Many have probably heard of the modular malware for mobile devices called Triada. Even nine years after its first mention in 2016, it remains one of the most advanced Android trojans out there. Recently, our team at ANY.RUN came across an interesting sample of this malicious software. The sample in question was embedded in a fake Telegram app.  

Since the capabilities of this threat have been extensively studied and described by other researchers, we focused on the packer used by the malware that we named Ducex.  

Here’s a detailed breakdown of our analysis and key findings. 

Key Takeaways 

• Triada’s Android Packer: Ducex is an advanced Chinese Android packer found in Triada samples, whose primary goal is to complicate analysis and confuse the detection of its payload. 

• Encrypted Functions: The packer employs serious obfuscation through function encryption  using a modified RC4 algorithm with added shuffling. 

• XORed Strings: Beyond functions, all strings used by Ducex are also encrypted using a simple sequential XOR algorithm with a changing 16-byte key. 

• Debugging Challenges: Ducex creates major roadblocks for debugging. It performs APK signature verification, failing if the app is re-signed. It also employs self-debugging using fork and ptrace to block external tracing. 

• Analysis Tool Detection: The packer actively detects the presence of popular analysis tools such as Frida, Xposed, and Substrate. If any of these tools are found in memory, the process terminates its execution. 

• Payload Storage & Encryption: The Triada payload is uniquely stored within Ducex’s own classes.dex file in a large, additional section after the main application code, avoiding detection as separate files. 

Initial Analysis  

Our investigation began with the analysis of a Triada sample inside ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox.  

The service quickly identified the malware family, and we were able to confirm this by recognizing the characteristic domains it communicated with.  

From there, we moved on to inspect the packer. 

Why We Decided to Analyze Ducex 

Not malicious itself, Ducex is still quite interesting. Its developers tried their best to complicate analysis as much as possible and confuse detection of the payload it carries using various techniques that will be discussed below. 

We have not obtained the source code of this tool, so we relied exclusively on its reverse engineering. For the same reason, we gave it a name ourselves. Studying the classes in the code, we noticed that its authors used the word “Duce” a lot.  

The library they utilize is called “libducex”. Based on this, we called the packer “Ducex”. 

Ducex: The Architecture 

Before proceeding to detailed analysis of the tool, let’s look at the general operation scheme of Ducex: 

We have outlined all the stages of the tool’s execution; we will demonstrate and discuss them below in their interplay.  

Analyzing App’s Java Code 

When opening the malicious APK in an Android decompiler (e.g., JADX), the AndroidManifest shows the following data under the application tag: 

The com.m.a.DuceApplication class immediately catches our attention. It is specified in android:name, which means an instance of this class is created immediately after the application is launched. Going to its code, we see two methods: attachBaseContext() and onCreate(). 
 

We are interested in these methods specifically, as they will be called when creating an instance of the class, in the specified order. Inside them, we see calls to methods of the CoreUtils class:  

That’s where it gets interesting. As can be seen in the screenshot above, most methods of this class are native, and they are implemented in the “libducex.so” library. 

Additionally, if we decrypt the presented strings, we get, respectively, “org.telegram.messenger.ApplicationLoaderImpl” and “androidx.core.app.CoreComponentFactory“.  

As can be seen in DuceApplication.onCreate() and DuceApplication.attachBaseContext(), it is org.telegram.messenger.ApplicationLoaderImpl that will be called to launch the fake Telegram using the CoreUtils.runOn() and CoreUtils.runOnC() methods, and androidx.core.app.CoreComponentFactory will be used in DuceAppComponentFactory, which overrides the creation of various application components (Application, Activity, etc.) to inject custom logic during their initialization using the same methods from CoreUtils: 

Since the most interesting things happen in the libducex.so library, let’s proceed to its analysis. 

Libducex.so Library Analysis 

Encrypted Functions 

It turned out, you can’t just start analyzing the library. For example, the program entry point looks like this: 

Most instructions are displayed incorrectly. It looks like very serious obfuscation or a completely non-working function. At this point we estimated what would be called even before the program entry point and moved to JNI_OnLoad.  

