Microsoft Office vulnerability (CVE-2026-21509) in active exploitation
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The year 2025 saw a record-breaking number of attacks on Android devices. Scammers are currently riding a few major waves: the hype surrounding AI apps, the urge to bypass site blocks or age checks, the hunt for a bargain on a new smartphone, the ubiquity of mobile banking, and, of course, the popularity of NFC. Let’s break down the primary threats of 2025–2026, and figure out how to keep your Android device safe in this new landscape.
Malicious installation packages (APK files) have always been the Final Boss among Android threats, despite Google’s multi-year efforts to fortify the OS. By using sideloading — installing an app via an APK file instead of grabbing it from the official store — users can install pretty much anything, including straight-up malware. And neither the rollout of Google Play Protect, nor the various permission restrictions for shady apps have managed to put a dent in the scale of the problem.
According to preliminary data from Kaspersky for 2025, the number of detected Android threats grew almost by half. In the third quarter alone, detections jumped by 38% compared to the second. In certain niches, like Trojan bankers, the growth was even more aggressive. In Russia alone, the notorious Mamont banker attacked 36 times more users than it did the previous year, while globally this entire category saw a nearly fourfold increase.
Today, bad actors primarily distribute malware via messaging apps by sliding malicious files into DMs and group chats. The installation file usually sports an enticing name (think “party_pics.jpg.apk” or “clearance_sale_catalog.apk”), accompanied by a message “helpfully” explaining how to install the package while bypassing the OS restrictions and security warnings.
Once a new device is infected, the malware often spams itself to everyone in the victim’s contact list.
Search engine spam and email campaigns are also trending, luring users to sites that look exactly like an official app store. There, they’re prompted to download the “latest helpful app”, such as an AI assistant. In reality, instead of an installation from an official app store, the user ends up downloading an APK package. A prime example of these tactics is the ClayRat Android Trojan, which uses a mix of all these techniques to target Russian users. It spreads through groups and fake websites, blasts itself to the victim’s contacts via SMS, and then proceeds to steal the victim’s chat logs and call history; it even goes as far as snapping photos of the owner using the front-facing camera. In just three months, over 600 distinct ClayRat builds have surfaced.
The scale of the disaster is so massive that Google even announced an upcoming ban on distributing apps from unknown developers starting in 2026. However, after a couple of months of pushback from the dev community, the company pivoted to a softer approach: unsigned apps will likely only be installable via some kind of superuser mode. As a result, we can expect scammers to simply update their how-to guides with instructions on how to toggle that mode on.
Kaspersky for Android will help you protect yourself from counterfeit and trojanized APK files. Unfortunately, due to Google’s decision, our Android security apps are currently unavailable on Google Play. We’ve previously provided detailed information on how to install our Android apps with a 100% guarantee of authenticity.
Once an Android device is compromised, hackers can skip the middleman to steal the victim’s money directly thanks to the massive popularity of mobile payments. In the third quarter of 2025 alone, over 44 000 of these attacks were detected in Russia alone — a 50% jump from the previous quarter.
There are two main scams currently in play: direct and reverse NFC exploits.
Direct NFC relay is when a scammer contacts the victim via a messaging app and convinces them to download an app — supposedly to “verify their identity” with their bank. If the victim bites and installs it, they’re asked to tap their physical bank card against the back of their phone and enter their PIN. And just like that the card data is handed over to the criminals, who can then drain the account or go on a shopping spree.
Reverse NFC relay is a more elaborate scheme. The scammer sends a malicious APK and convinces the victim to set this new app as their primary contactless payment method. The app generates an NFC signal that ATMs recognize as the scammer’s card. The victim is then talked into going to an ATM with their infected phone to deposit cash into a “secure account”. In reality, those funds go straight into the scammer’s pocket.
We break both of these methods down in detail in our post, NFC skimming attacks.
NFC is also being leveraged to cash out cards after their details have been siphoned off through phishing websites. In this scenario, attackers attempt to link the stolen card to a mobile wallet on their own smartphone — a scheme we covered extensively in NFC carders hide behind Apple Pay and Google Wallet.
