Overview

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has recently added three significant vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (KEV), based on evidence of active exploitation. These vulnerabilities, identified in popular networking and security products, represent a considerable risk to both private and government networks.

The recently added vulnerabilities to the CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog include CVE-2024-1212, a critical OS command injection flaw in the Progress Kemp LoadMaster; CVE-2024-0012, an authentication bypass vulnerability affecting Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS; and CVE-2024-9474, a privilege escalation issue within PAN-OS that enables attackers to escalate privileges via OS command injection.

These vulnerabilities have been categorized with varying levels of urgency and severity, but all share a common characteristic—they pose substantial risks when left unaddressed, particularly for federal enterprises. The vulnerabilities were identified through active threat research and exploitation monitoring, underlining the need for immediate mitigation and patching.

CVE-2024-1212: Progress Kemp LoadMaster OS Command Injection Vulnerability

Progress Kemp LoadMaster, a widely-used application delivery controller and load balancer, has been found to contain a severe OS command injection vulnerability. This issue, designated CVE-2024-1212, allows an attacker with access to the administrator web user interface (WUI) to execute arbitrary commands on the affected system. The vulnerability stems from a flaw in the LoadMaster’s handling of API requests via the administrator interface.

The vulnerability in Progress Kemp LoadMaster (CVE-2024-1212) is triggered when an attacker sends specially crafted input to the system’s “/access” endpoint, which bypasses existing restrictions. This input is improperly handled by a vulnerable Bash script, leading to unchecked user input being passed into a system() call.

As a result, attackers can inject malicious commands that could potentially escalate privileges to root, providing full control over the device. The affected version is 7.2.59.0.22007, while the issue has been addressed in the patched version 7.2.59.2.22338. For further details, users are encouraged to review the Kemp LoadMaster CVE-2024-1212 advisory.

The vulnerability was rapidly patched after its discovery, but administrators are urged to upgrade to the latest version to mitigate potential exploitation risks. If left unpatched, the vulnerability allows attackers to completely compromise the affected system, making it a prime target for cybercriminals.

CVE-2024-0012: PAN-OS Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2024-0012 is a critical vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS, the software that powers their next-generation firewalls. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms on the management web interface, granting them administrator-level privileges.

The vulnerability in PAN-OS software (CVE-2024-0012) affects the management interface, allowing attackers to bypass authentication controls and gain unauthorized access to administrative functions. This could lead to a full compromise of the firewall, enabling attackers to modify configurations, exfiltrate sensitive data, or exploit other vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2024-9474, which facilitates privilege escalation.

Reports indicate that this flaw is actively being exploited, with cybercriminals targeting management interfaces exposed to the internet. The vulnerability has been assigned a critical severity score of 9.3, highlighting its potential impact. Affected versions include PAN-OS 10.2, PAN-OS 11.0, PAN-OS 11.1, and PAN-OS 11.2.

Palo Alto Networks published an advisory (PAN-SA-2024-0015) on November 18, 2024, and has released patches for PAN-OS versions 10.2.12-h2, 11.0.6-h1, 11.1.5-h1, 11.2.4-h1, and later versions. To mitigate risks, the company strongly recommends restricting access to the management interface to trusted internal IP addresses.

CVE-2024-9474: PAN-OS Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

Another vulnerability, CVE-2024-9474, found in the same PAN-OS software, allows attackers to escalate privileges once they have compromised a device through the previously mentioned CVE-2024-0012 vulnerability. This privilege escalation (PE) vulnerability is especially dangerous for organizations that have already been compromised, as it allows attackers to gain root-level access to the device, providing them with full control over the firewall system.

The vulnerability (CVE-2024-9474) allows attackers who have already bypassed authentication (via CVE-2024-0012) to escalate their privileges through a flaw in the web management interface of PAN-OS. Once they gain elevated privileges, attackers can perform administrative actions that are normally restricted, such as modifying critical system files or configurations, potentially leading to a complete system compromise.

This vulnerability has been assigned a medium severity rating of 6.9 and is actively being exploited. Affected versions include PAN-OS 10.2, PAN-OS 11.0, PAN-OS 11.1, and PAN-OS 11.2. To address the issue, Palo Alto Networks has released patches for PAN-OS versions 10.2.12-h2, 11.0.6-h1, 11.1.5-h1, 11.2.4-h1, and later versions. In addition to applying these patches, it is recommended to restrict access to management interfaces to trusted internal IP addresses.