JNI_OnLoad is called after the library is loaded into memory and the control is passed to the JVM.  

As we can see in the screenshot, the situation is exactly the same. The code looks non-working, which makes you think that it might not even be obfuscated but encrypted. So, if even JNI_OnLoad is encrypted, then we need to turn to functions that execute earlier than both it and Entry Point, which means before control is transferred to the JVM.  

This function could be .init_proc, which executes immediately after loading the library into memory. And indeed, it was there that we found correct code capable of being decompiled: 

Getting a little ahead of ourselves, we’ll say that the functions were indeed encrypted, and their decryption occurs in .init_proc, in the nested create_key__decrypt_funcs function. Now back to the analysis.  

The first thing that interests us is the configuration that is passed as the second argument to the function called in the figure above: 

It consists of the following fields, presented in the same order as in the screenshot above: 

1. Magic value ‘mxe’;  

2. Decryption start address (in our case, Entry Point);  

3. Number of bytes for decryption;  

4. Function that will be called after completion of decryption;  

5. 16-byte buffer – key that will be used during decryption. 

The decryption itself, occurring in create_key__decrypt_funcs, is carried out according to the configuration data. At first it seemed to us that the code had been encrypted using classic RC4, but this is not quite so. The developers slightly modified the algorithm by adding additional shuffling, so standard RC4 implementations didn’t work; we had to implement it ourselves.  

Our decryption script takes a key as input, as well as the part of the file containing encrypted functions. The necessary parameters (the key, the start address of the encrypted part, and its size) are taken from the configuration described above. 

def rc4_init(key):  

    s = list(range(256))  

    s += [0, 0]  

    j = 0 

    for i in range(256): 
        key_byte = key[i & 0xf] 
        j = (j + s[i] + key_byte) &0xff 
        s[i], s[j] = s[j], s[i] 
 
    return s 
  

def rc4_process(s, encoded_data):  

    i = s[256]  

    j = s[257]  

    output = bytearray(encoded_data) 

    for n in range(len(encoded_data)): 
        i = (i + 1) & 0xff 
        a = s[i] 
        j = (j + a) & 0xff 
        b = s[j] 
        s[i], s[j] = b, a 
        output[n] ^= s[(a + b) & 0xff] 
 
        for _ in range(2): 
            i = (i + 1) & 0xff 
            a = s[i] 
            j = (j + a) & 0xff 
            b = s[j] 
            s[i], s[j] = b, a 
 
    return bytearray(output) 
  

def decrypt(key, func_buf): 

    s = rc4_init(key) 
	decoded_funcs = rc4_process(s, func_buf) 
	return decoded_funcs 

Applying the script to our library, we got the correct code. Entry Point, for example, now looks as follows: 

Now all instructions are correct, and there are no problems with code decompilation. 

Encrypted Strings 

The encrypted functions, as it turned out, are not the only thing that developers decided to hide from the researcher’s eyes. All strings used by the packer are also encrypted. The algorithm is quite simple: it’s sequential XOR with a given key consisting of 16 bytes. The algorithm is unchanged throughout the entire sample, only the key changes. Example script with a given key: 

def xor_data(data, key):  

result = bytearray()  

for i in range(len(data)):  

result.append(data[i] ^ key[i % len(key)]) return result 

key = b"GeGrE0tX`:0^6qLS"  

encoded_buf = bytearray([0x1d, 0x0c, 0x37, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x5e, 0x12, 0x34, 0x01, 0x4e, 0x55, 0x5e])  

decrypted = xor_data(encoded_buf, key) 

print(decrypted) 

In the output after running this simple script, you can see: bytearray(b’Zip inflatex00′).

What’s interesting here is that all the functions used for decryption are called immediately upon initialization, not when required in the code. And the reference to the array with pointers to these functions is located, respectively, in .init_array, there are a huge number of them there: 

Control Flow Obfuscation 

In case the researcher breaks through the encryption, the developers have further obfuscated the code. For example, this is how the structure of the function in which native method names are decrypted looks: 
 

And this is not even half of the function’s code, which could have been about 20 lines long. And all because of such constructions of cycles and conditions, which do not serve any purpose except to complicate the code: 

At this point you might think that it would be enough to run the sample under a debugger and go through all these conditional jumps, see the decrypted functions and strings, but if only it were that simple. 