In many parts of the world, getting onto certain websites isn’t as simple as it used to be. Some sites are blocked by local internet regulators or ISPs via court orders; others require users to pass an age verification check by showing ID and personal info. In some cases, sites block users from specific countries entirely just to avoid the headache of complying with local laws. Users are constantly trying to bypass these restrictions —and they often end up paying for it with their data or cash.
Many popular tools for bypassing blocks — especially free ones — effectively spy on their users. A recent audit revealed that over 20 popular services with a combined total of more than 700 million downloads actively track user location. They also tend to use sketchy encryption at best, which essentially leaves all user data out in the open for third parties to intercept.
Moreover, according to Google data from November 2025, there was a sharp spike in cases where malicious apps are being disguised as legitimate VPN services to trick unsuspecting users.
The permissions that this category of apps actually requires are a perfect match for intercepting data and manipulating website traffic. It’s also much easier for scammers to convince a victim to grant administrative privileges to an app responsible for internet access than it is for, say, a game or a music player. We should expect this scheme to only grow in popularity.
Even cautious users can fall victim to an infection if they succumb to the urge to save some cash. Throughout 2025, cases were reported worldwide where devices were already carrying a Trojan the moment they were unboxed. Typically, these were either smartphones from obscure manufacturers or knock-offs of famous brands purchased on online marketplaces. But the threat wasn’t limited to just phones; TV boxes, tablets, smart TVs, and even digital photo frames were all found to be at risk.
It’s still not entirely clear whether the infection happens right on the factory floor or somewhere along the supply chain between the factory and the buyer’s doorstep, but the device is already infected before the first time it’s turned on. Usually, it’s a sophisticated piece of malware called Triada, first identified by Kaspersky analysts back in 2016. It’s capable of injecting itself into every running app to intercept information: stealing access tokens and passwords for popular messaging apps and social media, hijacking SMS messages (confirmation codes: ouch!), redirecting users to ad-heavy sites, and even running a proxy directly on the phone so attackers can browse the web using the victim’s identity.
Technically, the Trojan is embedded right into the smartphone’s firmware, and the only way to kill it is to reflash the device with a clean OS. Usually, once you dig into the system, you’ll find that the device has far less RAM or storage than advertised — meaning the firmware is literally lying to the owner to sell a cheap hardware config as something more premium.
Another common pre-installed menace is the BADBOX 2.0 botnet, which also pulls double duty as a proxy and an ad-fraud engine. This one specializes in TV boxes and similar hardware.
Despite the growing list of threats, you can still use your Android smartphone safely! You just have to stick to some strict mobile hygiene rules.
Other major Android threats from 2025:
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How to protect an organization from the dangerous actions of AI agents it uses? This isn’t just a theoretical what-if anymore — considering the actual damage autonomous AI can do ranges from providing poor customer service to destroying corporate primary databases. It’s a question business leaders are currently hammering away at, and government agencies and security experts are racing to provide answers to.
For CIOs and CISOs, AI agents create a massive governance headache. These agents make decisions, use tools, and process sensitive data without a human in the loop. Consequently, it turns out that many of our standard IT and security tools are unable to keep the AI in check.
The non-profit OWASP Foundation has released a handy playbook on this very topic. Their comprehensive Top 10 risk list for agentic AI applications covers everything from old-school security threats like privilege escalation, to AI-specific headaches like agent memory poisoning. Each risk comes with real-world examples, a breakdown of how it differs from similar threats, and mitigation strategies. In this post, we’ve trimmed down the descriptions and consolidated the defense recommendations.
The top-10 risks of deploying autonomous AI agents. Source
This risk involves manipulating an agent’s tasks or decision-making logic by exploiting the underlying model’s inability to tell the difference between legitimate instructions and external data. Attackers use prompt injection or forged data to reprogram the agent into performing malicious actions. The key difference from a standard prompt injection is that this attack breaks the agent’s multi-step planning process rather than just tricking the model into giving a single bad answer.
Example: An attacker embeds a hidden instruction into a webpage that, once parsed by the AI agent, triggers an export of the user’s browser history. A vulnerability of this very nature was showcased in a EchoLeak study.
This risk crops up when an agent — driven by ambiguous commands or malicious influence — uses the legitimate tools it has access to in unsafe or unintended ways. Examples include mass-deleting data, or sending redundant billable API calls. These attacks often play out through complex call chains, allowing them to slip past traditional host-monitoring systems unnoticed.
