Overview

The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) has issued two critical vulnerability advisories related to Philips Smart Lighting products and the Matrix Door Controller. Both vulnerabilities are classified as high severity, signaling significant risks for users that cannot be ignored. If left unaddressed, these vulnerabilities could lead to serious repercussions, including unauthorized access to sensitive information and potential data breaches.

The implications of these vulnerabilities extend beyond mere inconvenience; they threaten the security and integrity of users’ home networks and connected devices. Affected users must take immediate action to protect their systems and ensure they are not exposed to potential exploitation.

By staying informed and implementing the recommended security measures stated in these vulnerability advisories, users can help mitigate these risks and protect their personal information from malicious actors.

Breakdown of Vulnerability Advisories

The first vulnerability advisory, labeled CIVN-2024-0329, addresses a vulnerability that impacts various Philips smart lighting devices. Specifically, the affected products include the Philips Smart Wi-Fi LED Batten 24-Watt, the Philips Smart Wi-Fi LED T Beamer 20-Watt, and the Philips Smart Bulb models (9, 10, and 12-Watt), as well as the Philips Smart T-Bulb models (10 and 12-Watt).  

All of these devices are at risk if they are operating on firmware versions prior to 1.33.1. The vulnerability arises from the storage of sensitive information, specifically Wi-Fi credentials, in cleartext within the firmware of these devices. This flaw allows an attacker with physical access to the device to extract the firmware and analyze the binary data, ultimately revealing the plaintext Wi-Fi credentials.  

Once obtained, these credentials could enable unauthorized access to the Wi-Fi network, jeopardizing the security of other connected devices and private information. Shravan Singh, Amey Chavekar, Vishal Giri, and Dr. Faruk Kazi, a team of researchers from the CoE-CNDS Lab at VJTI Mumbai, India, reported this vulnerability. 

To mitigate this vulnerability, CERT-In strongly advises users to upgrade their Philips Smart Wi-Fi LED Batten, LED T Beamer, Smart Bulb, and Smart T-Bulb to firmware version 1.33.1 or later. This update will secure the devices against potential exploitation.

The second advisory, CIVN-2024-0328, addresses an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Matrix Door Controller Cosec Vega FAXQ. This vulnerability affects all firmware versions prior to V2R17.

The flaw in the Matrix Door Controller is attributed to improper implementation of session management within its web-based management interface. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted HTTP requests to the device, potentially gaining unauthorized access and complete control over it.

If exploited, this vulnerability could compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system. While there is currently no evidence of public proof-of-concept exploitation, the potential risks remain significant, warranting immediate attention from users.

Recommendations and Mitigation Strategies

To protect against these two vulnerabilities, users are urged to follow these mitigations and mitigation strategies, as reported by the vulnerability advisories.

Ensure that better authentication mechanisms are in place for the web-based management interface.

Limit access to the Matrix Door Controller devices through effective network segmentation.

Regularly monitor and log all access attempts to these devices to detect any unauthorized activity.

Apply any security updates or patches provided by the vendor as soon as they are available.

Consider deploying a web application firewall (WAF) to protect against malicious HTTP requests.

Conclusion

The vulnerability advisories issued by CERT-In related to the technical flaws in Philips Smart Lighting products and the Matrix Door Controller highlight the sophistication of cyber threats and the importance of maintaining updated firmware. As smart devices become increasingly integrated into everyday life, ensuring their security is important.

Users of the affected Philips lighting devices are strongly encouraged to upgrade to firmware version 1.33.1, while Matrix Door Controller users should promptly move to firmware version V2R17. Adopting these updates and implementing the recommended security measures will help mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities and enhance overall cybersecurity resilience.

The post New Vulnerabilities Identified in Philips Smart Lighting and Matrix Door Controller appeared first on Cyble.

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Identifying new cyber threats is no simple task. They’re always evolving, adapting, and finding new ways to slip through the defenses.  

But no stress—ANY.RUN has you covered! 

Our team of researchers are always on the lookout, analyzing the latest attacks to keep you informed.  

In this article, we’re sharing some of the most recent threats our team has uncovered over the past month. Let’s dive in and see what’s out there! 

