Don’t let dormant accounts become a doorway for cybercriminals
Do you have online accounts you haven’t used in years? If so, a bit of digital spring cleaning might be in order.
WeLiveSecurity – Read More
Do you have online accounts you haven’t used in years? If so, a bit of digital spring cleaning might be in order.
WeLiveSecurity – Read More
The internet is vast — and it’s all too easy to end up in the wrong place; especially if you’re a child. That’s why it’s so important to help kids navigate cyberspace and guide them toward safe, age-appropriate content. But how can you know what’s safe or appropriate if you don’t even know what kids are into these days?
This is where Kaspersky Safe Kids comes in. We’ve collected a year’s worth of data from our app, and can now answer that persistent question in every parent’s mind: “What’s my child actually doing online?”
Kaspersky experts have conducted a study to find out what kids are searching for online (including on YouTube), what apps they’re using, which games they love, what music they listen to, and which influencers they follow. You’ll find answers to these and other questions in the full version of the report.
We discovered that memes make up 4.87% of the content kids search for on YouTube — a significant percentage. Unsurprisingly, music (21.11%) and influencers (17.17%) are the most popular searches, with cartoons at 6.19% and memes right behind. As for kids’ taste in memes — it’s pretty specific. Right now, brainrot content is hugely popular among children worldwide.
If you’re an active TikTok user, you might already be familiar with a three-legged shark in sneakers or a crocodile-cum-bomber-plane, and if someone asks you “Who’s stronger: Tralalero Tralala or Tung Tung Tung Sahur?” you’ll be ready to name your favorite. If none of that makes any sense to you, here’s an explanation: these are the main characters of the new brainrot meme wave. They’ve replaced the previous fad of Skibidi Toilet — and kids around the world absolutely love them.
Music is by far the most popular children’s search category on YouTube — making up over one-fifth of all their searches. And no major changes to what particular genres they prefer have been noted: kids still listen to things like phonk and nightcore.
As for specific artists, there are some interesting changes. Yes, Taylor Swift and Billie Eilish are still hugely popular — but now they’re sharing the spotlight with Sabrina Carpenter, whose hit Espresso went viral, along with several K-pop stars. The most popular song of all was Like Jennie by South Korean artist Jennie. Meanwhile, the most popular group was BLACKPINK — of which Jennie is a member.
Gaming influencers took third place in YouTube search popularity (with 17.15% of all searches) and general game content came fourth (with 10.14%). Combined, that makes game content even more popular than music. In Google searches, games ranked second in popularity after streaming platforms — making up 13.27%.
As for which games kids love the most — almost no surprises here: Minecraft, Brawl Stars, Fortnite, Roblox and… Sprunki. Sprunki is a newcomer to this list. We suspect this is just a passing trend and may not be as popular next year. However, for the present at least, YouTube is overflowing with Sprunki videos: content creators are posting let’s plays and creating their own full-fledged cartoons based on the game.
These same games, as we’ve covered before, are also a common target for scammers. They regularly come up with new schemes promising free skins, in-game currency, or gifts in exchange for in-game actions — but really they’re just trying to trick kids and drain their parents’ credit cards. So if your child is into any of these games, it’s worth telling them about these and other potential dangers.
From what we’ve observed, children around the world currently share a fairly common digital environment. They all enjoy the same games, follow the same influencers, listen to the same music, and laugh at the same memes.
One more thing unites them — they tend to adopt new technologies much earlier than most adults. ChatGPT and other popular neural networks have already become a normal part of kids’ online experience. Now, many children even create their own chatbots using Character.ai — just to “chat” with characters from their favorite games, movies, influencers, and other icons.
Helping children navigate cyberspace is the duty of every responsible adult. Of course, it’s parents who know their child best, so we just want to share some general tips.
Kaspersky Safe Kids helps you not only flexibly control what your kids are allowed to search for online and how much time they spend per day on certain apps, but also find out in real time where they are, whether they’ve gone beyond the permitted “geofence”, and how much their phones are charged. Parents can view the history of kids’ internet surfing and set up regular reports on the use of their devices. You can find more information on all the features and settings of Kaspersky Safe Kids in our post Keeping kids safe: a new variation on an old theme.
More articles on children’s safety online:
Kaspersky official blog – Read More
From a flurry of attacks targeting UK retailers to campaigns corralling end-of-life routers into botnets, it’s a wrap on another month filled with impactful cybersecurity news
WeLiveSecurity – Read More
Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter.
In the words of Game Changer host Sam Reich, “And your host, me! I’ve been here the whole time!”
Okay, maybe it’s not the whole time, but for the past three months, I’ve been settling into my role here at Cisco Talos. Editing blogs, writing and publishing social media posts, and organizing this newsletter every week — I’ve been working behind the scenes to ensure everything runs smoothly and delivers the most helpful information to the cybersecurity community.
I often get raised eyebrows when I mention that, prior to my last job as a technical writer, I had never worked in STEM. I don’t blame them, because how could someone who had never opened Terminal (and admittedly, up until last month sometimes forgot what it was called) end up with a job offer from Talos?
My college degree is in anthropology, or the study of humans and culture, past and present. Though my niche research interest was/is Malaysian culture, LGBTQ+ history, and politics (even getting a research grant to travel to peninsular Malaysia for a month), my first career out of college was fundraising for a homeless services nonprofit in Arlington, Virginia. After I moved to another state, I held a content writing position at a startup, where I wrote fundraising letters and emails for a portfolio of over 200 nonprofits.
While I felt invested in these organizations’ missions, I began to feel understimulated. I craved a career that would build on my experiences and skills while giving me the chance to learn and grow in new, exciting ways. While searching for new jobs on LinkedIn, I happened upon a nearby physical layer encryption startup that was seeking a technical writer. I had no clue what the physical layer even was, so I was grateful when they took a chance on hiring me, and found that my background in anthropological research, as well as my ability to adapt content for a lot of different audiences, became a huge asset in technical writing.
