Microsoft has released its monthly security update for January of 2025 which includes 159 vulnerabilities, including 12 that Microsoft marked as “critical.” The remaining vulnerabilities listed are classified as “important.”  

One notable critically rated vulnerability that has been patched this month is CVE-2025-21309, which is a remote code execution vulnerability affecting Windows Remote Desktop Services. Exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to arbitrary code execution on systems where the Remote Desktop Gateway role has been enabled. This vulnerability has been assigned a CVSS 3.1 score of 8.1 and is considered “more likely to be exploited” by Microsoft. 

Another notable remote code execution vulnerability in Window Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) was also patched this month. This vulnerability, CVE-2025-21298, is a critical remotely exploitable vulnerability that can be triggered by sending a malicious email to a victim running a vulnerable version of Microsoft Outlook. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems and can be triggered when the victim previews the malicious email. This vulnerability has been assigned a CVSS 3.1 score of 9.8. Microsoft recommends disabling RTF as mitigation for this vulnerability. 

CVE-2025-21294 is a critical vulnerability in Microsoft Digest Authentication that affects multiple versions of Windows and Windows Server. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would need to win a race condition. 

CVE-2025-21295 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in SPNEGO Extended Negotiation (NEGOEX) Security Mechanism. This vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems and does not require user interaction for successful exploitation.  

CVE-2025-21296 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in BranchCache. This vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems. Microsoft assesses that an attacker would need to be on the same network to successfully exploit this vulnerability.  

CVE-2025-21297 is another critical remote code execution vulnerability in Windows Remote Desktop Services. Microsoft has assessed that this vulnerability is “less likely to be exploited” and that it would require an attacker to win a race condition for exploitation to be successful. This vulnerability affects multiple versions of Windows Server.  

CVE-2025-21298 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Windows Object Linking and Embedding (OLE). It could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems. Microsoft recommends disabling RTF as a mitigation for this vulnerability.

CVE-2025-21307 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Windows Reliable Multicast Transport Driver (RMCAST). This vulnerability, if successfully exploited, could enable an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code by sending a specially crafted packet to vulnerable systems.  

CVE-2025-21311 is a critical privilege escalation vulnerability in NTLMv1. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely and could allow an attacker to increase their level of access to vulnerable systems. Microsoft recommends disabling the use of NTLMv1 as a mitigation for this vulnerability. 

CVE-2025-21362 – is a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Excel. This vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems. This vulnerability can also be triggered via the preview pane.  

CVE-2025-21380 is a critical information disclosure vulnerability affecting Azure Marketplace SaaS Resources. According to Microsoft this vulnerability, which could enable an attacker to disclose information, has been mitigated.  

CVE-2025-21385 is a critical information disclosure vulnerability affecting Microsoft Purview. This vulnerability is due to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that Microsoft reports has been mitigated. 

Talos would also like to highlight the following important vulnerabilities that Microsoft considers to be “more likely” to be exploited:   

• CVE-2025-21189 – MapUrlToZone Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21210 – Windows BitLocker Information Disclosure Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21219 – MapUrlToZone Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21268 – MapUrlToZone Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21269 – MapUrlToZone Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21292 – Windows Search Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21299 – Windows Kerberos Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21314 – Windows SmartScreen Spoofing Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21315 – Microsoft Brokering File System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21328 – MapUrlToZone Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21329 – MapUrlToZone Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21354 – Microsoft Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21364 – Microsoft Excel Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability 
• CVE-2025-21365 – Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 

A complete list of all the other vulnerabilities Microsoft disclosed this month is available on its update page.

In response to these vulnerability disclosures, Talos is releasing a new Snort rule set that detects attempts to exploit some of them. Please note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional information. Cisco Security Firewall customers should use the latest update to their ruleset by updating their SRU. Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.  

The rules included in this release that protect against the exploitation of many of these vulnerabilities are 64432 – 64436, 64444 – 64457. There are also these Snort 3 rules: 301113, 301114, 301117 – 301123. 

