monitoring and capturing real-time attack data through various Honeypot sensors. Last week’s research reveals the top cyber threats of the week including multiple exploit attempts, malware intrusions, financial fraud, and brute-force attacks. Multiple CVE attempts and targeted malware cases were observed from September 4, 2024, to September 10, 2024.  

CGSI’s recent research highlights a range of vulnerabilities impacting various IoT devices and software systems. A significant issue identified is the arbitrary code execution vulnerability in SPIP’s Porte Plume plugin, tracked as CVE-2024-7954. This flaw affects versions before 4.30-alpha2, 4.2.13, and 4.1.16, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via specially crafted HTTP requests. Users are advised to upgrade to the latest patched versions to mitigate this risk. 

Another critical vulnerability is CVE-2024-4577, which involves PHP CGI configurations. This flaw permits attackers to execute arbitrary commands through malicious URL parameters. GeoServer versions prior to 2.23.6, 2.24.4, and 2.25.2 are affected by CVE-2024-36401, a remote code execution vulnerability due to unsafe XPath evaluation of OGC request parameters. Users should either apply the available patches or remove the vulnerable gt-complex library to secure their systems. 

CVE-2024-32113, a path traversal vulnerability in Apache OFBiz affecting versions before 18.12.13, was also a highlight of this week’s research. This flaw allows unauthorized access to restricted directories, making it essential for users to upgrade to version 18.12.13 to close this security gap. In SolarWinds Web Help Desk, CVE-2024-28987 exposes a hardcoded credential vulnerability that enables remote attackers to gain internal access and manipulate data.  

Brute Force Attacks and Malware Infections 

Brute-force attacks targeting IT automation software and databases have surged. These attacks are characterized by relentless attempts to decipher passwords and gain unauthorized access. They are particularly concerning due to their focus on critical infrastructure, which can lead to substantial disruptions and data breaches.  

These attacks have been significant, involving systematic attempts to guess passwords for unauthorized access. Notable volumes of these attacks have been observed, particularly against IT automation software and databases. Brute-force attacks consist of an attacker submitting many passwords or passphrases with the hope of eventually guessing a combination correctly.  

The attacker employs a systematic trial-and-error approach to test every possible password and passphrase until the correct one is discovered. This brute force attack method involves iteratively guessing login credentials or encryption keys and potentially accessing hidden web pages. Hackers methodically work through all possible combinations in hopes of success. Last week, Cyble recorded numerous such attacks, and the statistics related to specific source IPs are illustrated below (Figure 1). 

Figure 1 – Statistics of recent brute force attacks 

The figure below highlights the most frequently targeted usernames and passwords in brute-force attacks. The analysis shows that these attacks predominantly affect IT automation software and servers, such as “3comcso,” “elasticsearch,” and “hadoop,” as well as databases like “mysql” and “Postgres.” The most commonly used username/password combinations include “root,” “admin,” “password,” and “123456.”  

Figure 2 – Most used usernames and passwords 

Several case studies highlight ongoing threats in terms of malware attacks. The CoinMiner Linux Trojan targets Linux systems to use their resources for cryptocurrency mining, leading to significant performance degradation.  

The Linux Mirai malware attack utilizes the Mirai Botnet to exploit IoT devices and Linux servers for widespread network assaults. The Mirai Botnet is well-known for targeting these devices, converting them into remotely controlled bots that participate in extensive network attacks. 

Similarly, the Linux IRCBot attack leverages IRC connections to take control of compromised systems, frequently incorporating them into a botnet. These IRC connections serve as backdoors, enabling attackers to execute a range of actions on the compromised systems. Many of these systems are subsequently used as part of a botnet controlled through IRC. 

The Rise of Phishing Emails and Other Scams 

Phishing email attacks have been notably prevalent, with several new types of scams emerging recently, leveraging phishing and social engineering. One prevalent type of fraud is the Delivery Scam, where scammers impersonate courier officials to deceive victims into believing they have a package awaiting delivery. Victims are instructed to send sensitive personal details to a specified email address to receive the supposed delivery. These fraudulent emails often come from typo-squatted domains mimicking legitimate courier services.  

Another common phishing attack vector is the Project Funding Scam. In this scam, fraudsters promise victims a large sum of money for a project, tricking them into providing sensitive financial information under the pretense of transferring funds. An example seen in this scam involved an email purporting to be from the “World Bank Group”. 

