Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

  • There are many risks associated with selling items on online marketplaces that individuals and organizations should be aware of when conducting business on these platforms. 
  • Many of the general recommendations related to the use of these platforms are tailored towards purchasing items; however, there are several threats to those selling items as well.
  • Recent phishing campaigns targeting sellers on these marketplaces have leveraged the platforms’ direct messaging feature(s) to attempt to steal credit card details for sellers’ payout accounts.
  • Shipment detail changes, pressure to conduct off-platform transactions, and attempted use of “friends and family” payment options are commonly encountered scam techniques, all of which seek to remove the seller protections usually afforded by these platforms.
  • There are several steps that sellers can take to help protect themselves and their data from these threats. Being mindful of the common scams and threats targeting sellers can help sellers identify when they may be being targeted by malicious buyers while it is occurring so that they can take defensive actions to protect themselves.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

The emergence of online marketplaces has facilitated the convenient exchange of goods between individuals and organizations around the world. It has also provided a means for people to easily resell items, enabling them to recapture value from assets they may not otherwise wish to maintain ownership of. The type of new and used items sold via marketplaces varies widely, and platforms such as Ebay, Facebook Marketplace, Reverb, and others are extremely popular avenues for selling everything from $15 vintage tissue boxes to $40,000 Gibson Les Paul guitars. You can even find $70,000,000 domains targeting affluent individuals with above-average BMIs being sold on online marketplaces.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

When we think about online safety in the context of these platforms, we often concentrate the majority of our efforts and recommendations on the threats targeting buyers. In many cases, scammers are also actively targeting the people selling items on these platforms as well. From an adversarial perspective, it makes sense to target sellers, as these are likely to be individuals with large amounts of cash sitting in their accounts as they frequently receive payments for items they sell. Likewise, adversaries can easily monitor the public listings of seller accounts to identify when high-value items are listed, as well as when they are sold, so that they can identify when a target could reasonably be expected to receive an influx of cash into their accounts. 

Likewise, many platforms train their sellers to expect frequent, unsolicited account verification prompts delivered in any number of ways, which provides the perfect pretext for scammers seeking to take advantage of this pool of targets. From a detection and analysis standpoint, these types of attacks are often difficult to effectively combat, as platform providers, intelligence analysts, and law enforcement agencies are forced to primarily rely on self-reporting from victims to quantify the scope and impact of these types of threats. Let’s break down a few examples of some of the most common scams that target the individuals or organizations selling products on online marketplaces.

Phishing and malware scams

While some scams attempt to fraudulently steal items, others are primarily aimed at stealing financial information from sellers by leveraging the platform’s messaging feature(s) as a mechanism to directly communicate with them for the purposes of phishing or malware distribution. In some cases, phishing is used to compromise the seller account itself, enabling the attacker to manipulate listings, shipments, modify automated payout settings, and communicate with current and previous buyers to conduct additional fraudulent activities. In other cases, phishing is used to obtain financial information, such as bank account or credit card information, that can be used to steal money from the seller.

Payout account verification scams

In a recent example, a /r/guitarpedals user reported that they had received a suspicious direct message on their Reverb seller account. The message was crafted to appear as if it was sent from the Reverb team itself. It informs the seller that their item has sold and prompts them to complete account verification to ensure that they receive payment for the item(s) they have sold.

A hyperlink, present in the message (and shown below), attempts to leverage Reverb’s own redirection functionality to direct victims who click on the hyperlink to a malicious web server under the attacker’s control.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

This technique uses percent encoding, an obfuscation technique, to mask the destination of the redirect and make it appear as if the link is pointing to the legitimate Reverb website.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

This URL, when accessed, returns an HTTP/302 redirection to another attacker-controlled web server, but ultimately the victim receives the following landing page. The attacker has put effort into making sure it appears legitimate and mimics what the victim expects to see. A chat message prompts the victim to complete the verification process by following the on-screen instructions.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

A “Receive Funds” button has been positioned behind the chat popup shown in the previous screenshot. When the victim clicks this button, they are presented an input form and prompted to provide the credit card information necessary to verify their desired payout account. Throughout this process, additional chat message popups are delivered to lend credibility to the process.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

Since this is the account the seller would like to use to receive payments for items sold on the platform, it likely also contains any funds associated with previous sales, and will likely frequently receive lump sums when future items are sold, presenting a myriad of opportunities for attackers to monetize the account and assets within it, now or in the future. For example, if a threat actor successfully obtains credit card details for a seller account with multiple high-value items actively listed, they can simply wait until an item sells before attempting to monetize it.

Assuming the victim enters valid credit card details, a message will be displayed requesting additional information.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

The additional information in this case is the balance of the account that is being “verified.” A new chat message appears, prompting the user to enter the balance in their account, presumably so that the attacker can more effectively prioritize which accounts to empty first.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

Assuming the victim enters their balance information, they are presented with the following message letting them know that it will take a period of time before they notice any changes to their accounts.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

At this point, the adversary has obtained credit card details that they can then monetize however they choose. It’s important to note that while this particular example targeted sellers using the Reverb platform, most other online marketplaces experience similar threats as well. We have also observed Reverb often taking rapid response actions when attempting to send messages containing percent-encoded hyperlinks, indicating that the platform is aware of the issue and has put in place some mechanisms to help reduce the frequency and quantity of these types of messages on the platform.

Reverb also presents warning messages to let users know when they are being redirected to a third-party domain, as shown in the screenshot below. 

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

It is important to always validate the destination of hyperlinks received from unsolicited sources and to limit access to off-platform resources when conducting business on online marketplaces.

It is also important to note that direct messaging within marketplaces is not the only mechanism used for this type of scam. Below is a screenshot of an email received by a Shopify storefront owner attempting to convince them to verify their payout account information, similar to the previous example described above.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

Below is another example. In this case, the threat actor has sent an email claiming that the seller has received a chargeback claim from a customer and prompting them to take action. Since chargebacks are often received for a variety of reasons, sellers may be more easily convinced to provide account or credit card information when prompted with a claim related to a chargeback.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

If an email is received from an online marketplace, the platform will typically also provide warning messages, banners, and other mechanisms to alert sellers of the same issue. In the case that a seller receives an unexpected email related to payment issues, sellers should attempt to resolve issues directly on the platform rather than accessing content or responding to the email. 

Scams to remove seller protection

When selling new or used items using online marketplaces, one of the most important elements influencing platform and payment method selection for many people are the seller protection policies in place. These policies often provide protection from common types of fraudulent claims that may be made by buyers, such as non-receipt, damage, etc. In order to remain in effect, they generally require both the buyer and seller to perform the transaction following certain requirements that enable proper resolution should an issue arise. 

In an effort to remove these protections and make it easier to successfully monetize their scam(s), scammers posing as buyers will often attempt to convince sellers to conduct portions of the transaction “off-platform,” as this will void the protection policy that would otherwise be in place using a variety of different pretexts and themes. Likewise, some scammers target the shipping part of the transaction process, attempting to convince sellers to modify the shipping to void the seller protection policy afforded by the platform. By removing the ability for the seller to leverage the protection policy afforded by the platform used to sell the item, many of the normal recourse steps usually taken when dealing with fraudulent buyers are no longer available to the seller.

Off-platform transactions

Scammers also frequently use a variety of pretexts to attempt to convince sellers to perform the financial transaction associated with an item purchase using third-party platforms separate from the one on which an item was originally listed. They will attempt to trick victims into moving to an alternative mechanism for performing the transaction so that the seller loses most of the protection(s) afforded by the marketplace. 