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Pivoting in cyber threat intelligence refers to using one piece of data to find and explore related information and expand your understanding of a threat. It lets discover hidden connections between indicators of compromise and find potential vulnerabilities before they are exploited.  

Why pivoting matters 

Cyber threat intelligence concentrates on indicators of compromise, IOCs. These are data points or artifacts (like IP addresses, domain names, file hashes, email addresses, etc.) that indicate a potential or actual malicious activity. Pivoting is researching links and correlations between IOCs and thus discovering new IOCs relevant to the same attack, malware, or threat agent.  
 
Pivoting helps make CTI proactive, helps predict and prevent the unfolding of an attack or the emergence of new threats. 
 
Threat intelligence and pivoting are critical for businesses and corporate security because they enhance an organization’s ability to anticipate, detect, and respond to cyber threats. By leveraging actionable insights from threat intelligence and pivoting to discover deeper connections, businesses can protect their assets, reduce risk, and strengthen overall cybersecurity posture. 

Note that the definition of pivoting in threat intelligence is different to that in cyber security. Generally, it’s a popular term used in many other fields.   

In CS the term is usually used by pen testers and hackers. Here pivoting is the act of an attacker moving from one compromised system to one or more other systems within the same or other organizations. Pivoting is fundamental to the success of advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks.  

How it works 

Pivoting for CTI shows its potential when IOCs are viewed not as “atomic” but rather as complex objects. Taken by themselves, they are, so to say, “backward-looking”, they lack context. IOCs are good forensic material, but not enough for predictive, proactive security effort.  

Pivoting focuses on behaviors. Indicators are linked through their behavioral commonalities. This approach grasps IOC relationships, helps discover new ones, predict their behavior, generalize tendencies, and eventually build strong and adaptive defense based on the understanding of adversaries. 

Pivoting routine 

Pivoting is not just about techniques and tools; it is rather about a certain approach or dare say a certain mindset. Once adopted, it’ll give your threat intelligence a new depth and perspective.   

The most basic algorithm is:  

• Select an initial indicator. For example, a suspicious IP. Or a domain name associated with a known threat or attack. 
• Analyze the indicator with a tool of your choice. 
• Decompose the indicator. Understand its parameters. Define which of them could signal malicious behavior or be linked to other artifacts. 
• Find and analyze linked artifacts. Pay attention to those that haven’t been yet connected with a threat or an attack.  
• Research the discovered data. 
• Draw actionable insights. 

Where to start  

You can start with network indicators pivoting.  Basic network IOCs are IPs, domains, SSL/TSL certificates. They all have certain parameters: for example, registrar and registrant for domains, hosting provider or server type for an IP address, issue date or issuer for a certificate. 
 
One of the most powerful tools for IOC research is ANY.RUN’s Thread Intelligence Lookup. It lets you search threat artifacts by about 40 search parameters, including YARA and Suricata rules, combine them and get real-time updates of search results.  

TI lookup is integrated with the Interactive Sandbox used for researching malware in action within a safe virtual environment.   
 
For example, let us try using ASN to identify network infrastructure.  
 
1. Find IPs assigned to the “Autonomous System of Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology” using TI Lookup. The search query is:  

2. Look at the list of IP addresses in the search results. Some of them have tags assigned to them. The tag “Stormkitty” refers to the eponymous stealer — StormKitty. 

ANY.RUN’s Cybersecurity Blog – ​Read More

Threats, exploitation, and mitigation of Ivanti’s two critical actively exploited vulnerabilities—CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283—affecting its Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and Neurons for ZTA Gateways.

Overview

On January 8, 2025, Ivanti disclosed two critical vulnerabilities—CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283—affecting its Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and Neurons for ZTA Gateways. These vulnerabilities expose enterprises to unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) and privilege escalation risks. While Ivanti has released patches to address these issues, threat actor exploitation, particularly of CVE-2025-0282, has prompted a global response.

This blog aims to provide detailed insights into these vulnerabilities and their exploitation, offering valuable guidance for mitigating risks.

