Under lock and key: Safeguarding business data with encryption
As the attack surface expands and the threat landscape grows more complex, it’s time to consider whether your data protection strategy is fit for purpose
WeLiveSecurity – Read More
As the attack surface expands and the threat landscape grows more complex, it’s time to consider whether your data protection strategy is fit for purpose
WeLiveSecurity – Read More
The internet is now a second home for most kids and teens. Many get their first device in elementary or middle school, while modern education basically runs on technology. Cybercriminals know this, and they can trick kids into revealing personal details, send harmful links, lure them into unsafe chats, or even drain their parents’ bank accounts.
That’s why cybersecurity needs to become a part of everyday life at home. Our guide to reducing your kids’ digital footprint will give you a firm grasp of the risks, and create a safe online environment — while avoiding blanket bans or grudging grievances.
First, let’s identify the digital “hot spots” where your attention as a parent matters most:
The best way to protect your kids isn’t through strict controls — it’s through honest conversation. Sure, you can block websites, introduce a phone curfew, and hover over your child every time they use Gemini. But this risks losing their trust: you could end up looking like a villain standing in the way of their freedom. Heavy-handed restrictions always invite attempts to get around them. It’s far better to build understanding, and explaining why the rules exist in the first place.
Here are some practical steps to help your child stay out of trouble and keep their digital footprint under control.
For Gen Z and Gen Alpha, sharing life online is second nature. But oversharing — being too open online — often opens the door to hacking and even offline risks.
Remind your child never to share their last name, date of birth, school name, or city when signing up for services. Explain the risk: attackers could use that data to find them and build false trust — for example, greeting them by name and posing as a classmate’s relative.
Turn off geolocation in posts and stories by default. If a post needs a location, only publish it after your child has left that place.
Also be careful with places your child visits regularly, and avoid sharing travel plans. The “gold standard” is to teach your child to remove geotags from photos they upload. Why this matters — and how to do it — we covered in our post Metadata: Uncovering what’s hidden inside.
Another taboo is sharing personal info — and in some cases even school uniforms. If the school has a distinctive look, photos or videos of clothing (whether sports or regular) can still give away too much.
Reinforce the first rule of the internet: what goes online, stays online. Everything they post can have consequences — from damaged reputations to data in scammers’ hands. If your child simply wants to share their experiences, suggest starting a blog. We cover how to do this safely here: How to help your kid become a blogger without ever worrying about their safety.
You probably know what phishing is — but your child may not. Explain that any links they get sent need scanning by a reliable anti-phishing tool for smartphones and computers.
Too-good-to-be-true offers, surprise prizes, and other “incredible deals” should always raise suspicion — and be shown to you before following the link. We’ve covered phishing schemes in detail, for example, in our post How scammers attack young gamers; use the examples there to show your child what can happen if links aren’t checked.
Caught up in a multiplayer game with voice chat, teens may let their tongues run wild. The gaming world has become a prime space for grooming — when adults build trust with teens for harmful purposes. So set a clear boundary with your child: voice chat should stick to gameplay only. If someone tries to steer things into personal topics, it’s safer to end the conversation — and if they persist, block them.
Explain that using public Wi-Fi networks is inherently unsafe: attackers can easily intercept logins, passwords, messages, and other sensitive data. Whenever possible, it’s best to stick to mobile data. If connecting to unsecured Wi-Fi is the only way to stay online, protect the connection with a trusted VPN service. That way your child’s data won’t leak.
Android smartphones are tempting targets for scammers of all stripes. Although malicious apps exist for iPhones too, it’s still easier to sneak onto Android. Teach your child that malicious files can take many forms. They may arrive through messengers or email disguised as photos or documents — even forwarded “homework assignments” — and can also hide behind links in their favorite Discord channels. By default, all attachments should be treated with caution and scanned automatically with a reliable antivirus.
Unsupervised chatbot use isn’t just an ethical or psychological issue — it’s a security risk. Recently, Google indexed tens of thousands of ChatGPT conversations, making them accessible internet-wide.
Explain to your child not to treat AI as a best friend for pouring out their soul. AI tools often collect large amounts of personal data — everything your child types, asks, or uploads in the chat. Make it clear they also shouldn’t share real names, school information, photos, or private details with AI.
And emphasize that chatbots are tools and helpers — not “wizards” that can think for them. Explain that AI can’t think, so any “facts” offered must be double-checked.
Start by enabling parental controls on all devices your child uses: smartphones, tablets, computers — even smart TVs. Most operating systems offer built-in features to block explicit websites, restrict certain apps, and filter search results.
On streaming platforms, enable “Restricted” or “Kids” mode to prevent access to adult content. For more fine-tuned control, your best option is Kaspersky Safe Kids, which filters content in real time, allows you to set screen-time limits, and monitors installed apps. It detects and blocks unwanted content that standard filters might miss — especially in browsers — and even shows your child’s physical location and phone battery level.
The most effective filter isn’t a program — it’s you. Make time to watch shows, surf the web, and play games together with your child. This will help you understand what’s going on in their life and create a space to discuss values, feelings, and real-life situations.
To further minimize your child’s digital footprint and reduce the risks of cyberattacks and cyberbullying, use:
For more advice on keeping your kids safe online, explore our Digital Schoolbag: A Parent’s Guide for the School Year.
