The Rise of Head Mare: A Geopolitical and Cybersecurity Analysis
Key takeaways
The Head Mare hacktivist group targets Russian and Belarusian organizations, linking their cyberattacks to geopolitical tensions with Ukraine.
Head Mare’s attacks on Russia and Belarus are strategic, aiming to influence political and economic stability in these countries and support its own objectives.
The group uses sophisticated phishing and ransomware attacks, exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2023-38831 in WinRAR and ransomware strains like LockBit and Babuk.
Head Mare’s cyber operations align with the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, applying pressure on Russia and Belarus to distract from Ukraine’s military actions.
The group employs advanced techniques for persistence and evasion, disguising malware and using sophisticated tools to control compromised systems.
Head Mare uses the Sliver framework to manage compromised systems, ensuring their command-and-control infrastructure is resilient.
Tools like Mimikatz are used to extract credentials, enhancing their control over targeted networks.
Overview
The Head Mare hacktivist group has emerged as a formidable digital adversary in today’s geopolitical conflicts. First reported in 2023 on X (previously Twitter), Head Mare has targeted Russian and Belarusian organizations. The group’s actions are not merely technical intrusions but are deeply entwined with the broader political tensions between these countries and their neighbors, particularly in the context of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
Head Mare’s focus on Russian and Belarusian entities is a strategic choice rather than a coincidence. By targeting organizations within these nations, Head Mare aligns its cyber operations with the geopolitical friction between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. This approach reflects a deliberate attempt to influence the political and economic stability of these countries through cyber means, thus amplifying the existing geopolitical tensions.
The group’s operations include deploying sophisticated phishing campaigns and ransomware attacks. By exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2023-38831 in WinRAR and utilizing ransomware strains such as LockBit and Babuk, Head Mare aims to destabilize key organizations within Russia and Belarus.
The Geopolitical Angle of Head Mare’s Activities
The geopolitical implications of Head Mare’s activities are evident in their choice of targets and methods. By focusing on Russian and Belarusian organizations, Head Mare is engaging in a form of cyber warfare that complements the broader Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The group’s attacks are likely intended to support Ukraine’s strategic objectives by applying additional pressure on Russia and Belarus.
The Russian military’s struggles, especially following Ukraine’s recent offensive into Kursk, have heightened the need for strategic distractions. President Vladimir Putin has used Belarus to create a diversion, hoping that the buildup of Belarusian troops near the Ukrainian border would draw Ukrainian forces away from their offensive operations. Head Mare’s attacks fit into this geopolitical maneuvering by amplifying the pressure on Russia and Belarus.
The situation on the ground further illustrates the intertwining of cyber operations and geopolitical strategy. In August, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka announced the deployment of a significant portion of Belarus’s army to the Ukrainian border, citing concerns over a potential Ukrainian offensive. Lukashenka claimed this move was a response to a perceived build-up of Ukrainian troops, which he attributed to a misunderstanding of Belarus’s preparations for Independence Day celebrations.
Despite the official narrative, Lukashenka’s actions are likely influenced by Moscow’s broader strategy. The Belarusian leader’s military deployment aligns with Putin’s attempt to create a strategic diversion. However, Belarus’s involvement in the conflict remains complex.
Lukashenka’s regime is heavily dependent on Russian support, yet Belarusian society shows limited enthusiasm for direct involvement in the war against Ukraine. This lack of domestic support, combined with Lukashenka’s precarious political position, suggests that a full-scale Belarusian invasion of Ukraine remains unlikely.
Technical Sophistication and Strategic Intent
Head Mare’s cyber tactics reflect both technical sophistication and strategic intent. The group employs advanced phishing techniques to exploit vulnerabilities in widely used software, such as WinRAR. By deploying multiple malware types, Head Mare establishes a foothold in targeted systems, enabling further attacks and data collection.
Persistence techniques are another hallmark of Head Mare’s operations. By adding malware samples to the Windows Run registry key or creating scheduled tasks, the group ensures that their malware remains active and continues to transmit data to their command-and-control servers. These methods not only enhance the group’s operational longevity but also contribute to the ongoing disruption.
Detection evasion is a critical component of Head Mare’s strategy. The group disguises its malware as legitimate software, using deceptive filenames to bypass traditional security measures. This approach allows them to maintain a low profile while exerting a significant influence over compromised systems.
Command and Control Infrastructure and Credential Theft
Head Mare utilizes the Sliver framework for managing compromised systems, demonstrating a high level of sophistication in its cyber operations. Sliver enables the group to execute commands, manage connections, and navigate network restrictions effectively. By disguising its Sliver implants and using VPS/VDS servers, Head Mare ensures that its command-and-control infrastructure remains resilient and challenging to dismantle.
Credential theft is another crucial aspect of Head Mare’s strategy. Tools like Mimikatz and XenArmor All-In-One Password Recovery Pro3 facilitate the extraction of credentials from compromised systems. This capability allows Head Mare to escalate their access and maintain control over targeted networks, amplifying their disruptive impact.
Head Mare’s use of ransomware, including LockBit and Babuk, highlights their intent to cause maximum disruption. LockBit targets Windows systems, while Babuk is designed for ESXi servers. The encryption of files and the demand for ransoms serve both financial and operational purposes. By employing multiple ransomware variants and encrypting files twice, Head Mare increases the complexity of recovery and intensifies the pressure on victims to comply with their demands.