The Relief Fund Scam is also prevalent. Scammers promise victims a substantial amount of money in exchange for a small upfront payment. The scam often masquerades as an email from a reputable organization, such as the “United Nations Compensation Committee Office,” using similar-looking email addresses.  

In 2024, QR code phishing attacks have surged, reflecting a growing trend among cybercriminals to exploit QR codes for malicious purposes. The rise in QR code phishing can be attributed to several factors.  

The widespread adoption of QR codes, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, has made them a convenient target for cybercriminals. Users are now more accustomed to scanning QR codes, which creates a false sense of security. QR codes also obscure the destination URL, making it difficult for users to verify the legitimacy of the site they are directed to. 

Previously, Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) identified a campaign targeting individuals in China. This campaign used Microsoft Word documents containing QR codes, which were distributed via spam email attachments and pretended to be from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China. The documents falsely offered labor subsidies and directed users to scan QR codes for authentication. These QR codes led to phishing sites designed to collect financial information, including credit card details and passwords. 

The phishing sites associated with this campaign used domains generated by a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) and were linked to a series of subdomains and IP addresses. The phishing sites prompted users to enter personal and financial information under the guise of claiming labor subsidies, ultimately aiming to facilitate unauthorized transactions. 

Conclusion 

The data gathered by the Cyble Global Sensor Intelligence (CGSI) network highlights a surge in cyber threats, including intensified brute-force attacks, critical vulnerabilities, and phishing scams. Key issues include vulnerabilities in SPIP’s Porte Plume plugin and PHP configurations, alongside malware attacks like CoinMiner and Mirai Botnet. Phishing scams, including QR code-based attacks, are increasingly targeting users.  

To mitigate these threats, organizations should promptly address vulnerabilities, implement strong passwords, block malicious IPs, and stay vigilant against phishing tactics. Regular updates and proactive security measures are crucial for protecting systems and data. 

Mitigations and Recommendations  


Ensure that your security systems block the hashes, URLs, and email addresses provided in the IoC list attachment. 

Address all listed vulnerabilities promptly and maintain vigilance by regularly monitoring top Suricata alerts within your internal networks. 

Consistently review the real-time attack table for any malicious ASNs and IP addresses. 

Implement measures to block IP addresses associated with brute-force attacks and secure the specific ports outlined in the IoC table. 

Immediately update default usernames and passwords to defend against brute-force attacks and establish a policy for regular password changes. 

Configure servers with complex, hard-to-guess passwords to enhance security. 

The post Top Cyber Threats of the Week: Brute Force Attacks, CVE Attempts and Malware Infections appeared first on Cyble.

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GitLab Community and Enterprise Editions Receive New Updates to Mitigate Severe Security Risks 

GitLab has rolled out essential patch updates for both its Community Edition (CE) and Enterprise Edition (EE), targeting multiple security vulnerabilities and system bugs. These critical updates are crucial for addressing high-severity issues that could jeopardize the security and functionality of GitLab environments.  

The new releases—versions 17.3.2, 17.2.5, and 17.1.7—introduce a range of fixes and improvements designed to counteract various vulnerabilities. Users operating on the affected versions are urged to promptly upgrade their GitLab instances to protect against these vulnerabilities.  

Cyble’s latest security advisory provides an in-depth examination of recent critical patches released by various vendors, with a particular focus on vulnerabilities addressed in GitLab. As a comprehensive DevOps platform, GitLab integrates the entire software development lifecycle into a single application, streamlining collaboration, code management, and deployment.  

Detailed Vulnerability Analysis 

The vulnerabilities identified in GitLab vary widely in severity, with CVSS base scores ranging from 3.1 to 9.9. These vulnerabilities encompass a range of critical issues, from unauthorized access to sensitive information to potential system compromises. Understanding and addressing these vulnerabilities is crucial for maintaining the security and integrity of GitLab installations. The following sections detail each vulnerability, including its severity, affected versions, and recommended remediation steps. 