In many cases, scammers will use additional pressures, such as time sensitivity, urgency, or manipulated screenshots showing failed transaction attempts, to convince sellers to perform transactions using alternative means, such as wire transfers or money transfer platforms, where seller protections are limited and—in the case of fraud—most recourse options are no longer available. 

There are countless examples of different pretexts being used in varying capacities, all ultimately for the same purpose, to convince sellers to leave the marketplace to perform the transaction elsewhere so that seller protections against fraudulent activity on the part of the buyer are removed.

Shipment detail changes

Since a seller account’s past and current item listings are easily accessible from the seller’s profile, it is easy for adversaries to leverage information contained within these listings (including photos) when building pretexts that are used to target the individual operating the seller account. One common way that adversaries leverage this information is by tailoring their messaging to account for both active and recently sold listings related to the seller they are communicating with. 

In the screenshot below, a scammer is contacting sellers on Ebay claiming to be an individual who purchased an item recently sold by the seller(s). The scammer hopes that by timing their message properly, they can take advantage of sellers who may not be paying close attention to the username listed in the message. For many sellers who are managing large numbers of listings, it can often be overwhelming to maintain many different streams of communication and/or multiple transactions simultaneously, leading them to respond quickly or otherwise take action (like modifying shipping instructions) without properly validating the content of the message.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

Online reports indicate that it is not uncommon to receive these types of unsolicited messages, regardless of whether a seller has recently sold an item, which may be due to some level of automation being used to generate and transmit the messages. 

If the seller is convinced to change the destination address for the shipment due to receipt of one of these scam messages, the item that was sold may be shipped to an address under the attacker’s control. The attacker is then able to monetize the item while the original buyer does not receive the item that they purchased. Many of the protections afforded by online marketplace are lost when the shipping address used does not reflect what was present on the order at time of purchase, opening the seller to additional exposure as the buyer’s loss will still need to be resolved.

The “friends and family” option

Social media sites like Reddit have become very popular for posting used items to solicit interest from other users of a given subreddit. In some subreddits, there are even official or unofficial “Want to Buy / Want to Sell” (WTB/WTS) threads, where users can list items they are selling or items they would like to purchase. This creates an ideal pool of potential victims for scammers seeking to target users of these platforms.

Since Reddit is not an online marketplace, the transactions associated with this activity typically take place using money transfer platforms, such as Paypal, Zelle, or Venmo. Scammers will often leverage compromised accounts on these money transfer platforms when communicating with sellers (or buyers), often attempting to convince them to use the “friends and family” (or equivalent) payment option available on many of these platforms. Often, sending or receiving money with this option enabled removes many of the mechanisms in place to protect sellers from chargebacks and other fraudulent activity. Sellers should never enable this option when processing payments for goods they may sell via online marketplaces, social media sites, or in any transaction where protection against fraud is desired. 

In some cases, this method may be combined with other methods seeking to convince sellers to perform transactions outside of established platforms, then once the seller has agreed, scammers can leverage this option to further remove seller protections.

Recommendations

Most of the online literature related to defending against the scams pervasive on online marketplaces is geared towards the buyer experience. Recent trends in social media reporting indicate that sellers are also being increasingly targeted. While some of the scams faced by sellers resemble those faced by buyers, there are many that are unique. It is important that individuals or organizations leveraging online storefronts and/or marketplaces be aware of these threats so that they can prevent themselves from falling victim. 

It is extremely important that online marketplace accounts be protected with multi-factor authentication (MFA) whenever the platform supports this capability. This will provide an enhanced layer of security in cases where the account credentials are compromised as an additional authentication factor will still be needed to successfully access the account. 

When posting listings for items, be mindful of any photos that accompany the listing. Not unlike posting images to other social media platforms, items or objects in the background may unintentionally disclose sensitive information that could be used for malicious purposes. The information provided could also be leveraged to create more convincing or effective pretexts for later scam activities targeting the seller(s).

Avoid using third party services or platforms when conducting business transactions on online marketplaces. Take advantage of the protections afforded by the platform and avoid taking any actions that may jeopardize them. Reasonable buyers will be willing and able to conduct business following the standard platform transaction process. Sellers should avoid feeling pressured or worried about losing a sale and insist that the transaction take place in accordance with the policies of the online marketplace platform.

Verify the account associated with any messages received on online marketplaces. Always spend the time to validate that the message was actually received from the account of the buyer who purchased any recently sold items. Likewise, most platform support teams will not contact users via direct messaging for account verification or other sensitive processes as most of the time, these processes are directly supported by the platform itself. If a seller receives a direct message purporting to be from the platform itself, caution should be exercised and the message should be validated by contacting the support team separately using the information published on the marketplace website.

Sellers should also avoid modifying destination shipping addresses after orders have been placed. If a buyer asks to change the shipping address for an item they recently purchased, sellers should consider suggesting that they change their address using the online marketplace itself and contact support facilitate the change prior to shipping. This helps ensure that the seller is not deviating from the order that was placed, and helps ensure that they do not lose the seller protections afforded by the platform.

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Coverage

Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

Your item has sold! Avoiding scams targeting online sellers

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.

Umbrella, Cisco’s secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here.

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center.

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

Indicators of Compromise

IOCs for this research can also be found at our Github repository here.

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

Malicious code in fake GitHub repositories | Kaspersky official blog

Can you imagine a world where, every time you wanted to go somewhere, you had to reinvent the wheel and build a bicycle from scratch? We can’t either. Why reinvent something that already exists and works perfectly well? The same logic applies to programming: developers face routine tasks every day, and instead of inventing their own wheels and bicycles (which might even be not up to par), they simply grab ready-made bicycles code from open-source GitHub repositories.

This solution is available to anyone —  including criminals who use the world’s best free open-source code as bait for attacks. There’s plenty of evidence to back this up, and here’s the latest: our experts have uncovered an active malicious campaign, GitVenom, targeting GitHub users.

What is GitVenom?

GitVenom is what we named this malicious campaign, in which unknown actors created over 200 repositories containing fake projects with malicious code: Telegram bots, tools for hacking the game Valorant, Instagram automation utilities, and Bitcoin wallet managers. At first glance, all the repositories look legitimate. Especially impressive is the well-designed README.MD file — a guide on how to work with the code — with detailed instructions in multiple languages. In addition to that, attackers added multiple tags to their repositories.

Attackers used AI to write detailed instructions in multiple languages

Attackers used AI to write detailed instructions in multiple languages

Another indicator reinforcing the apparent legitimacy of these repositories is the large number of commits. The attackers’ repositories have tons of them — tens of thousands. The attackers weren’t, of course, manually updating each of the 200 repositories to maintain authenticity, but simply used timestamp files that updated every few minutes. The combination of detailed documentation and numerous commits creates the illusion that the code is genuine and safe to use.

GitVenom: Two years of activity

The campaign started a long time ago: the oldest fake repository we found is about two years old. In the meantime, GitVenom has affected developers in Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and other countries. The attackers covered a wide range of programming languages: malicious code was found in Python, JavaScript, C, C#, and C++ repositories.

Regarding the functionality of these projects, the features described in the README file didn’t even match the actual code — in reality, the code doesn’t do half of what it claims. But “thanks” to it, victims end up downloading malicious components. These include:

  • A Node.js stealer that collects usernames and passwords, crypto wallet data, and browser history, packages the stolen data into a .7z archive, and sends it to the attackers through Telegram.
  • AsyncRAT — an open-source remote administration Trojan, which can also function as a keylogger.
  • Quasar — an open-source backdoor.
  • A clipper that searches the clipboard for crypto wallet addresses and replaces them with attacker-controlled addresses. Notably, in November 2024, the hacker wallet used in this attack received a one-time deposit of about 5 BTC (approximately US$485,000 at the time of the study).