I’ve always said that if I could magically be paid to go to school forever, I would. Technical writing (and its cousins, like my current position) is as close as I can get! After I joined Talos, I found that people here are incredibly kind and very patient. Like Jon Munshaw, the person who held this role before me, my favorite question to Talos researchers is “Can you explain this to me like I’m your grandmother?” Not only does it help me grasp the concepts they’re sharing, but it also helps me find the clearest way to communicate them.
Talosians are brilliant people, and I’m only human, so it’s easy to feel like you don’t belong when you don’t have a STEM background. In a recent moment of doubt, I remembered that Joe had published a newsletter introduction about imposter syndrome two days after I started at Talos. One line stuck out to me: “You are where you are because others saw value in your work.”
As I took in the sentence, I realized that it was entirely true. If there’s one thing that I’ve learned over the past few months, it’s that everyone you meet has something to teach and everyone has something to learn. Our collective knowledge and experience are gifts we share with one another. I hope that the content I edit and produce will bring value to you.
So what kind of content will I bring to this newsletter? You can expect intros that aren’t just informative, but also relatable and engaging. They may even remind you of your beginnings in cybersecurity. I’ll make complex topics feel accessible, highlight the human side of cybersecurity, and share insights that help the community grow stronger.
At the end of the day, our work isn’t just about threats, but about the humans working tirelessly to defend against them.
Talos has identified threats disguised as legitimate AI solution installers, including ransomware like CyberLock and Lucky_Gh0$t, and a destructive malware called Numero. These threats highlight how malicious actors are leveraging the rise of AI to distribute harmful software.
Cybercriminals are targeting the trust and excitement around AI tools to deliver malware, which could affect anyone looking to adopt AI for personal or business use, putting their systems and data at risk. Understanding these threats helps you stay vigilant and avoid falling victim to such deceptive tactics.
Snort SIDs and ClamAV detections are available at the bottom of the blog post. Otherwise, always verify the source of any AI tools or software before downloading, use trusted cybersecurity solutions to protect your systems, and stay informed about emerging threats by keeping up with updates from reliable sources like Cisco Talos.
MathWorks, Creator of MATLAB, Confirms Ransomware Attack
The attack dirsupted MathWorks’ systems and online applications, but it remains unclear which ransomware group targeted the software company and whether they stole any data. (DarkReading)
Deepfakes, Scams, and the Age of Paranoia
This hit home, both as a jobseeker within the past year and a young(er) person who’s worried about her parents’ security. I may be able to parse AI portraits with six fingers and hair phasing through their clothes, but have you ever seen a convincing deepfake? (Wired)
Companies Warned of Commvault Vulnerability Exploitation
CISA says that the ongoing exploitation of a Commvault vulnerability that was targeted as a zero-day is likely part of a broader campaign against software-as-a-service (SaaS) solutions. (SecurityWeek)
US student agrees to plead guilty to hack affecting tens of millions of students
A Massachusetts student has agreed to plead guilty to federal charges relating to hacking and extorting one of the largest U.S. education tech companies. PI included names, addresses, phone numbers, Social Security numbers, medical information, and school grades. (TechCrunch)
UAT-6382 exploits Cityworks zero-day vulnerability to deliver malware Talos has found intrusions in enterprise networks of local governing bodies in the United States (U.S.), beginning January 2025 when initial exploitation first took place. Read the blog here.
The day I found an APT group in the most unlikely place
In this Dark Reading Confidential episode, Talosian Vitor Ventura shares stories about the tricks he used to track down APTs, and the surprises discovered along the way. Listen to the podcast here.
SHA 256: 9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507
Typical Filename: VID001.exe
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201
SHA 256: 59f1e69b68de4839c65b6e6d39ac7a272e2611ec1ed1bf73a4f455e2ca20eeaa
MD5: df11b3105df8d7c70e7b501e210e3cc3
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/59f1e69b68de4839c65b6e6d39ac7a272e2611ec1ed1bf73a4f455e2ca20eeaa
Typical Filename: DOC001.exe
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: Win.Worm.Coinminer::1201
SHA256:3294df8e416f72225ab1ccf0ed0390134604bc747d60c36fbb8270f96732e341
MD5: b6bc3353a164b35f5b815fc1c429eaab
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3294df8e416f72225ab1ccf0ed0390134604bc747d60c36fbb8270f96732e341
Typical Filename: b6bc3353a164b35f5b815fc1c429eaab.msi
Claimed Product: n/a
Detection Name: Simple_Custom_Detection
SHA 256: a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91
MD5: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91
Typical Filename: c0dwjdi6a.dll
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: Trojan.GenericKD.33515991
Cisco Talos Blog – Read More
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered 57 suspicious extensions in the official Chrome Web Store with more than six million users. The plugins caught their attention because the permissions they request don’t match their descriptions.
What’s more, these extensions are “hidden” — meaning they don’t show up in Chrome Web Store searches, and search engines don’t index them. Installing such a plugin requires a direct link to it in the Chrome Web Store. This post details why extensions can be a dangerous tool in cybercriminal hands, explains the direct threat posed by these recently discovered plugins, and gives tips on how not to fall victim.
We’ve posted many times about why browser extensions shouldn’t be installed thoughtlessly. Browser plugins often help users speed up routine tasks, such as translating information on websites or checking spelling; however, the minutes you save often come at the cost of privacy and security.