Pipeline Execution as Arbitrary User (CVE-2024-6678) 

CVE-2024-6678, which carries a CVSS score of 9.9, represents a critical vulnerability affecting GitLab Community Edition (CE) and Enterprise Edition (EE) versions from 8.14 up to, but not including, 17.1.7, 17.2 up to 17.2.5, and 17.3 up to 17.3.2. This flaw allows attackers to trigger a pipeline as an arbitrary user under specific conditions. The impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it can lead to unauthorized actions within the GitLab environment. Cyble ODIN’s investigation has uncovered 89,706 internet-exposed GitLab instances, with a significant number located in China, highlighting the urgency of addressing this issue. 

Command Injection (CVE-2024-8640) 

CVE-2024-8640 is a high-severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 8.5, affecting GitLab EE versions from 16.11 up to 17.1.7, 17.2 up to 17.2.5, and 17.3 up to 17.3.2. This issue allows for command injection into a connected Cube server due to incomplete input filtering. The potential consequences include unauthorized command execution, which could compromise the integrity and security of the affected systems. 

Server-Side Request Forgery (CVE-2024-8635) 

CVE-2024-8635, with a CVSS score of 7.7, affects GitLab EE versions from 16.8 up to 17.1.7, 17.2 up to 17.2.5, and 17.3 up to 17.3.2. This vulnerability enables server-side request forgery, allowing attackers to make requests to internal resources using a custom Maven Dependency Proxy URL. This flaw could potentially lead to unauthorized access to internal systems, increasing the risk of data exposure or other security breaches. 

Denial of Service (CVE-2024-8124) 

CVE-2024-8124, rated 7.5 on the CVSS scale, impacts GitLab CE/EE versions from 16.4 to 17.1.7, 17.2 to 17.2.5, and 17.3 to 17.3.2. This vulnerability could open the door for a denial of service attack by sending a large ‘glm_source’ parameter without requiring user interaction. The result can be a disruption of service availability, affecting users’ ability to access or utilize GitLab functionalities effectively. 

Improper Session Handling (CVE-2024-8641) 

With a CVSS score of 6.7, CVE-2024-8641 affects GitLab CE/EE versions from 13.7 to 17.1.7, 17.2 to 17.2.5, and 17.3 to 17.3.2. This vulnerability involves improper session handling, allowing an attacker with access to a victim’s CI_JOB_TOKEN to obtain the victim’s GitLab session token. There’s a high chance that this could potentially lead to unauthorized access to sensitive areas within the GitLab environment. 

Security Bypass (CVE-2024-8311) 

CVE-2024-8311, with a CVSS score of 6.5, is present in GitLab EE versions from 17.2 up to 17.2.5 and 17.3 up to 17.3.2. This flaw allows authenticated users to bypass pipeline execution policies by including a CI/CD template, potentially leading to unauthorized modifications or access within the GitLab pipeline. 

Information Disclosure (CVE-2024-4660) 

CVE-2024-4660, also rated 6.5 on the CVSS scale, affects GitLab EE versions from 11.2 up to 17.1.7, 17.2 up to 17.2.5, and 17.3 up to 17.3.2. This vulnerability permits guests to read the source code of private projects through group templates, leading to unauthorized information disclosure and potential security risks. 

Several other vulnerabilities, including CVE-2024-4283 and CVE-2024-4612, present medium-severity risks, such as open redirects and improper input validation. If not promptly addressed, these issues can lead to account takeovers, exposure of sensitive data, or unauthorized access.  

Each of these vulnerabilities has been assigned a CVSS score reflecting its impact and severity, and organizations are urged to apply relevant patches and updates. 

Conclusion 

Given GitLab’s critical role in many organizations’ software development processes, the recent updates addressing multiple vulnerabilities are of paramount importance. These vulnerabilities, ranging from unauthorized access and sensitive data exposure to potential denial of service attacks, could significantly impact an organization’s security and operational integrity. Organizations must apply the latest patches and updates to reduce any potential impact of these risks being exploited and improve their overall security posture. 

Recommendations and Mitigations 


Organizations are strongly advised to immediately upgrade to the latest GitLab versions where these vulnerabilities have been addressed. 

Properly configuring permissions and access levels should be a priority for firms that want to safeguard sensitive information. 

Regular monitoring of logs and auditing access can help detect unusual activities and potential exploitation attempts. 

Training users to recognize phishing attempts and secure their accounts will further mitigate risks associated with social engineering attacks. 