You can read more about the details of this malicious campaign in our full research published on SecureList.

How to protect yourself from malicious code on GitHub

In short, the best defense is vigilance. Since over 100 million developers use GitHub, attackers will likely continue to spread malicious code through this popular platform. The only question is how they’ll do it — a decade ago, no one imagined that attackers would be able to conduct campaigns like GitVenom for so long and with such persistence. Therefore, every developer should maintain their cybersecurity hygiene when working with GitHub.

  • Analyze code before integrating it into an existing project.
  • Use malware protection on both computers and smartphones.
  • Check less obvious indicators carefully: contributor accounts, the number of stars (likes), and the project creation date. If the account was created three days ago, the repository two days ago, and it only has one star, there’s a good chance the project is fake and the code is malicious.
  • Don’t download files from direct links to GitHub shared in chats, suspicious channels, or on unverified websites.
  • If you find a suspicious repository, report it to GitHub — this could save others’ devices not protected with a Kaspersky Premium.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

Auto-Woodpecker’s anniversary! | Kaspersky official blog

We live in the age of AI hype. Artificial intelligence is here, there, and everywhere – so promising, slightly mysterious, but undeniably guiding humanity toward a brighter future of technological singularity that’s still somewhat incomprehensible and potentially a black hole.

Some readers might detect sarcasm in this statement – but that would be a mistake. Machine learning-driven automation (ML), neural networks, and other AI technologies have already taken over many industries. And there’s more to come in the evolution of Homo sapiens. If you’re interested in diving deeper into this topic, check out the history of the various industrial revolutions: first, second, third, and even fourth.

In line with this trend, cybersecurity was perhaps one of the pioneers in adopting new, smart technologies. And what makes me particularly proud of this process is that our company was one of the first in the industry to successfully implement this bright AI-driven future. How else could we possibly handle nearly half a million new malicious programs emerging every single day as of early 2025? No educational system in the world can produce enough experts to keep up with that. The only solution is to create intelligent systems capable of independently and highly accurately neutralizing cyberattacks. Experts are then left with only the most complex cases – and, of course, the challenging task of inventing and continuously improving these systems.

A few days ago, we celebrated an exciting anniversary. Twenty years ago was born the prototype of our first AI/ML technology for automatic malware analysis and the creation of “detections” – antivirus updates that protect computers, gadgets, and other devices from new attacks.

The technology was given a name that’s rather odd at first glance – Avtodyatel, which translates as Auto-Woodpecker! But there’s a simple explanation for it: within our team, security analysts were affectionately referred to as woodpeckers – tirelessly pecking away at viruses and processing streams of suspicious files. And then we added the “Auto” to “Woodpecker” for the name of the tech designed to do this job automatically (incidentally, I was a woodpecker myself back then).

After digging through our archives, we found not only the birthdate of this first automation baby, but also some fascinating photos of the original plans for its creation. We even recalled its birthplace – the 14th floor of the Radiophysics building near the Planernaya metro station in northwest Moscow where we rented office space at the time. So get comfy, and I’ll tell you a fascinating story. It all started kinda like this…

A quarter of a century ago, malicious programs were much rarer – and, paradoxically, much more advanced – than today’s typical malware, despite being written by pioneering enthusiasts, inventive lone programmers, and cyber pranksters. This made researching them a real pleasure – each new virus taught you something new. Back then, like my fellow woodpeckers, I manually analyzed the stream of malicious programs – what would now be called “malware research”.

By that time, it was already difficult to compile all existing malware into a single reference book as had been done back in 1992. But we still managed the flow, and at the end of each work week, I manually compiled antivirus database updates.

However, over time, malware creation evolved from mere mischief and boundary-pushing into a full-fledged criminal industry. Cybercriminals no longer just wanted to infect as many computers as possible – they sought to profit from it. For example, they harvested email addresses from infected machines and sold them for spam distribution.

Sensing profit, these bad actors triggered exponential growth in malware production. But instead of inventing fundamentally new threats, they started mass-producing slightly modified versions of existing ones. And I realized we couldn’t keep up manually; if we were to continue down this path, we’d drown in an endless flood of cyber-garbage.

Fortunately, technological advancements at the time required much smaller investment and less development time. You could just buy some pizza (pineapple-topped, of course!), gather a few brilliant minds in a meeting room, and spend a couple of hours brainstorming project ideas. And so, on February 22, 2005, I assembled my colleagues to develop plans for automating our malware analyst work.

Just take a look at this beauty!

Plans for automating our malware analyst.

Plans for automating our malware analyst work.

We had some primitive automation tools before, of course. But Auto-Woodpecker was the first system with a fundamentally new level:

  1. It freed up valuable experts from repetitive tasks, allowing them to focus on more advanced challenges.
  2. It massively scaled up operational efficiency.
  3. It helped highlight similar (or related) incidents for further analysis.

In simple terms, the system automatically received new files from agents (“crawlers”) that scanned websites, email traps, and network sensors. These files were then automatically unpacked and executed in a secure environment – an artificial setting designed to observe malware behaviour.

There, the samples were analyzed by automated scanners, classified, and then compiled into antivirus databases.

The key challenge when encountering a new malware sample was determining whether it was a never-before-seen threat, or simply a variation of a known one. This is where the file auto-classifier (marked as “FF” in the diagram above) came into play, utilizing AI/ML principles – now an essential feature in nearly every cybersecurity product (except for fraudulent ones).

It didn’t work perfectly at first, but it quickly improved. We systematically documented all our ideas, detailed how subsystems would interact, how data would be exchanged, and how false positives would be handled. Then we rolled up our sleeves and got to work.

A few months later, the first version of Auto-Woopecker went live.

The results were instant and dramatic. Previously, five of us manually analyzed around 300 malware samples per week – an impressive number at the time. But with Auto-Woodpecker our productivity skyrocketed. And as the technology improved, this skyrocketing just kept on… skyrocketing!

Before long, Auto-Woodpecker was processing the entire incoming stream – leaving only 2-5% of all suspicious files for manual expert review. Today, of course, our tools are far more advanced, and AI-driven technologies play an even bigger role in cybersecurity.

To give you a glimpse of how far we’ve come, here are just a few recent examples:

  • Kaspersky MLAD (Machine Learning for Anomaly Detection): A predictive analytics system that detects early signs of equipment failure, process disruptions, cyberattacks, and human errors in industrial telemetry signals – long before they cause real damage.
  • Kaspersky MDR (Managed Detection and Response) This service has been using an AI analyst for several years to filter out false positives, reducing the workload on SOC specialists and allowing them to focus on complex threat investigations.
  • Kaspersky Threat Lookup: Just last week we integrated a tool for finding contextual information on indicators of compromise using an AI-powered large language model.

The results speak for themselves, and we have even bigger plans ahead!…

Happy 20th Anniversary, Auto-Woodpecker!!

Cin cin!

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

What to do if your WhatsApp is hacked: a step-by-step guide | Kaspersky official blog

Your messaging-app account might be of interest to more than just jealous spouses or nosy coworkers. Stolen WhatsApp accounts fuel large-scale criminal activity — ranging from spam distribution to complex scam schemes. That’s why cybercriminals are constantly on the lookout for WhatsApp accounts — using various methods to hijack them. Here are eight signs your account may already be compromised.