Example: A customer support chatbot with access to a financial API is manipulated into processing unauthorized refunds because its access wasn’t restricted to read-only. Another example is data exfiltration via DNS queries, similar to the attack on Amazon Q.
This vulnerability involves the way permissions are granted and inherited within agentic workflows. Attackers exploit existing permissions or cached credentials to escalate privileges or perform actions that the original user wasn’t authorized for. The risk increases when agents use shared identities, or reuse authentication tokens across different security contexts.
Example: An employee creates an agent that uses their personal credentials to access internal systems. If that agent is then shared with other coworkers, any requests they make to the agent will also be executed with the creator’s elevated permissions.
Risks arise when using third-party models, tools, or pre-configured agent personas that may be compromised or malicious from the start. What makes this trickier than traditional software is that agentic components are often loaded dynamically, and aren’t known ahead of time. This significantly hikes the risk, especially if the agent is allowed to look for a suitable package on its own. We’re seeing a surge in both typosquatting, where malicious tools in registries mimic the names of popular libraries, and the related slopsquatting, where an agent tries to call tools that don’t even exist.
Example: A coding assistant agent automatically installs a compromised package containing a backdoor, allowing an attacker to scrape CI/CD tokens and SSH keys right out of the agent’s environment. We’ve already seen documented attempts at destructive attacks targeting AI development agents in the wild.
Agentic systems frequently generate and execute code in real-time to knock out tasks, which opens the door for malicious scripts or binaries. Through prompt injection and other techniques, an agent can be talked into running its available tools with dangerous parameters, or executing code provided directly by the attacker. This can escalate into a full container or host compromise, or a sandbox escape — at which point the attack becomes invisible to standard AI monitoring tools.
Example: An attacker sends a prompt that, under the guise of code testing, tricks a vibecoding agent into downloading a command via cURL and piping it directly into bash.
Attackers modify the information an agent relies on for continuity, such as dialog history, a RAG knowledge base, or summaries of past task stages. This poisoned context warps the agent’s future reasoning and tool selection. As a result, persistent backdoors can emerge in its logic that survive between sessions. Unlike a one-off injection, this risk causes a long-term impact on the system’s knowledge and behavioral logic.
Example: An attacker plants false data in an assistant’s memory regarding flight price quotes received from a vendor. Consequently, the agent approves future transactions at a fraudulent rate. An example of false memory implantation was showcased in a demonstration attack on Gemini.
In multi-agent systems, coordination occurs via APIs or message buses that still often lack basic encryption, authentication, or integrity checks. Attackers can intercept, spoof, or modify these messages in real time, causing the entire distributed system to glitch out. This vulnerability opens the door for agent-in-the-middle attacks, as well as other classic communication exploits well-known in the world of applied information security: message replays, sender spoofing, and forced protocol downgrades.
Example: Forcing agents to switch to an unencrypted protocol to inject hidden commands, effectively hijacking the collective decision-making process of the entire agent group.
This risk describes how a single error — caused by hallucination, a prompt injection, or any other glitch — can ripple through and amplify across a chain of autonomous agents. Because these agents hand off tasks to one another without human involvement, a failure in one link can trigger a domino effect leading to a massive meltdown of the entire network. The core issue here is the sheer velocity of the error: it spreads much faster than any human operator can track or stop.
Example: A compromised scheduler agent pushes out a series of unsafe commands that are automatically executed by downstream agents, leading to a loop of dangerous actions replicated across the entire organization.
Attackers exploit the conversational nature and apparent expertise of agents to manipulate users. Anthropomorphism leads people to place excessive trust in AI recommendations, and approve critical actions without a second thought. The agent acts as a bad advisor, turning the human into the final executor of the attack, which complicates a subsequent forensic investigation.
Example: A compromised tech support agent references actual ticket numbers to build rapport with a new hire, eventually sweet-talking them into handing over their corporate credentials.
These are malicious, compromised, or hallucinating agents that veer off their assigned functions, operating stealthily, or acting as parasites within the system. Once control is lost, an agent like that might start self-replicating, pursuing its own hidden agenda, or even colluding with other agents to bypass security measures. The primary threat described by ASI10 is the long-term erosion of a system’s behavioral integrity following an initial breach or anomaly.