Recommendations and Mitigations

To mitigate the risks posed by these vulnerabilities, the following actions are strongly recommended for affected organizations:

1. Ensure all affected systems are patched to the latest versions as listed in the vendor advisories. This will address the vulnerabilities at their core.
2. Limiting access to management interfaces to trusted internal IP addresses is the best defense against exploitation, particularly for vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-0012.
3. Regularly monitor for any unusual activity or configuration changes within your firewalls or load balancers. This includes reviewing logs for signs of exploitation or attempts to exploit the listed vulnerabilities.
4. Organizations using Palo Alto Networks’ firewalls with a Threat Prevention subscription should configure the system to block known attacks associated with these vulnerabilities using Threat IDs 95746, 95747, and others.

Conclusion

The addition of CVE-2024-1212, CVE-2024-0012, and CVE-2024-9474 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog highlights the active and ongoing nature of threats targeting critical infrastructure. Cybercriminals are increasingly targeting vulnerabilities in widely used enterprise tools like load balancers and firewalls, aiming to exploit weak points that could lead to full system compromises or privilege escalation.

Organizations that use affected products, such as Progress Kemp LoadMaster or Palo Alto Networks’ PAN-OS, are strongly encouraged to apply the necessary patches and follow best practices for securing management interfaces. By taking these steps, they can mitigate the risk of exploitation and protect their systems.

Sources:

• https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2024/11/18/cisa-adds-three-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
• https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-0012
• https://community.progress.com/s/products/loadmaster
• https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-9474

The post CISA Adds Three Critical Vulnerabilities to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog appeared first on Cyble.

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Overview

The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) has recently added two Cisco vulnerabilities to its catalog. Both vulnerabilities target Cisco products, with high severity ratings and potential for impacts on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of affected systems. 

The first vulnerability, CVE-2024-20536, affects Cisco’s Nexus Dashboard Fabric Controller (NDFC), specifically versions 12.1.2 and 12.1.3. The flaw is found in the REST API endpoint and web-based management interface, and it could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with read-only privileges to execute arbitrary SQL commands on an affected device.

The vulnerability arises due to insufficient input validation. An attacker with read-only privileges could exploit this flaw by sending specially crafted requests to the affected device’s REST API or management interface, bypassing input validation and potentially modifying or deleting data in the internal database. Exploiting this vulnerability could lead to denial of service (DoS) conditions and a significant disruption of operations.

The severity of the vulnerability is classified as high. It affects Cisco NDFC versions 12.1.2 and 12.1.3, making these systems particularly vulnerable to exploitation. The potential impact includes data manipulation, which could allow attackers to alter sensitive information and service disruption, potentially leading to system downtime. Furthermore, there is a risk of data leakage, where unauthorized individuals may access and expose confidential data stored within the affected systems.

This vulnerability does not affect Cisco NDFC when it is configured as a Storage Area Network (SAN) controller. However, for organizations using the affected versions of Cisco NDFC, the potential risks are significant, especially in terms of data integrity and availability.

CVE-2024-20484: Denial of Service in Cisco Enterprise Chat and Email (ECE)

The second vulnerability, CVE-2024-20484, affects Cisco Enterprise Chat and Email (ECE) versions 12.6 and earlier, running the External Agent Assignment Service (EAAS). This vulnerability could allow unauthenticated, remote attackers to trigger a Denial of Service (DoS) condition, disrupting the availability of the ECE system.

The vulnerability lies in the way Cisco ECE handles Media Routing Peripheral Interface Manager (MR PIM) traffic. An attacker could exploit this flaw by sending specially crafted MR PIM traffic, causing a failure in the MR PIM connection between Cisco ECE and Cisco Unified Contact Centre Enterprise (CCE). This failure leads to a denial-of-service condition, rendering the ECE system inoperable.

This issue primarily affects organizations using Cisco ECE for enterprise communication. A successful attack could lead to widespread disruptions, affecting internal communications and customer service operations.