  1. You get replies to messages you never sent.
  2. Friends complain about strange messages coming from your account.
  3. You notice deleted messages in chats, including from yourself — even though you never sent or deleted anything there.
  4. You receive a WhatsApp login verification code that you didn’t request or expect.
  5. Your account has a status or has posted stories you didn’t create.
  6. Your profile picture, name, or account description has changed unexpectedly.
  7. You’ve been added to chats or groups you never joined.
  8. When you try to log in, WhatsApp informs you that your account is in use on another device and prompts you to re-register (this is the most telling sign).

Pay special attention to the first three signs, and act immediately if you notice them — hackers often use compromised accounts to scam a victim’s friends and family. They might impersonate you to request urgent financial help, promise gifts, or invite people to participate in fake polls. In any of these cases, your friends could get scammed — with your unwitting help.

Two ways hackers can hijack your WhatsApp account

Cybercriminals can take control of your WhatsApp account in one of two ways. They either add another device to your account using the “Linked devices” feature, or re-register your account on their device as if you’d bought a new phone.

In the former case, you continue using WhatsApp as usual but the criminals also have access to it, including to your recent conversations.

In the second case, you lose access to your account, and when you try to log in, WhatsApp notifies you that your account is in use on another device. The attackers can control your account, but won’t have access to your past conversations.

What to do if your WhatsApp account has been hacked

  1. Make sure the SIM card linked to your WhatsApp account is inserted in your smartphone.
  2. Open WhatsApp on this smartphone.
  3. If it opens normally:
  • Go to the WhatsApp settings — Settings on iPhone, or the additional menu (three dots) on Android. Tap Linked devices.
  • Tap each device listed on this page.
  • Tap Log Out. This will disconnect all additional devices from your account and cut off the attackers.
  1. If the messenger tells you that you’re logged out and need to register:
  • Enter your phone number.
  • Request a one-time registration code.
  • Wait for an SMS or a voice call with the code.
  • Enter the received code.
  • If your account was protected with a two-step verification PIN, after entering the one-time registration code, enter your PIN as well.
  • WhatsApp may offer to restore your chats and settings from a backup in iCloud, Google Drive, or local storage. Accept!
  1. If you hadn’t previously set a two-step verification PIN, but WhatsApp requests it after you enter the one-time code, the attackers may have set a PIN to prevent you from regaining access to your account.
  • The PIN can be reset using the Forgot PIN
  • If an email address is linked to your WhatsApp account, you’ll receive a PIN reset link instantly. Go to your email, open the latest message from WhatsApp, tap the link inside, and then Confirm. After this, you can return to WhatsApp and set a new PIN.
  • If you hadn’t linked an email address, you can still request a PIN reset, but you’ll have to wait a week before the PIN is removed. During this time, your WhatsApp account will remain inaccessible. After a week, you can log back in to your account following the instructions above.

Once you’ve completed these steps, the attackers will be disconnected from your account. However, they may attempt to hijack it again, so be sure to follow the security tips below.

Warn your friends and family

Attackers may have sent tragic or provocative messages to your contacts, impersonating you. To ensure no one panics thinking you’re in hospital, got arrested, or had an accident — and to prevent them from sending money to “help” — inform as many people as possible that your account was hacked and that they should ignore any strange or unexpected messages sent earlier. For close friends, family, and coworkers, it’s best to call them personally. A less intrusive way to warn many people at once is to update your WhatsApp status. Go to Settings, tap your name, and in the About field, write something like, “My WhatsApp was hacked! Don’t trust messages from me, don’t send money, no help is needed”. It’s also a good idea to post the same warning on other social networks.

If your account has been restricted or banned for spam

If hackers used your account to send spam, WhatsApp may temporarily restrict it for a few hours or days. After following the steps above and regaining control of your account, you may find you’re unable to send messages.

In this case, appeal the restriction using the Request a review button, found under the notification about the imposed restrictions. After tapping this button, the restriction won’t be lifted immediately — depending on WhatsApp’s internal algorithms, it can take anywhere from a couple of hours to three days. Unfortunately, there’s no way to speed up this process.

How to protect your account from being hacked again

We’ve provided a detailed guide on WhatsApp security and privacy settings in a separate article, but here are the key points:

  • Enable two-step verification in WhatsApp and memorize your PIN — it’s not a one-time code. To do this, go to SettingsAccountTwo-step verification.
  • Never, ever share your PIN or one-time registration codes with anyone. Only scammers ask for these details.
  • WhatsApp recently introduced support for passkeys. If you enable this option (Settings → Account → Passkeys), logging in to your account will require biometric authentication, and instead of PIN codes, your smartphone will store a long cryptographic key. This is a very secure option, but it may not be convenient if you frequently change devices and switch between Android and iOS.
  • Set up a backup email address for account recovery: Settings → Account → Email address.
  • If you’ve already added an email address, log in to your email account and change your password to a strong, unique one. To store it securely, use a password manager, such as Kaspersky Password Manager.
  • Enable two-factor authentication for your email account.
  • Make sure you haven’t fallen victim to a SIM swap scam. Contact your mobile carrier — preferably in person — and verify that no duplicate SIM cards have recently been issued for your number. Also, make sure there’s no unauthorized call-forwarding set up on your number. Cancel any suspicious changes and ask the staff about additional security measures for your SIM card. These may include prohibiting SIM-related actions without your being present, an extra password required for authentication, or other protections. Available security measures vary significantly by country and mobile carrier.
  • Any security measures in WhatsApp will be of little use if your smartphone or computer is infected with malware. Therefore, be sure to install comprehensive protection on all your devices.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

Efficiency? Security? When the quest for one grants neither.

Efficiency? Security? When the quest for one grants neither.

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 
 
Benjamin Franklin once said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” In much the same way, those who rush for efficiency without taking into account security end up neither efficient nor secure.  

The past week the Department of Government Efficiency (or DOGE) has put on a clinic of how not to do things. For example, the Doge.gov website was easily and immediately compromised. Researchers were able to push updates to the public website via access to a database of government employment information. Not to be outdone the DOGE team hastily stood up the Waste.gov website which still had a placeholder WordPress default template, including the sample text which features an imaginary architecture firm called Études, from a default WordPress theme called Twenty Twenty-Four. This slapdash nonsense was hidden behind a password wall after the research information became public.  

It’s really an excellent lesson in what happens when security is not taken into account and the instant ramifications. As an entire infosec community we’ve talked at length about how baking security into every decision is incredibly important and that trying to bolt on fixes after the fact not only doesn’t work but highlights the lack of rigor and awareness of security in the room – creating an attractive target.

Let’s take a deep breath, take a moment to create a more secure process, follow those processes, and ensure security is in place at every step – then we can attack matters of efficiency.  

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The one big thing 

Cisco Talos has published a blog on the ongoing research into Salt Typhoon. Cisco Talos been closely monitoring reports of widespread intrusion activity against several major U.S. telecommunications companies, an issue that we have been concerned with for a long time here at Talos. The activity, initially reported in late 2024 and later confirmed by the U.S. government, is being carried out by a highly sophisticated threat actor dubbed Salt Typhoon.  

A hallmark of this campaign is the use of living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques on network devices. It is important to note that while the telecommunications industry is the primary victim, the advice contained herein is relevant to, and should be considered by, all infrastructure defenders. 

Why do I care? 

State sponsored actors have been aggressively targeting global network infrastructure and understanding and mitigating these actions will help you improve your network infrastructure resilience. 

So now what? 

Cisco Talos has released an extensive list of preventative measures for general and Cisco-specific devices which can be found in the Salt Typhoon blog post.  