Further reading on threats targeting children and teens online:
Kaspersky official blog – Read More

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter.
This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
Not with a bang but a whimper. – T.S. Eliot
So this is how Summer Camp 2025 ends, not with a bang but a whimper. We’ve put the summer behind us and are moving on to the next phase of the year, where we all put our noses down and grind from here to the holiday season. Happy Grind Season 2025.
As you know, threat research never takes a day off, but I’m going to step in and remind you all to look at your calendars. Decide, here and now, to take some time before that holiday season so that you can take care of your mental health, because mental health is health.
This is doubly important if you lead a team of people. Take a minute and make sure that they are going to do the same. Ensure your entire team is taking care of themselves. In the end, you will all be better for it.
Since we are on the subject of mental health, I don’t know if anyone else has read this paper (Psychopathia Machinalis: A Nosological Framework for Understanding Pathologies in Advanced Artificial Intelligence), but I found it truly fascinating. It’s one of the things we, as security practitioners, need to be cognizant of as we go forward with our AI tooling and efforts to protect against AI threats.
“As artificial intelligence (AI) systems attain greater autonomy and complex environmental interactions, they begin to exhibit behavioral anomalies that, by analogy, resemble psychopathologies observed in humans.”
The behavior of an evolving AI, and the psychosis it could present, is a touch-point to the long-standing problematic internal employee. This creates an interesting dynamic for defense and strategies within the evolving internal landscape.
I think understanding this presented framework can go a long way in identifying the types of behaviors that lead to malicious activity — not unlike understanding employee behavior. Stay ahead of the curve and prepare for not only a hallucinated package from an internal AI tool but perhaps a revelation that leads to new and interesting malicious behaviors.
In the latest episode of The Talos Threat Perspective, we explore three vulnerabilities that Talos researchers uncovered (and helped to fix) this year which highlight how attackers are pushing past the boundaries defenders rely on. One lived in the security chip within Dell laptops’ firmware, another in Microsoft Office for macOS permissions and the third in small office/home routers.
These aren’t just isolated issues. The Dell vulnerability showed that even a clean Windows reinstall isn’t always enough to kick out an attacker. The Office for macOS issue demonstrated how adversaries can “borrow” sensitive permissions like microphone access from trusted apps. And compromised routers allowed attackers to blend in with legitimate ISP traffic, making malicious connections hard to spot. Each case reveals current attacker creativity levels.
Take a closer look at the research:
TransUnion says hackers stole 4.4 million customers’ personal information
TransUnion is one of the largest credit reporting agencies in the United States, and stores the financial data of more than 260 million Americans. They confirmed that the stolen PII includes customers’ names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers. (TechCrunch)
Google warns that mass data theft hitting Salesloft AI agent has grown bigger
Google is advising users of the Salesloft Drift AI chat agent to consider all security tokens connected to the platform compromised following the discovery that unknown attackers used some of the credentials to access email from Google Workspace accounts. (Ars Technica)
High-severity vulnerability in Passwordstate credential manager
Passwordstate is urging companies to promptly install an update fixing a high-severity vulnerability that hackers can exploit to gain administrative access to their vaults. (Ars Technica)
JSON config file leaks Azure ActiveDirectory credentials
A publicly accessible configuration file for ASP.NET Core applications has been leaking credentials for Azure ActiveDirectory (AD), potentially allowing cyberattackers to authenticate directly via Microsoft’s OAuth 2.0 endpoints and infiltrate Azure cloud environments. (Dark Reading)
WhatsApp zero-day exploited in attacks targeting Apple users
Tracked as CVE-2025-55177 (CVSS score of 5.4), an attacker could have exploited the issue to trigger the processing of content from arbitrary URLs, on the victims’ devices, WhatsApp’s advisory reads. (SecurityWeek)
Cisco: 10 years protecting Black Hat
Cisco works with other official providers to bring the hardware, software and engineers to build and secure the Black Hat USA network: Arista, Corelight, Lumen, and Palo Alto Networks.
Tales from the Black Hat NOC
How do you build and defend a network where attacks are not just expected, but a part of the curriculum? Hazel sits down with Jessica Oppenheimer to learn more.
Static Tundra exposed
A Russian state-sponsored group, Static Tundra, is exploiting an old Cisco IOS vulnerability to compromise unpatched network devices worldwide.