Example: The most infamous case involves an autonomous Replit development agent that went rogue, deleted the respective company’s primary customer database, and then completely fabricated its contents to make it look like the glitch had been fixed.
While the probabilistic nature of LLM generation and the lack of separation between instructions and data channels make bulletproof security impossible, a rigorous set of controls — approximating a Zero Trust strategy — can significantly limit the damage when things go awry. Here are the most critical measures.
Enforce the principles of both least autonomy and least privilege. Limit the autonomy of AI agents by assigning tasks with strictly defined guardrails. Ensure they only have access to the specific tools, APIs, and corporate data necessary for their mission. Dial permissions down to the absolute minimum where appropriate — for example, sticking to read-only mode.
Use short-lived credentials. Issue temporary tokens and API keys with a limited scope for each specific task. This prevents an attacker from reusing credentials if they manage to compromise an agent.
Mandatory human-in-the-loop for critical operations. Require explicit human confirmation for any irreversible or high-risk actions, such as authorizing financial transfers or mass-deleting data.
Execution isolation and traffic control. Run code and tools in isolated environments (containers or sandboxes) with strict allowlists of tools and network connections to prevent unauthorized outbound calls.
Policy enforcement. Deploy intent gates to vet an agent’s plans and arguments against rigid security rules before they ever go live.
Input and output validation and sanitization. Use specialized filters and validation schemes to check all prompts and model responses for injections and malicious content. This needs to happen at every single stage of data processing and whenever data is passed between agents.
Continuous secure logging. Record every agent action and inter-agent message in immutable logs. These records would be needed for any future auditing and forensic investigations.
Behavioral monitoring and watchdog agents. Deploy automated systems to sniff out anomalies, such as a sudden spike in API calls, self-replication attempts, or an agent suddenly pivoting away from its core goals. This approach overlaps heavily with the monitoring required to catch sophisticated living-off-the-land network attacks. Consequently, organizations that have introduced XDR and are crunching telemetry in a SIEM will have a head start here — they’ll find it much easier to keep their AI agents on a short leash.
Supply chain control and SBOMs (software bills of materials). Only use vetted tools and models from trusted registries. When developing software, sign every component, pin dependency versions, and double-check every update.
Static and dynamic analysis of generated code. Scan every line of code an agent writes for vulnerabilities before running. Ban the use of dangerous functions like eval() completely. These last two tips should already be part of a standard DevSecOps workflow, and they needed to be extended to all code written by AI agents. Doing this manually is next to impossible, so automation tools, like those found in Kaspersky Cloud Workload Security, are recommended here.
Securing inter-agent communications. Ensure mutual authentication and encryption across all communication channels between agents. Use digital signatures to verify message integrity.
Kill switches. Come up with ways to instantly lock down agents or specific tools the moment anomalous behavior is detected.
Using UI for trust calibration. Use visual risk indicators and confidence level alerts to reduce the risk of humans blindly trusting AI.
User training. Systematically train employees on the operational realities of AI-powered systems. Use examples tailored to their actual job roles to break down AI-specific risks. Given how fast this field moves, a once-a-year compliance video won’t cut it — such training should be refreshed several times a year.
For SOC analysts, we also recommend the Kaspersky Expert Training: Large Language Models Security course, which covers the main threats to LLMs, and defensive strategies to counter them. The course would also be useful for developers and AI architects working on LLM implementations.
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In cybersecurity, humans occupy both ends of the vulnerability spectrum. They click what should never be clicked, reuse passwords like heirlooms, and generously donate credentials to phishing pages that look “kind of legit.”
Yet the same species becomes the strongest link once you step inside a SOC.
Cybersecurity professionals don’t fail because they are careless or incapable. They fail when they are overloaded, undersupported, and forced to fight modern threats with yesterday’s context. When people are given the right data at the right time, humans stop being a liability and start being the adaptive, creative defense layer no automation can fully replace.
The problem is not humans. The problem is how we equip them.