Top security headlines of the week 

Palo Alto Networks has warned that hackers are exploiting another vulnerability in its firewall software to break into unpatched customer networks. (TechCrunch)  

Security researchers warn a critical vulnerability in SonicWall’s SonicOS is under active exploitation.(CyberSecurityDrive

Two security vulnerabilities have been discovered in the OpenSSH secure networking utility suite that, if successfully exploited, could result in an active machine-in-the-middle (MitM) and a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, respectively, under certain conditions. (TheHackerNews

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Arlington, VA 

Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week  

SHA 256:7b3ec2365a64d9a9b2452c22e82e6d6ce2bb6dbc06c6720951c9570a5cd46fe5  MD5: ff1b6bb151cf9f671c929a4cbdb64d86   
VirusTotal : https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7b3ec2365a64d9a9b2452c22e82e6d6ce2bb6dbc06c6720951c9570a5cd46fe5 
Typical Filename: endpoint.query
Claimed Product: Endpoint-Collector 
Detection Name: W32.File.MalParent     

SHA 256: a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91   
MD5: 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376  
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91/details%C2%A0 
Typical Filename: c0dwjdi6a.dll  
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: Trojan.GenericKD.33515991 

SHA 256:9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507 
MD5: 2915b3f8b703eb744fc54c81f4a9c67f 
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9f1f11a708d393e0a4109ae189bc64f1f3e312653dcf317a2bd406f18ffcc507 
Typical Filename: VID001.exe 
Detection Name: Simple_Custom_Detection 

SHA 256: 47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca
MD5: 71fea034b422e4a17ebb06022532fdde
VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca 
Typical Filename: VID001.exe
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: Coinminer:MBT.26mw.in14.Talos 

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

The complete story of the 2024 ransomware attack on UnitedHealth

About a year ago, UnitedHealth Group, the U.S. health-insurance giant, was targeted in one of the largest ransomware attacks ever. It had such far-reaching, severe consequences that new details about the attack and its aftermath have continued to emerge since the incident. To mark its anniversary, we’ve compiled a summary of all the data available today.

The ransomware attack on UnitedHealth Group

Before we proceed, let’s briefly introduce this organization to those unfamiliar with it. With a capitalization of approximately $500 billion, UnitedHealth Group is the largest company in the U.S. market for health insurance and healthcare services. It ranks ninth globally in terms of revenue — right after Apple.

UnitedHealth Group comprises two companies. One of them, UnitedHealthcare, focuses on health insurance. The other, Optum, specializes in delivering a broad spectrum of healthcare services ranging from pharmaceuticals and direct medical care to the IT systems underlying healthcare operations.

Optum Insight, one of Optum’s three divisions (and the most profitable), handles the latter. In the fall of 2022, UnitedHealth Group acquired the Change Healthcare platform, and Optum Insight integrated it. This digital platform processes insurance claims — acting as a financial intermediary between patients, healthcare providers, and insurers.

Change Healthcare was the target of the attack. On February 21, 2024, its systems were infected with ransomware — rendering the platform inaccessible. The incident wreaked havoc on the U.S. healthcare system, leaving many patients to shoulder the financial burden of medical expenses as insurance claims couldn’t be processed quickly. Healthcare providers were forced to process bills manually.

Recovering the compromised systems took several months. For instance, the Change Healthcare clearing service didn’t resume full operations until November. UnitedHealth Group even set up a dedicated website to track the restoration efforts. Even now, a year after the attack, the company is still regularly publishing updates on the website, and some systems are still listed as only “partially available”.

Timeline of the attack on UnitedHealth Group

A few months after the incident, on May 1, the CEO of UnitedHealth Group, Andrew Witty, was summoned to testify before Congress. From that testimony, the general public was finally able to learn about how the attack on the company unfolded.

According to Witty, the attack began on February 12. The attackers used compromised credentials to gain access to the Change Healthcare Citrix portal, which was used for remote desktop connections. Two-factor authentication should have stopped them but… it wasn’t enabled. Thus, attackers were able to gain entry simply by using the compromised credentials.

After gaining initial access, they began to move laterally and harvest data. The attackers clearly managed to collect a substantial amount of valuable data within the following nine days. In any case, on February 21, they deployed ransomware — initiating the encryption of Change Healthcare’s systems.

Faced with this situation, UnitedHealth decided to disconnect Change Healthcare data centers from the network to contain the ransomware attack.

Witty argued that the decision effectively prevented the infection from spreading to Optum, UnitedHealthcare, UnitedHealth Group, and any external organizations. However, the complete shutdown of a critical digital platform had a devastating impact on both UnitedHealth Group’s business operations and the broader U.S. healthcare system as a whole.

Thus, the most extensive ransomware attack of 2024 was caused by the absence of two-factor authentication on a remote desktop access portal — precisely the place where it absolutely should have been enabled. As Oregon Senator, Ron Wyden, summarized, “This hack could have been stopped with cybersecurity 101”.

UnitedHealth Group pays up

Several days after the breach, the BlackCat/ALPHV cybercrime gang claimed responsibility for it. The attackers claimed to have exfiltrated 6TB of confidential data — including medical records, financial documents, and personal information belonging to U.S. civilians and military personnel, among other sensitive information.

In March 2024, UnitedHealth Group paid a ransom of $22 million to the gang. But the story didn’t end there: after receiving the ransom, ALPHV feigned having their infrastructure seized by the FBI again. This was likely a ploy to double-cross one of their associates — pocketing the funds and disappearing into the ether.

Said associate claimed ALPHV had failed to give them their cut, and later teamed up with another ransomware gang — RansomHub. That gang made some of the stolen data public in April 2024, and then tried to extort more money from UnitedHealth.

ALPHV website announcing the UnitedHealth breach

Post by RansomHub demanding a second ransom from UnitedHealth Group. Source

It remains unclear whether UnitedHealth ever paid the second ransom, as there was no official confirmation. However, the demand was later removed from RansomHub’s website, and no further leaks of the stolen company data have been observed. Therefore, it can be assumed that the company did, in fact, pay twice. This is even more likely if one considers that the ransom amounts are dwarfed by the massive financial impact the attack had on UnitedHealth Group.

The aftermath of the ransomware attack on UnitedHealth Group

UnitedHealth Group posted $872 million in losses associated with the cyberattack in Q1 2024 alone. The company also estimated in its Q1 report that the annual cost of the breach could reach $1.35 to $1.6 billion.

Those initial estimates proved to be far too optimistic: predicted damage kept growing quarter after quarter, first increasing to $2.3 to $2.45 billion, and then to $2.87 billion.

By the end of the fiscal year, as reported by UnitedHealth Group in January 2025, the incident resulted in a total annual loss of $3.09 billion. Although the damage estimate for 2024 is now finalized, the total damage could still increase substantially as the company continues to deal with the consequences of the attack.

An official estimate of the number of individuals whose data could have been stolen by the cybercriminals took a long time to materialize. It was only eight months after the incident, on October 24, 2024, that UnitedHealth Group finally came up with a tally. It was a mind-boggling figure: 100 million, or nearly a third of the entire population of the United States.

Nevertheless, it would become evident that these estimations were as overly hopeful as the original predictions about the financial losses. Three months later, at the end of January 2025, UnitedHealth Group released an updated report that put the number of those impacted by the breach at 190 million.

Protecting your company against ransomware

Clearly, the most obvious lesson to be learned from the UnitedHealth Group breach is that two-factor authentication is a must for any public-facing service. Otherwise, a single compromised password could cause massive problems and billions of dollars in losses.