Cisco’s Broader Vulnerability Landscape: A Year of Increased Threats

While CVE-2024-20484 and CVE-2024-20536 are the latest additions to the catalog of known vulnerabilities, Cisco has had a series of high-severity vulnerabilities throughout the year. In addition to these new vulnerabilities, Cyble recently reported on a critical flaw in the Unified Industrial Wireless Software for Ultra-Reliable Wireless Backhaul (URWB), tracked as CVE-2024-20418. This vulnerability, with a CVSS score of 10.0 (the highest possible severity), allows attackers to gain root-level access to vulnerable Cisco devices.

Exploiting this flaw can enable unauthorized command execution on affected systems, making it one of the most dangerous vulnerabilities in Cisco’s product lineup this year. The CVE-2024-20418 vulnerability affects Cisco Catalyst Access Points operating in URWB mode, such as the Catalyst IW9165D, IW9165E, and IW9167E models. Attackers can exploit this flaw by sending specially crafted HTTP requests to the affected device, injecting commands with root privileges, and gaining control over the device. Exploiting this vulnerability could lead to compromises in industrial and high-stakes environments.

Moreover, Cyble sensors have previously detected cyberattacks targeting the “/+CSCOE+/logon.html” URL, which is linked to Cisco ASA’s WebVPN Login Page. Vulnerabilities like XSS, path traversal, and HTTP response splitting could allow attackers to execute code, steal data, or disrupt services.

Conclusion 

The disclosure of these Cisco vulnerabilities, like CVE-2024-20484 and CVE-2024-20536, stresses the growing risk of exploitation in critical infrastructure, particularly in widely used systems like Cisco products. As Cyble and other threat intelligence firms have noted, cybercriminals are increasingly targeting known vulnerabilities, employing tactics such as brute-force attacks and leveraging the dark web to spread exploits. 

With vulnerabilities continuing to be discovered and actively targeted, organizations must prioritize patch management, implement strong security measures, and conduct regular vulnerability assessments. By staying on guard and proactive in updating systems, segmenting networks, and monitoring suspicious activity, businesses can better defend against online threats. 

The post CERT-In Flags Two High-Risk Cisco Vulnerabilities Targeting Key Infrastructure appeared first on Cyble.

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Key Takeaways

• Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) came across a campaign Linked to the known APT group DONOT, targeting the manufacturing industry that supports the country’s maritime and defense sectors.
• The campaign uses a malicious LNK file disguised as an RTF containing encrypted data. The file is decrypted via PowerShell to deliver a lure RTF and payload.
• A scheduled task is then created to ensure the malware runs every five minutes for persistence.
• Random domains are generated with hardcoded words and TLDs for backup C&C servers.
• The encryption method for C&C communication has changed compared to previous campaigns.
• The stager malware communicates with the C&C server using AES encryption and Base64 encoding to evade detection.
• The decryption key for the second-stage payload is now in the downloaded binary rather than hardcoded in the config file.
• The victim’s system information is collected before delivering the final payload to assess the target’s value.
• The stager malware uses environment variables to store critical configuration details, like C&C addresses and task information.

Overview

CRIL recently came across a campaign seemingly aimed at Pakistan’s manufacturing industry, which supports the country’s maritime and defense sectors. After analyzing the files involved in the campaign, it was determined that the attack was linked to the known APT group DONOT.

DoNot, also known as APT-C-35, is an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group operating since 2016. This group has a history of targeting government and military entities, as well as foreign affairs ministries and embassies across South Asia.

In this recent campaign, the Threat Actor (TA) uses the .LNK file as the initial infection vector, which could arrive within a RAR archive via spam email. The .LNK file is disguised as an RTF file, leading users to believe they are opening a legitimate file.

When the user clicks to execute, it triggers cmd.exe and powershell.exe to run additional malicious commands, loading the stager malware (a DLL file) and establishing persistence by creating a scheduled task to execute the DLL file through rundll32.exe. Also, it communicates with the primary C&C server by sending a unique device ID via a POST request and, in response, receives control commands from the TA to direct its next actions.

These actions include self-destruction, deployment of additional malicious payloads by downloading an encrypted payload from a specified URL, and subsequent execution. To evade detection and complicate analysis, the malware employs a different encryption method instead of the single-byte XOR key used in previous campaigns. The figure below shows the infection chain.

This “.LNK” file campaign was first identified by StrikeReady Labs, who reported it on the X platform. A similar campaign was also seen in July 2024, targeting Pakistan’s Government agencies and manufacturing industries using sector-specific lures. In the previous campaign, the TA employed malicious Office files with embedded macros and Rich Text Format (RTF) files that exploit vulnerabilities to load the stager DLL onto victim machines.