APT-C-36, aka BlindEagle, Campaign in LATAM 

Original post on X

APT-C-36, better known as BlindEagle, is a group that has been actively targeting the LATAM region for years. Their primary goal? To gain remote control of victims’ devices through continuous phishing attacks, installing Remote Access Tools (RATs) like Remcos and AsyncRAT for financial gain. 

Attack details 

We discovered that in recent cases attackers invite victims to an online court hearing via email. This official-sounding invitation creates a sense of urgency, pushing the target to download the malicious payload. 

You can view analysis of this attack inside ANY.RUN’s sandbox.

To deliver their malware, BlindEagle often relies on well-known online services, such as:  

Discord

Google Drive

Bitbucket  

Pastee  

YDRAY

This tactic helps them bypass certain security filters since these services are typically trusted by users. 

The malicious payload is stored in the archive, which is usually protected by a password that can be found in the initial email.

Thanks to ANY.RUN’s interactivity, you can manually enter the password right inside the sandbox.

As mentioned, BlindEagle use Remcos and AsyncRAT as their primary tools for remote access. The current attack involved Remcos distribution.

In the current analysis session, we observed a Remcos RAT connection attempting communication with a Command and Control (C2) server.  

This activity involves establishing TLS connection to an external server, which was immediately flagged by a Suricata IDS rule in the ANY.RUN sandbox. 

Threat Intelligence on APT-C-36 attacks 

To collect intel on other attacks belonging to BlindEagle’s campaigns, you can use ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup: 

Specify the country from where the phishing sample originated: 
submissionCountry:”Co” 

Filter for sessions that involve an email client, like Outlook: 
commandLine:”OUTLOOK.EXE” 

Since the payload is often stored in an archive, filter for an archiving tool, such as WinRAR: 
commandLine:”WinRAR” 

Look for sessions flagged as suspicious or malicious: 
threatLevel:”malicious” 

To find active RATs like Remcos, add a condition for Remote Access Tools: 
threatName:”rat” 

Here is the final query:

The search takes just a few seconds and reveals a wealth of information.

TI Lookup offers a list of samples matching the query each with their corresponding sandbox analysis. You can navigate to any sandbox session of your interest to explore these threats further.

Fake CAPTCHA Exploitation to Deliver Lumma 

Original post on X

Another phishing campaign discovered by ANY.RUN’s team exploited fake CAPTCHA prompts to execute malicious code, delivering Lumma malware onto victims’ systems. 

Attack details

In this phishing attack, victims were lured to a compromised website and asked to complete a CAPTCHA. They either needed to verify their human identity or fix non-existent display errors on the page. 

Once the user clicked the fake CAPTCHA button, the attackers prompted them to copy and run a malicious PowerShell script through the Windows “Run” function (WIN+R).

The instruction deceived users into executing harmful code, leading to system infection with Lumma malware for further exploitation.

More samples of the campaign

For further investigation into attacks leveraging fake CAPTCHA prompts, you can use ANY.RUN’s TI Lookup to locate additional samples and associated data.

As part of your search query, you can use a domain involved in the attack:

This query reveals multiple related domains, IP addresses, and sandbox sessions tied to the attacks outlined above.

Abuse of Encoded JavaScript

Original post on X

We also identified a growing use of encoded JavaScript files for hidden script execution.

Microsoft originally developed Script Encoder as a way for developers to obfuscate JavaScript and VBScript, making the code unreadable while remaining functional through interpreters like wscript.

Intended as a protective measure, Script Encoder has also become a resource for attackers. By encoding harmful JavaScript in .jse files, cybercriminals can embed malware in scripts that look legitimate, tricking users into running the malicious code. 

This type of obfuscation not only conceals the code but also complicates detection, as security tools struggle to identify the harmful intent within encrypted data. 

Encoded .jse files are commonly delivered through phishing emails or drive-by-downloads.  

See analysis of a .jse file disguised as a calculator software in the ANY.RUN sandbox.

Using the built-in Script Tracer feature, you can view entire script execution process to avoid manual decryption.

Conclusion

Our analysts are constantly on the lookout for emerging phishing and malware attacks, as well as new malicious techniques used by cyber criminals. To stay updated on the latest research of ANY.RUN’s team, make sure to follow us on X, LinkedIn, YouTube, Facebook, and other social media.