A Closer Look at CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-0283

CVE-2025-0282: Remote Code Execution

• Type: Stack-based Buffer Overflow
• Severity: Critical (CVSS Score: 9.0)
• Impact: Enables unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely via the Ivanti Connect Secure appliance.
• Affected Versions:
  • Ivanti Connect Secure: Versions prior to 22.7R2.5.
  • Ivanti Policy Secure: Versions prior to 22.7R1.2.
  • Ivanti Neurons for ZTA Gateways: Versions prior to 22.7R2.3.

This vulnerability is actively being exploited, primarily against Ivanti Connect Secure appliances exposed to the internet. Threat actors use it to achieve remote code execution, enabling deep infiltration into enterprise environments.

Exploitation Process

Threat actors have demonstrated sophisticated exploitation techniques, as observed by Mandiant. The process often includes:

1. Identifying the Target Version: Repeated requests to the vulnerable appliance help attackers determine the firmware version.
2. Disabling Security Mechanisms: Threat actors disable SELinux and block syslog forwarding to evade detection.
3. Writing and Executing Malicious Scripts: Base64-encoded scripts are written to temporary directories and executed to deploy malware.
4. Deploying Web Shells: These enable attackers to maintain remote access.
5. Erasing Logs: Tools like sed are used to remove traces of exploitation from debug and application logs.

CVE-2025-0283: Privilege Escalation

• Type: Stack-based Buffer Overflow
• Severity: High (CVSS Score: 7.0)
• Impact: Allows local authenticated attackers to escalate privileges.
• Affected Versions: The same versions as CVE-2025-0282.

While CVE-2025-0283 has not been actively exploited, its potential to be chained with other vulnerabilities poses significant risks.

Mitigation

Ivanti released a patch for Connect Secure on January 8, and updates for Policy Secure and ZTA Gateways are slated for January 21.

Malware Deployment and Persistence

Initial attacks leveraged the vulnerability for remote code execution and to drop obfuscated webshell payloads onto compromised systems, according to Mandiant. These webshells enable persistent access and lateral movement within targeted networks.

Key IoCs Identified

• Webshell Samples:
  • SHA256: 3C5F9034C86CB1952AA5BB07B4F77CE7D8BB5CC9FE5C029A32C72ADC7E814668
  • Decoded functionality allowed attackers to execute system commands remotely.

• Attack Vectors:
  • Exploitation originated from anonymous VPN services and known malicious IP addresses.
  • Common suspicious usernames: SUPPORT87, SUPPOR817, and VPN.

• Post-Exploitation Activities:
  • Unauthorized security policy modifications, including opening access from WAN to LAN.
  • Deletion of forensic evidence to obscure attack traces.

• Geographic Patterns:
  • Concentrated attack origin in Europe, leveraging proxied IP addresses.

Key Threat Actor Activities

Mandiant has linked the exploitation campaign to China-affiliated groups, specifically UNC5337 and UNC5221, using malware families like SPAWN and PHASEJAM.

Here’s how these tools are weaponized:

• SPAWN Family Components:
  • SPAWNMOLE: A tunneler that hijacks network connections to establish communication with command-and-control (C2) servers.
  • SPAWNSNAIL: An SSH backdoor enabling persistent access.
  • SPAWNSLOTH: A log-tampering utility that obfuscates traces of malicious activity.

• PHASEJAM:
  • Inserts malicious web shells into Ivanti appliance files like getComponent.cgi.
  • Blocks legitimate system upgrades by modifying upgrade scripts.

Anti-Forensics Techniques

Threat actors erase critical logs, such as:

• Kernel messages (dmesg).
• State dumps and core dumps from crashes.
• SELinux audit logs.

These actions complicate incident response and forensic investigations.

CISA, ACSC, and NCSC have classified CVE-2025-0282 as a critical vulnerability, emphasizing its inclusion in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. Their advisories stress that edge devices like VPNs are prime targets for attackers and require immediate patching.