Implementing robust security policies, including multi-factor authentication (MFA) and regular security assessments, is crucial. 

Maintaining up-to-date backups and testing recovery procedures will ensure timely and rapid restoration in the aftermath of a security incident. 

It is recommended that a comprehensive patch management strategy be developed that includes inventory management, patch assessment, testing, deployment, and verification. 

Proper network segmentation to avoid exposure of critical assets over the Internet and maintaining an up-to-date inventory of all internal and external assets will further enhance organizational security. 

The post GitLab Community and Enterprise Editions Receive New Updates to Mitigate Severe Security Risks  appeared first on Cyble.

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CosmicBeetle joins the ranks of RansomHub affiliates – Week in security with Tony Anscombe

ESET research also finds that CosmicBeetle attempts to exploit the notoriety of the LockBit ransomware gang to advance its own ends

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Stealthy Fileless Attack Targets Attendees of Upcoming US-Taiwan Defense Industry Event

Key Takeaways


Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) identified a campaign targeting individuals connected to the upcoming US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, as indicated by the lure document uncovered during the investigation.

The campaign involves a ZIP archive containing an LNK file that mimics a legitimate PDF registration form for deception.

When the LNK file is opened, it executes commands to drop a lure PDF and an executable in the startup folder, establishing persistence.

Upon system reboot, the executable downloads additional content and executes it directly in memory, effectively evading detection by the security products.

The first-stage loader triggers a second-stage loader, which downloads, decodes, and compiles C# code in memory, avoiding the creation of traceable files on disk.

Once the compiled code is executed, the malware exfiltrates sensitive data back to the attacker’s server via web requests designed to blend in with normal traffic, making detection more difficult.

Overview

The initial infection vector of this campaign remains unclear; however, based on the lure document analyzed, there are indications that the attack may have been delivered to users via spam emails. The attack commences with a suspicious archive file containing an LNK file disguised as a PDF document. This deception is designed to trick users into executing the malicious LNK file, which in turn triggers a series of covert actions in the background.

Upon execution, the LNK file extracts two components: a base64-encoded executable and the actual lure PDF. The executable is protected using .NET’s Confuser, an obfuscation tool, to evade detection and is placed in the startup folder to ensure persistence on the compromised system. Once the executable runs, it retrieves additional malicious content, specifically a DLL file, from a remote server. This DLL file is Encrypted using XOR operation to further obscure its purpose.

The executable employs .NET’s “Assembly.Load” function to load the decrypted DLL directly into memory, enabling it to bypass traditional security mechanisms that scan files written to disk. After the DLL is loaded, it downloads encrypted C# code from the TA-controlled server, compiles it on the victim’s machine, and then executes it entirely in memory.

During our testing of this malware, we were unable to capture the final payload. However, analysis of the loader’s code suggests that the payload’s ultimate purpose is to exfiltrate sensitive data from the victim’s machine to conduct further malicious activities. Based on the lure document used in this attack, it is likely that the TA behind this campaign is specifically targeting individuals associated with the upcoming US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference.

The figure below shows the infection chain.

Technical Analysis

CRIL uncovered a campaign targeting users by posing as registration forms for the upcoming Conference and distributed malicious ZIP files under the name “registration_form.pdf.zip”. The ZIP file contains an LNK file disguised as a PDF. When extracted, the archive presents a file named “registration_form.pdf,” but this is actually an LNK file with a dual extension (.pdf.lnk), misleading the user into thinking it is a legitimate PDF document. The malicious LNK file contains an embedded executable and a lure PDF, both encoded in base64 format, further concealing the malicious content, as shown in Figure 2.

When the user opens the LNK file, it triggers several background commands. First, the LNK file searches the base64 embedded content using the “findstr” command and saving them as “1.txt” and “2.txt,” respectively. Next, the “certutil” utility decodes these files, storing the lure PDF as ” registration_form.pdf ” in the Temp directory and the executable as “update.exe” in the “%AppData%RoamingMicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartup” folder, ensuring persistence. Finally, the registration_form.pdf is opened with the system’s default PDF viewer. The figure below shows the content of the malicious LNK file.

Lure Document:

The lure document used in this attack suggests that the TA behind the campaign is likely targeting individuals connected to the upcoming US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, which is scheduled to take place in the United States from September 22nd to September 24th, 2024.

