CISA Finds Palo Alto Networks’ CVE-2024-5910 Exploited in the Wild

Palo Alto

Overview

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Thursday alerted federal agencies regarding active exploitation of a critical missing authentication vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks’ Expedition, a tool widely used by administrators for firewall migration and configuration management.

This flaw, designated CVE-2024-5910, has been actively exploited by attackers since its patch release in July, underscoring the urgency for immediate remediation.

Expedition is a popular migration tool designed to assist administrators in transitioning firewall configurations from vendors such as Check Point and Cisco to Palo Alto’s PAN-OS. However, due to a missing authentication mechanism, this tool now presents a significant risk for compromised credentials and potentially severe network intrusions.

What is CVE-2024-5910 Vulnerability

The CVE-2024-5910 vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks’ Expedition tool is a missing authentication flaw, which allows an attacker with network access to exploit the vulnerability and take over an admin account.

Once exploited, attackers can potentially gain access to sensitive configuration secrets, credentials, and other data stored within the tool. This flaw carries a critical CVSSv4.0 base score of 9.3.

According to Palo Alto Networks, only Expedition versions below 1.2.92 are vulnerable, while all versions from 1.2.92 and onward are protected against this flaw. As CISA emphasized, the lack of authentication on such a critical function poses severe security risks, especially for government and enterprise environments relying on Expedition for firewall migration and tuning.

Technical Details and Vulnerability Summary

  • Vulnerability: CVE-2024-5910 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function)
  • Severity: CRITICAL (CVSSv4.0 Score: 9.3)
  • Affected Versions: Expedition versions below 1.2.92
  • Unaffected Versions: Expedition 1.2.92 and later
  • Weakness Type: CWE-306, Missing Authentication for Critical Function
  • Impact: Admin account takeover, access to sensitive configuration data, potential firewall control

Likely Reason for Exploitation of CVE-2024-5910

Although Palo Alto Networks initially released a patch in July to fix CVE-2024-5910, the exploitation attempts likely escalated when security researcher Zach Hanley from Horizon3.ai released a proof-of-concept (PoC) in October.

This PoC showed how CVE-2024-5910 admin reset vulnerability could be chained with another command injection vulnerability – CVE-2024-9464. This combination allows for unauthenticated, arbitrary command execution on vulnerable Expedition servers, enabling attackers to execute commands remotely.

This chained vulnerability scenario magnifies the risk, as attackers can exploit the admin reset vulnerability to ultimately compromise PAN-OS firewall admin accounts, providing full control over firewall configurations and potentially allowing access to sensitive network areas.

CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog Update

Adding to the urgency, CISA has included CVE-2024-5910 in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog. This addition mandates all U.S. federal agencies to secure vulnerable Expedition servers against potential attacks by November 28. This move underscores the federal directive for securing essential digital infrastructure against known vulnerabilities, especially those that facilitate admin credential resets and remote command execution.

Recommendations and Mitigations

To secure systems against this exploit, it is strongly recommended that administrators:

  1. Upgrade Expedition to Version 1.2.92 or Later: This release addresses CVE-2024-5910 and subsequent vulnerabilities, providing a robust safeguard against admin account takeover and unauthorized access.
  2. Rotate All Credentials Post-Upgrade: After updating to the latest version, administrators should rotate all Expedition usernames, passwords, and API keys. Additionally, all firewall usernames, passwords, and API keys processed through Expedition should be reset to prevent any potential misuse of compromised credentials.
  3. Restrict Network Access: As a mitigating measure, organizations unable to immediately apply the patch should restrict network access to Expedition servers to authorized users and hosts only. Network segmentation and access control lists (ACLs) should be employed to limit exposure.

Conclusion

The exploitation of CVE-2024-5910 exemplifies the persistent challenge organizations face in securing digital tools that facilitate network management and firewall configuration. Regular patching, vigilant credential management, and access control are fundamental to safeguarding critical infrastructure against similar vulnerabilities.

With CISA actively monitoring this threat and urging patching compliance, addressing this vulnerability is essential not only for regulatory compliance but for maintaining network security integrity.

By upgrading to the latest version of Expedition and implementing the outlined mitigations, organizations can strengthen their defenses against these specific exploits and prevent unauthorized access to network configurations.

Sources:

https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?search_api_fulltext=CVE-2024-5910&field_date_added_wrapper=all&field_cve=&sort_by=field_date_added&items_per_page=20&url=

https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-5910

https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2024-9464

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Kaspersky uncovers a crypto game created by Lazarus APT | Kaspersky official blog

Battle City, colloquially known as “that tank game”, is a symbol of a bygone era. Some 30 years ago, gamers would pop a cartridge into their console, settle in front of a bulky TV, and obliterate waves of enemy tanks until the screen gave out.

Today, the world’s a different place, but tank games remain popular. Modern iterations offer gamers not just the thrill of gameplay but also the chance to earn NFTs. Cybercriminals too have something to offer: a sophisticated attack targeting crypto-gaming enthusiasts.

Backdoor and zero-day exploit in Google Chrome

This story begins in February 2024, when our security solution detected the Manuscrypt backdoor on a user’s computer in Russia. We’re very familiar with this backdoor; various versions of it have been used by the Lazarus APT group since at least 2013. So, given we already know the main tool and methods used by the attackers — what’s so special about this particular incident?

The thing is that these hackers typically target large organizations like banks, IT companies, universities, and even government agencies. But this time, Lazarus hit an individual user, planting a backdoor on a personal computer! The cybercriminals lured the victim to a game site and thereby gained complete access to their system. Three things made this possible:

  • The victim’s irresistible desire to play their favorite tank game in a new format
  • A zero-day vulnerability in Google Chrome
  • An exploit that allowed remote code execution in the Google Chrome process

Before you start to worry, relax: Google has since released a browser update, blocked the tank game’s website, and thanked the Kaspersky security researchers. But just in case, our products detect both the Manuscrypt backdoor and the exploit. We’ve delved into the details of this story on the Securelist blog.

Fake accounts

At the start of the investigation, we thought the group had gone to extraordinary lengths this time: “Did they actually create an entire game just for a scam?” But we soon worked out what they’d really done. The cybercriminals based their game — DeTankZone — on the existing game DeFiTankLand. They really went all out, stealing the source code of DeFiTankLand and creating fake social media accounts for their counterfeit.

Around the same time, in March 2024, the price of the DefitankLand (sic) cryptocurrency plummeted — the developers of the original game announced that their cold wallet had been hacked, and “someone” had stolen $20,000. The identity of this “someone” remains a mystery. The developers believe it was an insider, but we suspect that the ever-present tentacles of Lazarus are involved.

Differences between the fake and the original are minimal

Differences between the fake and the original are minimal

The cybercriminals orchestrated a full-blown promotion campaign for their game: they boosted follower counts on X (formerly Twitter), sent collaboration offers to hundreds of cryptocurrency influencers (also potential victims), created premium LinkedIn accounts, and organized waves of phishing emails. As a result, the fake game got even more traction than the original (6000 followers on X, versus 5000 for the original game’s account).