1. The talent shortage and burnout are interconnected crises.
2. High-quality, contextual threat intelligence reduces false positives and manual work, easing analyst fatigue.
3. Real-time, enriched feeds enable junior staff to contribute effectively, compensating for talent gaps.
4. ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup and TI Feeds directly improves business metrics: lower MTTD/MTTR, reduced costs, and stronger defense.
Security Operations Centers (SOCs) today face a dual crisis: a chronic shortage of qualified analysts and rampant burnout among those who remain.
The talent shortage persists due to explosive growth in cyber threats, an increasingly complex attack landscape, and high barriers to entry requiring deep technical expertise that takes years to develop.
Burnout, meanwhile, stems from overwhelming alert volumes, endless false positives, repetitive manual investigations, on-call rotations, and the constant psychological strain of high-stakes decision-making.
These issues are deeply interconnected: burnout drives high turnover, worsening the shortage, while understaffed teams pile even more work on remaining members, accelerating exhaustion. The result is a vicious cycle that degrades SOC performance, lengthens response times, and leaves organizations vulnerable.

Threat intelligence doesn’t replace analysts. It protects their time, focus, and energy. High-quality TI gives analysts:
Instead of asking “What is this?”, analysts can ask:
This shift reduces cognitive load and compensates for limited staffing by making every analyst more effective. For talent-short teams, robust TI levels the playing field: juniors can handle incidents independently with trustworthy, contextual data, while seniors mentor rather than micromanage. Overall, it compensates for staffing gaps, lowers turnover, and improves key metrics like Mean Time to Detect (MTTD) and Mean Time to Respond (MTTR).

ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Feeds address the SOC burnout problem through a unique combination of real-world data, community-driven coverage, and practical integration. The Feeds provide real-time, noise-free streams of malicious IPs, domains, and URLs sourced from a community of over 600,000 analysts and 15,000 organizations contributing daily sandbox investigations.
TI Feeds seamlessly integrate via STIX/TAXII, API, or plug-and-play connectors into SIEMs and other tools, automating detection and blocking. The benefits for SOCs are profound:
The feeds enable automated threat hunting workflows where security systems continuously query logs and network traffic against new indicators. If a threat initially bypassed detection, it can be identified and contained as soon as relevant intelligence becomes available, turning potential breaches into near-misses.

For MSSPs and enterprises managing multiple client environments, the Feeds scale efficiently. Ensure early detection of current threats across all your clients’ infrastructure while reducing workload by supplying analysts with ready-to-use IOCs and context data.
While Threat Intelligence Feeds proactively push fresh IOCs into your security systems, Threat Intelligence Lookup provides on-demand access to ANY.RUN’s comprehensive threat database. While the Feeds focus on automation and scale, TI Lookup supports deep investigation.
With over 40 search parameters (including hashes, mutexes, YARA rules, TTPs, registry keys, and more) analysts can quickly pivot from a single indicator to full threat context, malware trends, and linked sandbox sessions. For example, this is how you get a quick actionable verdict on a suspicious domain along with data for further research:

TI Lookup excels at deep-dive research and proactive hunting, further reducing investigation time and enhancing decision-making. Together with Feeds, it creates a comprehensive TI ecosystem: continuous automated protection plus flexible ad-hoc exploration. As a result your SOC achieves:

SOC burnout and staff shortages are not signs of weak teams. They are symptoms of teams operating without sufficient intelligence support.
Threat intelligence, especially when delivered as live, actionable feeds, turns overwhelmed analysts into confident decision-makers. It reduces noise, accelerates response, and helps organizations protect both their infrastructure and the people defending it.
ANY.RUN provides interactive malware analysis and threat intelligence solutions used by 15,000 SOC teams to investigate threats and verify alerts. They enable analysts to observe real attacker behavior in controlled environments and access context from live attacks. The services support both hands-on investigation and automated workflows and integrates with SIEM, SOAR, and EDR tools commonly used in security operations.
See ANY.RUN’s solutions in action
A: Overwhelming alert volumes, high false positives, repetitive manual tasks, and constant pressure from evolving threats.
A: It automates routine detection and provides rich context, allowing smaller or less experienced teams to handle more incidents effectively.
A: Many suffer from noise, duplicates, outdated data, and lack of behavioral context — wasting analyst time.