About ANY.RUN  

ANY.RUN helps more than 500,000 cybersecurity professionals worldwide. Our interactive sandbox simplifies malware analysis of threats that target both Windows and Linux systems. Our threat intelligence products, TI Lookup, YARA Search and Feeds, help you find IOCs or files to learn more about the threats and respond to incidents faster.  

With ANY.RUN you can: 

Detect malware in seconds

Interact with samples in real time

Save time and money on sandbox setup and maintenance 

Record and study all aspects of malware behavior

Collaborate with your team 

Scale as you need

Request free trial → 

The post Recent Cyber Attacks Discovered by ANY.RUN: October 2024 appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

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Key takeaways

Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) came across an ongoing cyberattack campaign originating from malicious LNK files.

The sophisticated multi-stage attack chain relies heavily on PowerShell and BAT scripts to streamline the download and execution of additional payloads, demonstrating the Threat Actor’s (TA) preference for script-based methods to evade detection by traditional security solutions.

The attack involves the creation of an administrative account on the victim’s system and altering Remote Desktop settings to lower authentication requirements, simplifying unauthorized RDP access for the attacker.

The campaign deploys an additional well-known password recovery tool, ChromePass, which collects saved passwords from Chromium-based browsers, increasing the risk of broader account compromises.

Based on its TTPs, we have not been able to attribute this campaign, so for tracking purposes, we are naming it “HeptaX”.

Overview

CRIL has come across a multi-stage cyberattack campaign that begins with a ZIP file containing a malicious shortcut file (.lnk). While the source of this ZIP file remains unknown, it is suspected to be disseminated through phishing emails. Based on the LNK file name, it is suspected that this campaign targets the healthcare industry.

Upon execution, the LNK file triggers a PowerShell command that downloads and executes a series of additional payloads, including PowerShell scripts and BAT files, from a remote server. These scripts work in tandem to create a new user account on the compromised system with administrative privileges and modify Terminal Services (RDP) settings, lowering authentication requirements. This setup enables the TAs to easily establish remote desktop access (RDP) to the victim’s system, facilitating further malicious activities such as data exfiltration, the installation of additional malware, or even system monitoring.

Furthermore, CRIL identified the presence of an unwanted application called “ChromePass” within the threat actors’ network infrastructure. This hacking tool is designed to steal saved passwords from Chromium-based browsers, adding another layer of risk for victims by exposing their credentials. The image below illustrates the infection chain.

Based on the information obtained through pivoting, this group has been operational since 2023 and has executed a range of attacks across different sectors, as reflected in the names of the lure files. While the overall attack flow has remained consistent, it is surprising that they are still active using the same techniques. Several researchers have previously identified this campaign [1],[2],[3],[4],[5], with the majority of findings shared by the Malware Hunter Team.

Campaign analysis

Over the past 12 months, this unidentified group has consistently reemerged with various lure themes while maintaining unchanged attack patterns. Tracked as HeptaX,’ the campaign relies heavily on PowerShell and Batch scripts to gain control over compromised systems. By pivoting the IP address, we uncovered several additional artifacts associated with the same TAs used across different campaigns.

One of the notable files from this campaign is:

202409_Resident_Care_Quality_Improvement_Strategies_for_Nursing_Homes_Enhancing_Patient_Satisfaction_and_Health_Outcomes.pdf.lnk

In addition, older campaigns attributed to this threat group over the past year include malicious files with names such as:

SOW_for_Nevrlate.pdf

WebContentWriting_Handout.pdf

Blockchain_Trading_Website_Manager.docx

Project Description – PoC smart assistant Vhyro Project from jvope signature.pdf

Resume – professional sax, keys and guitar player with over 40 years experience working with own bands, accompanied world stars.pdf

dropshipping Elien project prposal-soft online service ventilization from xihu.pdf.lnk

The diversity in file names and themes suggests that this group tailors its campaigns to appeal to a variety of victims, indicating a broad targeting strategy across multiple industries.

Technical Analysis

 Upon execution, the LNK file runs a PowerShell command that downloads and executes subsequent payloads from a remote server. The image below shows a partially de-obfuscated PowerShell command.

First stage – bb.ps1

As an initial step, the downloaded PowerShell script constructs a base URL to which it sends information and from which it downloads other stage payloads. The PowerShell script contains multiple functions, the first of which retrieves a unique identifier (UID) for the compromised system. This UID is obtained either from a specific registry path (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWAREWireless) or from a log file (id.log) in the “C:UsersPublicDocuments” directory. If neither exists, a new GUID is generated and saved to a newly created id.log file.