Social media content created by AI with the help of graphic designers

Social media content created by AI with the help of graphic designers

How we played tanks

Now for the most fun part…

The malicious site that Lazarus lured their victims to offered a chance, not only to “try out” a zero-day browser exploit, but also to play a beta version of the game. Now, here at Kaspersky, we respect the classics, so we couldn’t resist having a go on this promising new version. We downloaded an archive that seemed completely legitimate: 400MB in size, correct file structure, logos, UI elements, and 3D model textures. Boot her up!

The DeTankZone start menu greeted us with a prompt to enter an email address and password. We first tried logging in using common passwords like “12345” and “password” but that doesn’t work. “Fine, then”, we think. “We’ll just register a new account”. Again, no luck — the system wouldn’t let us play.

The start menu inspires confidence with a seemingly legitimate login form

The start menu inspires confidence with a seemingly legitimate login form

So why were there 3D model textures and other files in the game archive? Could they really have been other components of the malware? Actually, it wasn’t that bad. We reverse-engineered the code and discovered elements responsible for the connection to the game server — which, for this fake version, was non-functional. So, in theory, the game was still playable. A bit of time spent, a little programming, and voilà — we replace the hackers’ server with our own, and the red tank “Boris” enters the arena.

The game reminded us of shareware games from 20 years ago — which made all the effort worthwhile

The game reminded us of shareware games from 20 years ago — which made all the effort worthwhile

Lessons from this attack

The key takeaway here is that even seemingly harmless web links can end up with your entire computer being hijacked. Cybercriminals are constantly refining their tactics and methods. Lazarus is already using generative AI with some success, meaning we can expect even more sophisticated attacks involving it in the future.

Security solutions are also evolving with effective integration of AI — learn more here and here. All ordinary internet users have to do is make sure their devices are protected, and stay informed about the latest scams. Fortunately, the Kaspersky Daily blog makes this easy — subscribe to stay updated…

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Weekly ICS Vulnerability Intelligence Report: Rockwell Automation, Delta Electronics, Solar-Log

Vulnerability

Overview

Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs (CRIL) has investigated significant ICS vulnerabilities this week, providing essential insights derived from advisories issued by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). This week’s report highlights multiple vulnerabilities across critical ICS products, with specific focus on those from Rockwell Automation, Delta Electronics, and Solar-Log.

CISA released three security advisories addressing four ICS vulnerabilities across these products, underscoring the urgent need for mitigation.

Among the most notable is a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) flaw in Solar-Log Base 15, a widely used photovoltaic energy management product, which poses heightened risks due to internet-facing deployments identified by Cyble’s ODIN scanner.

ICS Vulnerabilities Overview

CRIL has pinpointed the following critical ICS vulnerabilities requiring immediate action:

  • CVE-2023-46344Solar-Log Base 15
    • Type: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
    • Severity: Medium
    • Description: This vulnerability allows unauthorized access through internet-facing instances, enabling attackers to potentially compromise device security and functionality. Cyble’s ODIN scanner identified a significant number of Solar-Log Base 15 devices deployed in Germany, emphasizing the need for prompt patching.
    • Patch available here.

  • CVE-2024-10456Delta Electronics InfraSuite Device Master
    • Type: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
    • Severity: Critical
    • Description: The Delta InfraSuite Device Master vulnerability allows critical systems to process untrusted data, which could lead to unauthorized access or system manipulation. This vulnerability impacts essential operational systems, necessitating immediate patching.
    • Patch available here.

  • CVE-2024-10386Rockwell Automation ThinManager
    • Type: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
    • Severity: Critical
    • Description: Rockwell Automation’s ThinManager vulnerability allows unauthorized users to access sensitive systems without proper authentication, potentially exposing operational systems to attacks. This flaw requires urgent attention due to its impact on operational continuity.
    • Patch available here.

  • CVE-2024-10387Rockwell Automation ThinManager
    • Type: Out-of-Bounds Read
    • Severity: Medium
    • Description: This vulnerability could allow unauthorized data access, which can lead to security breaches in operational systems if left unpatched.
    • Patch available here.

The severity overview indicates that these vulnerabilities span medium to critical levels, affecting critical infrastructure and necessitating prioritized mitigation.

Figure 1. Sectors impacted due to these vulnerabilities. (Source: CRIL)

Recommendations and Mitigations

To address these vulnerabilities effectively, organizations should consider the following best practices:

  1. Stay Updated: Regularly monitor security advisories from vendors and regulatory bodies to stay informed of critical patches and vulnerabilities.
  2. Risk-Based Vulnerability Management: Implement a risk-focused approach to manage and patch vulnerabilities based on their potential impact, especially for internet-facing ICS components.
  3. Network Segmentation: Isolate critical assets using effective network segmentation to prevent lateral movement and reconnaissance attempts by potential attackers.
  4. Continuous Vulnerability Assessments: Conduct regular vulnerability assessments, audits, and penetration testing to proactively identify and fix security loopholes.
  5. Utilize Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): Maintain visibility into software components, libraries, and dependencies to detect vulnerabilities promptly.
  6. Incident Response Preparedness: Develop and routinely test a robust incident response plan, ensuring it is aligned with the latest threat landscape.
  7. Cybersecurity Training: Conduct ongoing training programs for employees, particularly those with access to OT systems, covering threat recognition, authentication protocols, and security best practices.

Conclusion

The vulnerabilities highlighted in this ICS intelligence report call for swift action from organizations to mitigate potential security risks. With threats evolving rapidly and exploit attempts on the rise, maintaining a proactive stance is essential. By prioritizing the recommendations and implementing necessary patches, organizations can safeguard critical infrastructure, enhance operational resilience, and minimize the risk of exploitation.

Source:

https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories

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Critical Zero-Click Vulnerability in Synology NAS Devices Needs Urgent Patching

Vulnerability

Overview

A recently discovered high-severity vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-10443 and dubbed “RISK:STATION,” poses a significant threat to Synology NAS users worldwide.

The vulnerability, affecting Synology DiskStation and BeeStation models, allows remote code execution without user interaction, heightening the potential for malicious exploitation.

CERT-In has released an advisory urging Synology users to apply critical security patches immediately to secure their devices and prevent unauthorized access.

Affected Systems and Risk Assessment

The flaw specifically impacts Synology Photos and BeePhotos components, which come pre-installed on many Synology NAS products. Vulnerable versions include:

  • BeePhotos for BeeStation OS 1.1 – versions below 1.1.0-10053
  • BeePhotos for BeeStation OS 1.0 – versions below 1.0.2-10026
  • Synology Photos 1.7 for DSM 7.2 – versions below 1.7.0-0795
  • Synology Photos 1.6 for DSM 7.2 – versions below 1.6.2-0720

Given that NAS devices are highly valuable targets in ransomware attacks, the risks associated with this vulnerability are extensive, including data theft, malware installation, and unauthorized system access.

System owners using affected versions are encouraged to upgrade to secure versions immediately.

Impact and Exploitation Risks

The “RISK:STATION” vulnerability represents an “unauthenticated zero-click” attack vector. Attackers exploiting this flaw can gain root-level control without any user interaction.