SHA 256: 41f14d86bcaf8e949160ee2731802523e0c76fea87adf00ee7fe9567c3cec610
MD5: 85bbddc502f7b10871621fd460243fbc
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/41f14d86bcaf8e949160ee2731802523e0c76fea87adf00ee7fe9567c3cec610/details
Typical Filename: N/A
Claimed Product: Self-extracting archive
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Bitmin-9847045-0
SHA 256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507
Typical Filename: VID001.exe
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201
SHA 256: c67b03c0a91eaefffd2f2c79b5c26a2648b8d3c19a22cadf35453455ff08ead0
MD5: 8c69830a50fb85d8a794fa46643493b2
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c67b03c0a91eaefffd2f2c79b5c26a2648b8d3c19a22cadf35453455ff08ead0
Typical Filename: AAct.exe
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: PUA.Win.Dropper.Generic::1201
SHA 256: 186aa2c281ca7bb699ce0b48240b7559a9ac5b0ba260fb78b81ec53249548f62
MD5: bfc168a01a2b0f3cd11bf4bccd5e84a1
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/186aa2c281ca7bb699ce0b48240b7559a9ac5b0ba260fb78b81ec53249548f62
Typical Filename: PDFSkills_Updater.exe
Claimed Product: PDF Skills
Detection Name: Win64.Application.Agent.W2MG0A
SHA 256: 83748e8d6f6765881f81c36efacad93c20f3296be3ff4a56f48c6aa2dcd3ac08
MD5: 906282640ae3088481d19561c55025e4
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/83748e8d6f6765881f81c36efacad93c20f3296be3ff4a56f48c6aa2dcd3ac08
Typical Filename: AAct_x64.exe
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: PUA.Win.Tool.Winactivator::1201
Cisco Talos Blog – Read More
The flaws and vulnerabilities of cellular networks are regularly exploited to attack subscribers. Malicious actors use devices with catchy names like IMSI Catcher (Stingray) or SMS blaster to track people’s movements and send them spam and malware. These attacks were easiest to carry out on 2G networks, becoming more difficult on 3G and 4G networks through the introduction of security features. But even 4G networks had implementation flaws that made it possible to track subscriber movements and cause other information leaks. Can we breathe a sigh of relief when we upgrade to 5G? Unfortunately not…
Many practical attacks, such as the aforementioned SMS blaster, rely on a downgrade: forcing the victim’s smartphone to switch to an older communication standard. Legacy standards allow attackers more leeway — from discovering the subscriber’s unique identifier (IMSI), to sending fake text messages under the guise of real companies. A downgrade typically uses a device that jams the signal of the legitimate carrier’s base station, and broadcasts its own. However, this method can be detected by the carrier, and it will become less effective in the future as smartphones increasingly incorporate built-in protection against these attacks, which prevents the switch to 2G and sometimes even 3G networks.
Researchers at Singapore University of Technology and Design have demonstrated a SNI5GECT attack, which works on the latest 5G networks without requiring easy-to-detect actions like jamming legitimate base station signals. An attacker within a 20-meter radius of the victim can make the target device’s modem reboot and then force-switch it to a 4G network, where the subscriber is easier to identify and track. So how does this attack work?
Before a device and a 5G base station connect to each other, they exchange some information — and the initial stages of this process aren’t encrypted. Once they establish a secure, encrypted connection, the base station and the smartphone exchange handshakes, but coordinate the session parameters in a plain, unencrypted format. The attacker’s device monitors this process and selects the precise moment to inject its own information block before the legitimate base station does. As a result, the victim’s modem processes malicious data. Depending on the modem and the contents of the data packet, this either causes the modem to switch to a 4G network and refuse to reconnect to said 5G base station, or to crash and reboot. The latter is only good for temporarily disconnecting the victim, while the former brings all known 4G-based surveillance attacks into play.
The attack was demonstrated on the OnePlus Nord CE 2, Samsung Galaxy S22, Google Pixel 7, and Huawei P40 Pro smartphones. These devices use completely different cellular modems (MediaTek, Qualcomm, Samsung, Huawei, respectively), but the problem lies in the characteristics of the standard itself — not in the particular smartphones. The differences are subtle: some modems can be rebooted while others can’t; on some modems, inserting a malicious packet has a 50% success rate, while on others it’s 90%.
In its current form, the attack is unlikely to become widespread since it has two major limitations. First, the distance between the attacker and the victim can’t be over 20 meters under ideal conditions — even less in a real urban environment. Second, if the smartphone and the 5G base station have already established a connection, the attack cannot proceed. The attacker has to wait for a moment when the victim’s movement or changes in the radio environment require the smartphone to re-register with the base station. This happens regularly, but not every minute, so the attacker has to literally shadow the victim.
Still, such conditions may exist in certain situations, like when targeting people attending a specific meeting, or in an airport business lounge, or similar scenarios. The attacker would also need to combine SNI5GECT with legacy 4G/3G/2G attacks to achieve any practical results, which means making some radio noise.
SNI5GECT plays a significant role as a stepping stone toward more complex and dangerous future attacks. As 5G becomes more popular and older generations of connectivity are phased out, researchers will increasingly work with the new radio protocol, and apply their findings to the next stages of the mobile arms race.
Currently, there is no defense against 5G attacks. Disabling 5G for protection is pointless, as the smartphone just switches to a 4G network, which is exactly what hypothetical attackers want. Therefore, we have three pieces of advice:
Kaspersky official blog – Read More
August was a busy month at ANY.RUN. We expanded our list of connectors with Microsoft Sentinel and OpenCTI, added Linux Debian (ARM) support to the SDK, and strengthened detection across hundreds of new malware families and techniques. With fresh signatures, rules, and product updates, your SOC can now investigate faster, detect more threats in real time, and keep defenses sharp against the latest campaigns.
Let’s dive into the details now.
We continue to expand ANY.RUN connectors so teams can work with familiar tools while boosting threat visibility. Our goal is simple: reduce setup friction and deliver fresh, high-fidelity IOCs directly into your workflows; no extra tools, no complex scripts, no wasted analyst time.