Next, the PowerShell script creates a shortcut file in the Windows Startup folder for persistence. The contents of the newly generated LNK file match those of the original malicious LNK file. The image below shows the function responsible for creating the new LNK file in the startup folder.

Then, the PowerShell script constructs a URL by appending the previously generated UID to the remote server, forming the request hxxp://157.173.104.153/up/get-command.php?uid=<UID>, and uses WebClient to send a request to fetch commands from the server. Upon receiving a successful response, it checks whether the response contains the string “autoreconnect”. If this string is present, the Powershell script runs the code in the current session using `iex`; otherwise, it executes the code as a background task in a separate PowerShell process.

Afterward, the PowerShell script downloads a password-protected lure document from the above-mentioned remote server, saves it in the system’s temporary directory “C:Users<Username>AppDataLocalTemp”, and then launches the document. The image below displays the function code and the open directory containing the lure PDF.

Finally, the PowerShell script retrieves two registry values related to User Account Control (UAC):

HKLM:SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPoliciesSystemConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin, which controls the consent prompt behavior for administrators.

HKLM:SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPoliciesSystemEnableLUA, which indicates whether UAC is enabled.

If either of these values is 0, suggesting that UAC is either disabled or configured to a less secure setting, the script proceeds to download and execute another PowerShell script (b.ps1) from the remote server.

Second Stage – b.ps1

The newly downloaded second-stage PowerShell script includes several functions, some mirroring those from the first stage. The primary function of this script is focused on evaluating the system’s User Account Control (UAC) settings, utilizing the same registry checks employed earlier to determine whether UAC is enabled and if the consent prompt for administrators remains active.

If UAC is disabled or the consent prompt behavior is configured to a less secure state, the function sends a message to the remote server indicating that UAC is off by default: (“hxxp://157.173.104[.]153/up/index.php?uid=$uid&msg=UAC off in default!”).

If both settings are enabled, the function enters a loop, repeatedly attempting to disable UAC by setting the “ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin” value to 0. Once successful, it sends a message to the remote server stating that UAC has been forcefully disabled: (“hxxp://157.173.104[.]153/up/index.php?uid=$uid&msg=UAC force disabled!”). The below image shows the function code responsible for sending a POST request to the remote server, transmitting information about the victim’s User Account Control (UAC) status.

After a brief 300-millisecond sleep, the PowerShell script calls the schReg() function, which downloads three batch files from the remote server into the system’s temporary directory ($env:TEMP). The files are named “k1.bat,” “scheduler-once.bat,” and “k2.bat.” After downloading, the script runs the “scheduler-once.bat” file using the “Start-Process” cmdlet with elevated privileges. The image below shows the code responsible for downloading and executing the batch files.

Third Stage – scheduler-once.bat

The executed batch file copies “k1.bat” and “k2.bat” from the %temp% directory to “C:WindowsSystem32”, renaming them to “sysmon.bat” and “sysmon2.bat”. It then deletes the original “k1.bat” and “k2.bat” files from the temp location. Next, the batch file checks for and removes any scheduled tasks named:

Intel(R) Ethernet Connection 1219-LM

Intel(R) Ethernet2 Connection 1219-LM

Afterward, it creates a new scheduled task called “Intel(R) Ethernet2 Connection 1219-LM” to run “sysmon2.bat”. Finally, the script “scheduler-once.bat” deletes itself to cover its traces from the system. The image below displays the contents of the batch file “scheduler-once.bat”.

Fourth Stage – sysmon2.bat

Once the scheduled task is triggered to execute the “sysmon2.bat” file, it first checks for and removes any existing scheduled tasks named:

Intel(R) Ethernet Connection 1219-LM2

Intel(R) Ethernet2 Connection 1219-LM2

Afterward, it creates a new scheduled task called “Intel(R) Ethernet2 Connection1219-LM2” to run the “sysmon.bat” file located in the “C:WindowsSystem32” folder. Notably, the previous third-stage batch file performs similar checks, but the task names differ slightly. The image below shows the content of the “sysmon2.bat” file.

Fifth Stage – Sysmon.bat

The sysmon.bat script executes a series of actions:

Creates a new user account named “_BootUEFI_”.