Detection and Mitigation

Detection

Ivanti said, “Threat actor activity was identified by the Integrity Checker Tool (ICT) on the same day it occurred, enabling Ivanti to respond promptly and rapidly develop a fix.”

Organizations are advised to use Ivanti’s Integrity Checker Tool (ICT) to identify signs of compromise. However, ICT alone may not detect all malicious activity, especially if attackers have erased traces. Combining ICT results with endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools is crucial.

Mitigation

1. Patch Systems:
   • Update to Ivanti’s patched firmware versions:
     • Connect Secure: 22.7R2.5
     • Policy Secure and ZTA Gateways: 22.7R2.5 (available by January 21, 2025)

2. Reset Credentials:
   • Change all passwords for admin and user accounts, including VPN pre-shared keys.

3. Reconfigure Security Policies:
   • Remove unauthorized rules allowing broad access.

4. Monitor Network Activity:
   • Continuously monitor logs for unusual behavior or unauthorized access.

5. Enforce Network Segmentation:
   • Restrict management interfaces to trusted internal IP addresses only.

Key Agency Recommendations

• CISA: Advocates for enhanced monitoring of ICS appliances and swift adoption of fixes.
• ACSC: Warns against delayed patching, highlighting the potential for mass exploitation.
• NCSC: Stresses the importance of layered defenses and regular security assessments.

Best Practices for Enhanced Security

Cyble emphasizes the importance of adopting a proactive security strategy. Key recommendations include:

• Two-Factor Authentication (2FA): Enforce 2FA for all accounts to reduce the risk of unauthorized access.
• Log Monitoring: Use SIEM solutions to track anomalies in real time.
• Incident Response: Maintain a tested and updated incident response plan to mitigate the impact of breaches.
• Limit External Exposure: Disable internet-facing management interfaces wherever possible.

References:

https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-Policy-Secure-ZTA-Gateways-CVE-2025-0282-CVE-2025-0283

https://www.ivanti.com/blog/security-update-ivanti-connect-secure-policy-secure-and-neurons-for-zta-gateways

https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/01/08/cisa-adds-one-vulnerability-kev-catalog

https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/active-exploitation-ivanti-vulnerability

https://www.cyber.gov.au/about-us/view-all-content/alerts-and-advisories/critical-vulnerabilities-ivanti-connect-secure-ivanti-policy-secure-and-ivanti-neurons-zta-gateways

The post Inside the Active Threats of Ivanti’s Exploited Vulnerabilities appeared first on Cyble.

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Researchers from three European universities recently demonstrated the so-called BadRAM attack. This attack is made possible because of a vulnerability in AMD EPYC processors, and primarily threatens cloud-solution providers and virtualization systems. In the worst-case scenario, the vulnerability could be used to compromise data from highly secure virtual machines.

However, implementing this scenario in practice would be quite difficult. The attack requires physical access to the server, plus the highest level of access to the software. Before discussing the BadRAM attack in detail, we should first understand the concept of a trusted execution environment (TEE).

Features of TEE

Software errors are inevitable. Estimates from as early as the 1990s suggest that there are between one and 20 errors for every thousand lines of code. Some of these errors lead to vulnerabilities that malicious actors can exploit to access confidential information. Therefore, when certain data or computational processes (for example, processing private encryption keys) must be highly secure, it makes sense to isolate this data — or these processes — from the rest of the code. This is the essence of the trusted execution environment concept.

There are numerous TEE implementations designed for various tasks, each varying in the degree of security they provide. In AMD processors, TEE is implemented as Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) — a technology that enhances the protection of virtual machines. It encrypts the data of a virtual system in memory so that other virtual systems — or even the operators of the physical server running these virtual OSs — can’t access it. Secure Nested Paging, a more recent extension of this technology, can detect unauthorized attempts to access virtual system data.

Consider the scenario where a financial institution uses third-party infrastructure to run its virtual systems. These virtual OSs process highly confidential data, and it’s essential to ensure their absolute security. While it’s possible to impose stringent requirements on the provider of the infrastructure, in some cases it’s easier to operate under the assumption that they can’t be fully trusted.