Synology’s QuickConnect feature, a remote-access service, further increases device exposure, as it allows attackers to reach NAS devices even behind firewalls. According to the researchers who were credited with finding this zero-click bug, this flaw carries a high potential for misuse and could impact an estimated one to two million devices globally.

Device Exposure and Enumeration Concerns

The vulnerability’s severity is amplified by Synology’s QuickConnect feature’s extensive reach. This service provides devices with a unique subdomain that enables remote access, even bypassing firewalls and NAT configurations.

Due to the ease of obtaining these subdomains through Certificate Transparency logs, adversaries can readily enumerate exposed Synology devices. QuickConnect domains often contain identifiable names or locations, raising privacy concerns and potentially making it easier for attackers to prioritize targets.

Mitigations and Recommended Actions

Synology has issued patches that effectively neutralize this vulnerability, covering both the SynologyPhotos and BeePhotos applications. Users should ensure they apply the following updates:

  • For Synology DiskStation (DSM 7.2):

  • Synology Photos 1.7 – Update to version 1.7.0-0795
  • Synology Photos 1.6 – Update to version 1.6.2-0720

  • For Synology BeeStation:

  • BeePhotos 1.1 – Update to version 1.1.0-10053
  • BeePhotos 1.0 – Update to version 1.0.2-10026

Alternatively, users can mitigate exposure by disabling QuickConnect, blocking ports 5000 and 5001, and disabling the SynologyPhotos or BeePhotos components if not actively in use.

Although these actions prevent internet-based exploitation, they do not secure devices within local networks, so a firmware update remains the most effective solution.

Conclusion

The CVE-2024-10443 vulnerability in Synology NAS devices showcases the need for proactive patching, particularly for high-value, internet-exposed assets. Synology users are urged to follow the recommended upgrade steps or apply alternative mitigation measures to secure their devices from exploitation. By addressing these vulnerabilities promptly, organizations can reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access, ransomware attacks, and data breaches on their network-attached storage devices.

Source:

https://www.cert-in.org.in

https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_18

https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_19

https://www.midnightblue.nl/research/riskstation

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Critical Bug in Cisco’s URWB Exposes Systems to Root Privilege Command Injection

URWB

Overview

Cisco has disclosed a severe vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-20418, in its Unified Industrial Wireless Software for Ultra-Reliable Wireless Backhaul (URWB) Access Points. The flaw, rated with a maximum CVSS score of 10.0, affects multiple Cisco Catalyst Access Point models.

Attackers exploiting this vulnerability can gain root-level control, enabling unauthorized command execution on vulnerable devices.

Vulnerability Details

This critical CVE-2024-20418 vulnerability stems from improper input validation within Cisco’s web-based management interface, which controls URWB Access Points. A remote attacker without authentication can exploit this flaw by sending specially crafted HTTP requests to vulnerable devices, thereby injecting commands with root privileges on the device’s operating system.

Cisco has responded by releasing updates to mitigate the risk, advising immediate software upgrades as there are no workarounds. Importantly, only devices operating in URWB mode are impacted.

According to the Office of Information Technology of the New York State, while government institutions and business are at high risk of the bug, home users could be the least affected.

RISK:
Government:

  • Large and medium government entities: High
  • Small government entities: Medium

Businesses:

  • Large and medium business entities: High
  • Small business entities: Medium

Home users: Low

What is Cisco’s Ultra-Reliable Wireless Backhaul (URWB)?

Cisco’s URWB technology provides the robust, low-latency wireless connectivity essential for critical, high-stakes applications across industrial and mobile environments. Designed to replace costly and complex wired infrastructure, URWB enables seamless, multigigabit performance with minimal packet loss, making it invaluable for sectors relying on autonomous systems.

Industries including ports, railways, and manufacturing leverage URWB for real-time applications, such as video monitoring and remote machinery control, benefiting from reduced deployment costs and greater flexibility. The technology supports dual-mode capability, allowing devices to toggle between URWB and Wi-Fi 6/6E based on project needs, thereby optimizing infrastructure investments.

Affected Devices

The following Cisco Catalyst Access Points running a vulnerable version of Cisco’s Unified Industrial Wireless Software are affected if URWB mode is enabled:

  • Catalyst IW9165D Heavy Duty Access Points
  • Catalyst IW9165E Rugged Access Points and Wireless Clients
  • Catalyst IW9167E Heavy Duty Access Points

To determine if URWB mode is enabled, Cisco advises using the show mpls-config command. If available, URWB mode is active, and the device is vulnerable.

Cisco has confirmed that other products, including the 6300 Series Embedded Services Access Points, Aironet models, and Catalyst 9100 Series Access Points, are unaffected.

Mitigation Steps

Cisco has issued free software updates addressing this vulnerability. However, users must ensure they are compliant with licensing and have sufficient memory and compatible configurations for successful upgrades.

Customers without service contracts should reach out directly to the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) for help obtaining the necessary updates. More details can be found on Cisco’s Security Advisory page.

Fixed Software Releases

For the Cisco Unified Industrial Wireless Software versions affected, the company has released the following fixed versions:

  • 17.15 – First fixed in version 17.15.1
  • 17.14 and earlier – Cisco advises migrating to the nearest fixed release.

Security practitioners managing industrial or critical infrastructure networks are strongly urged to update vulnerable devices promptly. Failure to patch could expose systems to high-risk attacks due to the root-level access that this vulnerability permits.

Sources:

https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-backhaul-ap-cmdinj-R7E28Ecs

https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/ultra-reliable-wireless-backhaul/ultra-wireless-backhaul-so.html

https://its.ny.gov/2024-123

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-20418

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Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

  • Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) recently observed an attacker conducting big-game hunting and double extortion attacks using the relatively new Interlock ransomware.  
  • Our analysis uncovered that the attacker used multiple components in the delivery chain including a Remote Access Tool (RAT) masquerading as a fake browser updater, PowerShell scripts, a credential stealer, and a keylogger before deploying and enabling the ransomware encryptor binary. 
  • We also observed that the attacker primarily used remote desktop protocol (RDP) to move laterally within the victim’s network, as well as other tools such as AnyDesk and PuTTY. 
  • The attacker used Azure Storage Explorer, which leverages the utility AZCopy, to exfiltrate the victim’s data to an attacker-controlled Azure storage blob.  
  • The timeline of the attacker’s activity, from the initial compromise stage until the deployment of ransomware encryptor binary, indicates their dwelling time in the victim’s environment was about 17 days.  
  • Talos assesses with low confidence that Interlock ransomware is likely a new diversified group that emerged from Rhysida ransomware operators or developers, based on some similarities in the operators’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and in the ransomware encryptor binaries. 

Who is Interlock? 

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

Interlock first appeared in public reporting in September 2024 and has been observed launching big-game hunting and double extortion attacks. The group has notably targeted businesses in a wide range of sectors, which at the time of reporting includes healthcare, technology, government in the U.S. and manufacturing in Europe, according to the data leak site disclosure, indicating their targeting is opportunistic. 