The potential targets are expected to include key participants such as defense officials, industry executives, government representatives, and other stakeholders involved in or attending the event. The timing and focus of the campaign suggest that the TA aims to exploit the significance of the conference, potentially for gathering sensitive information to conduct further malicious activities. This strategic targeting underscores the sophisticated nature of the campaign and its alignment with geopolitical interests. The figure below shows the Lure document.

First Stage Loader: updater.exe

The “Updater.exe” file functions as a loader and is protected using the .NET “Confuser protector.” It is placed in the Startup folder, ensuring it executes each time the user logs into the system. Upon execution, the file first verifies if it is running from the “Startup” directory. If it is, the execution proceeds; otherwise, it terminates without further action. When the file runs, it sends a POST request to a compromised site controlled by the TA, transmitting the victim’s machine.

Next, using “WebClient”, it downloads string content from “hxxp://tdea.com.tw/asset/uploads/files/68679813[.]txt” and removes the first character to retrieve the correct base64-encoded content. This reveals the


machine name: “MSEDGEWIN10″

URL for the 2nd stage loader: “hxxp://tdea.com.tw/asset/uploads/files/68679815[.]txt

The first-stage loader downloads a base64-encoded data stream from the above URL, which is first decoded and then further processed by applying an XOR operation using a hardcoded key with a decimal value of 16. This operation results in the extraction of a DLL file. The below shows the decryption loop used for getting the DLL file.

The extracted DLL is then dynamically loaded and executed using the .NET “Assembly.Load” function, allowing the TA to invoke malicious functionality embedded within the DLL. The below figure shows how the “Assembly.Load” function is used to load the decrypted DLL and call a specific method named “MyEntry” with in a class named “ConsoleApp.MyClass

Second Stage Loader

The “.NET Assembly.Load” function is used to load the second-stage loader, which functions similarly to the initial stage. This DLL loader retrieves additional base64-encoded content from the TA’s controlled server. Once the content is downloaded, it is decoded using base64 and then processed with an XOR operation using a hardcoded key of 48 in decimal, as shown below.

Although the URL “hxxp://tdea.com.tw/asset/uploads/files/68679811[.]txt” currently doesn’t contain any data, code analysis indicates that the decoded content is likely XML data containing C# code and assembly references (DLLs) which utilizes “Compile After Delivery” technique to compile the source code during runtime.

In-memory Execution

The downloaded C# code is compiled in memory using specific compiler parameters such as “GenerateExecutable = false” and “GenerateInMemory = true”. These parameters, along with references to core assemblies like “System.dll”, “System.Data.dll”, and “System.Management.dll”. The “System.Management.dll” is specifically used to interact with Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), allowing the code to query system properties and interact with system components through WMI queries. This suggests that the TA may use WMI queries to gather system information from the victim.  

Additional DLLs may also be included as reference assemblies. The compiled code is executed directly in memory, bypassing the disk entirely, which complicates detection by conventional security tools.

This method is highly effective for evasion. It allows malware or APT groups to dynamically generate and execute payloads at runtime, making detection and mitigation efforts significantly more challenging for defenders. The figure below shows a code snippet responsible for compiling the downloaded C# code and executing it in memory.

Data Exfiltration

After executing the compiled code, the resulting data is sent back to the TA’s server using a web request. A “WebClient” object is utilized to upload the data, where the request’s “ContentType” is set to “application/x-www-form-urlencoded” to simulate standard form data submission, and the “UserAgent” header is modified to mimic a web browser. The “UploadString” method is used to send a POST request to the TA’s specified URL, along with parameters such as a randomly generated filename, a command flag, and the encoded content being transmitted.

Network Communication:

The TA leverages a compromised website to host malicious content and frequently retrieves files stored within an exposed open directory. Moreover, the TA employs CKFinder, a PHP-based file management framework, to upload and manage files sent from the victim machines. This framework allows the TA to store exfiltrated data or additional malicious payloads on the server. The image below illustrates the structure of the open directory on the compromised site, highlighting the ease with which the TA can access and manipulate stored files.