Secure Encrypted Virtualization, just like Intel’s similar Trusted Domain Extensions (TDX) technology, essentially uses a separate processor. Although it’s physically part of the server processor (Intel or AMD), it’s effectively isolated from the main processor cores. By participating in the data encryption process, this isolated module provides an additional layer of security.

Details of the BadRAM attack

Let’s return to the BadRAM attack. It bypasses the Secure Encrypted Virtualization protection and gains access to the encrypted data of a virtual system in such a way that the Secure Nested Paging technology is also unable to detect the breach. This video shows how a “malicious” application on a server can read data from a protected virtual machine running on the same server.

How does it work? The authors of the study used a very unusual attack method — modifying the hardware itself. Every computer has random access memory (RAM). Each memory module contains several chips for storing data, plus one service chip — known as the SPD. This chip announces the presence of the memory module in the system and transmits key parameters (such as the optimal operating frequency of the memory chips and their capacity) to the processor. It was precisely this information about the capacity that the researchers modified.

This is a rather paradoxical attack method. First, the attackers take a 32GB memory module; then, they re-flash the SPD chip, setting its capacity to twice that amount — 64GB. The processor trusts this information and tries to use the memory module as if its capacity was indeed 64GB. Under normal circumstances, this would quickly lead to freezes or other failures: some data blocks would simply overwrite others, and information from various applications would get corrupted. To prevent this, the researchers restricted write-access to the modified memory module for all processes except the target virtual system.

So what does this accomplish? If the processor thinks that the memory capacity is twice as large as it actually is, then each pair of virtual addresses maps to only one physical memory cell. This allows a scenario where a real memory area is simultaneously used by a protected virtual OS — and accessible to another, malicious, application. The latter won’t write to the memory cells, but can read what the virtual OS writes to them. This is precisely the scenario that AMD’s SEV technology is designed to prevent, but in this case it proves ineffective — both memory access protection and encryption are bypassed.

We’re glossing over many important details of the study, but the main takeaway is that this malicious memory module creates a situation where the supposedly highly-secure data of a virtual machine becomes accessible to an external application. Yes, this is an extremely complex attack — requiring physical access to the server in addition to “hacking” the server’s software to gain the highest access privileges. However, compare this to a previous study, where a similar result was achieved using an extremely expensive ($170,000) hardware device that intercepted data transmission between the processor and the memory module in real time.

In the BadRAM attack, the SPD chip is modified using a simple kit consisting of a microcomputer and readily available software costing around $10 in total. After modification, physical access to the server is no longer required, and all subsequent attack stages can be carried out remotely. In some memory modules, even remote rewriting of the SPD data may be possible.

Fortunately, the vulnerabilities exploited in this attack have been patched in firmware updates for AMD EPYC 3^rd Gen and 4^th Gen processors. The protection technology now includes a mechanism capable of detecting “malicious” memory modules. By the way, the researchers also tested Intel’s TDX technology, which appears to already have a similar RAM integrity-check in place, making attacks like BadRAM impossible.

The concept of a trusted execution environment is designed for work in highly hostile environments. We discussed a scenario where the owner of a virtual OS doesn’t trust the hosting provider. Even under such paranoid conditions, avoiding errors remains a significant challenge — as demonstrated by the BadRAM study. The authors generally argue that TEE system developers rely too heavily on the difficulty of extracting data from RAM, and illustrate how even the most sophisticated security systems can be bypassed using relatively simple means.

Kaspersky official blog – ​Read More

Overview 

This week’s ICS vulnerability report sheds light on multiple flaws detected between January 01, 2025, to January 07, 2025. The report offers crucial insights into the cybersecurity challenges faced by organizations. It draws attention to the vulnerabilities identified by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which has issued multiple advisories highlighting the risks that need urgent mitigation.