Conclusion
Head Mare’s cyber operations illustrate the evolving nature of cyber threats and their intersection with geopolitics. By targeting organizations in Russia and Belarus with sophisticated phishing and ransomware attacks, the group leverages its technical capabilities to influence political outcomes and create disruption.
Head Mare’s operations are a reflection of the broader geopolitical dynamics at play, with their cyber tactics serving as a means to exert political pressure and shape public perceptions. As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues to unfold, the role of cyber actors like Head Mare will likely remain an influential factor in international relations and security.
Recommendations and Mitigation
To counteract the threats posed by Head Mare and similar actors, organizations should implement the following best practices:
Continuously scan for vulnerabilities and apply patches promptly to mitigate the risk of exploitation.
Maintain encrypted backups in isolated locations to safeguard against ransomware attacks.
Use EDR solutions to detect and respond to malicious activities in real time.
Educate employees on recognizing and avoiding phishing attempts and other cyber threats.
Keep systems and software up to date with the latest security patches to reduce vulnerabilities.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Indicator
Type of Indicator
Comments
201F8DD57BCE6FD70A0E1242B07A17F489C5F873278475AF2EAF82A751C24FA8
SHA-256
NA
9F5B780C3BD739920716397547A8C0E152F51976229836E7442CF7F83ACFDC69
SHA-256
NA
08DC76D561BA2F707DA534C455495A13B52F65427636C771D445DE9B10293470
SHA-256
NA
6A889F52AF3D94E3F340AFE63615AF4176AB9B0B248490274B10F96BA4EDB263
SHA-256
NA
33786D781D9C492E17C56DC5FAE5350B94E9722830D697C3CBD74098EA891E5A
SHA-256
NA
5D924A9AB2774120C4D45A386272287997FD7E6708BE47FB93A4CAD271F32A03
SHA-256
NA
9B005340E716C6812A12396BCD4624B8CFB06835F88479FA6CFDE6861015C9E0
SHA-256
NA
5A3C5C165D0070304FE2D2A5371F5F6FDD1B5C964EA4F9D41A672382991499C9
SHA-256
NA
DC3E4A549E3B95614DEE580F73A63D75272D0FBA8CA1AD6E93D99E44B9F95CAA
SHA-256
NA
053BA35452EE2EA5DCA9DF9E337A3F307374462077A731E53E6CC62EB82517BD
SHA-256
NA
2F9B3C29ABD674ED8C3411268C35E96B4F5A30FABE1AE2E8765A82291DB8F921
SHA-256
NA
015A6855E016E07EE1525BFB6510050443AD5482039143F4986C0E2AB8638343
SHA-256
NA
9D056138CFB8FF80B0AA53F187D5A576705BD7954D36066EBBBF34A44326C546
SHA-256
NA
22898920DF011F48F81E27546FECE06A4D84BCE9CDE9F8099AA6A067513191F3
SHA-256
NA
2F1EE997A75F17303ACC1D5A796C26F939EB63871271F0AD9761CDBD592E7569
SHA-256
NA
AF5A650BF2B3A211C39DCDCAB5F6A5E0F3AF72E25252E6C0A66595F4B4377F0F
SHA-256
NA
9E9FABBA5790D4843D2E5B027BA7AF148B9F6E7FCDE3FB6BDDC661DBA9CCB836
SHA-256
NA
B8447EF3F429DAE0AC69C38C18E8BDBFD82170E396200579B6B0EFF4C8B9A984
SHA-256
NA
92804FAAAB2175DC501D73E814663058C78C0A042675A8937266357BCFB96C50
SHA-256
NA
664B68F2D9F553CC1ACFB370BCFA2CCF5DE78A11697365CF8646704646E89A38
SHA-256
NA
311EDF744C2E90D7BFC550C893478F43D1D7977694D5DCECF219795F3EB99B86
SHA-256
NA
4C218953296131D0A8E67D70AEEA8FA5AE04FD52F43F8F917145F2EE19F30271
SHA-256
NA
2D3DB0FF10EDD28EE75B7CF39FCF42E9DD51A6867EB5962E8DC1A51D6A5BAC50
SHA-256
NA
DC47D49D63737D12D92FBC74907CD3277739C6C4F00AAA7C7EB561E7342ED65E
SHA-256
NA
EDA18761F3F6822C13CD7BEAE5AF2ED77A9B4F1DC7A71DF6AB715E7949B8C78B
SHA-256
NA
188.127.237[.]46
IP
NA
45.87.246[.]169
IP
NA
45.87.245[.]30
IP
NA
185.80.91[.]107
IP
NA
188.127.227[.]201
IP
NA
5.252.176[.]47
IP
NA
45.11.27[.]232
IP
NA
188.127.237[.]46/winlog.exe
URL
NA
188.127.237[.]46/servicedll.exe
URL
NA
194.87.210[.]134/gringo/splhost.exe
URL
NA
194.87.210[.]134/gringo/srvhost.exe
URL
NA
94.131.113[.]79/splhost.exe
URL
NA
94.131.113[.]79/resolver.exe
URL
NA
45.156.21[.]178/dlldriver.exe
URL
NA
5.252.176[.]77/ngrok.exe
URL
NA
5.252.176[.]77/sherlock.ps1
URL
NA
5.252.176[.]77/sysm.elf
URL
NA
5.252.176[.]77/servicedll.rar
URL
NA
5.252.176[.]77/reverse.exe
URL
NA
5.252.176[.]77/soft_knitting.exe
URL
NA
5.252.176[.]77/legislative_cousin.exe
URL
NA
5.252.176[.]77/2000×2000.php
URL
NA
Sources:
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