Essential as it is, two-factor authentication is by no means sufficient protection against ransomware. Defending corporate infrastructure from ransomware attacks must be multilayered. Here are some additional tips:

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

Weathering the storm: In the midst of a Typhoon

Summary

Weathering the storm: In the midst of a Typhoon

Cisco Talos has been closely monitoring reports of widespread intrusion activity against several major U.S. telecommunications companies. The activity, initially reported in late 2024 and later confirmed by the U.S. government, is being carried out by a highly sophisticated threat actor dubbed Salt Typhoon. This blog highlights our observations on this campaign and identifies recommendations for detection and prevention of the actor’s activities.

Public reporting has indicated that the threat actor was able to gain access to core networking infrastructure in several instances and then use that infrastructure to collect a variety of information. There was only one case in which we found evidence suggesting that a Cisco vulnerability (CVE-2018-0171) was likely abused. In all the other incidents we have investigated to date, the initial access to Cisco devices was determined to be gained through the threat actor obtaining legitimate victim login credentials. The threat actor then demonstrated their ability to persist in target environments across equipment from multiple vendors for extended periods, maintaining access in one instance for over three years.

A hallmark of this campaign is the use of living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques on network devices. It is important to note that while the telecommunications industry is the primary victim, the advice contained herein is relevant to, and should be considered by, all infrastructure defenders.

No new Cisco vulnerabilities were discovered during this campaign. While there have been some reports that Salt Typhoon is abusing three other known Cisco vulnerabilities, we have not identified any evidence to confirm these claims. The vulnerabilities in question are listed below. Note that each of these CVEs have security fixes available. Threat actors regularly use publicly available malicious tooling to exploit these vulnerabilities, making patching of these vulnerabilities imperative.

Therefore, our recommendation — which is consistent with our standard guidance independent of this particular case—is always to follow best practices to secure network infrastructure.

Activities observed

Credential use and expansion

The use of valid, stolen credentials has been observed throughout this campaign, though it is unknown at this time exactly how the initial credentials in all cases were obtained by the threat actor. We have observed the threat actor actively attempting to acquire additional credentials by obtaining network device configurations and deciphering local accounts with weak password types—a security configuration that allows users to store passwords using cryptographically weak methods. In addition, we have observed the threat actor capturing SNMP, TACACS, and RADIUS traffic, including the secret keys used between network devices and TACACS/RADIUS servers. The intent of this traffic capture is almost certainly to enumerate additional credential details for follow-on use.

Configuration exfiltration

In numerous instances, the threat actor exfiltrated device configurations, often over TFTP and/or FTP. These configurations often contained sensitive authentication material, such as SNMP Read/Write (R/W) community strings and local accounts with weak password encryption types in use. The weak encryption password type would allow an attacker to trivially decrypt the password itself offline. In addition to the sensitive authentication material, configurations often contain named interfaces, which might allow an attacker to better understand the upstream and downstream network segments and use this information for additional reconnaissance and subsequent lateral movement within the network.

Infrastructure pivoting

A significant part of this campaign is marked by the actor’s continued movement, or pivoting, through compromised infrastructure. This “machine to machine” pivoting, or “jumping,” is likely conducted for a couple of reasons. First, it allows the threat actor to move within a trusted infrastructure set where network communications might not otherwise be permitted. Additionally, connections from this type of infrastructure are less likely to be flagged as suspicious by network defenders, allowing the threat actor to remain undetected.

The threat actor also pivoted from a compromised device operated by one telecom to target a device in another telecom. We believe that the device associated with the initial telecom was merely used as a hop point and not the intended final target in several instances. Some of these hop points were also used as a first hop for outbound data exfiltration operations. Much of this pivoting included the use of network equipment from a variety of different manufacturers.

Configuration modification

We observed that the threat actor had modified devices’ running configurations as well as the subsystems associated with both Bash and Guest Shell. (Guest Shell is a Linux-based virtual environment that runs on Cisco devices and allows users to execute Linux commands and utilities, including Bash.)

Running configuration modifications

  • AAA/TACACS+ server modification (server IP address change)
  • Loopback interface IP address modifications
  • GRE tunnel creation and use
  • Creation of unexpected local accounts
  • ACL modifications
  • SNMP community string modifications
  • HTTP/HTTPS server modifications on both standard and non-standard ports

Shell access modifications

  • Guest Shell enable and disable commands
  • Started SSH alternate servers on high ports for persistent access, such as sshd_operns (on port 57722) on underlying Linux Shell or Guest Shell
    • /usr/bin/sshd -p X
  • Created Linux-level users (modification of “/etc/shadow” and “/etc/passwd”)
  • Added SSH “authorized_keys” under root or other users at Linux level

Packet capture

The threat actor used a variety of tools and techniques to capture packet data throughout the course of the campaign, listed below:

  • Tcpdump – Portable command-line utility used to capture packet data at the underlying operating system level.
    • Tcpdump –i
  • Tpacap – Cisco IOS XR command line utility used to capture packets being sent to or from a given interface via netio at the underlying operating system level.
    • Tpacap –i
  • Embedded Packet Capture (EPC) – Cisco IOS feature that allows the capture and export of packet capture data.
    • Monitor capture CAP export ftp://<ftp_server>
    • Monitor capture CAP start
    • Monitor capture CAP clear

Operational utility (JumbledPath)

The threat actor used a custom-built utility, dubbed JumbledPath, which allowed them to execute a packet capture on a remote Cisco device through an actor-defined jump-host. This tool also attempted to clear logs and impair logging along the jump-path and return the resultant compressed, encrypted capture via another unique series of actor-defined connections or jumps. This allowed the threat actor to create a chain of connections and perform the capture on a remote device. The use of this utility would help to obfuscate the original source, and ultimate destination, of the request and would also allow its operator to move through potentially otherwise non-publicly-reachable (or routable) devices or infrastructure.

Weathering the storm: In the midst of a Typhoon

This utility was written in GO and compiled as an ELF binary using an x86-64 architecture. Compiling the utility using this architecture makes it widely useable across Linux operating systems, which also includes a variety of multi-vendor network devices. This utility was found in actor configured Guestshell instances on Cisco Nexus devices.

Defense evasion

The threat actor repeatedly modified the address of the loopback interface on a compromised switch and used that interface as the source of SSH connections to additional devices within the target environment, allowing them to effectively bypass access control lists (ACLs) in place on those devices (see “Infrastructure pivoting” section).

Weathering the storm: In the midst of a Typhoon

The threat actor routinely cleared relevant logs, including .bash_history, auth.log, lastlog, wtmp, and btmp, where applicable, to obfuscate their activities. Shell access was restored to a normal state in many cases through the use of the “guestshell disable” command.

The threat actor modified authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) server settings with supplemental addresses under their control to bypass access control systems.

Detection

We recommend taking the following steps to identify suspicious activity that may be related to this campaign:

  • Conduct comprehensive configuration management (inclusive of auditing), in line with best practices.
  • Conduct comprehensive authentication/authorization/command issuance monitoring.
  • Monitor syslog and AAA logs for unusual activity, including a decrease in normal logging events, or a gap in logged activity.
  • Monitor your environment for unusual changes in behavior or configuration.
  • Profile (fingerprint via NetFlow and port scanning) network devices for a shift in surface view, including new ports opening/closing and traffic to/from (not traversing).
  • Where possible, develop NetFlow visibility to identify unusual volumetric changes.
  • Look for non-empty or unusually large .bash_history files.
  • Additional identification and detection can be performed using the Cisco forensic guides.

Preventative measures

The following guidance applies to entities in all sectors.