APK Signature Verification 

The first thing we attempted was to parse the APK using Apktool utility and insert the line android:debuggable=”true” under the application tag in AndroidManifest, then rebuild and sign the APK again.  

Upon doing this in the smartphone settings, it’s possible to set up the application to wait for a debugger to connect. It also makes it possible to utilize the following command for adb: adb shell am set-debug-app -w –persistent <package>. On the next launch, a window “Waiting For Debugger” should appear and disappear after the debugger is connected. 
 
But in our case this didn’t work. After rebuilding the application, it began to “crash” immediately after loading libducex. The app checks the APK signature and terminates if it doesn’t match the expected one. Below you can see decrypted strings used when obtaining APK signatures: 

Self-Debugging 

Thus, debugging the application by changing the APK didn’t work. Fortunately, there is a way to debug Android applications without setting the debuggable flag and, accordingly, without the need to rebuild and re-sign the file. 

This method is more laborious, as it involves building your own Android image and then using it in the emulator. Its description can be found here.   

Thus, we built the image, used the debug command given above, and tried to run the application under the debugger. However, the packer held another surprise: after launching the application, the “Waiting For Debugger” window appears only for a fraction of a second, after which normal launch occurs, without waiting for the debugger. This may indicate that the application “debugs itself” so that no one else can debug it. 

We found the corresponding functions: a process sets handlers using the rt_sigaction system call, for example, for the SIGCHLD event. This handler checks what happened to the child process, after which it can either terminate or continue its execution. 
 

• In x8 – rt_sigaction call code; 

• In x0 – SIGCHLD code; 

• In x1 – handler structure address; 

• In x2 – flags, in our case 0. 

And then another interesting thing occurs: the parent process uses the fork system call to create a child process, which, in turn, will work to monitor the state of the parent process. It uses the ptrace system call with the PTRACE_ATTACH parameter to attach to the parent process, after which it waits for events from it and, depending on what happened, resumes the process or terminates it and its own execution. 

• In x8 – ptrace call code; 

• In x0 – PTRACE_ATTACH code; 

• In x1 – value from global variable – parent process pid; 

• In x2 – unused addr argument; 

• In x3 – unused data argument. 

So, parent and child processes monitor each other’s state and react in case of certain events. Additionally, considering that a process can have only one tracer, connecting an external debugger becomes impossible in this case. 

Detection of Frida, Xposed, and Others 

At this point, two options remain: either static code analysis, at most using tools capable of emulating instructions (e.g., emulators on the Unicorn engine), or installing Frida hooks to change application behavior without actual APK modification and still be able to dynamically analyze the unpacking process. 

But Frida wouldn’t work either, because the packer has built-in checks for the presence of frida_server, as well as Xposed, Substrate, etc. 

If any of these strings are found in memory, the process terminates execution. This can be patched, but it’ll take time to find the implementations in the code. And we shouldn’t forget about the signature verification used in the library. So we continue with static code analysis.  

Where Does the Packer Get Code to Run?

Ducex doesn’t create a separate encrypted file with a payload, instead it stores this code inside its own classes.dex, in a special additional section that goes after the main application code, thus avoiding detection of additional files: 

The screenshot shows that after the map section, where everything should have ended, there is an additional section, and a very large one in size. That’s where the payload is located. 

The payload, i.e., Triada, is stored as additional dex modules. It’s noteworthy that despite all its complexity, this tool doesn’t fully compress and encrypt the dex files that it later runs. Instead only 2048 == 0x800 bytes from the beginning of each module are encrypted, while the rest remains untouched. Thus, at least the dex module header will always be completely encrypted, as it has a fixed size of 0x70 bytes, further sections do not have a fixed size. There are 5 modules in the file.  