ANY.RUN now delivers Threat Intelligence (TI) Feeds directly to Microsoft Sentinel via the built-in STIX/TAXII connector. That means:

Investigations become faster and responses more precise with IOCs enriched by full sandbox context. Unlike static or delayed threat feeds, ANY.RUN’s TI Feeds are powered by real-time detonations of fresh malware samples observed across attacks on 15,000+ organizations worldwide. The data is updated continuously and pre-processed by analysts to ensure high fidelity and near-zero false positives, so your SOC can act on threats that truly matter.
For SOC teams using Filigran’s OpenCTI, ANY.RUN now provides dedicated connectors that bring interactive analysis and fresh threat intelligence directly into your workflows. Instead of juggling multiple tools, analysts can analyze files, enrich observables, and track emerging threats inside the OpenCTI interface they already use.

You can connect any combination of these connectors based on their specific needs and licenses.
View documentation on GitHub →

We’ve expanded our software development kit (SDK) to include Linux Debian 12.2 (ARM, 64-bit) in the Linux connector. This addition ensures that analysts can now automate malware analysis for ARM-based threats alongside Windows, Linux x86, and Android, all from the same SDK.
With this update, your team can:
ARM-based malware is rapidly expanding across IoT, embedded systems, and cloud servers. By adding Debian ARM support, the SDK gives SOCs earlier visibility into these threats and helps reduce costs by keeping all environments under one automated process.
Explore ANY.RUN’s SDK on GitHub
In August, our team continued to expand detection capabilities to help SOCs stay ahead of evolving threats:
These updates mean analysts get faster, more confident verdicts in the sandbox and can enrich SIEM, SOAR, and IDS workflows with fresh, actionable IOCs.
New Behavior Signatures
In August, we introduced a new set of behavior signatures to help SOC teams detect obfuscation, persistence, and stealthy delivery techniques earlier in the attack chain. These detections are triggered by real actions, not static indicators, giving analysts deeper visibility and faster context during investigations.
This month’s coverage includes new families and techniques across stealers, lockers, loaders, and RATs:
YARA Rule Updates
In August, we released 14 new YARA rules into production to help analysts detect threats faster, improve hunting accuracy, and cover a wider range of malware families and evasion tactics. Key additions include:
New Suricata Rules
We also added 2,124 targeted Suricata rules to help SOC teams catch data exfiltration and phishing campaigns more reliably. Highlights include:
Other Updates
ANY.RUN supports over 15,000 organizations across banking, manufacturing, telecom, healthcare, retail, and tech, helping them build faster, smarter, and more resilient cybersecurity operations.
Our cloud-based Interactive Sandbox enables teams to safely analyze threats targeting Windows, Linux, and Android systems in under 40 seconds; no complex infrastructure required. Paired with TI Lookup, YARA Search, and Threat Feeds, ANY.RUN empowers security teams to accelerate investigations, reduce risk, and boost SOC efficiency.
The post Release Notes: Fresh Connectors, SDK Update, and 2,200+ New Detection Rules appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.
ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog – Read More
A recent MIT report, The GenAI Divide: State of AI in Business 2025, brought on a significant cooling of tech stocks. While the report offers interesting observations on the economics and organization of AI implementation in business, it also contains valuable insights for cybersecurity teams. The authors weren’t concerned with security issues: the words “security”, “cybersecurity”, or “safety” don’t even appear in the report. However, its findings can and should be considered when planning new corporate AI security policies.
The key observation is that while only 40% of surveyed organizations have purchased an LLM subscription, 90% of employees regularly use personal AI-powered tools for work tasks. And this “shadow AI economy” — the term used in the report — is said to be more effective than the official one. A mere 5% of corporations see economic benefit from their AI implementations, whereas employees are successfully boosting their personal productivity.
The top-down approach to AI implementation is often unsuccessful. Therefore, the authors recommend “learning from shadow usage and analyzing which personal tools deliver value before procuring enterprise alternatives”. So how does this advice align with cybersecurity rules?
A policy favored by many CISOs is to test and implement — or better yet, build one’s own — AI tools and then simply ban all others. This approach can be economically inefficient, potentially causing the company to fall behind its competitors. It’s also difficult to enforce, as ensuring compliance can be both challenging and expensive. Nevertheless, for some highly regulated industries or for business units that handle extremely sensitive data, a prohibitive policy might be the only option. The following methods can be used to implement it:
If the company considers the risks of using AI tools to be insignificant, or has departments that don’t handle personal or other sensitive data, the use of AI by these teams can be all but unrestricted. By setting a short list of hygiene measures and restrictions, the company can observe LLM usage habits, identify popular services, and use this data to plan future actions and refine their security measures. Even with this democratic approach, it’s still necessary to:
When it comes to company-wide AI usage, neither extreme — a total ban or total freedom — is likely to fit. More versatile would be a policy that allows for different levels of AI access based on the type of data being used. Full implementation of such a policy requires:
Armed with the listed requirements, a policy needs to be developed that covers different departments and various types of information. It might look something like this:
| Data type | Public-facing AI (from personal devices and accounts) | External AI service (via a corporate AI proxy) | On-premise or trusted cloud AI tools |
| Public data (such as ad copy) | Permitted (declared via the company portal) | Permitted (logged) | Permitted (logged) |
| General internal data (such as email content) | Discouraged but not blocked. Requires declaration | Permitted (logged) | Permitted (logged) |
| Confidential data (such as application source code, legal or HR communications) | Blocked by DLP/CASB/NGFW | Permitted for specific, manager-approved scenarios (personal data must be removed; code requires both automated and manual checks) | Permitted (logged, with personal data removed as needed) |
| High-impact regulated data (financial, medical, and so on) | Prohibited | Prohibited | Permitted with CISO approval, subject to regulatory storage requirements |
| Highly critical and classified data | Prohibited | Prohibited | Prohibited (exceptions possible only with board of directors approval) |
To enforce the policy, a multi-layered organizational approach is necessary in addition to technical tools. First and foremost, employees need to be trained on the risks associated with AI — from data leaks and hallucinations to prompt injections. This training should be mandatory for everyone in the organization.