Like other ransomware players in the big-game hunting space, Interlock also operates a data leak site called “Worldwide Secrets Blog,” providing links to victims’ leaked data, chat support for victims’ communications, and the email address, “interlock@2mail[.]co”.   

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

In their blog, Interlock claims to target organizations’ infrastructure by exploiting unaddressed vulnerabilities and claims their actions are in part motivated by a desire to hold companies’ accountable for poor cybersecurity, in addition to monetary gain. 

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

Recent attack methodologies 

Throughout the investigation into the Interlock ransomware attack, Talos observed several notable TTPs used by the attacker in each stage of the delivery chain. Talos assesses that the attacker was present in the victim’s environment for approximately 17 days, from the initial compromise until deployment and execution of the Interlock ransomware. 

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

Initial access 

The attacker gained access to the victim machine via a fake Google Chrome browser updater executable that the victim was prompted to download from a compromised legitimate news website.  When clicked, the fake browser updater executable “upd_2327991.exe” was downloaded onto the victim machine from a second compromised URL of a legitimate retailer. 

Execution 

Talos IR discovered the fake browser updater executable is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) that automatically executes an embedded PowerShell script when downloaded and run. The script initially downloads a legitimate Chrome setup executable “ChromeSetup.exe” to the victim machine’s applications temporary folder and established persistence by dropping a Windows shortcut file in the Windows StartUp folder with the file name “fahhs.lnk” configured to run the RAT every time the victim logs in, establishing persistence.  

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack
Sample PowerShell command that downloads the RAT. 

The RAT executes the command “cmd.exe /c systeminfo” and collects information from victim machine, listed below:

Host Name Time Zone
OS Name Total Physical Memory
OS Version Available Physical Memory
OS Manufacturer Virtual Memory
OS Configuration Max Size
OS Build Type Virtual Memory: Available
Registered Owner Virtual Memory: In Use
Registered Organization Page File Location(s)
Product ID Domain
Original Install Date Logon Server
System Boot Time Hotfix(s)
System Manufacturer Network Card(s)
System Model Connection Name
System Type Status
Processor(s) DHCP Enabled
BIOS Version DHCP Server
Windows Directory IP address(es)
System Directory Hyper-V Requirements
Boot Device System Locale

Then, the RAT encrypts the collected information in the memory stream. It establishes a secured socket to the command and control (C2) server hidden behind the attacker-controlled Cloudflare domain “apple-online[.]shop”, sends the encrypted data stream of victim machine information to the C2 server, and waits to receive the response.  

The RAT also allowed the attacker to execute two other PowerShell commands on the victim machine, which downloads the encrypted data blobs of a credential stealer “cht.exe” and a keylogger binary “klg.dll”, decrypts them with the passwords “jgSkhg934@kjv#1vkfg2S” and runs them. We observed that the keylogger is a DLL file that is run using the LOLBin “rundll32.exe”.  

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack
A sample PowerShell command that downloads and runs the Keylogger. 

Defense Evasion 

Talos IR observed that EDR was disabled on some of the compromised servers in the victim environment during the investigation. According to the indicators seen, Talos IR believes that the attacker could have either leveraged an EDR uninstaller tool or instrumented a vulnerable device driver Sysmon.sys (TfSysMon.sys) to disable the EDR on the victim machine. We also observed the attacker’s attempts to delete contents of the Event logs on some of the compromised systems.  

Credential Access 

The credential stealer discovered in this campaign is compiled in Golang. It enumerates the installed browser profiles on the victim machine and copies the Login data, Login State, key4.db, browser history and bookmarks files to the victim’s application profile temporary folder. The stealer then processes the data and uses SQL queries to collect the login information of victims’ online accounts along with the associated account URLs. Finally, the data is written to a file “chrgetpdsi.txt” in the user profile temporary folder.  

The keylogger DLL running on the victim machine is a tiny executable, which hooks to the victim machine keyboard and logs keystrokes in a file called “conhost.txt”, the same folder where the Keylogger was downloaded.  

Discovery 

The attacker ran PowerShell commands that are known indicators of pre-kerberoasting reconnaissance, a method used to obtain domain admin credentials. We assess with moderate confidence that a Kerberoasting attack was used to obtain accounts with higher privileges. 

(('AD_Computers: {0}' -f ([adsiSearcher]'(ObjectClass=computer)').FindAll().count)  
([adsisearcher]'(&(objectCategory=user)(servicePrincipalName=*))').FindAll() 

Lateral Movement 

Talos IR observed that the attacker primarily used Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and several compromised credentials to move between systems.  Further analysis showed that the attacker has also used AnyDesk and possibly LogMeIn to allow remote connectivity. We also spotted the installation of PuTTY on the compromised machines, which was likely used to move laterally to Linux hosts. We are not clear how these tools were dropped and executed on the infected machines. 

Sample RDP command executions observed during our analysis and with the redacted IP address details are shown below. 

mstsc /v 10.*.*.* 
.conhost.exe -d 10.*.*.*e$ 

Collection and Exfiltration  

The attacker executed storage-explorer, a tool that allows users to manage and interact with Azure Storage, and AzCopy, which allows users to copy files to a remote Azure storage, in the victim’s machine. We believe that the attacker used storage-explorer to navigate and identify sensitive information in the victim network and executed AzCopy to upload the data to the Azure storage blob according to network artifacts analysis. We were not able to confirm how the storage-explorer and AzCopy were delivered to the victim machine. 

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

Impact 

The attacker deployed the Interlock ransomware encryptor binary with the file name “conhost.exe”, masquerading as a legitimate file, onto the victim machine and stored it in a folder named with a single digit number (example: “3” or “4”) in the user profile application data temporary folder. When run, the ransomware encrypts the targeted files on the victim machine with the file extension “.Interlock” and drops the ransom note “!__README__!.txt” file in every folder containing files that the encryptor has attempted to encrypt. Talos IR also observed that the attacker configured the ransom note to display during interactive login, was pushed using Group Policy Objects (GPOs), a Windows utility that allows users to manage Windows operating systems and applications.  

In the ransom note, the attacker warns against attempting to recover the encrypted files and rebooting the affected machines. They also demand a response within 96 hours or else they threaten to release the victim’s data on their leak site and notify the media outlets, which could lead to financial and reputational damage.  

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

The ransom note includes the URL for an onion site where the affected victims can contact the operator to discuss the ransom demand and purchase the decryption keys using a unique company ID of sixty alphanumeric characters generated for each victim. 

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

Interlock ransomware analysis 

Talos observed that Interlock ransomware has both Windows Portable Executable (EXE) and the Linux executable (ELF) variants, indicating that the attacker is targeting both Windows and Linux machines.   

The Interlock ransomware encryption binary is a 64-bit executable, compiled on October 2, 2024. The ransomware appears on the victim’s machines in a packed executable format with the custom unpacker code located in its Thread Local Storage and several obfuscated stack strings in the binary which are decrypted during the runtime of the ransomware. 