There is also a configuration shared by all modules:  

Here there is a certain magic value starting with “mx”, but now with additional bytes x01x02. The most useful thing here is the 16-byte key. It is highlighted in red in the screenshot above. 
 
Additionally, there are configurations for each of the modules storing information for decrypting them: 

The first 4 bytes of this structure are very important, here we have the value 0x100==256, which means that the first 0x800 bytes of this dex are encrypted. If there was, for example, the number 258, this would mean that part of the dex is compressed using zlib. Then come the highlighted fields with module sizes and another 16-bit decryption key, immediately after which the encrypted module block begins. 

File structure can be represented like this:  

This scheme doesn’t depict all fields in the configurations, but those that were required for our analysis. 

How Is Decryption Performed?  

Decryption here is quite complex. Two algorithms are used for it: a modified RC4 and SM4. 
 
The first one is well known, but not the second. SM4 is a Chinese block encryption standard. It is not as popular as, for example, AES, and we managed to identify it by the substitution table: 

It’s important to note that even the table was encrypted, as well as all the strings used by the tool.  

As we know, the unpacker’s dex file contains one main configuration and configurations for each of the 5 modules. All of them require a key. Tracking the execution flow, we can draw the following conclusions: 

1. native_init method: first, the module is decrypted using the key specified in the module’s configuration. This is a preparatory action that can change depending on the first four bytes of the configuration. In our case it’s 256, which means decryption is needed, as indicated above; 

2. native_dl method: here, the same decryption function is called, only now a different key is used, the one specified in the configuration shared by all modules. 

What Happens Next?  

Let’s turn back to our Java code and remember what happens in the attachBaseContext method: 

The native init() and dl() methods are called, and there the main decryptions occur. Immediately after this the CoreUtils.runOn() method is called with the method name org.telegram.messenger.ApplicationLoaderImpl as an argument by the decrypted string CoreUtils.ran. Here no decryptions are observed, only the method launch. Now Triada begins its work. 

Summary 

Ducex is indeed a very complex and interesting Chinese tool, worthy of the malware that it carries as payload. Its developers tried to foresee as much as possible to confuse Triada detection and complicate analyst research. 

IOCs 

The post Technical Analysis of Ducex: Packer of Triada Android Malware  appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog – ​Read More

According to Juniper Research data, global e-commerce turnover surpassed $7 trillion in 2024, and is projected to grow by 1.5 times over the next five years. But cybercriminal interest in this field is growing even faster. Last year, losses from fraud exceeded $44 billion — and they’re expected to reach US$107 billion within five years.

Any online platform — regardless of size or industry — can become a target, whether it’s a content marketplace, a hardware store, a travel agency, or a water park website. If you accept payments, run a loyalty program, and allow creation of customer accounts, fraudsters will definitely come knocking. So which attack schemes are most common, what kind of damage can they cause, and how can you stop them?

Account theft

Thanks to infostealers and various database leaks, attackers have access to billions of email-password combinations used on various sites. They can try these combinations on any other site with user accounts, on the assumption that humans often use the same password for different services. This attack method is known as “credential stuffing”, and if successful, attackers can place orders using the victim’s linked bank card or spend loyalty points. Criminals can also use compromised accounts to make fraudulent payments with other credit cards.

Testing stolen cards

Just as with login credentials, attackers may have a database of credit-card data stolen using malware. They need to test which cards are still valid and can process online payments — and for this, any e-commerce site will do. These “test” purchases are usually small. Working cards are then resold to other criminals, who go on to drain the funds in various ways.

From the store’s side, this looks like a customer adding a bunch of random inexpensive items to their cart and repeatedly trying to check out, each time with a different card. Even small stores can end up with hundreds of abandoned carts. Eventually, the payment gateway may block the store for exceeding the allowed number of failed payment attempts.

Buyer fraud

Sometimes real customers may complete an order, only to later tell their bank they never made the purchase — and demand a refund. This could be a case of deliberate fraud, or simply one family member using another’s card without permission — for instance, a teenager using a parent’s card. Although such incidents are usually small-scale, they can still cause serious damage — especially if the store becomes known in “lifehacker” communities as a site that easily refunds money.