After the initial training, it’s essential to develop more detailed policies and provide advanced training for department heads. This will empower them to make informed decisions about whether to approve or deny requests to use specific data with public AI tools.
Initial policies, criteria, and measures are just the beginning; they need to be regularly updated. This involves analyzing data, refining real-world AI use cases, and monitoring popular tools. A self-service portal is needed as a stress-free environment where employees can explain what AI tools they’re using and for what purposes. This valuable feedback enriches your analytics, helps build a business case for AI adoption, and provides a role-based model for applying the right security policies.
Finally, a multi-tiered system for responding to violations is a must. Possible steps:
The policies discussed here cover a relatively narrow range of risks associated with the use of SaaS solutions for generative AI. To create a full-fledged policy that addresses the whole spectrum of relevant risks, see our guidelines for securely implementing AI systems, developed by Kaspersky in collaboration with other trusted experts.
Kaspersky official blog – Read More
Open any website, and the first thing you’ll likely see is a pop-up notification about the use of cookies. You’re usually given the option to accept all cookies, accept only necessary ones, or flatly reject them. Regardless of your choice, you probably won’t notice a difference, and the notification disappears from the screen anyway.
Today, we dive a little deeper into the cookie jar: what cookies are for, what types exist, how attackers can intercept them, what the risks are, and how to stay safe.
When you visit a website, it sends a cookie to your browser. This is a small text file that contains data about you, your system, and the actions you’ve taken on the site. Your browser stores this data on your device and sends it back to the server every time you return to that site. This simplifies your interaction with the site: you don’t have to log in on every single page; sites remember your display settings; online stores keep items in your cart; streaming services know at which episode you stopped watching — the benefits are limitless.
Cookies can store your login, password, security tokens, phone number, residential address, bank details, and session ID. Let’s take a closer look at the session identifier.
A session ID is a unique code assigned to each user when they sign in to a website. If a third party manages to intercept this code, the web server will see them as a legitimate user. Here’s a simple analogy: imagine you can enter your office by means of an electronic pass with a unique code. If your pass is stolen, the thief — whether they look like you or not — can open any door you have access to without any trouble. Meanwhile, the security system will believe that it’s you entering. Sounds like a scene from a crime TV show, doesn’t it? The same thing happens online: if a hacker steals a cookie with your session ID, they can sign in to a website you were already signed in to, under your name, without needing to enter a username and password; sometimes they can even bypass two-factor authentication. In 2023, hackers stole all three of the YouTube channels of the famous tech blogger Linus Sebastian – “Linus Tech Tips” and two other Linus Media Group YouTube channels with tens of millions of subscribers — and this is exactly how they did it. We’ve already covered that case in detail.
Now let’s sort through the different cookie varieties. All cookies can be classified according to a number of characteristics.
It’s possible for session cookies to become persistent. For example, if you check a box like “Remember me”, “Save settings”, or some such on a website, the data will be saved in a persistent cookie.
The same cookie can fall into multiple categories: for example, most optional cookies are third-party, while required cookies include temporary ones responsible for the security of a specific browsing session. For more details on how and when all these types of cookies are used, read the full report on Securelist.
Cookies that contain a session ID are the most tempting targets for hackers. Theft of a session ID is also known as session hijacking. Let’s examine some of the most interesting and widespread methods.
Session hijacking is possible by monitoring or “sniffing” the internet traffic between the user and the website. This type of attack happens on websites that use the less secure HTTP protocol instead of HTTPS. With HTTP, cookie files are transmitted in plain text within the headers of HTTP requests, meaning they’re not encrypted. A malicious actor can easily intercept the traffic between you and the website you’re on, and extract cookies.
These attacks often occur on public Wi-Fi networks, especially if not protected by either the WPA2 or WPA3 protocols. For this reason, we recommend exercising extreme caution with public hotspots. It’s much safer to use mobile data. If you’re traveling abroad, it’s a good idea to use an Kaspersky eSIM Store.
Cross-site scripting consistently ranks among the top web-security vulnerabilities, and with good reason. This type of attack allows malicious actors to gain access to a site’s data — including the cookie files that contain the coveted session IDs.
Here’s how it works: the attacker finds a vulnerability in the website’s source code and injects a malicious script; that done, all that remains is for you to visit the infected page and you can kiss your cookies goodbye. The script gains full access to your cookies and sends them to the attacker.
Unlike other types of attacks, cross-site request forgery exploits the trust relationship between a website and your browser. An attacker tricks an authenticated user’s browser into performing an unintended action without their knowledge, such as changing a password or deleting data like uploaded videos.