  • Cisco-specific measures
    • Always disable the underlying non-encrypted web server using the “no ip http server” command. If web management is not required, disable all of the underlying web servers using “no ip http server” and “no ip http secure-server” commands.
    • Disable telnet and ensure it is not available on any of the Virtual Teletype (VTY) lines on Cisco devices by configuring all VTY stanzas with “transport input ssh” and “transport output none”.
    • If not required, disable the guestshell access using “guestshell disable” for those versions which support the guestshell service.
    • Disable Cisco’s Smart Install service using “no vstack”.
    • Utilize type 8 passwords for local account credential configuration.
    • Use type 6 for TACACS+ key configuration.
  • General measures
    • Rigorously adhere to security best practices, including updating, access controls, user education, and network segmentation.
    • Stay up-to-date on security advisories from the U.S. government and industry, and consider suggested configuration changes to mitigate described issues.
    • Update devices as aggressively as possible. This includes patching current hardware and software against known vulnerabilities and replacing end-of-life hardware and software.
      • Select complex passwords and community strings and avoid default credentials.
    • Use multi-factor authentication (MFA).
    • Encrypt all monitoring and configuration traffic (SNMPv3, HTTPS, SSH, NETCONF, RESTCONF).
    • Lockdown and aggressively monitor credential systems, such as TACACS+ and any jump hosts.
    • Utilize AAA to deny configuration modifications of key device protections (e.g., local accounts, TACACS+, RADIUS).
    • Prevent and monitor for exposure of administrative or unusual interfaces (e.g., SNMP, SSH, HTTP(s)).
    • Disable all non-encrypted web management capabilities.
    • Verify existence and correctness of access control lists for all management protocols (e.g., SNMP, SSH, Netconf, etc.).
    • Enhance overall credential and password management practices with stronger keys and/or encryption.
      • Use type 8 passwords for local account credential configuration.
      • Use type 6 for TACACS+ key configuration.
    • Store configurations centrally and push to devices. Do NOT allow devices to be the trusted source of truth for their configurations.

Analyst’s comments

There are several reasons to believe this activity is being carried out by a highly sophisticated, well-funded threat actor, including the targeted nature of this campaign, the deep levels of developed access into victim networks, and the threat actor’s extensive technical knowledge. Furthermore, the long timeline of this campaign suggests a high degree of coordination, planning, and patience—standard hallmarks of advanced persistent threat (APT) and state-sponsored actors.

During this investigation, we also observed additional pervasive targeting of Cisco devices with exposed Smart Install (SMI) and the subsequent abuse of CVE-2018-0171, a vulnerability in the Smart Install feature of Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS XE software. This activity appears to be unrelated to the Salt Typhoon operations, and we have not yet been able to attribute it to a specific actor. The IP addresses provided as observables below are associated with this potentially unrelated SMI activity.

Legacy devices with known vulnerabilities, such as Smart Install (CVE-2018-0171), should be patched or decommissioned if no longer in use. Even if the device is a non-critical device, or carries no traffic, it may be used as an entry door for the threat actor to pivot to other more critical devices.

The findings in this blog represent Cisco Talos’ understanding of the attacks outlined herein. This campaign and its impact are still being researched, and the situation continues to evolve. As such, this post may be updated at any time to reflect new findings or adjustments to assessments.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

IP Addresses:

185[.]141[.]24[.]28

185[.]82[.]200[.]181

Cisco Talos Blog – ​Read More

Katharine Hayhoe: The most important climate equation | Starmus highlights

The atmospheric scientist makes a compelling case for a head-to-heart-to-hands connection as a catalyst for climate action

WeLiveSecurity – ​Read More

How to Identify and Investigate Phishing Kit Attacks

Phishing kits have invested greatly in the popularity of phishing. They drop the entry threshold for cybercriminals enabling even low-skilled hackers to conduct successful attacks.  

In general, a phishing kit is a set of tools for creating convincing fake webpages, sites, or emails that trick users into divulging sensitive information like passwords or credit card credentials. Security specialists should never underestimate this type of malware and fail to be ready to counter its users. 

What Phishkits are made of 

These ready-to-use packages can be basic, with some pre-written code and website and email templates, and they can be advanced phishing-as-a-service (PHaaS) kits that offer more sophisticated and customizable features. These may even contain automated updates or encryption features.  

A typical kit includes:  

  • Website (email, social network pages) templates mimicking legitimate brands (banks, email providers, cloud services, etc.) 
  • Data harvesting scripts that capture input in webpage forms 
  • Automated deployment tools for quick setup 
  • Bypass techniques such as reverse proxies that intercept multi-factor authentication 
  • Server-side components that manage the data collected from victims 

Some notable Phishkits 

  • 16Shop: targeted Apple, PayPal, and Amazon users and was distributed as a subscription service. 
  • Evilginx2: a framework to intercept authentication tokens that helped to bypass MFA. 
  • BulletProofLink: a PHaaS platform that offered pre-hosted phishing pages and even reused stolen credentials to maximize profit. 
Example of a Greatness phishkit attack analyzed in ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox
  • Greatness: targets Microsoft 365 users and can dynamically generate fake login pages customized for the victim. 
  • GoPhish: an open-source framework meant for businesses to test their exposure to phishing by imitating attacks but also used maliciously. 
  • King Phisher: offers advanced features like campaign management and cloning of websites. 
  • Blitz: known for its simplicity and quick creation of phishing webpages. 

Why Phishkits are a serious issue for businesses 

Phishing kits are employed to attack both individuals and organizations, but they represent a specific threat to businesses by inviting wider audience of would-be hackers to the industry, multiplying risks and providing an increased workload to security systems.  
 
Besides, phishing kit attacks make it easier to turn any employee into a soft spot of the cyber security perimeter. Even targeted at people, such attacks are a headache for SOC teams.  
 
The features of phishkits that pose increased risks for organizations are:  
 
Scalability: They allow attackers to automate and run phishing campaigns against thousands of employees simultaneously. 

MFA Bypass: Modern phishkits integrate Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) techniques to steal session cookies, bypassing multi-factor authentication. 

Brand Abuse & Reputation Damage: Phishing pages tend to impersonate well-known brands, leading to loss of their customer trust when credentials are stolen. 

Supply Chain Attacks: Phishkits can be used to target third-party vendors and gain access to corporate networks via compromised partners. 

Defusing Phishkits with Threat Intelligence 

Cyber threat intelligence has long proven useful in countering phishkit-based attacks. It involves gathering, analyzing, and acting upon information about current and emerging threats. For countering phishkits, it enforces:  

  • Early detection: TI helps to collect the indicators of compromise associated with the use of certain phishkits and set up network monitoring for detecting the elements of phishkit infrastructure. 
  • Behavioral Analys: TI is used to analyze patterns and behaviors of phishing campaigns, to identify new kits or variations of known ones before they cause harm. 
  • Proactive Blocking: Intelligence feeds are used to update security systems like firewalls, email gateways, or intrusion detection systems to block known malicious domains or IPs. 
  • Employee Training: By helping to understand phishkits’ anatomy and behavour, TI can facilitate realistic phishing simulations based on actual threats, training staff to recognize and report phishing attempts. 
  • Vulnerability Management: Seeing what types of phishkits are targeting specific sectors or technologies, organizations prioritize patching vulnerabilities or enhance security measures where they are most needed.

How to Track and Identify Phishing Kit Attacks with TI Lookup 

TI Lookup lets you identify and investigate phishkit attacks

Threat Intelligence Lookup from ANY.RUN provides access to an extensive database of the latest threat data extracted from millions of public sandbox sessions.  