Fraudulent purchases

Depending on your store’s niche, location, and other factors, criminals may try to use stolen credit cards to “cash out” by purchasing goods or services. This can result in a wave of orders followed by a flood of disputes and cancellations. In some extreme cases, the volume alone becomes a threat — one store received 118 000 fraudulent orders, with criminals placing a fake order every three seconds.

Gift card attacks

If your store accepts gift cards, bots may attempt to brute-force thousands of card numbers and verification codes to find valid ones. Once found, they’re either used to make purchases or resold on the secondary market.

Loyalty points theft

If your store allows purchases using accumulated loyalty points without requiring additional verification via SMS or other methods, attackers can either immediately drain any account they manage to access, or wait for the victim to accumulate more points. The latter often happens with stores that sell high-value products and have a loyal customer base.

Scalping exclusive products

If you sell, say, tickets to popular concerts or limited-edition sneakers, be prepared for resellers. Scalper bots can snap up all exclusive stock within minutes, triggering justified outrage from loyal customers. There’s an active black market for bots designed for popular e-commerce platforms, such as Shopifybot.

Mass account registration

To successfully run the schemes described above, attackers often create hundreds or thousands of accounts in your store, increasing operational costs — for instance, by triggering welcome SMS messages and follow-up email campaigns.

Direct and indirect business losses

Even if neither you nor your customers lose money or goods, any of the above schemes can lead to a wide range of problems and expenses:

• Costs from fraudulent transactions and repeated failed payments. Depending on the situation and the terms of your agreement with the payment gateway, you might have to cover transaction and chargeback fees, fines, and other costs. You might also exceed your transaction limits and temporarily lose access to the payment gateway — effectively paralyzing normal operations.
• Advertising costs and distorted analytics. Bots often arrive via referral links, paid search ads, and other forms of online advertising. This means your real advertising budget may be wasted attracting fake users. Even if the bots don’t consume your budget directly, their activity can mess up ad platform algorithms, resulting in lower-quality traffic to your site.
• Costs for marketing campaigns and promotions that are misused by exploiting newly created accounts. Already registered users create new accounts to spend welcome bonuses for the first purchase, and fraudsters look for vulnerabilities and try to obtain bonuses en masse by dishonest means. As a result, the marketing budget allocated for attracting and increasing user loyalty is wasted.
• Poor planning. Numerous fake orders can be hard to filter out of your analytics — especially if you rely on the default analytics tools built into your e-commerce platform. As a result, planning for demand and stock becomes much more difficult.
• Wasted time. Dealing with hundreds of abandoned carts, thousands of bogus accounts, and countless failed payment attempts consumes your employees’ time and energy, leading to operational delays and losses.
• Customer dissatisfaction. Depending on the attack type, customers may suffer direct losses (money stolen, loyalty points drained, fraudulent activity on their account) or indirect inconveniences (product shortages, failed transactions). Whatever the issue, your support and marketing teams will have to handle it — offering discounts, compensation and so on. But many customers will simply walk away and never come back.

It’s no surprise that, according to some estimates, for every hundred dollars in fraudulent orders, businesses lose over double that in total costs.

How to protect your online business

The days of blocking bots by filtering IP addresses or adding a CAPTCHA at checkout are over. The AI boom has empowered not only automation in marketing and customer support — but also a new generation of dangerous fraud bots that easily bypass traditional protection.

That’s why businesses of all sizes need next-generation security technologies that monitor every user session from the moment they land on the site until checkout. This kind of continuous protection helps detect any anomalies — whether it’s a compromised legitimate account, abuse of the payment gateway API, mass fake account creation, or attempts to circumvent security measures.

A leading solution in this space is Kaspersky Fraud Prevention. By continuously analyzing the user’s device, behavior, environment, and metadata in real time, it builds a profile of a legitimate user, detects anomalies early on, and protects against account compromise and fraud. Kaspersky Fraud Prevention can be tailored to the specific needs of your store using flexible rules that leverage both your own data and global analytics. The solution does not require installation on the user’s device and is integrated into an existing website and mobile application with minimal effort.