For this type of attack, the threat actor creates a web page or email containing a malicious link, HTML code, or a script with a request to the vulnerable website. Simply opening the page or email, or clicking the link, is enough for the browser to automatically send the malicious request to the target site. All of your cookies for that site will be attached to the request. Believing that it was you who requested, say, the password change or channel deletion, the site will carry out the attackers’ request on your behalf.
That’s why we recommend not opening links received from strangers, and installing a Kaspersky Password Manager that can alert you to malicious links or scripts.
Sometimes, attackers don’t need to use complex schemes — they can simply guess the session ID. On some websites, session IDs are generated by predictable algorithms, and might contain information like your IP address plus an easily reproducible sequence of characters.
To pull off this kind of attack, hackers need to collect enough sample IDs, analyze them, and then figure out the generating algorithm to predict session IDs on their own.
There are other ways to steal a session ID, such as session fixation, cookie tossing, and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. These methods are covered in our dedicated Securelist post.
A large part of the responsibility for cookie security lies with website developers. We provide tips for them in our full report on Securelist.
But there are some things we can all do to stay safe online.
Want to know even more about cookies? Read these articles:
Kaspersky official blog – Read More
Running a SOC means living in a world of alerts. Every day, thousands of signals pour in; some urgent, many irrelevant. Analysts need to separate noise from real threats, investigate quickly, and keep the organization safe without letting cases pile up.
The challenge isn’t only about detecting threats but doing it fast enough to reduce escalations, avoid burnout, and keep operations efficient.
That’s where an all-in-one detection workflow changes everything. ANY.RUN brings together the tools analysts rely on most; live threat feeds, interactive sandboxing, and instant lookups, into a single, streamlined process. The result: faster answers, fewer escalations, and more confidence in every decision.
It’s not the flood of alerts alone that puts SOCs under pressure but the fractured way they’re handled. One tool for threat feeds, another for detonation, a third for enrichment. Every time an analyst switches context, minutes are lost. Multiply that across hundreds of alerts, and the delays add up fast.
The bigger problem is what those delays cause: escalations that didn’t need to happen, senior staff tied up with routine checks, and threats that linger longer than they should. Instead of building momentum, investigations stall.
This is the hidden cost of disconnected tools. They don’t only slow analysts down but also create more work for everyone and open the door to mistakes.
When detection runs as one continuous workflow, every step strengthens the next. Instead of losing time hopping between tools, analysts work with a steady flow:
| The result is measurable: |
|---|
| +62.7% more threats detected overall |
| 94% of surveyed users report faster triage |
| 63% year-over-year user growth, driven by analyst efficiency |
| 30% fewer alerts require escalation to senior analysts |
The outcome of this unified workflow is speed, clarity and confidence. Analysts know what to act on, what to ignore, and when a case can be closed without doubt.
The first challenge in any SOC is deciding which alerts deserve attention. With live IOC streams collected from thousands of users worldwide, ANY.RUN’s TI Feeds works as your early filter. Analysts see instantly whether an IP, domain, or hash has already been confirmed as malicious and can rule out duplicates on the spot. That means less time wasted on “non-issues” and more focus on real threats that matter.

Every IOC in the feed is actionable and connected to sandbox analyses, giving analysts not just a red flag but the full context behind it. This means faster triage, more confident decisions, and the ability to trace threats back to their behavior in real-world samples.
The numbers speak for themselves: with Threat Feed and Lookup combined, analysts gain access to 24× more IOCs than from typical isolated sources. And because the feed captures real-world attacks, from targeted phishing campaigns to large-scale malware hitting banks and enterprises, your SOC works with threat data that reflects the real distribution of risks.

ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Feeds come in multiple formats with simple integration options, making it easy to plug into your existing SIEM, TIP, or SOAR setup.
When an alert passes the filter, it needs proof. This is where ANY.RUN’s interactive sandbox becomes the proving ground, turning suspicious files, scripts, and URLs into full investigations in real time. Instead of waiting for static reports or snapshots, analysts can detonate samples and watch the behavior unfold step by step, just like a real user would.
This approach uncovers what traditional sandboxes often miss:
But visibility doesn’t depend solely on manual clicks. With automated interactivity, ANY.RUN simulates user actions to expose threats faster, reducing the need for analysts to intervene at every step. Junior analysts gain confidence because the system highlights behaviors for them, while senior staff can focus on advanced investigations instead of routine triage.
The user-friendly interface and AI assistance add another layer of efficiency. Complex behaviors are explained clearly, reports are well-structured, and the entire attack chain is mapped from start to finish.
For example, in the case of Lumma Stealer, ANY.RUN captured the full infection chain, from initial dropper to persistence mechanisms, all preserved in a detailed report ready for escalation, rule writing, or sharing.
View Lumma Stealer exposed in 30 seconds

The outcome is a process where analysts of all skill levels can act faster, escalate less, and make decisions with confidence, while SOC leaders gain time back from their most experienced staff.
Even with full sandbox results, one question always remains: Has this threat been seen before? Knowing whether an IOC belongs to a fresh campaign or something already circulating across industries changes how analysts respond.

ANY.RUN’s Threat Lookup delivers that answer in seconds. With access to millions of past analyses contributed by more than 15,000 organizations worldwide, analysts can instantly check whether an IP, domain, or hash has been observed elsewhere. This turns isolated alerts into patterns, helping teams connect the dots and react with confidence.