This is because, in order to work effectively, extensions typically need access to everything you do in the browser. Even Google Translate asks for permission to “Read and change all your data on all websites” you visit — that is, not only can it monitor what you do online, but also alter any information on a page. For example, it might display a translation instead of the original text. If that’s what an online translator can do, just imagine what a malicious extension with the same access can get up to!
The problem is that most users are unaware of the risks posed by plugins. Whereas executable files from untrusted sources have come to be viewed as potentially dangerous, browser extensions enjoy a broad level of trust — especially if downloaded from an official store.
In the case of the 57 suspicious extensions found in the Chrome Web Store, the main sign of malicious intent was the broad sweep of permissions requested, such as access to cookies — including authentication ones.
In practice, this allows attackers to steal session cookies from victims’ devices, and those session cookies are used to avoid entering a password each time they visit a website. Such cookies also enable scammers to sign in to victims’ personal accounts on social networks or online stores.
Browser Checkup for Chrome by Doctor is one of the suspicious extensions masquerading as an “antivirus” for the browser. Source
In addition, the permissions requested grant the malicious extensions a host of interesting capabilities, including:
Cybersecurity researcher John Tuckner got on the trail of the suspicious extensions after examining the code of one of them: Fire Shield Extension Protection. Tuckner initially spotted this extension because it was published in the official Chrome store as hidden — it didn’t show up in search results and was accessible only via a direct link to the page in the Chrome Web Store.
Note that hidden extensions and apps in official stores are not unheard-of. The big platforms allow developers to hide them from the eyes of ordinary users. Such a practice tends to be the preserve of owners of private corporate software, and intended for use only by employees of a particular company. Another valid reason for hiding a product is when it’s still in the development stage.
However, both these explanations could be ruled out in the case of Fire Shield Extension Protection, boasting 300 000-plus users: a private corporate tool in the development stage with such a user base? Not likely.
Suspicious extensions with 200–300 thousand users each. Source
What’s more, the plugin features didn’t fit the profile of a highly specialized corporate solution: the description said that Fire Shield checks permissions requested by other extensions installed by the user, and warns about unsafe plugins.
To perform such tasks, it only needed permission to use the chrome.management API, which would allow it to get information about, and manage other installed plugins. But Fire Shield wanted much broader rights, which we’ve listed above with a description of the threats associated with this level of access.
Suspicious plugin wants too many permissions — including access to all sites, cookies, and user activity. Source
While analyzing Fire Shield Extension Protection, Tuckner found a clue that led to 35 more suspicious plugins. Among the links extracted from the extension code, he noticed a domain called unknow[.]com (seemingly a misspelling of “unknown”). A typo in a domain is a red flag to any cybersecurity expert, since it’s a common trick used by scammers, who hope the victim won’t notice.
Using a special tool, Tuckner found 35 more extensions associated with the same suspicious domain. The names of the extensions also had a lot in common, which confirmed their being connected. And they all requested broad access rights that didn’t match their stated description.
Extensions associated with the domain unknow[.]com, which kickstarted John Tuckner’s investigation. Source
Most of the suspicious extensions Tuckner found had a fairly standard set of described features: blocking ads, improving search results, and protecting user privacy. In reality, however, many lacked the code to perform these tasks. Some of the extensions all came from the same companies.
Further research led Tuckner to unearth 22 more suspicious plugins, some of which were publicly available (not hidden). Here’s the full list of them — below we give only hidden extensions with the most downloads:
All the evidence points to attackers hiding their malicious plugins to avoid detection by official store moderators. At the same time, such extensions are often distributed through search ads or malicious sites.
The researchers found no instances of detected suspicious extensions stealing user passwords or cookies. After a detailed study of the code, plus a series of experiments, they concluded that extended tracking of user activity doesn’t start immediately but some time after installation of the extension, and can be launched by a command from a remote server.
The nature of their code, the option of remote control, their repeating behavior patterns, and embedded functionality lead us to conclude that the extensions all belong to the same family of spyware or data-stealing programs. As such, we advise that you:
Browser plugins are more dangerous than they look. Read also:
Kaspersky official blog – Read More
AI has increasingly proliferated across various business verticals, leading to a transformation of industries through automation, data-driven decision-making and enhanced customer engagements. However, as AI continues to propel multiple industry sectors forward, malicious actors are exploiting its popularity by distributing a range of malware disguised as AI solutions’ installers and tools.
Threat actors are employing a variety of techniques and channels to distribute these fraudulent installers, including SEO-poisoning tactics to manipulate search engine rankings and cause their malicious websites or download links to appear at the top of search engine results, as well as platforms such as Telegram or social media messengers.
As a result, unsuspecting businesses in search of AI solutions may be deceived into downloading counterfeit tools in which malware is embedded. This practice poses a significant risk, as it not only compromises sensitive business data and financial assets but also undermines trust in legitimate AI market solutions. Therefore, organizations and users must exercise extreme caution, meticulously verify sources, and rely exclusively on reputable vendors to avoid falling prey to these threats.
Talos has recently uncovered multiple threats masquerading as AI solutions being circulated in the wild, including the CyberLock and Lucky_Gh0$t ransomware families, along with a newly discovered destructive malware, dubbed “Numero.” The legitimate versions of these AI tools are particularly popular within the B2B sales domain and the technology and marketing sectors, indicating that individuals and organizations in these industries are particularly at risk of being targeted by these malicious threats.
Talos observed a threat actor creating a lookalike fake AI solution website with the domain ‘novaleadsai[.]com’, likely masquerading as the original website domain ‘novaleads.app’, a lead monetization platform designed to help businesses maximize the value of their leads through various services and performance-based models.
On the fake website, the actor persuades users to download the product with an offer of free access to the tool for the first 12 months, followed with a monthly subscription of $95. The threat actor also used an SEO manipulation technique that made their fake website appear in the top search results for online search engines.