Sets the password for this newly added account to “123456!!!” and activates it.

Adds the “_BootUEFI_” account to the Administrators group, granting it administrative privileges.

Adds the “_BootUEFI_” account to the Remote Desktop Users group, allowing it to utilize Remote Desktop.

Removes the “_BootUEFI_” account from the Users group, ensuring it retains only administrative and remote desktop privileges.

Additionally, the batch file makes several registry modifications to enable Remote Desktop and lower its security features. This includes hiding the “_BootUEFI_” user from the login screen and adjusting Terminal Services (Remote Desktop) settings to facilitate easier remote connections without stringent authentication requirements.

The batch file runs a PowerShell command that circumvents execution policy restrictions and adds the System32 directory, which contains the three malicious batch files, to the Windows Defender exclusion list.

Finally, it initiates a background PowerShell process that downloads and executes another PowerShell script from the remote server (hxxp://157.173.104[.]153/up/a.ps1).

Sixth Stage – a.ps1

The newly downloaded PowerShell script “a.ps1” functions similar to the first stage script (bb.ps1). It constructs a URL by appending the previously generated UID to the remote server address, forming a request to “hxxp://157.173.104.153/up/get-command.php?uid=<UID>”.

The script then utilizes a WebClient to send a request and retrieve commands from the server. Upon receiving a response, it checks for the presence of the string “autoreconnect id.” If this string is found, the PowerShell script executes the code in the current session using iex; otherwise, it runs the code as a background task in a separate PowerShell process. Notably, in both stages, we did not receive any specific commands such as “autoreconnect” or “autoreconnect id”. The main difference in this sixth-stage script is that it looks for the string “autoreconnect id” instead of just “autoreconnect”. The below image shows the code for reconnecting to the server.

Seventh Stage – Server response PowerShell Script

Upon establishing a connection with the server, a new PowerShell script is executed. This script contains several functions aimed at system reconnaissance, data exfiltration, and interaction with the remote server.

The script collects detailed system information, including:

Computer name and username.

Retrieves recent files from the directory: C:Users<user profile>AppDataRoamingMicrosoftWindowsRecent.

Acquires network configuration details using “ipconfig /all”.

List of users on the machine (net user).

Obtains current logged-in user details.

Identifies local user groups associated with the current user.

Retrieves excluded directories in Windows Defender.

Lists installed antivirus products.

Captures running processes using “tasklist”.

Gathers overall system information using “systeminfo”.

All this data is saved in a log file located at “C:WindowsTempOneDriveLogOneDrive.log”.

The script then reads the contents of the log file, converts the data into a byte array, and encodes it in Base64 format. This encoded data, along with the unique user ID (uid), is appended to the base URL” hxxp://157.173.104[.]153/up/index.php” and sent via a POST request. After successfully transmitting the data, the log file and its directory are deleted to eliminate any traces of the data collection.

Taking Remote desktop

With all the collected information, User Account Control (UAC) disabled, and a new user account named “BootUEFI” created with administrative privileges, along with lowered authentication requirements for Terminal Services, the TAs can easily gain access to the compromised remote desktop. This access enables them to perform various actions on the victim’s machine, such as:

Installing additional malware

Exfiltrating sensitive data

Monitoring user activity

Modifying system settings

Utilizing the machine for malicious activities

Additionally, we observed an unwanted application—a hacking tool named ChromePass—associated with the same network infrastructure at “hxxp://157.173.104[.]153/up/Tool/ChromePass.exe” This tool is designed to steal saved passwords from Chromium-based browsers.

Conclusion

Over the past year, this group has executed multiple attacks utilizing various lures and targeting different victims, all while remaining largely unnoticed. Their reliance on basic scripts has enabled TAs to gain remote access to compromised systems seamlessly, allowing for extensive exploitation without triggering alarms.

Additionally, the deployment of the ChromePass tool further underscores the group’s intent to harvest sensitive information, such as saved passwords from Chromium-based browsers, thereby posing a significant threat to the security of individuals and organizations alike. This combination of tactics highlights the need for enhanced detection and prevention measures to combat these stealthy cyber threats effectively.

Recommendations

The initial breach may occur via spam emails. Therefore, it’s advisable to deploy strong email filtering systems to identify and prevent the dissemination of harmful attachments.