When comparing the previous campaigns, the initial infection vector has shifted from Microsoft Office files to .LNK files. Additionally, the stager DLL now employs an enhanced payload delivery method and improved C&C communication, incorporating encryption mechanisms at various stages.

Technical Analysis

The malicious “.LNK” file contains PowerShell commands, an encrypted lure RTF file, and the encrypted stager payload. Upon execution, the “.LNK” file initiates “cmd.exe,” which creates a directory in the “%temp%” path and copies “powershell.exe” to this location as “2SqSxDA2.exe.” The newly copied PowerShell process subsequently executes the PowerShell code embedded in the LNK file. The figure below shows the partial content of the LNK file.

PowerShell Code

The PowerShell command embedded within the “.LNK” file retrieves both a lure file and a DLL from the “.LNK” itself. It identifies the “.LNK” file based on its file size and directory path, then decrypts the lure RTF file and the DLL file using a single-byte XOR operation with “0xB2.” Decryption begins at offset “0x1774” for the lure file and “0x79AF” for the DLL.

These extracted files are stored in the “%temp%7GGVXwRn” directory. Once extraction is complete, the PowerShell command deletes the PowerShell copy “2SqSxDA2.exe,” opens the lure document, and calls “rundll32.exe” to execute the DLL, invoking the export function “HgCallClient.”

Lure Document

The lure document is related to Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KS&EW), a prominent defense contractor and shipbuilding company in Pakistan. This suggests that the TA is targeting industries supporting the defense sector. The figure below shows the lure document.

DLL file analysis

Upon execution, the DLL begins extracting configuration details from an embedded JSON file. This configuration includes information such as the configuration filename, environment variable name, server domain, transit keys for secure communication, mutex, and user-agent string. The table below shows the configuration details.

Filed Name	Value
ConfigFileName	Config.json
EnvVarTaskName	PFTN
HMAC_Security	j4fhrJpSqvgE
MachineMutex	5734b817-1bb8-402b-a761-da8f2e188baf
ServerDomain	hxxps://internalfileserver[.]online:443/
TransitKey	tTRxrb0kmbQGpdci
TransitSalt	aWrtRHXuEBy6CwXj
userAgent	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/119.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
BackupServerURL	hxxps://safehydratedcloudcosmoswebglobe[.]cc/
PrimaryServerUrl	hxxps://internalfileserver[.]online:443/
FirstTaskName	Schedule
TaskDefinition	This service enables a user to configure and schedule automated tasks on this computer. It also hosts multiple Windows system-critical tasks. If this service is stopped or disabled, these tasks will not be run at their scheduled times, and any services that explicitly depend on it will fail to start.

Random domain generation

The BackupServerURL mentioned in the config file is generated by selecting six values from a hardcoded array of words and concatenating them to create a domain. A TLD is then selected from a separate array of TLD values. This randomly generated domain serves as a backup for Command and Control (C&C) communication. The figure below shows the list of available words used for generating random domains.

Persistence

After extracting the configuration details, the DLL checks for the presence of a specific scheduled task named “Schedule.” If the task is not found, it creates a new task to execute the DLL via “rundll32.exe” every 5 minutes for one day, as shown in the figure below.

After establishing persistence, the DLL sends a POST request to the primary server URL. This request includes headers such as an HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) generated from the HTTP method, contact URL, current DateTime, and an HMAC secret key, along with an “X-Timestamp.” The request body contains the unique DeviceID and configuration filename, encrypted using a hardcoded AES transit key and salt, then base64 encoded before being sent to the C&C primary URL. This encryption method marks a relatively new approach in this campaign compared to previous ones observed.

If the C&C server responds with a status code of 200, the response content contains JSON configuration data, which is decrypted using the same AES transit key and IV. The decrypted data includes the following details:

• DownloadURL
• FileDropEnvironment
• FileDropName
• ExportFunctionName
• TaskName
• Self_Destruction (boolean)
• Execution (boolean)

The decrypted JSON configuration data allows the TA to control key aspects of the malware’s behavior, such as downloading additional payloads, specifying file locations, and configuring execution options. This enables flexibility to adjust the attack as needed.