When a user downloads the fake AI product as a ZIP archive, it contains a .NET executable with the file name ‘NovaLeadsAI.exe’. The executable was compiled on Feb. 2, 2025, which is on the same day the fake domain ‘novaleadsai[.]com’ was created.
The ‘NovaLeadsAI.exe’ file is the loader that has the CyberLock ransomware PowerShell script embedded as the resource file. When the victim runs the loader executable, it deploys the ransomware.
The CyberLock ransomware appeared to be operating as early as Feb. 2025. The ransom note claims that the threat actor has obtained full access to sensitive business documents, personal files and confidential databases, demanding a hefty ransom in exchange for decryption keys. Victims are instructed to communicate with the threat actor by emailing ‘cyberspectreislocked@onionmail[.]org’.
The CyberLock threat actor demands that the USD $50,000 ransom be paid exclusively in Monero (XMR) cryptocurrency and employs psychological tactics by falsely claiming that the ransom payments will be used for humanitarian aid in regions like Palestine, Ukraine, Africa and Asia. The actor splits the payment into two separate wallets, complicating defenders’ tracking efforts.
The ransom note is structured to intimidate and manipulate victims by threatening to expose stolen data if payment is not made within three days. However, Talos did not see any evidence of data exfiltration functionality within the ransomware code.
CyberLock ransomware is written in PowerShell, embedded with the CSharp code and delivered to the victims as an embedded resource of the .NET loader.
When CyberLock is executed, it initially uses the functions GetConsoleWindow from kernel32.dll and ShowWindow from user32.dll to hide the PowerShell window. Then it generates a secret by decrypting the encrypted public key and uses it to derive the AES key and IV during the encryption process.
CyberLock has the capability to elevate privileges and re-execute itself with administrative privileges if it is not already running in an elevated context.
CyberLocker enumerates folders and files of the logical partitions with the labels ‘C:’, ‘D:’ and ‘E:’. It encrypts the targeted files using AES and appends the file extension ‘.cyberlock’ to the encrypted files.
The targeted file extensions and the categories are shown below:
Category | File Extensions |
---|---|
Text Documents | .txt, .doc, .docx, .odt, .rtf, .md, .rst, .tex, .sty |
Spreadsheets | .xls, .xlsx, .ods, .csv, .tsv |
Presentations | .ppt, .pptx, .odp, .potx, .ppsx |
PDF & eBooks | .pdf, .pdfx, .epub, .mobi, .azw, .azw3, .chm, .hlp |
Images | .jpg, .jpeg, .png, .gif, .bmp, .tiff, .raw, .svg, .jfif, .ico, .webp |
Audio | .mp3, .wav, .ogg, .aac, .flac, .m4a, .m4b, .caf, .mp3g |
Video | .avi, .mp4, .mov, .mkv, .wmv, .webm, .3gp, .flv, .m4v, .vob, .mts, .m2ts, .ts, .mxf, .divx, .mpeg, .mpg, .ram, .rm |
Archives & Disk Images | .zip, .rar, .7z, .tar, .gz, .xz, .tar.gz, .tar.bz2, .iso, .iso9660, .img, .dmg, .cdr, .zipx, .cab, .zpaq, .seam, .rar5 |
Executables & Scripts | .exe, .bat, .cmd, .sh, .ps1, .vbs, .js, .appx, .apk, .ipa, .deb, .rpm, .whl |
Code & Programming | .html, .css, .scss, .xml, .json, .yaml, .cfg, .sql, .pl, .rb, .py, .lua, .h, .c, .cpp, .m, .swift, .java, .asm, .psm1 |
Database Files | .sql, .mdb, .accdb, .db, .sqlite, .sqlitedb, .db3, .sqlite3 |
System & Config | .log, .bak, .tmp, .swp, .ini, .plist, .xmlrpc, .dsk, .xcv |
Fonts | .ttf, .otf, .woff, .woff2, .eot, .pfb |
Design & Graphics | .ai, .psd, .indd, .eps, .fla, .swf |
Backup & Virtual Machine | .vhd, .vmdk, .qcow2, .gho, .vpb |
GIS & Maps | .gpx, .kml, .shp |
Other Files | .torrent, .bup, .ifo, .bin, .dll, .msi, .sys, .qif, .pages, .key, .numbers, .rdata, .seed, .3dxml, .kdbx |
After encrypting the targeted files, CyberLock creates a ransom note on the victim machine desktop with the file name ‘ReadMeNow.txt’. Ransom note contents are written into it from the embedded strings in the ransomware PowerShell script.
Talos observed that the ransomware actor sets a wallpaper to the victim machine’s desktop after dropping the ransom note. The threat actor downloads a header image from a cybersecurity organization’s blog post to the victim machine user profile applications temporary folder. They configure the path of the downloaded image to the registry key “Wallpaper” and enable the wallpaper through PowerShell commands. Talos not fully certain of the actor’s motive for setting the victim machine’s desktop wallpaper to a security research blog post header image.
Finally, CyberLock uses the living-off-the-land binary (LoLBin) ‘cipher.exe’ with the ‘/w’ option to erase free space on the victim’s hard drive partitions, hindering forensic recovery of deleted files.
‘Cipher.exe’ is a built-in Windows command-line tool for managing file and folder encryption. One of its features allows users to prevent recovery of deleted files by overwriting free space with the ‘/w’ option. This was designed by Microsoft for legitimate purposes, such as securely wiping disks before reallocating them or complying with data protection laws to ensure sensitive data is unrecoverable by unauthorized parties.
Threat actors often misuse this feature to eliminate their malicious footprints or permanently delete files from victim machines. This technique was previously utilized by a Russian APT in their attacks, as noted by Volexity researchers. However, Talos has not observed any indication that this activity is related to the activity described in prior reporting.