Exercise caution when handling email attachments or links, particularly those from unknown senders. Verify the sender’s identity, particularly if an email seems suspicious.

Consider disabling the execution of shortcut files (.lnk) from email attachments or implementing policies that require explicit user consent before executing such files.

Consider disabling or limiting the execution of scripting languages, such as PowerShell and cmd.exe, on user workstations and servers if they are not essential for legitimate purposes.

Implement policies that prevent the unauthorized creation of privileged accounts.

Regularly track changes to User Account Control (UAC)- related registry keys, such as “EnableLUA” and “ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin.” Monitoring these keys helps identify potential attempts to bypass UAC, enhancing system protection against unauthorized changes.

Strengthen the security of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by enforcing strong authentication mechanisms, such as multi-factor authentication (MFA), and by using network-level authentication (NLA). Limiting RDP access to trusted IP addresses and utilizing VPNs can also help mitigate risks.

Set up network-level monitoring to detect unusual activities or data exfiltration by malware. Block suspicious activities to prevent potential breaches.

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques

Tactic
Technique
Procedure

Initial Access (TA0001)
Phishing (T1566)
The LNK file may be delivered through phishing or spam emails

Execution (TA0002)
User Execution:  Malicious Link (T1204.001)    Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001)
  Execution begins when a user executes the LNK file     The LNK file executes PowerShell commands

Defense Evasion (TA0005) 
Obfuscated Files or  
Information (T1027)   
Scripts include packed or encrypted data.

Persistence (TA0003)
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001)
Adds LNK file in the startup folder

Privilege  
Escalation 
(TA0004) 
Abuse Elevation Control  Mechanism (T1548)    Account Manipulation (T1098)
Bypass User Account Control      Manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems.

Discovery (TA0007)
System Information Discovery (T1082)
Script gathers system information.

Credential Access (TA0006)
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) 
Retrieves credentials from web browsers 

C&C 
(TA0011) 
Ingress Tool Transfer 
(T1105) 
Downloads files from webservers via  
HTTP 

C&C 
(TA0011) 
Application Layer Protocol 
(T1071) 
Malware exe communicate to C&C server. 

Indicators Of Compromise

Indicators 
Indicator Type
Description

6605178dbc4d84e789e435915e86a01c5735f34b7d18d626b2d8810456c4bc72
SHA256
Zip File

18e75bababa1176ca1b25f727c0362e4bb31ffc19c17e2cabb6519e6ef9d2fe5 5ff89db10969cba73d1f539b12dad42c60314e580ce43d7b57b46a1f915a6a2b
SHA256
Malicious LNK file

1d82927ab19db7e9f418fe6b83cf61187d19830b9a7f58072eedfd9bdf628dab
SHA256
bb.ps1

a8d577bf773f753dfb6b95a3ef307f8b4d9ae17bf86b95dcbb6b2fb638a629b9
SHA256
b.ps1

999f521ac605427945035a6d0cd0a0847f4a79413a4a7b738309795fd21d3432
SHA256
K1.bat

4b127e7b83148bfbe56bd83e4b95b2a4fdb69e1c9fa4e0c021a3bfb7b02d8a16
SHA256
GooglePass

hxxp://157.173.104[.]153/up/index.php hxxp://157[.]173.104.153/up/b.ps1 hxxp://157.173.104[.]153/up/bb.ps1 hxxp://157.173.104[.]153/up/scheduler-oncex
hxxp://157.173.104[.]153/up/trigger
hxxp://157.173.104[.]153/up/Tool/ChromePass.exe
hxxp://157.173.104[.]153/up/get-command.php
hxxp://157.173.104[.]153/up/bait/202409_Resident_Care_Quality_Improvement_Strategies_for_Nursing_Homes_Enhancing_Patient_Satisfaction_and_Health_Outcomes.pdf
URL
Remote server

References

"Project Description.rar": 3778d79087d4e44fe8cf19e26c28bfa261343934034e3493e7d76bbc82eec5b0
"Project Description – PoC smart assistant Vhyro Project from jvope signature.pdf.lnk": b9bebbc0c45cbc87124ba497cb7b7f15fbac6e39535869ae006a950ac04ea285
🤔@ShadowChasing1 @h2jazi pic.twitter.com/MA4CvdDVUd