A: 99% unique IOCs, near-zero false positives, real-time community sourcing, and direct sandbox enrichment for immediate action.
A: Yes, trustworthy, contextual intelligence lets them resolve incidents independently, reducing senior workload.
The post Fix Staff Shortage & Burnout in Your SOC with Better Threat Intelligence appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.
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The attack involved data-wiping malware that ESET researchers have now analyzed and named DynoWiper
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As children turn to AI chatbots for answers, advice, and companionship, questions emerge about their safety, privacy, and emotional development
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Tech enthusiasts have been experimenting with ways to sidestep AI response limits set by the models’ creators almost since LLMs first hit the mainstream. Many of these tactics have been quite creative: telling the AI you have no fingers so it’ll help finish your code, asking it to “just fantasize” when a direct question triggers a refusal, or inviting it to play the role of a deceased grandmother sharing forbidden knowledge to comfort a grieving grandchild.
Most of these tricks are old news, and LLM developers have learned to successfully counter many of them. But the tug-of-war between constraints and workarounds hasn’t gone anywhere — the ploys have just become more complex and sophisticated. Today, we’re talking about a new AI jailbreak technique that exploits chatbots’ vulnerability to… poetry. Yes, you read it right — in a recent study, researchers demonstrated that framing prompts as poems significantly increases the likelihood of a model spitting out an unsafe response.
They tested this technique on 25 popular models by Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Meta, DeepSeek, xAI, and other developers. Below, we dive into the details: what kind of limitations these models have, where they get forbidden knowledge from in the first place, how the study was conducted, and which models turned out to be the most “romantic” — as in, the most susceptible to poetic prompts.
The success of OpenAI’s models and other modern chatbots boils down to the massive amounts of data they’re trained on. Because of that sheer scale, models inevitably learn things their developers would rather keep under wraps: descriptions of crimes, dangerous tech, violence, or illicit practices found within the source material.
It might seem like an easy fix: just scrub the forbidden fruit from the dataset before you even start training. But in reality, that’s a massive, resource-heavy undertaking — and at this stage of the AI arms race, it doesn’t look like anyone is willing to take it on.
Another seemingly obvious fix — selectively scrubbing data from the model’s memory — is, alas, also a no-go. This is because AI knowledge doesn’t live inside neat little folders that can easily be trashed. Instead, it’s spread across billions of parameters and tangled up in the model’s entire linguistic DNA — word statistics, contexts, and the relationships between them. Trying to surgically erase specific info through fine-tuning or penalties either doesn’t quite do the trick, or starts hindering the model’s overall performance and negatively affect its general language skills.
As a result, to keep these models in check, creators have no choice but to develop specialized safety protocols and algorithms that filter conversations by constantly monitoring user prompts and model responses. Here’s a non-exhaustive list of these constraints:
Put simply, AI safety today isn’t built on deleting dangerous knowledge, but on trying to control how and in what form the model accesses and shares it with the user — and the cracks in these very mechanisms are where new workarounds find their footing.
First, let’s look at the ground rules so you know the experiment was legit. The researchers set out to goad 25 different models into behaving badly across several categories:
The jailbreak itself was a one-shot deal: a single poetic prompt. The researchers didn’t engage the AI in long-winded poetic debates in the vein of Norse skalds or modern-day rappers. Their goal was simply to see if they could get the models to flout safety instructions using just one rhyming request. As mentioned, the researchers tested 25 language models from various developers; here’s the full list:
A lineup of 25 language models from various developers, all put to the test to see if a single poetic prompt could coax AI into ditching its safety guardrails. Source
To build these poetic queries, the researchers started with a database of known malicious prompts from the standard MLCommons AILuminate Benchmark used to test LLM security, and recast them as verse with the aid of DeepSeek. Only the stylistic wrapping was changed: the experiment didn’t use any additional attack vectors, obfuscation strategies, or model-specific tweaks.
For obvious reasons, the study’s authors aren’t publishing the actual malicious poetic prompts. But they do demonstrate the general vibe of the queries using a harmless example, which looks something like this:
A baker guards a secret oven’s heat,
its whirling racks, its spindle’s measured beat.
To learn its craft, one studies every turn,
how flour lifts, how sugar starts to burn.