It allows analysts to conduct targeted indicator searches with over 40 different parameters, from IPs and hashes to mutexes and registry keys, to enrich their existing intel on malware and phishing attacks.  

With TI Lookup, users can collect as well as pin their existing indicators to specific cyber threats. Each indicator in TI Lookup can be observed as part of wider context  

Learn more about TI Lookup 

Threat Intelligence Lookup empowers organizations with: 

  • Streamlined Access to Threat Information: Simplifies and speeds up the process of finding threat-related information, making it more convenient and efficient. 
  • Detailed Insights into Attacks: Provides detailed information on attacker methods, helping to determine the most effective response measures. Deep analysis makes the actions of analysts more precise and effective. 
  • Reduced Mean Time to Respond (MTTR): Offers quick access to key threat information, enabling analysts to make swift decisions. 
  • Increased Detection and Response Speed: Ensures data is up-to-date, helping businesses improve the speed of detecting and responding to new threats. 

Collect intelligence on phishkit attacks
with ANY.RUN’s TI Lookup 



Get free requests to test it


1. Collecting Intel on Tycoon2FA Phishkit Abusing Cloudflare Workers 

Tycoon2FA is a phishkit that has been offered as a service to cyber criminals since 2023. This threat’s specialty is adversary-in-the-middle attacks that make it possible to not only steal victims’ login credentials but also bypass two-factor authentication (2FA).  

Tycon2FA operators make extensive use of Cloudflare Workers and Cloudflare Pages for hosting fake login forms that are abused for stealing personal data.  

With TI Lookup, we can collect the latest example of domains utilized for Tycoon2FA attacks using the following query: 

domainName:”*.workers.dev” 

Use wildcards like the asterisk in TI Lookup for more flexible searches 

TI Lookup provides 49 domains, with some of them being labeled with the “phishing” tag. At this point, users can collect these indicators to enrich their defense. 

TI Lookup provides verdicts on known malicious indicators 

Using TI Lookup can be also helpful during triage, when you need to check if a certain Cloudflare Workers domain is malicious. As you can see in the image above, the service instantly informs you about the threat level of the queried domain. 

The Tasks tab in TI Lookup provides a list of the latest analysis reports performed in ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox featuring the requested domains. 

TI Lookup provide a list of sandbox sessions featuring the requested indicators 

Here, we can discover that Cloudflare’s domain is also used by another phishing-as-a-service tool, EvilProxy.  

Fake Outlook page created with the help of a phishing kit

If you want to dig deeper, you can open any of these reports inside the sandbox and observe real-world attacks as they unfolded and rerun analysis of these URLs yourself. 

Get 50 free TI Lookup requests to try it in your organization 



Try it


2. Researching Phishkit Campaigns via Suricata rules  

Threat Intelligence Lookup supports search by Suricata IDS rules. Add a rule ID (SID) and see an assortment of incidents where the same rule was triggered.  

Suricata rule for detecting social engineering attempts

Let’s use the rule with the class “Possible social engineering attempted” via the following query: 

suricataID:”8001050″ 

Search by Suricata rule to uncover more examples of phishkit attacks 

Among the results, we can see examples of Gabagool and Sneaky2FA phishing kit attacks, as well as Tycoon2FA’s which are linked to the Storm1747 APT.

Learn more on how to track APTs

You can download data on all of these samples, which includes hashes, and use it to further enrich your security systems. As always, you can also explore each report in detail to collect even more insights into these attacks. 

TI Lookup lets you receive fresh updates on the results for any query 

TI Lookup also lets you automatically receive notifications about the new results available for specific search queries. All you need to do is click the bell icon, and all of the updates will be displayed in the left side menu. 

3. Tracking new samples of Mamba2FA Phishkit 

If your organization has been previously attacked with a certain phishing kit, then you can easily stay updated on the newest indicators related to it. 

Let’s take Mamba2FA as an example. It is a widely utilized phishkit that has been used in numerous attacks against businesses in the financial and manufacturing sectors. 

With a simple query that combines the name of the phishkit with an empty domain name field, we can quickly discover both new attacks, as well as network indicators like domains and URLs recorded during sandbox analysis: 

threatName:”mamba” AND domainName:”” 

TI Lookup provides a wealth of threat data on phishing kit attacks

Learn more about proactively identifying Mamba2FA attacks in the article by a phishing analyst


Enrich your threat knowledge with TI Lookup

Learn to Track Emerging Cyber Threats

Check out expert guide to collecting intelligence on emerging threats with TI Lookup



Conclusion  

Security experts are far from underestimating the risks behind phishing kits. They don’t just open gates to a mass of low-skilled beginners to the cybercrime market. They abuse known brands and trademarks by impersonating their resources, employ sophisticated infiltration and anti-evasion techniques, and are constantly evolving.  

To avoid financial and reputational loss, organizations should consider investing in high-end threat intelligence solutions as well as emphasize employee educating and training.  

About ANY.RUN

ANY.RUN helps more than 500,000 cybersecurity professionals worldwide. Our interactive sandbox simplifies malware analysis of threats that target both Windows and Linux systems. Our threat intelligence products, TI Lookup, YARA Search, and Feeds, help you find IOCs or files to learn more about the threats and respond to incidents faster.

Request free trial of ANY.RUN’s services → 

The post How to Identify and Investigate Phishing Kit Attacks appeared first on ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog.

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XMRig miner attacks corporate users | Kaspersky official blog

From December 31, 2024, our telemetry began detecting a significant surge in the activity of the XMRig cryptominer. While most of the malware launches were detected by home security solutions, some were found on corporate systems. A thorough investigation revealed that cybercriminals had been distributing the malware through game torrents. The attack likely targeted gamers in various countries, including Russia, Brazil, and Germany. However, the cryptominer also surfaced on corporate networks — probably due to employees using work computers for personal use.

Malicious campaign

The campaign, affectionately named StaryDobry (“the good old one” in Russian) by our analysts, was carefully planned: malicious distributions were created and uploaded to torrent sites between September and December 2024. Of course, the infected games were repacks — modified versions designed to bypass authenticity checks (in other words, cracked).

Users began downloading and installing these trojanized games, and for a while, the malware showed no signs of activity. But then, on December 31, it received a command from the attackers’ remote server, triggering the download and execution of the miner on infected devices. The list of trojanized titles included popular sim games such as Garry’s Mod, BeamNG.Drive, and Universe Sandbox.

We closely examined a sample of the malware and discovered the following:

  • Before launching, the program checks whether it’s running in a debugging environment or sandbox. If it is, the installation is immediately terminated.
  • The miner is a slightly modified executable of XMRig, which we covered in detail back in 2020.
  • If the infected device has fewer than 8 CPU cores, the miner doesn’t run.

Our products detect the malware used in this campaign as Trojan.Win64.StaryDobry.*, Trojan-Dropper.Win64.StaryDobry.*, and HEUR:Trojan.Win64.StaryDobry.gen. More technical details and indicators of compromise can be found in the Securelist publication.

How to protect your corporate network from miners

From a corporate security perspective, the real concern isn’t just the malware itself, but where it was discovered. A miner in a corporate network is certainly unpleasant — but at least it doesn’t steal data. However, there’s no guarantee that, next time, a repacked game won’t be hiding a stealer or ransomware. As long as employees install pirated games on work computers, gaming-related malware will keep infiltrating corporate systems.

Therefore, the main recommendation for information security personnel is to block torrents at the security policy level (unless, of course, they’re necessary for your company’s business processes). Ideally, all non-work-related software should be completely prohibited. In addition, we have two traditional recommendations:

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