— MalwareHunterTeam (@malwrhunterteam) September 12, 2023

5ff89db10969cba73d1f539b12dad42c60314e580ce43d7b57b46a1f915a6a2b
202409_Resident_Care_Quality_Improvement_Strategies_for_Nursing_Homes_Enhancing_Patient_Satisfaction_and_Health_Outcomes.pdf.lnk
157.173.104[.]153 pic.twitter.com/cslQgnjyUA

— 安坂星海 Azaka || VTuber (@AzakaSekai_) October 16, 2024

🤔

0aef2fee350f93d5783aa7a3c9c15cf6428a64a09ea7b42360d0d8e115503e49
hxxp://issue.homes/up/get-command.php?uid=
hxxp://issue.homes/up/bait/Blockchain_Trading_Website_Manager.docx pic.twitter.com/3ViYAFYGed

— NaN_FMC (@fmc_nan) September 12, 2023

"Resume.rar": 42fc9bc9683f8cb4f3902dcbd23d932b06f050ae150acd2f7258185d05bc1f57
"Resume Felipe Luís – professional sax, keys & guitar player with over 20 years experience working with own bands, […].pdf.lnk": e103f352581cafcccb7211526cc7bd288e3c3320ae6aa25748389a250da4d773
🤔 pic.twitter.com/aoORqpcD9O

— MalwareHunterTeam (@malwrhunterteam) September 30, 2023

Related "Elien project proposal.zip": 95257318449fe3dafb1c5269f53942b9fce04ee41450d102aa2c2e9e8aed912b
"dropshipping Elien project prposal-soft online service ventilization from xihu.pdf.lnk": 0aef2fee350f93d5783aa7a3c9c15cf6428a64a09ea7b42360d0d8e115503e49 pic.twitter.com/qwqHiHcYSb

— MalwareHunterTeam (@malwrhunterteam) September 12, 2023

The post HeptaX: Unauthorized RDP Connections for Cyberespionage Operations appeared first on Cyble.

Blog – Cyble – ​Read More

Overview

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has issued urgent advisories regarding two vulnerabilities that pose substantial risks to organizations: CVE-2024-20481, a denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability affecting Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and Firepower Threat Defense (FTD), and CVE-2024-37383, a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in RoundCube Webmail. Both vulnerabilities highlight the necessity for immediate action to safeguard against potential exploitation.

The relevant CVE IDs for these vulnerabilities are CVE-2024-37383 and CVE-2024-20481. The first vulnerability, CVE-2024-37383, affects Roundcube Webmail versions prior to 1.5.7 and 1.6.x before 1.6.7, while CVE-2024-20481 impacts Cisco products running a vulnerable release of Cisco ASA or FTD Software with the RAVPN service enabled. 

Even though patches are available for both vulnerabilities, with public exploits noted for CVE-2024-37383. Links to the respective patches for Roundcube Webmail and Cisco ASA or FTD Software are provided for reference.

New Vulnerability details: CVE-2024-37383 and CVE-2024-20481

CVE-2024-20481 retains a critical denial-of-service vulnerability found in Cisco ASA and FTD devices. The flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to exploit the affected systems through a crafted HTTP request, which can lead to a system crash and a complete service outage.

This vulnerability has been assigned a CVSSv3.1 score of 9.8, categorizing it as critical. The implications of a successful exploit are severe, as it can have wide-ranging consequences, such as disrupting operations and compromising the availability of critical network security devices. Cisco ASA and FTD devices are essential for maintaining secure network infrastructures, making this vulnerability particularly concerning for organizations that rely on these systems for their security posture.

The second vulnerability that was highlighted by CISA is CVE-2024-37383, which is a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability found in RoundCube Webmail. This vulnerability allows attackers and APT groups to inject malicious scripts into web pages viewed by users, potentially leading to data theft, session hijacking, or other malicious activities.

CVE-2024-37383 has been rated with a CVSSv3.1 score of 6.5, indicating a medium severity level. However, the potential consequences of a successful XSS attack can be significant, especially in webmail applications where users may unwittingly expose sensitive information.

Recommendations and Mitigation Strategies

To address the risks posed by CVE-2024-37383 and CVE-2024-20481, organizations are advised to take the following actions:

Organizations should promptly apply updates and patches released for RoundCube to close this vulnerability and prevent potential exploitation.