When the ransomware runs on the victim machine it initializes the binary by loading custom structures, strings, and Application programming interface (API) functions. After the initialization, it enumerates the logical disk drives that are available on the victim machine. Initially, the ransomware checks for the drive letters “A” through “Z” and excludes the “C drive”. It picks the available logical drives and enumerates all the folders and files in them, encrypting the targeted files on the victim machine and appending the file extension “.interlock” on encrypted files. Once the logical drives are enumerated, the ransomware then enumerates and encrypts the files in the folders of the “C drive”.  

During this enumeration process, the ransomware excludes specific folders and file extensions on the victim machine from being encrypted. The operator hardcoded the folder and files extension exclusion list, shown below, in the Interlock binary.

Folder exclusion list of Windows Interlock variant:
$Recycle.Bin Windows
Boot $RECYCLE.BIN
Documents and Settings AppData
PerfLogs WindowsApps
ProgramData Windows Defender
Recovery WindowsPowerShell
System Volume Information Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection

File extension exclusion list of Windows Interlock variant:
.bat .bin .cab
.cmd .com .cur
.diagcab .diagcfg .diagpkg
.drv .hlp .hta
.ico .msi .ocx
.psm1 .src .sys
.ini .url .dll
.exe .ps1 Thumbs.db

The Linux variant of the Interlock ransomware performs a similar enumeration of directories and files, starting from the root directory, and encrypts the files excluding those that are in the file extension exclusion list hardcoded in the binary.

File extension exclusion list of Linux Interlock variant:
boot .cfg .b00
.v00 .v01 .v02
.v03 .v04 .v05
.v06 .v07 .t00

Interlock ransomware uses LibTomCrypt library, an open-source comprehensive, modular and portable cryptographic library for encryption.  The Windows Interlock ransomware variant uses the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption technique to encrypt the files on the victim machine whereas the Linux Interlock variant uses either CBC or RSA encryption technique. 

Encryption routine in Windows variant 

Encryption routine in ELF variant 

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack 

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack 

After encrypting each of the targeted files in the victim machine Interlock drops the ransom note “!__README__!.txt” file in each of the enumerated folders. 

Windows variant ransom note function 

ELF variant ransom note function 

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack 

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack 

We observed that the Windows Interlock variant creates a windows task name “TaskSystem” that runs at 8:00 PM daily on the victim machine as a SYSTEM user executing the configured command to run the ransomware, indicating the ransomware establishing the persistence.  

schtasks /create /sc DAILY /tn “TaskSystem” /tr “cmd /c cd “$Path of the Interlock binary” && “$command” /st 20:00 /ru system > nul

The ransomware has the capability to delete itself upon encrypting the targeted files, hiding the evidence of the encryption binary on the victim machine.  To delete the encryption binary in the Windows variant, Interlock ransomware has a tiny DLL binary embedded in the data section that is dropped into the user profile applications temporary folder with the file name “tmp41.wasd”.  

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

Then, “rundll32.exe” is used to execute the DLL’s export function, called “run”, which then executes the remove() function to delete the encryption binary.  

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

The Linux variant uses a similar technique to delete the encryptor binary from the victim machine, by executing the removeme function, which is an inline routine in the same encryptor binary.  

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

Interlock TTPs overlap with Rhysida Ransomware 

Talos assesses with low confidence that Interlock ransomware is a new diversified group that emerged from Rhysida operators or developers, based on some similarities in TTPs, tools, and the ransomware encryptor binaries’ behaviors. 

We discovered code overlaps in the binaries of Interlock and Rhysida ransomware samples. Notably, the files and folders exclusion list hardcoded in the Windows variant of the Interlock ransomware has similarities with the exclusion list in Rhysida ransomware, reported by Talos in an August 2023 Threat Advisory

Additionally, the Interlock ransomware encryptor with the filename “conhost.exe” was earlier seen in Rhysida ransomware attacks, along with overlaps in TTPs and tools including PowerShell scripts, AnyDesk, and PuTTY, based on a CISA #StopRansomware advisory report on Rhysida Ransomware. Furthermore, both Rhysida and Interlock operators use AzCopy to exfiltrate the victim’s data to an attacker-controlled Azure storage blob, an old but uncommon technique. 

Finally, Interlock and Rhysida deliver ransom notes with a similar theme, where they portray themselves as a helpful partner notifying the victim of a breach and offering to help rectify it. This is in contrast to other prolific and sophisticated cyber groups, such a Black Basta and ALPHV, whose ransom notes demand payment, threaten, and attempt to intimidate the victim.  

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attackRhysida ransom note. 

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attackInterlock ransom note. 

Interlock’s possible affiliation with Rhysida operators or developers would align with several broader trends in the cyber threat landscape, which Talos reported in our 2022 and 2023 Year in Review reports. We observed ransomware groups diversifying their capabilities to support more advanced and varied operations, and ransomware groups have been growing less siloed, as we observed operators increasingly working alongside multiple ransomware groups. 

Coverage 

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks. 

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. 

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products. 

Umbrella, Cisco’s secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them. 

Additional protection with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network. 

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. Snort SIDs for this threat are 64114, 64113, 64189 and 301042. 

ClamAV detections are also available for this threat: 

Win.Ransomware.Interlock-10036524-0 

Unix.Ransomware.Interlock-10036662-0 

Win.Trojan.Kryptik-10036729-0 

Win.Downloader.Kryptik-10036730-0 

Indicators of Compromise 

IOCs for this threat can be found in our GitHub repository here

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

AsyncRAT’s Infection Tactics via Open Directories: Technical Analysis 

Editor’s note: The current article is authored by the guest author RacWatchin8872, who is a threat intelligence analyst. You can find him on X. 

This article covers two distinct methods used to infect systems with AsyncRAT via open directories. These techniques show how attackers are constantly adapting, finding new ways to use publicly accessible files to broaden AsyncRAT’s impact and reach. 

Overview 

AsyncRAT is a type of Remote Access Trojan (RAT) malware designed to stealthily infiltrate systems and give attackers remote control over infected devices. It is commonly used for spying, data theft, and manipulation of compromised systems.  

Recently, two open directories surfaced, each employing unique methods to distribute and infect victims with AsyncRAT. These techniques highlight the persistent threat posed by this malware and its diverse infection strategies. 

First Technique 

Open Directory 

While investigating malicious open directories exposed to the internet, I discovered one with an unusual structure.  

The directory contained the following files: 

  • A text file with an extensive string that turned out to be a VBS script 
  • A JPG file that was actually a disguised ZIP archive 
Figure 1: Open directory structure 

Analysis of the Txt file 

The text file’s extensive string conceals an obfuscated VBS script. It uses random variables to store parts of the text that will be used to download the JPG file.

Figure 2: Obfuscated VBS code 

To make it easier to read we just need to make a few changes: 

  1. Replace the variables with the actual text
  1. Use intuitive names for variables that are used to write or download files
Figure 3: Deobfuscated VBS code 

Now we see that the VBS script creates an XML file OMjRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRvbK.xml located at C:UsersPublic. The content of the XML file contains a PowerShell script that downloads the disguised JPG file, saves it, and extracts it to the same directory. 