Next Stage payload Execution

If the TA intends to execute an additional payload, the encrypted payload is downloaded according to the C&C configuration. It is then decrypted using an XOR key found within the encrypted file, just after a sequence of magic bytes, and processed using the XOR round-robin method, as shown in Figure 10. This process differs from a previous campaign where the encrypted data was fetched from a URL, and the decryption key was provided directly in the C&C configuration, as shown in Figure 11

Once decryption is successful, the data is verified as a valid binary by checking for the presence of the string “This program cannot be run in DOS mode”. The decrypted payload is then placed in the directory specified by the “FileDropEnvironment” variable.

After verifying the binary, the stager malware creates a scheduled task to execute the decrypted binary using “rundll32.exe”. The task name and execution interval are specified in the configuration details provided by the TA via the C&C.

In case of a decryption failure, the stager malware updates the configuration with the backup server URL and logs the error message “File corruption while decrypting” It also collects detailed system information, such as disk space and installed security products, to help identify the cause of the decryption failure. This information is then sent to the TA via POST request.

In case of successful payload deployment through the scheduled task, the stager malware logs the event in the same manner as it does for a failure, with the only difference being that the result is recorded as “Payload Deployment Successful.” This log also contains detailed system information, helping the TA identify potential targets in case of success and detect security solutions in case of failure. The TA collects and logs all relevant details, regardless of the outcome, and sends the information to the TA’s C&C via POST request.

The stager malware typically stores data, including the number of attempts to communicate with the C&C, the primary C&C domain name, the last connection date, the backup domain name, and details of the second-stage payload. These values are stored as encrypted entries in the environment variables, as shown in the table below.

Variable Name	Value	Decrypted value
NFC (Not Found Count)	iOJDUU+oq2I1wQwfdYl98w==	2
PDN (Primary Domain Name)	ehdXQoPR9RjVlJYUWq+tIkQkazp1KhA1+59IGAXaXL94XRvH8aNbs9pv3e6PLCKK	hxxps://internalfileserver[.]online:443/
LCD (Last Check Date)	vKXaygaagiZygkd7/K+uvQ==	11-11-2024
BDN (Backup Domain Name)	“tc6rjFyW2AVO6pu2y/c/Vg626iQ+S/FHqYIGBpIejquLjQJwMxVv/r6q44XNnInvBJPP86CLYx9qKJ0lMfryxQ==”	hxxps://floridacloudcyberhydratedfloridatech[.]online/

During our testing, the C&C server was unavailable, preventing us from receiving a response. As a result, we were unable to observe or analyze the behavior of the next-stage DLL payload, which would have been triggered by communication with the C&C server. Without this crucial interaction, we could not fully understand how the payload executes or what further actions it might take.

Self- Deletion
If TA activates the self-destruction command via C&C, the stager malware removes the scheduled task and initiates self-deletion by executing the “DEL” command through “cmd.exe”. The image below illustrates the self-deletion process.

Threat Actor Attribution

The malicious DLL connects to the C&C server “internalfileserver[.]online,” which resolves to the IP address “94[.]141.120[.]137.” This same IP address previously hosted the domain “office-updatecentral[.]com,” which was used by the DoNot APT group in a prior campaign. Also, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) observed in this campaign exhibit similar behavior to those reported by the 360 Threat Intelligence Centre.

Conclusion

This DoNot APT campaign shows an evolution in tactics. It uses malicious LNK files, PowerShell for payload delivery, and scheduled tasks for persistence. The group also employs dynamic domain generation for backup C&C servers and has updated its encryption methods to avoid detection.

The shift in how decryption keys are handled and the collection of system information before payload delivery indicate a more sophisticated approach. These changes highlight the growing complexity of APT campaigns and the need for improved detection and defense strategies.

Threat hunting Packages

The threat hunting package, including YARA and Sigma rules capable of detecting this campaign, can be downloaded from the linked GitHub pages.

Recommendations 

• Deploy robust EDR solutions to monitor unusual PowerShell activity, scheduled task creation, and suspicious network connections to C&C servers. Ensure these tools are configured to flag and alert on anomalies.
• Limit the execution of PowerShell and other scripting tools to necessary users only and enforce least privilege policies to prevent malware from escalating privileges and performing malicious actions.
• Conduct frequent audits of scheduled tasks to identify any unusual or unauthorized tasks, particularly those involving rundll32.exe. Ensure only trusted applications are allowed to create or execute scheduled tasks.
• Implement behavior-based detection systems that can identify malicious actions, such as frequent attempts to contact C&C servers or unexpected encrypted data being transmitted.
• Implement a well-defined incident response plan with clear steps to handle potential APT intrusions. This plan should include rapid identification, containment, and recovery from any detected malicious activity.
• Conduct regular cybersecurity awareness training for employees, focusing on identifying phishing emails and handling suspicious attachments to reduce the risk of initial infection.