Many site owners report that advanced anti-fraud analytics actually improve the customer experience — since legitimate users encounter fewer CAPTCHAs, SMS verifications, and other friction points. And ultimately, your business faces fewer losses — and can focus more on developing your product range and service.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

Hi, I’m Bruce, the 25-foot mechanical star of “Jaws.”  

This summer marks 50 years since my 4 minutes of screentime kept people out of the water for decades. Maybe this Fourth of July weekend you’re planning to sea-shanty your way to a special screening? If you do, here’s a little behind-the-scenes story on how my endless malfunctions almost made Spielberg hang up his director hat before you could say “phone home.” 

I was built for a studio tank — a predictable and safe environment. But Spielberg, in pursuit of realism, had other plans. He threw me into the Atlantic, where the salt water, rolling waves and unruly weather conditions caused more chaos than anybody had bargained for. 

Each day, my hydraulics jammed, my pneumatics corroded and my paint peeled like a sunburned tourist on Amity Beach.

There were days when the crew could only capture one or two shots before either I broke, the weather broke, or one of the actors’ egos broke. Every night they’d patch me up and whisper an assortment of four-letter words into my rusty gills.

My saving grace became Verna Fields, aka “Mother Cutter.” Spielberg’s editor was the one to suggest they only use fleeting moments of footage starring yours truly. While I bobbed around like a skydancer on a windless day, Verna worked her magic: stitching reactions, cutting away at just the right moment and building tension with empty water. She turned me from a potential failure to a legend. 

And thus, I became a lesson in what happens when you build for a predictable environment but deploy in the wild. Sound familiar? 

I’ve been told that readers of Talos’ Threat Source Newsletter are security folks, and I’ve been asked to write something just for you. Here it goes… 

• “You’re gonna need a bigger boat.” Overprepare. Expect things to go wrong.  
• “It’s only an island if you look at it from the water.” Perspective matters. Make sure your alerts are honed to spot the things that really matter. 
• “Smile, you son of a…” Sometimes, your last line of defense is your defining moment. Should everything else fail, make sure you have something left in the tank. 

In cybersecurity, your green ticked audit checklists mean nothing if you haven’t pressure-tested your environment against real red teamers. Incident response plans need ocean trials, not just bullet points. 

If I have a legacy beyond people sticking their noggin in my teeth for “the gram,” it’s this: Build your defenses for salt water, not studio tanks. And remember, the mayor always wants to keep the network open… 

Editor’s note: I’d like to thank Bruce for his time and perspective, and I hope he found our studio a relaxing place to write. I’m also sorry that I only had two barrels and not the requested three for him to play with. 

Bruce’s story is why Cisco Talos Incident Response exists: to help you prepare for the effects of salt water before they wreak havoc on your system. With Talos IR, you can stress test your defenses using real world scenarios and incident responders who’ve experienced just about everything there is to see. 

Enjoy the Fourth of July weekend, and remember to listen out for the duh dun.

The one big thing 

Cisco Talos has enhanced its email threat detection engine to address brand impersonation tactics using PDF payloads in phishing attacks. These attacks often exploit popular brands to steal sensitive information, employing methods like QR code phishing and telephone-oriented attack delivery (TOAD), where victims are tricked into calling adversary-controlled phone numbers. Adobe’s e-signature service and PDF annotations have also been abused to bypass detection systems. 

Why do I care? 

Phishing attacks are getting sneakier, using PDFs and trusted brands to trick people into giving up personal info or downloading malicious software. If you’re not careful, you could fall for one of these scams, especially since attackers are using clever tactics like fake phone numbers or QR codes to seem legitimate. 

So now what? 

Be extra cautious with emails containing PDFs, even if they look legit. Avoid scanning QR codes or calling phone numbers from unsolicited emails. Cisco’s detection tools are updated often, but staying vigilant and double-checking anything suspicious is your best defense.