Once extracted, the process continues by executing another script, TesKKKeLAvaYdAfbBS.vbs. Then, it cleans up by deleting both the XML and ZIP files. 

Analysis of the VBS file 

The VBS script is also obfuscated and uses the same technique as the other text file. By examining the file, we can understand a few parts of its execution:

Figure 4: TesKKKeLAvaYdAfbBS.vbs obfuscated 

To make it simple to read, we just need to make a few changes: 

  1. Replace the variables with the actual text
  1. Use intuitive names for variables that are in use
  1. Delete all the If statements that execute the same code regardless of the result

By making these changes, we can transform a 34-line VBS script into a simpler 6-line version that is easier to read. 

Figure 5: Clean TesKKKeLAvaYdAfbBS.vbs

The VBS script will then execute the KKKKKKllLavIOOOOOtesAA.bat, which is the next stage.

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Analysis of the Bat file 

The BAT script is also obfuscated, but it is possible to understand its purpose by reading the values stored inside the variables vertically.

Figure 6: KKKKKKllLavIOOOOOtesAA.bat file 

Its role is to execute PowerShell without a prompt window. It initiates the next stage by running KiLOvBeRNdautESaatnENn.ps1 

Analysis of the PowerShell (PS1) file 

The PS1 file is a simple script that creates a scheduled task named ‘tMicNet Work40,’ which runs UhLQoyDAMaCUTPaE.vbs every 2 minutes.

Figure 7: Scheduled task created by PowerShell 

Analysis of the Second VBS file 

UhLQoyDAMaCUTPaE.vbs has the same structure as the previous VBS (TesKKKeLAvaYdAfbBS.vbs), so we can use the same technique to make the script easier to read and analyze.

Figure 8: UhLQoyDAMaCUTPaE.vbs obfuscated 

Using the same technique we will get this result: 

Figure 9: UhLQoyDAMaCUTPaE.vbs deobfuscated 

Analysis of The Second BAT file 

aaaNOOTKiiiLAViiiiOOs.bat has the same structure as the previous BAT (KKKKKKllLavIOOOOOtesAA.bat), so by reading it vertically, we can figure out what the file does. 

Figure 10: aaaNOOTKiiiLAViiiiOOs.bat 

The BAT file executes the last stage, which is a Powershell file. 

Analysis of the Last Stage 

The final stage is obfuscated by changing the variable names to make the code harder to interpret. Instead of giving a straightforward name to the variable, they break the word into pieces, mix them up, and then call each position to reconstruct the variable name.  

To simplify the analysis, we can deconstruct the code in a similar way, isolating each piece to make the script clearer and easier to understand. 

Figure 11: Analysis of the last stage 

The first part of the code is a function that receives a string and converts it from hexadecimal to a 32-bit integer.

Figure 12: First part of the final stage 

The second part of the code contains two variables with large strings. Both strings use a replace function to retrieve the correct value, which are then sent to the ‘PARSer’ for further processing. 

Figure 13: Second part of the last stage 

The last part of the final stage is simply loading the files into memory to execute them.

Figure 14: Last part of the last stage 

With the help of CyberChef, we can apply the same technique as shown in the second part of the final stage to retrieve the values inside the two variables and see what they really are.

The first variable is a DLL: 

Figure 15: AsyncRAT DLL 

The second variable is an EXE: 

Figure 16: AsyncRAT EXE 

By running both in the ANY.RUN sandbox, it is possible to gather information about the C2, ports, certificates, mutex, and more. 

Figure 17: Text report generated by ANY.RUN sandbox

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Second Technique 

Open Directory 

The structure of the second open directory mirrors the first, containing two files: a TXT file and a JPG file.  

The TXT file, with a shorter name, is a VBS script, while the JPG file hides a PowerShell script in disguise. 

Figure 18: Open directory 

Analysis of the Txt file 

In this case, the TXT file contains a VBS script that is easier to interpret due to its comments. It includes an array storing commands to download the disguised JPG file. 

Figure 19: VBS script 

To simplify the script further, we can delete the array and store all the array values in a single variable. 

Figure 20: Cleaning VBS script 

The VBS script then calls cmd to execute PowerShell, which downloads and runs the JPG file. 

Analysis of the Powershell file 

The PowerShell file performs 2 main functions: 

  1. File creation and content writing: Creates three files essential to the infection process
  1. Scheduled task setup: Schedules a task to ensure repeated execution, thereby maintaining the AsyncRAT infection

File Creation 

The Powershell creates 3 files.

First file

This obfuscated file stores and executes the values of EXE and DLL files related to AsyncRAT directly in memory. 

Figure 21: First file created by the Powershell file 

After cleaning the file, it removes ‘%&%’ from both variables, converts them from hexadecimal, and then loads and executes them into memory. 

Figure 22: Loading file into memory 

 
By carrying out the above-mentioned processes via CyberChef, we get the following results:

Figure 23: AsyncRAT Exe 
Figure 24: AsyncRAT DLL 

Second file

The second file triggers PowerShell to execute the previous file (roox.ps1). 

Figure 25: Second file created by Powershell file 

Third file

The third and final file runs the previous file roox.bat while keeping the execution hidden from the victim. This ensures that the infection process remains invisible and minimizes any visible indicators, making it harder for the victim to detect the ongoing activity. 

Figure 26: Third file created by Powershell file 

Scheduled Task 

The scheduled task, named thepiratMicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask, executes roox.vbs every two minutes, ensuring that the infection persists. 

Figure 27: Scheduled task named thepiratMicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask 

Upon running the PowerShell script inside the ANY.RUN sandbox, we can see the files being created and executed. We can also gather more information about the command and control (C2) infrastructure.

Figure 28: Files created by the Powershell script 
Figure 29: C2 Ip and DNS 

Conclusion 

Our investigation uncovered two IPs actively spreading AsyncRAT through different methods. The first method follows a multi-stage process, employing several files and scripts to complete the infection.  

The second method uses only two stages, one of which involves generating files that are triggered by a scheduled task, as shown in the image below: 

Figure 30: Difference between two methods 

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IOCs

23.26.108.141  Open Directory IP 
fsp.txt  7b73596346a36f83b6b540bfc2b779fec228a050e6d7de631d0518b526b9b128 
zohre.jpg  561bb05d2c67fe221646b5af653ef7d1e7e552e6745f980385bd344d8155df0f 
AsyncRAT.exe  70733e5f26a5b4d8c3d2bcc9a21cd015cee63dc0f93c819e7c401237f69967fe 
AsyncRAT.dll  2c6c4cd045537e2586eab73072d790af362e37e6d4112b1d01f15574491296b8 
storeroot[.]duckdns[.]org  Command and Control 
45.126.208.245  Open Directory IP 
nkXhhzeT6H6bxJcU.txt  20b15104f0afc362126f43c0b8628bced3cdecec768bcde79e60ff094c108f8a 
aaaNOOTKiiiLAViiiiOOs.bat   73e945f14db13a00fe72b5c2a20233e3bb98816bb31d035e0776b92246f681bc 
KiLOvBeRNdautESaatnENn.ps1  f0d190d78b3ed7d83cc30224cd55bc158bdd5c40ec7b1f0108ee27afa1996ab1  
KKguLavTEsaaEtneeNARdeP.ps1  29e93b2eac97547386f435811ccf0531ad0df62fd5f021e7e5ea90b2f1f2d69a  
KKKKKKllLavIOOOOOtesAA.bat  d5ca45ab8c9c9e6f932e9500836bd8cd725c4739dafe80a5d41e29389c3d69f3  
TesKKKeLAvaYdAfbBS.vbs  b1b67754391f0598e86254ad8c3a5741b70472138c1fa1be439be788c682345e  
UhLQoyDAMaCUTPaE.vbs  2b312c476ccf036b5339f023a732ddf1aef3f193f59b304ba8089872bae47540 
AsyncRAT.exe  d4edb13aa499b39b74912a30c22a1cba6d00694dcb68fa542bdc3d9ab2b66f68 
AsyncRAT.dll  5b1b7bd1fadfc3d2abcd8ea8f863fe96233e1dac8b994311c6a331179243b5cd 
anothonesevenfivesecsned[.]ddns[.]net  Command and Control 