Threat Attribution

Chinese threat actors have a well-documented history of targeting Taiwan, particularly around significant political events. For instance, during the period leading up to Taiwan’s presidential election earlier in 2024, there was a marked increase in cyberattacks within the 24 hours preceding the election, as reported by Trellix. This surge underscores China’s ongoing efforts in cyber espionage aimed at Taiwan’s political and military sectors. Despite this pattern, the specific TA behind the current campaign remains unidentified, and we have not been able to link these tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to any known threat actor or advanced persistent threat (APT) group at this time.

Conclusion

This sophisticated attack employs social engineering and advanced in-memory execution techniques to avoid detection. By disguising the LNK file as a legitimate conference registration PDF and executing payloads dynamically in memory, the TAs can conduct malicious activities to steal sensitive information without leaving traces on the disk. Given the timing and context of the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, this campaign is likely intended to conduct malicious operations targeting valuable information related to defense collaborations.

Our Recommendations


Deploy advanced email filtering solutions to block phishing emails and suspicious attachments before they reach the end users. Anti-phishing solutions that use machine learning or behavior analysis can also identify and block malicious campaigns at an early stage.

Implement security solutions with advanced threat detection that can monitor in-memory execution of code or PowerShell commands. Tools like EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) should be used to detect unusual behavior, such as programs compiling and running C# code in memory.

Ensure that users have the least privileges required for their roles, reducing the risk of malware being able to execute in privileged areas.

Application whitelisting or blocking untrusted applications from executing in certain directories can also minimize the risk.

Monitor outbound network traffic for signs of exfiltration and communication with command-and-control (C2) servers, especially encrypted and base64-encoded traffic. Use firewalls, IDS/IPS (Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems), and network analysis tools to detect suspicious web traffic patterns.

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques

Tactic
Technique
Procedure

Initial Access (TA0001)
Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001)
The ZIP archive containing the LNK file may be delivered via phishing or spam emails

Persistence (TA0003)
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001)
update.exe added into the Startup folder

Execution (TA0002)
User Execution: Malicious File  (T1204.002)
Malicious LNK file executed by the user after extracted from archive file

  Defence Evasion (TA0005)
Obfuscated Files or Information: LNK Icon Smuggling (T1027.012)
The LNK file uses a PDF file icon, leveraging the “IconEnviromentDataBlock” to appear as a harmless PDF document.

Defence Evasion (TA0005)
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1140)  
Certutil is used to decode base64 content.

Defence Evasion (TA0005)
Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery (T1027.004)
CSharp code is compiled and executed in memory

Command and Control (TA0011)
Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding (T1132.002)  
Encrypted file is downloaded from TA controlled server.

Exfiltration (TA0010)
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003)  
Exfiltrated data is transmitted using standard protocol.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Indicator
Indicator Type
Comments

6b1af6be189e31168b8f4eff84cd475eb5d0cbd08e646760fb352165a30cb269
SHA-256
registration_form.pdf.zip

4989882339d745692eabe0a375d8cecd6e7e3af534cd1173d94867b8d069cd7f
SHA-256
registration_form.pdf.lnk

0e07b96c508dfc0e11f119071cca4ec628dae635771532dae7f034ed369591d7
SHA-256
updater.exe

df92e2c56f53c9139da70c5a813b6512df616abd56dc10dc80a625c4512cb7f2
SHA-256
updater.exe

e0174968064b45d1b0c255bec351de94bb59852cb7f2e6ac694debbac59acb7a
SHA-256
d.dll

5aaa5a7ef2eaa13e6e4274ccdb3c80251c868043fa51c2ca1e5b556a65d5166c              
SHA-256
68679815.txt

531db819d928243bda43997165da1fa3ebda3412e7d9928cb6bd2a8c898a85ae                       
SHA-256
68679813.txt

hxxp://tdea.com.tw/asset/uploads/files/68679813[.]txt
URL
URL used to get the DLL link

hxxp://tdea.com.tw/asset/uploads/files/68679815[.]txt
URL
URL used to get the DLL file

hxxp://tdea[.]com[.]tw/ckeditor/ckfinder/core/connector/php/connector[.]php?command=SaveFile&type=Files&currentFolder=%2F&langCode=en&hash=f92a86fd96382c5a

URL
POST request to send exfiltrated data

hxxp://tdea.com.tw/asset/uploads/files/68679811[.]txt
URL
URL used to get the CSharp (C#) code

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