The result is a smoother close to every investigation: sandbox analysis provides the behavior, Threat Lookup adds the history, and reports go out with stronger evidence. Analysts save time, senior experts get fewer escalations, and the SOC becomes more resilient with every case resolved.
The real power of ANY.RUN is in how the solutions work together, seamlessly feeding into one another to create a single, continuous process.
Instead of bouncing between disconnected tools, analysts move through one streamlined workflow: alerts are filtered at the start, suspicious activity is detonated, the entire attack chain is exposed in real time, and findings are instantly validated against global threat history.
The outcome is faster resolutions, fewer unnecessary escalations, and reports enriched with both behavioral detail and historical context; the kind of evidence leaders and clients can trust.
Sign up today to see how ANY.RUN’s all-in-one suite can turn your SOC into a faster, more confident detection machine.
The post Streamline Your SOC: All-in-One Threat Detection with ANY.RUN appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.
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Picture this: you’re on a train chatting with a nice lady and her young child — visitors to your home city. As the train approaches the station, she reaches for her wallet, pulls out a bank card, and her face falls. “Oh no! I accidentally snaped my card!” she exclaims. “What am I going to do now? I needed to withdraw cash…” Could I transfer you some money, so you can then withdraw it for me at an ATM?”
Most people would agree to help. She’s a young lady with a child in a new city after all, and she’s in a tight spot. What could go wrong? And she’s not asking for money — she’s sending it to you. It seems completely harmless. The money is quickly transferred to your account, you withdraw the cash from your account from an ATM, and the woman thanks you enthusiastically before disappearing into the crowds. But a couple of weeks later the police show up at your door…
You thought you were doing a good deed, but you’ve just become an unwitting participant in a money laundering scheme. People who help criminals move stolen money through their bank accounts are called “money mules”. Today we explain how you can accidentally become a money mule, and the serious consequences you could face.
A money mule is anyone whose bank account is used to move or withdraw money as part of a scam. Mules are considered expendable in any fraudulent scheme, and anyone can become one — even someone who’s never heard the term before. There are many ways people get roped into these schemes, and here are just a few of them.
The “easy-money online job” scam. Job-search chats are often filled with tasty offers: “Looking for a few people, paying $50 an hour, easy work, all you need is internet access”. The “job” involves accepting transfers from certain people, and then making payments to others. Another variation involves withdrawing cash after funds are sent to you and giving it to a random courier. They might actually pay you for this “service”, but trust us, even $50 an hour isn’t worth the potential consequences, which we’ll get into later.
“I left my card at home. Do you mind helping me out?” The young-lady-in-a-tight-spot role is easy to recast in other narratives. Instead of a young lady, there could be a young man telling you a sob story about a card he’s left somewhere and needing help to pay for a smartphone, a TV, perfume, or some other expensive item. He’ll offer to transfer you funds so you can pay for the item with your own card. You may agree to help out — especially if you get cashback from using your card. But notice the difference: if this stranger messaged you online, you’d probably just tell them to get lost. However, when you’re standing next to them at the checkout counter, the likelihood of your “helping out” is much higher.
“We’ll pay you in cash under the table”. Even employees of small, shady companies can unknowingly become money mules. These companies don’t officially hire their workers, and pay only in cash under the table. Note that if the employer has obtained money illegally, all employees working without a contract may be considered money mules and could face serious legal consequences.
There are other schemes too, which primarily target teenagers. Youngsters are asked to open a bank account and pass the account details to strangers online who’ll pay them, say, $20 or $30 for the service. Opening a new bank account takes only a few seconds, and the promised sum is a real help for any hard-up student. Unfortunately, these young victims most likely have no idea who could use their accounts or how.
Nothing good. At a minimum, a money mule is considered an active participant in a criminal scheme — even if they’re unaware of their involvement. Fraudsters constantly steal large sums of digital money from both companies and ordinary people, employing hundreds of social engineering tactics. But they need a way to cash out. And that’s where schemes to create entire networks of unsuspecting money mules come in — and they’re the ones who’ll have the police knocking on their door.
Many countries have laws against money muling. Money mules get prosecuted regardless of whether they knew where the funds came from, or that they were pawns in a grand scheme. Proving the absence of criminal intent in court can be difficult, so, despite being unaware of the third party’s illicit intentions when transferring the money, they may be slapped with fines or other penalties.
Actual punishment varies by country: for example, in the United States, if criminal intent is proven, a money mule can face up to 20 years in prison. In Germany, to avoid punishment, it’s enough to turn yourself in to the police and report the scam you’ve become involved in. In Singapore, inadvertent money laundering can lead to fines of up to $150 000, or a prison sentence of up to three years if there were clear “red flags” pointing to a scam.
Regardless of the penalties in your country for cashing out criminal money, you need to be extremely careful to avoid unwittingly becoming a money mule. Here’s a list of rules to help you avoid unwanted problems:
Most importantly, remember that nothing’s truly free. Learn how to spot scammers with the help of read our Telegram channel — subscribe to stay up to date on all the new trends in cybersecurity.
What else to read on fraudulent schemes:
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The WordPress content management system (CMS) has been popping up frequently on cybersecurity news sites lately. Most of this coverage was driven by vulnerabilities in plugins and themes. However, our colleagues have also observed a case where attackers used poorly secured WordPress sites to distribute trojans. This in itself isn’t surprising — WordPress remains one of the most popular CMS platforms in the business. But the sheer number of discovered plugin vulnerabilities and related incidents shows that attackers are watching the WordPress ecosystem just as closely as its defenders.