The post AsyncRAT’s Infection Tactics <br>via Open Directories: Technical Analysis  appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog – ​Read More

Tor Browser and anonymity: what you need to know | Kaspersky official blog

The desire to remain anonymous online is as old as the internet itself. In the past, users believed hiding behind a nickname meant they could badmouth their neighbors on local forums with impunity. Now, such trolls can be identified in seconds. Since those early days, technology has taken a quantum leap: distributed networks, anonymous browsers, and other privacy tools have emerged. One of these tools, which was heavily promoted a decade ago by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, is the Tor Browser, where “TOR” is an acronym for “The Onion Router”.

But in today’s world, can Tor truly provide complete anonymity? And if it doesn’t, should we just forget all about anonymity and rely on a regular browser like Google Chrome?

How Tor users are deanonymized

If Tor is new to you, check out our vintage article from way back when. There, we answered some common questions: how the browser ensures anonymity, who needs it, and what people usually do on the dark web. In brief, Tor anonymizes user traffic through a distributed network of servers, called nodes. All network traffic is repeatedly encrypted as it passes through a number of nodes between two communicating computers. No single node knows both the origin and destination addresses of a data packet, nor can it access the packet’s content. OK, short digression over — now let’s turn to the real security threats facing anonymity enthusiasts.

In September, German intelligence services identified a Tor user. How did they do it? The key to their success was data obtained through what’s called “timing analysis”.

How does this analysis work? Law enforcement agencies monitor Tor exit nodes (the final nodes in the chains that send traffic to its destination). The more Tor nodes the authorities monitor, the greater the chance a user hiding their connection will use one of those monitored nodes. Then, by timing individual data packets and correlating this information with ISP data, law enforcement can trace anonymous connections back to the end Tor user — even though all Tor traffic is encrypted multiple times.

The operation described above, which led to the arrest of the administrator of a child sexual abuse platform, was possible partly because Germany hosts the highest number of Tor exit nodes — around 700. The Netherlands ranks second with about 400, and the US comes in third with around 350. Other countries have anywhere from a few to a few dozen. International cooperation among these top exit-node countries played a significant role in deanonymizing the child sexual abuse offender. Logically, the more nodes a country has, the more of them can be state-monitored, increasing the likelihood of catching criminals.

Germany and the Netherlands are among the leaders on the number of Tor exit nodes — not only in Europe but worldwide.

Germany and the Netherlands are among the leaders on the number of Tor exit nodes — not only in Europe but worldwide. Source

The Tor Project responded with a blog post discussing the safety of their browser. It concludes that it’s still safe: the de-anonymized individual was a criminal (why else would authorities be interested?), using an outdated version of Tor and the Ricochet messaging app. However, Tor noted it wasn’t given access to the case files, so their interpretation regarding the security of their own browser might not be definitive.

This kind of story isn’t new; the problem of timing attacks has long been known to the Tor Project, intelligence agencies, and researchers. So although the attack method is well-known, it remains possible, and most likely, more criminals will be identified through timing analysis in the future. However, this method isn’t the only one: in 2015, our experts conducted extensive research detailing other ways to attack Tor users. Even if some of these methods have become outdated in the forms presented in that study, the principles of these attacks remain unchanged.

“Generally it is impossible to have perfect anonymity, even with Tor”.

This phrase opens the “Am I totally anonymous if I use Tor?” section of the Tor Browser support page. Here, the developers provide tips, but these tips can at best only increase the chances of remaining anonymous:

  • Control what information you provide through web forms. Users are advised against logging in to personal accounts on social networks, as well as posting their real names, email addresses, phone numbers, and other similar information on forums.
  • Don’t torrent over Tor. Torrent programs often bypass proxy settings and prefer direct connections, which can de-anonymize all traffic — including Tor.
  • Don’t enable or install browser plugins. This advice also applies to regular browsers, as there are many dangerous extensions out there.
  • Use HTTPS versions of websites. This recommendation, incidentally, applies to all internet users.
  • Don’t open documents downloaded through Tor while online. Such documents, the Tor Project warns, may contain malicious exploits.

With all these recommendations, the Tor Project is essentially issuing a disclaimer: “Our browser is anonymous, but if you misuse it, you may still be exposed”. And this actually makes sense — your level of anonymity online depends primarily on your actions as a user — not solely on the technical capabilities of the browser or any other tool.

There is another interesting section on the Tor support page: “What attacks remain against onion routing?” It specifically mentions possible attacks using timing analysis with the note that “Tor does not defend against such a threat model”. However, in a post about the German user’s de-anonymization, the developers claim that an add-on called Vanguard, designed to protect against timing attacks, has been included in Tor Browser since 2018, and in Ricochet-Refresh since June 2022. This discrepancy suggests one of two things: either the Tor Project hasn’t updated its documentation, or it’s being somewhat disingenuous. Both are problematic because they can mislead users.

So what about anonymity?

It’s important to remember that Tor Browser can’t guarantee 100% anonymity. At the same time, switching to other tools built on a similar distributed node network structure is pointless, as they are equally vulnerable to timing attacks.

If you’re a law-abiding individual using anonymous browsing simply to avoid intrusive contextual ads, secretly shop for gifts for loved ones, and for other similarly harmless purposes, the private browsing mode in any regular browser will probably suffice. This mode, of course, doesn’t offer the same level of anonymity as Tor and its counterparts, but it can make surfing the net a bit more… well, private. Just make sure you fully understand how this mode works in different browsers, and what it can and can’t protect you from.

In addition, all of our home security solutions include Private Browsing. By default, this feature detects attempts to collect data and logs them in a report but doesn’t block them. To block data collection, you need to either enable Block data collection in the Kaspersky app or activate the Kaspersky Protection plugin directly in the browser.

Besides this, our protection can also block ads, prevent the hidden installation of unwanted apps, detect and remove stalkerware and adware, and remove traces of your activity in the operating system. Meanwhile, the special component Safe Money provides maximum protection for all financial operations by conducting them in a protected browser in an isolated environment and preventing other apps from gaining unauthorized access to the clipboard or taking screenshots.