Implementing strict input validation and sanitization practices can help mitigate the risks associated with XSS vulnerabilities. This involves ensuring that all user input is properly escaped and validated before being rendered on a web page(s).

Educating users about the risks of clicking on suspicious links or opening unexpected emails can reduce the likelihood of falling victim to XSS attacks.

Deploying WAFs can provide an additional layer of security by filtering and monitoring HTTP traffic to and from web applications, blocking malicious requests before they reach the application.

Organizations should apply the latest Cisco patches as soon as possible. This is essential to protect against potential exploitation of the vulnerability.

Implementing better monitoring and logging practices can help detect unusual activities that may indicate an attempted exploitation of the vulnerability.

Proper segmentation of networks can minimize the risk of a successful attack impacting the entire network infrastructure.

Firewalls and access controls should be employed to protect critical assets.

Conclusion

CISA’s advisories regarding CVE-2024-20481 and CVE-2024-37383 highlight the critical nature of addressing cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Organizations that utilize Cisco ASA and FTD devices or RoundCube Webmail must take immediate action to mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities.

Patches must be applied on time to maintain the integrity and availability of online systems. Organizations must prioritize these actions to protect their networks and sensitive information from potential exploitation.

The post CISA Warns of Critical Vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-20481 and CVE-2024-37383 Require Immediate Attention appeared first on Cyble.

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Overview 

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has added Fortinet’s FortiManager to its known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, indicating a pressing need for organizations to address the associated risks. 

The critical vulnerability identified as CVE-2024-47575 has been assigned a CVSS score of 9.8. This vulnerability affects various versions of FortiManager, including FortiManager 7.6.0, 7.4.0 through 7.4.4, 7.2.0 through 7.2.7, 7.0.0 through 7.0.12, 6.4.0 through 6.4.14, and 6.2.0 through 6.2.12, as well as multiple iterations of FortiManager Cloud.  

The vulnerability stems from a missing authentication issue within the critical functions of the FortiManager fgfmd daemon, allowing remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands or code via specially crafted requests. This flaw poses a significant risk to organizations that rely on this technology. 

Recovery Methods 

Organizations impacted by CVE-2024-47575 are encouraged to undertake specific recovery actions to address the vulnerability effectively. One recommended recovery method is database rebuilding or resynchronization, which helps ensure that the FortiManager configuration remains uncompromised. This can involve installing a fresh FortiManager virtual machine (VM) or reinitializing a hardware model and re-adding devices. Additionally, restoring a backup taken before any indicators of compromise (IoC) detection is advised. 

An alternative recovery action is the Quick Recovery Option, which allows for swift recovery without extensive database changes. However, this method requires manual verification of the current configuration. In this case, organizations should install a new FortiManager VM or reinitialize a hardware model and restore components from a compromised FortiManager. They can also restore from a backup taken from the compromised system. 

To further mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should consider upgrading to fixed versions of FortiManager or implementing certain workarounds. For FortiManager versions 7.0.12 and above, 7.2.5 and above, and 7.4.3 and above (excluding 7.6.0), it is recommended to enable a configuration that denies unknown devices from registering.  

This setting is important as it may prevent FortiGates with serial numbers not listed on the device roster from successfully registering. Additionally, for FortiManager versions 7.2.0 and above, organizations should implement local-in policies to whitelist FortiGate IP addresses that are permitted to connect.  

This involves configuring policies to accept connections on port 541 for the specified source addresses. Finally, organizations should ensure that custom certificates are implemented for versions 7.2.2 and above, 7.4.0 and above, and 7.6.0 and above, thereby guaranteeing that only authorized certificates are utilized within their systems. 

Recommendations and Mitigations 

To effectively combat vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-47575, organizations should: 

Regularly update systems with patches from official vendors and prioritize critical updates. 

Establish an effective patch management strategy to ensure timely application of updates. 

Use network segmentation to protect critical assets and limit exposure to threats. 

Create and maintain a comprehensive incident response plan to address security incidents effectively. 

Utilize monitoring solutions to detect and analyze suspicious activities within the network. 

Conclusion 

The inclusion of vulnerabilities in CISA’s KEV catalog signals that threat actors are actively exploiting these flaws in real-world scenarios. This development highlights the urgency for organizations to respond promptly to mitigate risks associated with CVE-2024-47575 and similar vulnerabilities. Failure to address these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences, including data breaches and system compromises. 

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