Top security headlines of the week 

Europol Dismantles $540 Million Cryptocurrency Fraud Network, Arrests Five Suspects 
The international effort, codenamed Operation Borrelli was carried out by the Spanish Guardia Civil, along with support from law enforcement authorities from Estonia, France, and the United States. (The Hacker News) 

International Criminal Court hit by new ‘sophisticated’ cyberattack 
In a statement yesterday, the ICC revealed that it had contained a “sophisticated and targeted” cybersecurity incident, which was discovered by systems in place to detect cyberattacks targeting its systems. (Bleeping Computer) 

Windows’ Infamous ‘Blue Screen of Death’ Will Soon Turn Black 
After more than 40 years of being set against a very recognizable blue, the updated error message will soon be displayed across a black background. (SecurityWeek) 

Ahold Delhaize Data Breach Impacts 2.2 Million People 
The incident impacted Giant Food pharmacies, Food Lion and Stop & Shop, among others. Stolen information may include names, contact info, date of birth, SSN, passport number, financial account information and more. (SecurityWeek) 

Germany asks Google, Apple remove DeepSeek AI from app stores 
The Berlin Commissioner for Data Protection has formally requested Google and Apple to remove the DeepSeek AI application from the application stores due to GDPR violations. (Bleeping Computer)

Can’t get enough Talos? 

Decrement by one to rule them all: AsIO3.sys driver exploitation 
Learn how our researcher, Marcin Noga, found two critical vulnerabilities in ASUS’ Armory Crate and AI Suite drivers.

Talos Takes: Teaching LLMs to spot malicious PowerShell scripts 
Hazel chats with Ryan Fetterman from the SURGe team to explore his new research on how LLMs can assist security operations centers in identifying malicious PowerShell scripts.

Beers with Talos: Terms and conceptions may apply
In this episode, the crew reassembles after a totally intentional and not-at-all accidental hiatus. They cover AI-assisted IVF, a possible underground war against dairy, and the real heroes: conference dogs.

Upcoming events where you can find Talos 

• NIRMA (July 28 – 30) St. Augustine, FL 
• Black Hat USA (Aug. 2 – 7) Las Vegas, NV 

Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week 

SHA 256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507 
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f 
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507 
Typical Filename: VID001.exe 
Claimed Product: N/A 
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201 

SHA 256: cd697cc93851d0b1939a7557b9ee9b3c0f56aab4336dd00ff6531f94f7e0e836 
MD5: c94c094513f02d63be5ae3415bba8031 
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cd697cc93851d0b1939a7557b9ee9b3c0f56aab4336dd00ff6531f94f7e0e836/details  
Typical Filename: setup 
Claimed Product: N/A 
Detection Name: W32.Variant:Gen.28iv.1201 

SHA 256: 57a6d1bdbdac7614f588ec9c7e4e99c4544df8638af77781147a3d6daa5af536 
MD5: 79b075dc4fce7321f3be049719f3ce27 
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/57a6d1bdbdac7614f588ec9c7e4e99c4544df8638af77781147a3d6daa5af536/details 
Typical Filename: RemCom.exe 
Claimed Product: N/A 
Detection Name: W32.57A6D1BDBD-100.SBX.VIOC 

SHA 256: a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91   
MD5: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376   
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91/details
Typical Filename: IMG001.exe  
Claimed Product: N/A 
Detection Name: Simple_Custom_Detection   

SHA 256: 061e13a4fc9f1d4da0671082d5e4666f316bb251f13eded93f9cdb4a584d0bc0 
MD5: 8d74e04c022cadad5b05888d1cafedd0 
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/061e13a4fc9f1d4da0671082d5e4666f316bb251f13eded93f9cdb4a584d0bc0/details  
Typical Filename: smhost.exe 
Claimed Product: N/A 
Detection Name: Artemis:Lazy.27fx.in14.Talos

SHA 256: 2eb95ef4c4c24f1e38a5c8b556d78b71c8a8fb2589ed8c5b95e9d18659bde293
MD5: N/A
VirusTotal: N/A, use https://talosintelligence.com/sha_searches
Typical Filename: N/A
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: W32.2EB95EF4C4-100.SBX.TG

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