Double VPN

You can also stay anonymous on the internet using Kaspersky VPN Secure Connection that support Double VPN (also known as multi-hop). As the name suggests, this technology allows you to create a chain of two VPN servers in different parts of the world: your traffic first passes through an intermediary server, and then through another. Double VPN in Kaspersky VPN Secure Connection uses nested encryption — the encrypted tunnel between the client and the destination server runs inside a second encrypted tunnel between the client and the intermediary server. Encryption in both cases is only performed on the client side, and data is not decrypted on the intermediary server. This provides an additional layer of security and anonymity.

Double VPN is available to users of Windows and Mac versions of Kaspersky VPN Secure Connection. Before enabling Double VPN, make sure that the Catapult Hydra protocol is selected in the application settings: Main → Settings (gear icon) → Protocol → Select automatically, or Catapult Hydra.

After that, you can enable Double VPN:

  1. Open the main application window.
  2. Click the Location drop-down to open the list of locations of VPN servers.
  3. Click the Double VPN
  4. Select two locations and click Connect.

You can add your Double VPN server pair to Favorites by clicking the Add to Favorites button.

How to enable Double VPN in Kaspersky VPN Secure Connection

How to enable Double VPN in Kaspersky VPN Secure Connection

Congratulations! Now your traffic is encrypted more securely than usual — but remember that these traffic encryption methods are not intended for illegal activities. Double VPN will help you conceal personal information from data-gathering sites, avoid undesirable ads, and access resources unavailable in your current location.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

Jane Goodall: Reasons for hope | Starmus highlights

The trailblazing scientist shares her reasons for hope in the fight against climate change and how we can tackle seemingly impossible problems and keep going in the face of adversity

WeLiveSecurity – ​Read More

New 2024 NIST requirements for password strength and storage

The requirements set by online services for user verification — whether it’s password length, a mandatory phone number, or biometric checks with blinking — are often governed by industry standards. One of the most important documents in this field are the NIST SP 800-63 Digital Identity Guidelines, developed by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This standard is mandatory for all US government agencies and their contractors; in practice, this means that all the world’s largest IT companies adhere to this standard, with consequences reaching far beyond the borders of the United States.

Even organizations that aren’t strictly required to comply with NIST SP 800-63 would still benefit from familiarizing themselves with these updated guidelines, as they often serve as a blueprint for regulators in other countries and industries. The recent update, developed through four rounds of public revisions with industry experts, reflects the latest understanding of digital identification and authentication. It covers security and privacy requirements, and considers a possible distributed (federated) approach. The standard is practical, and factors in human considerations — how users respond to various authentication requirements.

This new edition formalizes concepts, and outlines requirements for:

  • passkeys (referred to in the standard as “syncable authenticators”);
  • phishing-resistant authentication;
  • user storage of passwords and accesses (“attribute bundles”);
  • regular re-authentication;
  • session tokens.

So — how to authenticate users in 2024?

Password authentication

The standard defines three Authentication Assurance Levels (AALs). AAL1 allows the least restrictions and minimal confidence that the user is indeed who they claim to be, while AAL3 offers the strongest guarantees and requires more stringent authentication. Only AAL1 permits single-factor authentication — such as just a single password.

The requirements for passwords are as follows:

  • Only centrally verified secrets sent by the user to the server over a secure channel qualify as passwords. Passwords that are stored and verified locally are termed “activation secrets” and have different requirements.
  • Passwords shorter than eight characters are prohibited, with a minimum of 15 characters recommended.
  • Scheduled, mandatory password rotation is considered an outdated practice and therefore prohibited.
  • It’s also prohibited to impose requirements on password composition (such as “your password must contain a letter, a number, and a symbol”).
  • It’s recommended to allow using any visible ASCII characters, spaces, and most Unicode symbols (such as emojis).
  • Maximum password length, if enforced, must be at least 64 characters.
  • Truncating passwords during verification is prohibited, but trimming leading/trailing whitespace is allowed if it interferes with authentication.
  • Using and storing password hints or security questions (such as “your mother’s maiden name”) is prohibited.
  • Commonly used passwords must be eliminated through the use of a stop-list of popular or leaked passwords.
  • Compromised passwords (for example, appearing in data breaches) must be reset immediately.
  • Login attempts must be limited in both rate and number of unsuccessful attempts.

Activation secrets

These are PINs and local passwords that restrict access to the on-device key storage. They can be numeric, with a recommended minimum length of six digits— though four digits are permissible. For AAL3, the primary cryptographic secret (for example, a passkey) must be stored in a tamper-resistant chip, and decrypted using the activation secret. For AAL1 and AAL2, it’s enough that the key restricts access from outsiders, with a limit on input attempts — no more than 10 tries. After exceeding the limit, the storage is locked, requiring an alternative authentication method.

Multi-factor authentication (MFA)

It’s recommended to implement MFA at all AAL levels, but while this is only a suggestion for AAL1, it’s mandatory for AAL2, and only phishing-resistant MFA methods are acceptable for AAL3.

Only cryptographic authentication methods are considered phishing-resistant: USB tokens, passkeys, and cryptographic keys stored in digital wallets conforming to SP 800-63C (distributed identification and authentication services). All cryptographic secrets must be stored in tamper-resistant systems (such as TPM or Secure Enclave). Synchronizing keys across devices and storing them in the cloud is permitted, provided each device meets the standard’s requirements. These provisions enable the use of passkeys across Android and iOS ecosystems.

To ensure resistance to phishing, authentication must be tied to the communication channel (channel binding) or verifier service name (verifier name binding). Examples of these approaches include client-authenticated TLS connections and the WebAuthn protocol from the FIDO2 specification. In simple terms, the client uses cryptography to confirm they’re connecting with the legitimate server rather than a fake one set up for AitM attacks.

Time-based one-time passwords (TOTP) from authenticator apps, SMS codes, and one-time codes from scratch cards or envelopes are not phishing-resistant but are permitted for AAL1 and AAL2 services. The standard specifies which methods for handling one-time codes don’t qualify as MFA and must be avoided. One-time codes should not be sent through email or VoIP — they must be delivered over a communication channel that’s separate from the primary authentication process. OTPs sent through SMS and traditional telephone lines are acceptable — even if both connections (for example, internet and SMS) are on the same device.

Use of biometrics

The standard restricts the use of biometrics — they may serve as an authentication factor, but are prohibited for identification. Biometric checks must be used only as a supplemental factor combined with proof of possession (for example, a smartphone or token — something you physically possess).

Biometric equipment and algorithms must ensure a false match rate (FMR) no greater than 1 in 10,000, and a false non-match rate (FNMR) no greater than 5%. These accuracy rates must be consistent across all demographics. The verification algorithm must also be resistant to presentation attacks in which the sensor is shown a photo or video instead of a live person.

After generating and verifying a cryptographic “fingerprint” from biometric data, the standard mandates immediate deletion (zeroing out) of collected biometric data.

Like other authentication methods, biometric checks must include limits on input rate and the number of unsuccessful attempts.

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