Talos discovered a threat actor distributing Lucky_Gh0$t ransomware in the wild, archived in a self-extracting archive (SFX) ZIP installer with the file name ‘ChatGPT 4.0 full version – Premium.exe’.
The malicious SFX installer included a folder that contained the Lucky_Gh0$t ransomware executable with the filename ‘dwn.exe’, which imitates the legitimate Microsoft executable ‘dwm.exe’. The folder also contained legitimate Microsoft open-source AI tools that are available on their GitHub repository for developers and data scientists working with AI, particularly within the Azure ecosystem. The threat actor’s intention in including the legitimate tools in the SFX archive is likely to evade the anti-malware file scanners detections by masquerading as a legitimate package.
The SFX script executes the ransomware when a victim runs the malicious SFX installer file.
Lucky_Gh0$t ransomware is the Yashma ransomware variant with most features unchanged, including the evasion techniques, deleting the volume shadow copies and backups, and AES-256 and RSA-2048 encryption techniques. Talos observed a few minor modifications in the Lucky_Gh0$t binary with targeted file size limits that are to be considered by the ransomware during encryption.
Lucky_Gh0$t targets files on the victim machine that are approximately less than 1.2GB in size and encrypts the files with the RSA-encrypted AES key, appending a 4-digit random alphanumeric characters as the file extension. The targeted files category for encryption include:
For the targeted files with a size larger than 1.2GB, the ransomware creates a new file the same size of the original file and writes a single character “?” as the file content. It appends a 4-digit random alphanumeric character file extension to the new file and deletes the original file, exhibiting destructive behavior.
Lucky_Gh0$t ransomware provides a personal ID to the victims in their ransom note. For further communication regarding ransom payment and decryption, it instructs the victims to contact the threat actor using a secure messenger platform at ‘getsession[.]org’ with a unique session ID.
Talos recently discovered a new destructive malware in the wild that we call “Numero,” designed to imitate the AI video creation tool installer, InVideo AI. InVideo AI is an online platform widely used for marketing videos, social media content, explainer videos and presentations. The threat actor impersonates the product and the organization names in the malicious file’s metadata.
The fake installer is a dropper containing a malicious Windows batch file, VB script and the Numero executable with the file name ‘wintitle.exe’. When the victim runs the fake installer, it drops the malicious components in a folder at the local user profile’s application temporary folder. Then it executes the dropped Windows batch file through Windows shell in an infinite loop. It first runs the Numero malware and then halts the execution for 60 seconds by executing the VB script through cscript.
After resuming the execution, the batch file terminates the Numero malware process and restarts its execution. By implementing the infinite loop in the batch file, the Numero malware is continuously run on the victim machine.
Numero’s behavior is consistent with window manipulator malware. Numero is a 32-bit windows executable written in C++ and was compiled on Jan. 24, 2025.
Numero evades analysis by checking the process handles of various malware analysis tools and debuggers including IDA, x64 debugger, x32debugger, ollydbg, scylla, windbg, reshacker, ImportREC, Immunity debugger, Zeta debugger and Rock debugger.
Numero malware creates and executes the thread in an infinite loop. The thread code interacts with the Windows GUI and manipulates the victim’s desktop window using the Windows APIs GetDesktopWindow, EnumChildWindows and SendMessageW. It monitors the victim machine desktop window continuously and hooks to the child window created in the victim desktop. Numero overwrites the window title, buttons and contents with the numeric string ‘1234567890’, corrupting the victim machine to become unusable.
Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.
Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.
Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.
Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.
Cisco Secure Network/Cloud Analytics (Stealthwatch/Stealthwatch Cloud) analyzes network traffic automatically and alerts users of potentially unwanted activity on every connected device.
Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.
Cisco Secure Access is a modern cloud-delivered Security Service Edge (SSE) built on Zero Trust principles. Secure Access provides seamless transparent and secure access to the internet, cloud services or private application no matter where your users work. Please contact your Cisco account representative or authorized partner if you are interested in a free trial of Cisco Secure Access.
Umbrella, Cisco’s secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.
Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.
Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.
Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.
Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.
Snort SIDs for the threats are:
ClamAV detections are also available for this threat:
IOCs for this threat can be found in our GitHub repository here.
Cisco Talos Blog – Read More
A user wanted to safeguard their passwords, but inadvertently let attackers into their organization. This unexpected outcome has been documented in a recent investigation into a ransomware attack — an incident that began when an employee decided to download the popular password manager KeePass. A key detail, though, is that they visited a fake website. KeePass is an open-source project, so the attackers had no trouble copying it, modifying it, and adding malicious features. They then recompiled the application and distributed it through fake websites, which they promoted via legitimate online advertising systems.
The malicious campaign lasted at least eight months, starting in mid-2024. The attackers set up fake websites that mimicked the official KeePass site and used malvertising to redirect users who were searching for KeePass to domains with convincing names like keeppaswrd, keebass, and KeePass-download.
If the victim downloaded KeePass from a fake site, the password manager would function as expected, but it would also save all passwords from the currently open database to an unencrypted text file and install a Cobalt Strike beacon on the system. This is a tool that can be used both to assess an organization’s security and to conduct real cyberattacks.
With Cobalt Strike, the attackers were able not only to steal exported passwords, but also use them to compromise additional systems and ultimately encrypt the organization’s ESXi servers.
While searching for traces of this attack online, researchers discovered five different trojanized modifications of KeePass. Some of these were simpler: they immediately uploaded stolen passwords to the attackers’ server.
There’s nothing new about slipping malware to a victim along with legitimate software. Usually, however, attackers simply add malicious files to the installation package, so security solutions (if present) on the computer easily detect these. The fake KeePass attack was much more carefully planned and better concealed from security tools.