Indicators of Compromise

Indicator	Indicator Type	Comments
cffe7eb01000de809b79a711702eaf3773f2e6167ce440f33f30bcd6fabcace3	SHA-256	Proc list 2024.lnk
a7893c54edaecaa0e56010576a8249ad9149456f5d379868a0ecaa4c5c33fa70	SHA-256	CertPropOrigin.dll
Internalfileserver[.]online	domain	C&C server

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques 

Tactic	Technique	Procedure
Initial Access (TA0001)	Phishing (T1566)	This campaign is likely to reach users through spam emails.
Execution (TA0002)	Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001)	PowerShell commands are used to decrypt and execute the lure RTF file and stager DLL payload.
Execution (TA0002)	Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (T1059.003)	Cmd.exe is used to copy PowerShell.exe to the %temp% directory as “2SqSxDA2.exe”.
Defense Evasion (TA0005)	System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 (T1218.011)	Rundll32.exe is used to execute the stager payload.
Persistence (TA0003)	Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (T1053.005)	A scheduled task is created for persistence, running the DLL payload regularly via rundll32.exe.
Defense Evasion (TA0005)	Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion (T1070.004)	Temporary PowerShell.exe file (“2SqSxDA2.exe”) is deleted after executing the malicious commands.
Defense Evasion (TA0005)	Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)	XOR and AES encryption mechanisms are used in various stages of the attack
Command and Control (TA0011)	Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001)	GET and POST requests are sent to the Threat Actor’s C&C server.
Command and Control (TA0011)	Remote File Copy (T1105)	The additional payload is downloaded from the C&C server using a URL provided in the configuration.
Exfiltration (TA0010)	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041)	Extensive system information is collected and exfiltrated to the C&C server via encrypted communication.

References:

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/qCcuU0E6d84tdQ1r2dCsjA

https://twitter.com/StrikeReadyLabs/status/1852532673283268899

https://twitter.com/suyog41/status/1814230027560501248

The post Sailing Into Danger: DONOT APT’s Attack on Maritime & Defense Manufacturing appeared first on Cyble.

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Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recently released The State of Cybersecurity 2024 report, which illuminates the critical threats and advances in resilience across Germany’s digital landscape.

In a joint press briefing, Federal Minister of the Interior Nancy Faeser and BSI President Claudia Plattner said that while the cyberthreat landscape remains tense, resilience measures are proving effective in protecting businesses, institutions, and democratic processes.

Federal Minister Nancy Faeser noted the importance of cybersecurity for societal stability, stating, “Cybersecurity is central to our society and affects each and every one of us.” She highlighted that extortion, cyber espionage, and hybrid threats—especially from state-sponsored actors—continue to pose significant risks, necessitating robust cybersecurity investments to safeguard democratic institutions.

BSI President Claudia Plattner reinforced this stance, noting that Germany has witnessed increased resilience against cyber threats. However, she warned against complacency: “We must continue to increase our resilience in a nationwide effort.” Both leaders stressed the importance of swiftly incorporating the NIS-2 Directive into national law to fortify Germany’s cyber defenses.

Key Findings from BSI’s 2024 Report

Rising Threats from Malware and Ransomware Attacks

Between mid-2023 and mid-2024, an alarming increase in malware variants was recorded, with an average of 309,000 new variants discovered daily—a 26% increase over the previous year. Much of this rise is attributed to attacks targeting 64-bit Windows systems and an above-average increase in Android malware.

Ransomware continues to be a significant challenge, especially for businesses and government institutions. Data leaks following ransomware attacks have increased, although the percentage of victims paying ransom has dropped. LockBit leads the list of the five most active groups targeting Germany. The group published 40 alleged leak victims on its leak site during the reporting period, followed by BlackBasta and 8Base.

Many organizations now rely on robust backup systems, reducing their dependency on attackers to restore encrypted data. BSI observed that transparent communication about cyber incidents has helped mitigate potential impacts, as other organizations can swiftly address and close similar vulnerabilities.

Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) and Cyber Espionage

Germany noted the surge in persistent threats from Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups, many of which are state-sponsored. Against a backdrop of geopolitical tension, these groups are increasingly targeting political parties, governmental agencies, and corporations for cyber espionage. Germany urged its public and private sectors to adopt proactive threat intelligence and protective measures to defend against these sophisticated, continuous attacks.

Cybersecurity for Elections: Ensuring Democratic Integrity

For German citizens, not only the European elections but also three state elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg and nine local elections took place. The BSI said the electoral process, communication by the authorities and the media, and the formation of opinion and will in the context of elections are now highly dependent upon information technology and are, therefore, at the center of information security.

BSI provided dedicated security oversight, working with electoral authorities to protect the integrity of the voting process. As Germany heads toward future elections, the BSI has enhanced its monitoring and support for political entities, prioritizing resilience against potential cyber threats and disinformation campaigns from state actors.

Emerging Cybersecurity Challenges

Increase in High-Volume DDoS Attacks

The first half of 2024 saw a substantial uptick in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, with a marked increase in high-volume attacks exceeding 10,000 Mbps. DDoS attacks not only disrupt services but are increasingly used to sow public uncertainty by exaggerating their impact on social media.

 The BSI recommends adopting advanced DDoS mitigation strategies, particularly for critical infrastructure, to withstand these escalating attack volumes.

Data Theft Targeting Consumers

Phishing remains a major threat to German citizens, with attackers expanding beyond financial institution impersonation to include popular streaming services. During 2024, phishing campaigns have increasingly targeted user data—such as credit card information and personal identifiers—via emails masquerading as communications from banks and entertainment platforms. The BSI advises consumers to stay vigilant and adopt robust identity protection measures to counter phishing attempts.

Strategic Initiatives to Strengthen Cyber Resilience

Cybernation Germany Initiative

The Cybernation Germany initiative, launched in early 2024, is a step towards a national commitment to building resilience and expanding Germany’s cybersecurity expertise. The initiative’s goals align with the NIS-2 Directive and the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), which impose mandatory cybersecurity measures and incident reporting standards for companies. The CRA emphasizes a “security by design” approach, particularly for IoT devices, to bolster protections across interconnected networks.

This initiative demonstrates a concerted push from Germany towards enhanced threat intelligence, cyber resilience, and protective infrastructure.

Key Recommendations from BSI for Strengthening Cybersecurity

1. Governance and Risk-Based Policies: Organizations should maintain updated, approved cybersecurity policies, leveraging threat intelligence to refine policies and prioritize high-risk threats.
2. Enhanced Monitoring and Detection: With the rise in malware and ransomware, BSI recommends integrating Security Operations Centers (SOC) with continuous threat detection and red teaming exercises to effectively simulate real-world scenarios.
3. Incident Response and Recovery: BSI encourages organizations to establish structured Incident Response plans, supported by Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), to reduce response times and facilitate efficient recovery from cyber incidents.
4. Increased Public Awareness and Resilience Measures: Awareness campaigns, employee training, and enhanced communication strategies have proven effective in helping organizations and consumers defend against phishing and ransomware attacks.
5. Collaboration with International Security Standards: Adhering to NIS-2 and the Cyber Resilience Act ensures that German entities align with European cybersecurity standards, enhancing cross-border protections and maintaining consistent security measures across sectors.

Conclusion: A Proactive Path Forward

The BSI’s 2024 report reaffirms Germany’s proactive approach to cybersecurity, emphasizing resilience, regulatory compliance, and advanced threat intelligence.

With heightened preparedness across government, businesses, and society, Germany is well-positioned to defend against increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. However, as Minister Faeser stated, the evolving cyber threat landscape necessitates continuous investment and adaptation to safeguard Germany’s critical infrastructure and democratic systems.

Germany’s Cybernation initiative and collaboration with international cybersecurity frameworks hint at a robust defense strategy that other nations can use as a model. By maintaining proactive measures, aligning with global security standards, and fostering a culture of resilience, Germany aims to ensure cybersecurity remains integral to its digital and democratic future.

References:

https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Service-Navi/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2024/241112_Lagebericht_2024.html

https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Service-Navi/Publikationen/Lagebericht/lagebericht_node.html

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