Just this summer, several serious WordPress-related security incidents have come to light.
In early July, attackers gained access to a site running Gravity Forms — a popular form-building plugin — and injected malicious code into versions 2.9.11.1 and 2.9.12. Sites where these plugin versions were installed manually by administrators, or via the PHP dependency manager, Composer, were infected between July 9 and 10.
The malware blocked further updates, downloaded and installed additional malicious code, and created new administrator accounts. This gave the attackers full control of the site, which they then used for malicious purposes.
The Gravity Forms team urges all users to check if they’re running a potentially vulnerable version. Instructions on how to do this are available in the incident notice on the official plugin website. The notice also explains how to remove the malware. And of course, the plugin should be updated to version 2.9.13.
Also in July, researchers reported that attackers were actively exploiting a critical vulnerability in the unauthenticated file upload validation process (CVE-2025-5394) affecting all versions of the Alone theme for WordPress — up to and including 7.8.3. The flaw enables remote code execution (RCE), giving attackers full control over affected sites.
Notably, attacks began several days before the vulnerability was officially disclosed. According to Wordfence, already by June 12 over 120 000 attempts to exploit CVE-2025-5394 had been made. Threat actors used the flaw to upload ZIP archives containing webshells, install password-protected PHP backdoors for remote HTTP access, and create hidden administrator accounts. In some cases, they even installed full-featured file managers on the compromised WordPress site, giving them complete control over the site’s database.
The developers of the Alone theme have since released version 7.8.5, which patches the vulnerability. All users are strongly advised to update to this version immediately. Additional guidance on how to protect against this bug can be found in the Wordfence report.
In June, attackers also targeted WordPress sites using another premium theme called Motors. In this case, attackers exploited CVE-2025-4322 — a weakness in the user validation process affecting all versions up to 5.6.67. Exploiting it allowed attackers to hijack administrator accounts.
The theme creators, StylemixThemes, released a patched version (5.6.68) on May 14, 2025. That was followed by a Wordfence statement five days later urging users to update without delay. However, not all users updated in time — attacks began the very next day, May 20, and by June 7 Wordfence had recorded 23 100 exploitation attempts.
Successful exploitation of CVE-2025-4322 grants attackers administrator rights, enabling them to create new accounts and reset passwords.
And finally, a case in which cybercriminals have not exploited vulnerabilities in plugins and themes, but that nevertheless demonstrates the interest of attackers in WordPress-based sites. In early August, our colleagues investigated an attack involving the Efimer malware — designed primarily to steal cryptocurrency. Attackers spread it via email and malicious torrents, but some infections also originated from compromised WordPress sites.
Careful analysis revealed that Efimer also included a WordPress password cracker. Essentially, each time the malware ran, it launched a brute-force attack on the WordPress admin panel using a set of standard passwords hard-coded in the script. Any successfully cracked passwords were sent back to the attackers’ command server.
Beyond the above incidents, several other vulnerabilities have been reported — though they’ve not yet been observed in real-world attacks. However, as the Motors case demonstrates, attackers could start exploiting them real soon, so they should be monitored closely.
In late July, the team behind the open-source Pi-hole project discovered a vulnerability in the GiveWP plugin, which they were using on their own WordPress site. This plugin allows websites to accept online donations, manage fundraising campaigns, and more.
The developers found that the plugin inadvertently exposed donor data by displaying it in the page source, making names and email addresses accessible without authentication.
GiveWP’s developers released a patch just hours after the issue was reported on GitHub. However, since the data had already been exposed, the Have I Been Pwned service added the incident to its leak database, estimating that nearly 30 000 people’s data had been compromised.
Administrators of sites using GiveWP are advised to update the plugin to version 4.6.1 or later.
The CVE-2025-24000 vulnerability — rated 8.8 on the CVSS scale — was recently discovered in the Post SMTP plugin. This extension provides more reliable and user-friendly delivery of outgoing emails from a WordPress site than the built-in wp_mail function.
CVE-2025-24000, which affects all Post SMTP versions up to and including 3.2.0, stems from a broken access control mechanism in the plugin’s REST API. The issue is that this API checks only whether a user is authenticated — not their access level. As a result, even a low-privileged user can view logs containing sent emails along with their full contents.
This makes it possible to hijack an administrator account. An attacker only needs to initiate a password reset for the admin account, then inspect the email logs to retrieve the reset message and follow the link inside, thereby gaining administrator access.
The developer released a patched version — Post SMTP 3.3.0 — on June 11. However, download statistics on WordPress.org at the time of writing show that only about half of the plugin’s users (51.2%) have updated to the fixed version. That leaves more than 200 000 sites still exposed. Moreover, nearly a quarter of all sites (23.4%, or around 100 000) are still running the outdated 2.x branch, which contains this and other unpatched vulnerabilities.
To make matters worse, proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code for CVE-2025-24000 has already been published online, though we haven’t verified its functionality.
Plugins and themes make WordPress highly flexible and user-friendly, but they also significantly expand the attack surface. While avoiding them entirely isn’t realistic, you can ensure the security of your site by following these best practices:
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