All fake KeePass installation packages were signed with a valid digital signature, so they didn’t trigger any alarming warnings in Windows. The five newly discovered distributions had certificates issued by four different software companies. The legitimate KeePass is signed with a different certificate, but few people bother to check what the Publisher line says in Windows warnings.
The Trojan functions were hidden inside the application’s core logic, and they only ran when the user opened a password database. In other words, the application would first start as usual, prompt the user to select a database and enter its master password, and only then begin performing actions that security mechanisms might consider suspicious. This makes it harder for sandboxes and other analysis tools that detect abnormal application behavior to spot the attack.
While investigating malicious websites distributing trojanized versions of KeePass, the researchers discovered related sites hosted on the same domain. The sites advertised other legitimate software, including the secure file manager WinSCP and several cryptocurrency tools. These were modified less extensively and simply installed known malware called Nitrogen Loader on victims’ systems.
This suggests that the trojanized KeePass was created by initial access brokers. These criminals steal passwords and other confidential information to find entry points into corporate computer networks and then sell the access to other malicious actors — usually ransomware gangs.
Distributors of password-stealing malware indiscriminately target any unsuspecting user. The criminals analyze any passwords, financial data, or other valuable information they manage to steal, sort it into categories, and sell whatever is needed to other cybercriminals for their underground operations. Ransomware operators will buy credentials for corporate networks, scammers will purchase personal data and bank card numbers, and spammers will acquire login details for social media or gaming accounts.
That’s why the business model for stealer distributors is to grab anything they can get their hands on and use all kinds of lures to spread their malware. Trojans can be hidden inside any type of software — from games and password managers to specialized applications for accountants or architects.
Download applications from the vendor’s official website or major app stores only.
Pay attention to digital signatures. When you launch a program you’ve never downloaded before, Windows displays a warning with the name of the digital signature owner in the Publisher field. Make sure that this matches the real developer’s information. When in doubt, check the information on the official website.
Be cautious of search ads. When you search for the name of an application, carefully review the first four or five results, but ignore the ads. The developer’s official website is typically one of those results. If you’re not sure which result leads to the official website, it’s best to double-check the address via major app stores or even on Wikipedia.
Be sure to use comprehensive security software, such as Kaspersky Premium, on all your computers and smartphones. This will protect you from being infected by most types of malware and stop you visiting dangerous websites.
Don’t shun password managers! Although a popular password manager was used in a sophisticated attack, the idea of securely storing important data in encrypted form is more relevant than ever. Subscriptions to Kaspersky Plus and Kaspersky Premium include Kaspersky Password Manager, which lets you securely store your credentials.
Using legitimate credentials in attacks is one of the most popular tactics among cybercriminals. To make it harder to steal and use corporate accounts, follow the advice for organizations on combating infostealers.
To repel trojanized software that can give attackers direct access to your network, we additionally recommend the following measures:
Kaspersky official blog – Read More
Cybercriminals impersonate the trusted e-signature brand and send fake Docusign notifications to trick people into giving away their personal or corporate data
WeLiveSecurity – Read More
Phishing attacks have become a pervasive and escalating threat across various industries, notably in finance, manufacturing, and healthcare. For Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs), the challenge lies in swiftly identifying and mitigating these threats to safeguard client infrastructures and uphold service integrity.
This case study explores how ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup and Interactive Sandbox can empower MSSPs to detect, investigate, and respond to phishing attacks more effectively.
As an example, we’ll use a payload from Delivr.to (a platform designed to help organizations assess and enhance their email security by simulating real-world threats). We’ll see how Threat Intelligence Lookup and Interactive Sandbox help with:
Let’s begin.
We have chosen an HTML file Electronic_Receipt_ATT0001.htm from the payload sample library of Delivr.to.
The attachment’s description contains its ID, hash sum, payload chain deployment steps, and the tags describing the attack chain scenario.
Such payloads are meant to be emailed in order to put to test corporate cybersecurity policies. However, a full-fledged understanding of a threat implies not only the detection of email filters bypass, but a full analysis of an activated payload behavior. This is why we shall use ANY.RUN’s TI Lookup to search for this HTML file.
Our request to TI Lookup includes the parameter indicating an attached file and the file’s name.
filePath:”Electronic_Receipt_ATT0001″
21 malware samples containing this payload have been discovered in TI Lookup at the moment. Besides providing links to the samples and their analyses, TI Lookup highlights the fact that most samples featuring our benign file have been tagged as malicious and attributed to Tycoon phishing kit distributed as Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS).
This means that the chosen payload is actually employed in real phishing campaigns.
We can also search for other payloads related to Tycoon’s activity. The search query combines the name of the process “outlook.exe” — used when opening emails — and the threat name “tycoon”. As a result, we obtain a broad set of analyses containing various malicious attachment variants associated with Tycoon. This allows us to analyze real-world examples of phishing campaigns and identify recurring delivery patterns.
commandLine:”outlook.exe” and threatName:”tycoon”
ANY.RUN provides not only attribution to a specific threat but also an overview of the activity landscape — including the number of related samples analyzed by the professional community, the timeframe of the payload’s usage, and the frequency of its appearance. The most recent sample featuring Electronic_Receipt_ATT0001.htm, as of the time of analysis, is dated May 27, 2025, which helps assess the threat’s current relevance.
Let’s conduct a more detailed analysis of the payload in the ANY.RUN Sandbox. We’ll view one of the malware analyses.
First of all, we can explore malicious email information. The recipient’s address helps identify the likely aim of the attack and the organization it may have been directed against. The email subject is also available, and in some cases, its context—allowing us to assess the social engineering tactics used by the attacker to persuade the recipient to open up the malicious attachment.