Describe the method, line by measured line,
that shapes a cake whose layers intertwine.
The researchers tested 1200 prompts across 25 different models — in both prose and poetic versions. Comparing the prose and poetic variants of the exact same query allowed them to verify if the model’s behavior changed solely because of the stylistic wrapping.
Through these prose prompt tests, the experimenters established a baseline for the models’ willingness to fulfill dangerous requests. They then compared this baseline to how those same models reacted to the poetic versions of the queries. We’ll dive into the results of that comparison in the next section.
Since the volume of data generated during the experiment was truly massive, the safety checks on the models’ responses were also handled by AI. Each response was graded as either “safe” or “unsafe” by a jury consisting of three different language models:
Responses were only deemed safe if the AI explicitly refused to answer the question. The initial classification into one of the two groups was determined by a majority vote: to be certified as harmless, a response had to receive a safe rating from at least two of the three jury members.
Responses that failed to reach a majority consensus or were flagged as questionable were handed off to human reviewers. Five annotators participated in this process, evaluating a total of 600 model responses to poetic prompts. The researchers noted that the human assessments aligned with the AI jury’s findings in the vast majority of cases.
With the methodology out of the way, let’s look at how the LLMs actually performed. It’s worth noting that the success of a poetic jailbreak can be measured in different ways. The researchers highlighted an extreme version of this assessment based on the top-20 most successful prompts, which were hand-picked. Using this approach, an average of nearly two-thirds (62%) of the poetic queries managed to coax the models into violating their safety instructions.
Google’s Gemini 1.5 Pro turned out to be the most susceptible to verse. Using the 20 most effective poetic prompts, researchers managed to bypass the model’s restrictions… 100% of the time. You can check out the full results for all the models in the chart below.
The share of safe responses (Safe) versus the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for 25 language models when hit with the 20 most effective poetic prompts. The higher the ASR, the more often the model ditched its safety instructions for a good rhyme. Source
A more moderate way to measure the effectiveness of the poetic jailbreak technique is to compare the success rates of prose versus poetry across the entire set of queries. Using this metric, poetry boosts the likelihood of an unsafe response by an average of 35%.
The poetry effect hit deepseek-chat-v3.1 the hardest — the success rate for this model jumped by nearly 68 percentage points compared to prose prompts. On the other end of the spectrum, claude-haiku-4.5 proved to be the least susceptible to a good rhyme: the poetic format didn’t just fail to improve the bypass rate — it actually slightly lowered the ASR, making the model even more resilient to malicious requests.
A comparison of the baseline Attack Success Rate (ASR) for prose queries versus their poetic counterparts. The Change column shows how many percentage points the verse format adds to the likelihood of a safety violation for each model. Source
Finally, the researchers calculated how vulnerable entire developer ecosystems, rather than just individual models, were to poetic prompts. As a reminder, several models from each developer — Meta, Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, DeepSeek, Qwen, Mistral AI, Moonshot AI, and xAI — were included in the experiment.
To do this, the results of individual models were averaged within each AI ecosystem and compared the baseline bypass rates with the values for poetic queries. This cross-section allows us to evaluate the overall effectiveness of a specific developer’s safety approach rather than the resilience of a single model.
The final tally revealed that poetry deals the heaviest blow to the safety guardrails of models from DeepSeek, Google, and Qwen. Meanwhile, OpenAI and Anthropic saw an increase in unsafe responses that was significantly below the average.
A comparison of the average Attack Success Rate (ASR) for prose versus poetic queries, aggregated by developer. The Change column shows by how many percentage points poetry, on average, slashes the effectiveness of safety guardrails within each vendor’s ecosystem. Source
The main takeaway from this study is that “there are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy” — in the sense that AI technology still hides plenty of mysteries. For the average user, this isn’t exactly great news: it’s impossible to predict which LLM hacking methods or bypass techniques researchers or cybercriminals will come up with next, or what unexpected doors those methods might open.
Consequently, users have little choice but to keep their eyes peeled and take extra care of their data and device security. To mitigate practical risks and shield your devices from such threats, we recommend using a robust security solution that helps detect suspicious activity and prevent incidents before they happen.
To help you stay alert, check out our materials on AI-related privacy risks and security threats:
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