CISA’s latest advisories target two specific vulnerabilities affecting a wide range of ICS devices and systems. These advisories are crucial, given that vulnerabilities in ICS systems can have serious consequences for the safety and efficiency of critical infrastructure. In total, 27 vulnerabilities were reported, affecting products from vendors such as ABB and Nedap Librix. These vulnerabilities span multiple series, including ASPECT-Enterprise, NEXUS, and MATRIX, as well as the Nedap Librix Ecoreader.

Several Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) have been identified across the affected products, including CWE-1287 (improper validation), CWE-552 (insufficient access control), CWE-770 (resource exhaustion), CWE-943 (improper validation of input), and CWE-521 (insufficient access control). These CWEs highlight recurring issues that undermine the security of critical systems, such as improper input validation and insufficient access control measures.

One of the more interesting aspects of these vulnerabilities is that 12 out of the 27 reported have publicly available proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits. This greatly increases the risk for organizations, as cybercriminals can easily leverage these exploits to target vulnerable systems, potentially resulting in severe damage.

Breakdown of the Weekly ICS Vulnerability Report 

The ICS vulnerabilities reported during the week are mostly categorized as critical, with a small proportion classified as high-severity. Critical vulnerabilities are those that have the potential to cause severe damage or compromise sensitive systems, while high-severity vulnerabilities still present cyber risks but may be less immediately impactful.

Among the affected vendors, ABB stands out with 26 vulnerabilities reported in its ASPECT-Enterprise, NEXUS, and MATRIX series products. The remainder of the vulnerabilities, one in total, was reported for Nedap Librix devices. The vulnerabilities reported by CISA affect a variety of critical infrastructure sectors, with a particularly high concentration in the Critical Manufacturing sector.

This sector, which plays an important role in national security and economic stability, accounted for 96.3% of the reported vulnerabilities, highlighting its importance and vulnerability. On the other hand, the Commercial Facilities sector reported just 3.7% of the vulnerabilities, reflecting comparatively lower exposure.

Recommendations for Mitigating ICS Vulnerabilities 

The CRIL report highlights the need for proactive measures to mitigate these vulnerabilities and enhance the overall security of ICS systems. Below are some key recommendations: 

1. It is essential for organizations to stay on top of security advisories and patch alerts issued by vendors and regulatory bodies like CISA. A risk-based approach to vulnerability management is recommended, with the goal of reducing the risk of exploitation. 

2. Implementing a Zero-Trust Policy is crucial for minimizing exposure and ensuring that all internal and external network traffic is scrutinized and validated. 

3. Developing a comprehensive patch management strategy that covers inventory management, patch assessment, testing, deployment, and verification is vital. Automating these processes can help maintain consistency and improve efficiency. 

4. Proper network segmentation can limit the potential damage caused by an attacker and prevent lateral movement across networks. This is particularly important for securing critical ICS assets. 

5. Conducting regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can identify gaps in security that might be exploited by threat actors. 

6. Establishing and maintaining an incident response plan is vital. Organizations should ensure that the plan is tested and updated regularly to adapt to the latest threats. 

7. Ongoing cybersecurity training programs should be mandatory for all employees, especially those working with Operational Technology (OT) systems. Training should focus on recognizing phishing attempts, following authentication procedures, and understanding the importance of cybersecurity practices in day-to-day operations. 

Conclusion  

The ongoing vulnerabilities within Industrial Control Systems (ICS) pose cyber threats to critical infrastructure sectors, with the potential to disrupt operations, compromise sensitive data, and cause physical damage. The ICS vulnerability report and advisories from CISA are crucial in helping organizations stay informed and address these risks proactively.  

To access the full report on ICS vulnerabilities observed by Cyble, along with additional insights and details, click here. By adopting a comprehensive, multi-layered security approach that includes effective vulnerability management, timely patching, and ongoing employee training, organizations can reduce their exposure to cyber threats. With the right tools and intelligence, such as those offered by Cyble, critical infrastructure can be better protected, ensuring its resilience and security in an increasingly complex cyber landscape. 

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