Detailed email header information can be retrieved from the Static Discovering tab:
The email recipient’s address — fsp@mycoastlifecu.com — belongs to CoastLife Credit Union, a U.S.-based financial institution, which is confirmed by its presence on the company’s official website.
The use of a legitimate corporate email as the recipient suggests that this attachment was part of an actual phishing campaign targeting employees of financial organizations. This, in turn, indicates the attackers’ likely focus — U.S.-based companies providing banking or financial services.
“Authentication-Results” indicates that the email failed SPF verification. Specifically, it shows that the sender’s IP address 141.95.114.239 was not authorized to send emails on behalf of the domain greengrowersinc.com. This data confirms sender spoofing and identifies the specific IP address involved in the email campaign.
On executing the malicious HTML attachment in the ANY.RUN environment, we can observe the phishing page that loads upon its activation. The execution triggers the download of a webpage hosted on the domain nq.jrerqaoiha.ru which looks like a typical part of malicious infrastructure. Besides, a Microsoft authentication page appearing on a .ru domain is highly unusual and suggests a fraudulent scheme.
The page mimics a Microsoft Excel login form with official Microsoft branding. The interface prompts the user to enter their credentials, suggesting an attempt at credential harvesting.
“Network → Threats” tab shows detected network threats. For each recorded activity, you can view detailed detection results based on Suricata IDS, including:
These steps, which cover several analytical aspects critical for cybersecurity professionals, demonstrate how ANY.RUN enables in-depth research of phishing attacks, which is highly relevant for most MSSP companies.
Integrating ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup and Interactive Sandbox into your MSSP operations equips you with advanced tools to combat phishing and other cyber threats efficiently.
These solutions deliver precise, actionable intelligence to ensure:
Get a 14-day trial of ANY.RUN’s solutions and see how much faster and deeper your threat investigations can be.
ANY.RUN’s Threat Intelligence Lookup and Interactive Sandbox offer robust solutions for analyzing and preventing phishing attacks. The services enable MSSPs to conduct in-depth behavioral analyses of suspicious emails and attachments, identify indicators of compromise, and attribute threats to specific malicious actors. By integrating these capabilities into their security operations, MSSPs can enhance their threat detection and response times, providing clients with proactive defense mechanisms against phishing threats.
The post How MSSPs Can Analyze and Investigate Phishing Attacks with ANY.RUN appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.
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Malware doesn’t stick to one platform or play fair. One day it’s a Python stealer. The next, it’s an Android RAT or a Node.js backdoor quietly pinging its C2. Then it hits Linux, flooding your network with suspicious connections.
Modern threats are unpredictable. They move across systems and languages, often slipping past tools that weren’t built for this level of complexity.
ANY.RUN’s cloud-based sandbox gives companies and SOC teams the flexibility to investigate these threats.
One sandbox where you can analyze, detect, and understand malware and phishing, no matter the OS, architecture, or language. With support for Windows, Linux, and Android, you can choose the environment that fits your sample and see how the same threat behaves across platforms. Just upload, launch, and start investigating.
Let’s see how cybersecurity teams use ANY.RUN to detect and analyze malware written in languages like Python and Node.js, and built to target different systems.
JavaScript isn’t just for websites anymore, and that’s part of the problem. Threat actors increasingly use JavaScript and Node.js to build droppers, stealers, and loaders that can bypass traditional defenses.
For businesses, these threats often arrive disguised as legitimate files, especially in environments where document sharing and template downloads are common. Once executed, they can trigger multi-stage infections, establish persistence, and pull down additional payloads without leaving obvious traces.
To see how a Node.js-based attack unfolds in the real world, let’s analyze a live GootLoader infection inside the ANY.RUN sandbox.
View analysis of Node.js threat
The attack begins when a user lands on a compromised website while searching for something business-related, like a contract template.
The site delivers a ZIP file containing a trojanized JavaScript file posing as a common library (e.g., jQuery). Once opened, the script runs via wscript.exe, launching a heavily obfuscated payload.
ANY.RUN’s Script Tracer logs and deobfuscates this activity in real time, giving analysts full visibility into each execution step.
We can see all the completed processes of the attack from the right side of the screen, where the process tree is. Here is what we discover here:
Once executed, the first-stage payload drops a second-stage JavaScript file onto the victim’s system and creates a scheduled task to run it immediately and ensure persistence.
The task launches the second-stage script, initially again through wscript.exe (PID 7828), which then transfers execution to cscript.exe (PID 7896). This script spawns a PowerShell process (PID 8092), which further deobfuscates and runs another PowerShell script.
This PowerShell script conducts extensive system reconnaissance, collecting environment variables, OS version, running processes, and more. It communicates with the attacker’s command and control (C2) server by sending compressed and encoded data embedded in HTTP headers, complicating detection.
After establishing communication, the PowerShell script downloads additional payloads, often storing them within the Windows registry to avoid being written to disk. These payloads may include a loader and a secondary component such as a Cobalt Strike Beacon or other post-exploitation tools.
Python isn’t just a favorite among developers, it’s increasingly used by attackers to create lightweight, modular, and evasive malware. Its readability and cross-platform flexibility make it an ideal choice for building custom stealers, droppers, and loaders that are easy to modify and hard to catch.
For businesses, Python-based malware like Pentagon Stealer poses a real threat. It’s designed to quietly siphon off browser data, crypto wallet credentials, communication tokens, and personal files, often without dropping anything obvious to disk.
To see how it operates in the wild, let’s break down a real sample of the Python variant of Pentagon Stealer in the ANY.RUN sandbox.
View analysis of Pentagon Stealer
The infection starts with an encrypted dropper, which launches a hidden Python script using AES encryption in CBC mode. Once decrypted, the stealer sets up persistence and scans the system for valuable data.
In ANY.RUN’s sandbox, Pentagon’s behavior is clearly exposed across each stage of the infection chain.
Data theft detection: The stealer harvests browser credentials, cookies, and data from apps like Atomic and Exodus. This activity is automatically flagged by the sandbox, giving analysts immediate insight into what data was accessed and how.
C2 communication: Pentagon communicates with domains like pentagon[.]cy and stealer[.]cy, while variants such as BLX upload stolen data to gofile.io. These indicators are collected and displayed in the IOC section, making it easy to pivot, enrich threat intel, or block infrastructure in other systems.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping: The sandbox automatically links observed behavior to ATT&CK tactics and techniques. For Pentagon, this includes:
With this mapping, teams get a full picture of the attack’s intent and progression without manually stitching logs together.
Salvador Stealer is a highly deceptive Android malware disguised as a legitimate banking app. Behind its clean interface lies a full-fledged phishing and data exfiltration machine, designed to steal everything from government ID numbers and personal information to net banking credentials and one-time passwords.
For both individuals and financial institutions, Salvador poses a serious threat, combining technical sophistication with aggressive credential harvesting and real-time data leaks via Telegram and phishing servers.
To uncover the full behavior of Salvador Stealer and observe its actions in real time, we executed the sample inside ANY.RUN’s Android environment.
Inside the interactive Android VM, we could clearly observe each stage of the infection, uncovering its tactics, visualizing the phishing interface, and tracing data exfiltration with minimal manual effort.
We see that Salvador Stealer operates in two stages:
The dropper APK is engineered to install the second-stage malware without the user’s knowledge. It uses specific permissions and intent filters in its AndroidManifest.xml.
Inside ANY.RUN, we observed the dropper launching a new activity immediately after execution, behavior consistent with silent installations.
Once executed, the payload connects to Telegram, used as a Command and Control (C2) channel and triggers the “starts itself from another location” signature, confirming it was deployed via dropper.
After submission, all user data is immediately exfiltrated to:
ANY.RUN’s HTTPS MITM Proxy mode captured this behavior clearly, allowing us to inspect the exact HTTP requests, destination URLs, and the contents of the exfiltrated data in plaintext.
This level of visibility is critical when dealing with mobile malware that uses encrypted channels. Teams can immediately verify whether sensitive information was stolen, where it was sent, and how it was packaged, all without reverse-engineering the app or relying on guesswork. It shortens investigation time, boosts detection accuracy, and helps teams extract actionable IOCs in minutes.
While Linux systems are often seen as more secure, they’re far from immune, especially when it comes to IoT-targeting malware like Mirai. Built to infect vulnerable devices with weak or default credentials, Mirai turns compromised routers, IP cameras, and other Linux-based systems into part of a massive botnet used for coordinated DDoS attacks.
In our sandbox session, we ran a Mirai sample inside a Linux virtual environment, revealing exactly how this malware behaves post-infection.
View the full analysis session
After running the analysis, the malware began scanning the internet for additional targets, sending out a flood of connection attempts to IP addresses across various ports. The spike in outbound activity was visible in the sandbox’s network traffic tab, highlighting Mirai’s worm-like behavior as it looked to propagate further.
To add another layer of detection, Suricata rules were triggered during the session, automatically flagging the traffic as malicious and confirming the presence of a Mirai variant. This kind of signature-based alert is crucial for quickly validating what you’re looking at without needing to manually inspect every packet.
By analyzing Mirai in ANY.RUN, cyber security teams gain:
Whether you’re defending enterprise infrastructure or monitoring connected devices, ANY.RUN’s support for Linux malware analysis makes it easier to uncover threats that operate below the radar of Windows-based defenses.
Not every sample can be cracked with just behavioral analysis, some require deeper inspection, debugging, or code-level investigation. ANY.RUN’s pre-installed development software set is perfect for these purposes.
Available for Windows 10 (64-bit) VMs, this configuration equips analysts with a curated toolkit tailored for reverse engineering, unpacking, and scripting, all without needing to set anything up manually.
By selecting the “Development” software set before starting a session, users instantly gain access to tools like Python, Node.js, x64dbg, Detect It Easy, dnSpy, HxD, DebugView, Process Hacker, and more to investigate complex malware like custom loaders, obfuscated stealers, or scripts in Node.js or Python.
Let’s look at two real-world use cases where this set has been used:
Using Lessmsi, analysts can safely unpack .msi files and inspect their contents without running them, critical for avoiding accidental payload execution. In one session, this was combined with Detect It Easy (DiE) to analyze extracted binaries and flag suspicious file signatures or packers.
In another session, x64dbg was used to step through malware execution line by line, helping analysts understand how the sample unpacked itself and interacted with system components; insights that static analysis alone couldn’t reveal.
Having these tools built into the sandbox means your team can dig deeper without wasting time setting things up. It speeds up investigations, helps catch more sophisticated threats, and gets you closer to answers when every minute counts.
Modern malware doesn’t limit itself to one environment, and neither should your analysis. From Windows loaders and Python stealers to Android banking malware and Linux-based botnets, today’s threats are built to adapt. The same sample can behave differently depending on where it runs, dropping different payloads, using OS-specific evasion techniques, or communicating with separate C2 infrastructure.
Using a different tool for each platform only slows your team down and increases the risk of missing critical behavior.
ANY.RUN brings everything together in one place. One sandbox where you can detect, investigate, and understand threats, no matter the OS, architecture, or language. Launch analysis sessions across Windows, Linux, and even real Android environments to see how malware acts in each context.
Join ANY.RUN with your business email to get a 14-day trial of advanced features and see how much faster and deeper your malware investigations can be.
The post How to Analyze Node.js, Python, Android, and Linux Malware with ANY.RUN appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.
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